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PROJECT GEMINI 
A TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
INTRODUCTION 
Project Gemini was begun i n  November 1961 by the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration as a follow-on program t o  Project Mercury, NASA's 
first manned space flight program. "he Gemini program was concluded ahead 
of schedule and below ant ic ipated  costs   in  November 1966 a f t e r  the successful 
flights of two unmanned and ten manned spacecraft. The McDonnell Company was 
the prime contractor for both Wrcury and Gemini. 
The Mercury program, i n  which the last of s i x  manned space flights was 
made i n  May 1963 demonstrated t h a t  spacecraft could be launched on precise 
schedules, and could safely orbit the earth, re-enter, and land. Gemini 
showed t h a t  man could survive long periods in  space and that spacecraft could 
rendezvous and dock with a target vehicle  in space and could use the ta rge t  
vehicle's propulsion system t o  achieve a new orbit. 
Thus, Gemini achieved a l l  i ts  goals (Table 1) t o  pave the way f o r  the 
Apollo flights and for  other  space programs, such as the A l r  Force Manned 
Orbiting Laboratory. 
MODULAR DESIGN CONCEPT 
Gemini's modular system design, which replaced Mercury's stacked system 
concept, simplified construction, testing, and operation of the spacecraft. 
Modular design permitted v i r tua l ly  independent design, qualification, and 
system checkout. Rel iabi l i ty  analysis  was possible without the complications 
of interacting  influences of associated systems. 
Spacecraft 7/6 mission, hailed as one of the high points of the program, 
w a s  made possible because launch crews w e r e  able, despite a t i g h t  time 
schedule, t o  remove the rendezvous and recovery section (R & R) of Spacecraft 7 
and modify it for tracking by Spacecraft 6 .  Another example of the effective- 
ness of the modular design was the Gemini X I 1  mission which was t o t a l l y  
changed and replanned  within two weeks. 
Gemini system design was simplified by extensive use of manual sequencing 
and systems management, u t i l i z ing  the astronaut ' e  a b i l i t y   t o  disgnoae failures 
and t o  take corre'ctive action. 
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TABLE 1 GEMINI SPACECRAFT FLIGHT HISTORY 
TYPE LAUNCHED LAUNCHED 
GEMINI VI1 DEMONSTRATED STRUCTURAL 3 APR. 1964 
MISSION MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS 
INTEGRITY. 
19 JAN. 1965 DEMONSTRATED HEAT PROTECTION 
AND S'YSTEMS PERFORMANCE. 
23 MAR"1965 DEMONSTRATED MANNED QUALIFICA- 
TIONS OF THE GEMINI SPACECRAFT. 
3 JUNE 1965 GEMINI Ix DEMONSTRATED EVA AND SYSTEMS 
PERFORMANCE FOR 4 DAYS IN 
SPACE. 
21 AUG. 1965 DEMONSTRATED LONG-DURATION 
FLIGHT, RENDEZVOUS RADAR 
CAPABILITY, AND RENDEZVOUS 
MANEUVERS. 
GEMINI X 
25 OCT. 1965 DEMONSTRATED DUAL COUNTDOWN 
PROCEDURES (GATV AND GLV- 
SPACECRAFT), FLIGHT PERFORM- 
ANCE OF TLV AND FLIGHT READI- 
NESS OF GATV SECONDARY PRO- 
CELED AFTER GATV FAILED  TO GEMINI XI 
ACHIEVE ORBIT. 
PULSION SYSTEM. MISSION CAN- 
1 DEC. 1965 DEMONSTRATED 2-WEEK FLIGHT AND 
STATION KEEPING WITH GLV STAGE 
11; EVALUATED "SHIRT SLEEVE" 
ENVIRONMENT; ACTED AS RENDEZ- 
VOUS TARGET FOR SPACECRAF.T 6; 
ANDDEMONSTRATEDCONTROLLED 
GEMINI x11 
PLANNED LANDING POINT. 
U.E-ENTRY WITHIN 7 MILES OF 
15 DEC. 1965 DEMONSTRATED ON-TIME LAUNCH 
PROCEDURES, CLOSED-LOOP r 
MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS 
DEMONSTRATED RENDEZVOUS AND 
DOCKING WITH GATV, CONTROLLED 
LANDING, EMERGENCY RECOVERY., 
MULTIPLE RESTART OF GATV 
IN ORBIT. SPACECRAFT MISSION 
TERMINATED EARLY DUE TO 
ELECTRICAL SHORT IN CONTROL 
SYSTEM. 
DEMONSTRATEDTHREE RENDEZVOUS 
TECHNIQUES. EVALUATED  EVA WITH 
DETAILED WORK TASKS. DEMONSTRATED 
PRECISION LANDING CAPABILITY. 
DEMONSTRATED DUAL RENDEZVOUS 
USING GATV PROPULSION FOR 
REMOVAL OF EXPERIMENT PACKAGE 
DOCKED MANEUVERS. DEMONSTRATED 
FROM PASSIVE TARGET  VEHICLE DURING 
EVA. EVALUATED FEASIBILITY OF 
USING ONBOARD NAVIGATIONAL TECH. 
NIQUES FOR RENDEZVOUS. 
DEMONSTRATED FIRST-ORBIT REN- 
DEZVOUS AND DOCKING. EVALUATED 
EVA. DEMONSTRATED FEASIBILITY 
OF TETHERED STATION KEEPING. 
CAPABILITY. 
DEMONSTRATED AUTOMATIC RE-ENTRY 
DEMONSTRATED OPERATIONAL 
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM COMPLEX 
NOTICEABLE ASTRONAUT FATIGUE. 
(THREE SEPARATE EVA OPERATIONS 
TOTALLED ABOUT 5.5 HOURS.) 
AND LONG-DURATION EVA WITH NO 
~ 
GEMINI I UNMANNED 
64 ORBITS 
MANNED 
3 DAYS 
RENDEZVOUS 
AND DOCK 
(TERMINATEC 
IN REV. 7) 
16 MAR. 1966 
GEMINI II  UNMANNED 
;MANNED 
SUBORBITAL 
r 
' 3 ORBITS 
MANNED 
4 DAYS 
GEMINI 111 
3 JUNE 1966 GEMINI IV MANNED 
3 DAYS 
RENDEZVOUS 
AND DOCK, 
AND EVA GEMINI V 'MANNED 
8 DAYS 
MANNED 
3 DAYS 
RENDEZVOUS 
AND DOCK, 
AND EVA 
18 JULY 1966 
GEMINI VI IMANNED 
2 DAYS 
,RENDEZVOU! 
(CANCELLED 
AFTER GATV 
MANNED 
3 DAYS 
RENDEZVOUS 
AND DOCK, 
AND EVA 
12 SEP. 1966 
14 DAYS 
RENDEZVOU! 
MANNED 
4 DAYS 
RENDEZVOUS 
AND DOCK, 
AND EVA 
1 1  NOV. 1966 
7GEMINI VI-A MANNED I 
RENDEZVOUS.CAPABILITY, AND 
STATION KEEPING TECHNIQUES 
WITH SPACECRAFT 7. 
EVA - EXTRbVtHICULAR ACTIVITY 
GATV - GEMINI-AGENA TARGET VEHICLE 
GLV - GEMINI LAUNCH VEHICLE 
I I TLV - TARGET  LAUNCH VEHICLE 
Pze Gemini 
Spacecraft flew 
the 16 crewman. 
program stressed safety. As a result 'the t en  manned Gemini 
a t o t a l  of 969 hr  and 56 min without  an  injury t o  any of 
All crewmen were  recovered in  excellent  physical  condition. 
, b j o r  Spacecraft Safety Features 
Ine r t i a l  Guidance System. - me spacecraf t  iner t ia l  guidance system (IGS) 
serves a8 a back-up t o  the launch-vehicle guidance system during the launch 
phase. [-See GUIDANCE AND CONTROL SYS'PEM, page UO!.) 
Ejection Seats and Retro-rockets. - Ejection seats and retro-rockets 
provide escape modes from the launch vehicle during the prelaunch and the 
launch phases. (See ESCAPE, LANDING AND RFXOVEHY SYSTEMS, page 208 and 
Retrograde Rocket System, page 156. ) 
Secondary Oxygen Bottles. - Two secondary oxygen bo t t l e s  are provided, 
e i the r  of which w i l l  support the crew f o r  one orb i t  and re-entry, i f  the 
primary oxygen supply i s  lost .  All other flight safety components i n  the 
environmental control system (ECS) are redundant. (See ENVIRONM3NTAL CONTROL 
SYSTEM, page 157. ) 
Visual Aids. - In.the event tha t  a lo s s  of reference of the guidance 
platform should occur, the crew can control re-entry using out-the-window 
visual  aids. 
Re-entry Control System. - The re-entry control system (RCS) is  completely 
redundant. It is composed of two identical  but independent systems, e i the r  
of which can be used to  cont ro l  the vehicle through re-entry. These systems 
are sealed wi th  zero-leakage valves u n t i l  they are activated shortly before 
retrograde. (See Re-entry Control System, page 145 . ) 
Drogue Parachute. - A drogue parachute, which is  normally deployed at 
50,000 f t  a l t i tude  after re-entry, backs up the RCS f o r   s t a b i l i t y   u n t i l  the 
main parachute is deployed. (See ESCAPE, LANDING AND RECOVERY SYSTEM3, 
PaQe m.1 
Ejection Seats. - Ejection seats provide an escape mode i f  the recovery 
parachute fails t o  deploy o r  is damaged. 
BASIC OBJECTIVES 
Basic Objectives O f  Gemini And How They Were Met 
L 
Continuous Program at Minimum Cost. - To provide a continuation program 
of manned space f l ight   object ives  at minimum cost with major milestones t o  be 
3 
complete as soon as practical. Gemini was completed months ahead of the  
schedule tha t  was estimated i n  early-1963. Spacecraft 2 through 12 each was 
delivered at least a month ahead of schedule. 
Rendezvous, Docking and Maneuvering. - To rendezvous and dock with a 
second orbiting vehicle and then perform combined maneuvering. Rendezvous 
was first achieved by Spacecraf't 6; Spacecraft 8 was the  first t o  dock. 
Maneuvering in   o rb i t   u s ing   t he  Agena Target Vehicle was first achieved by 
Spacecraft  10 . 
Ung Duration Missions. - To expose two astronauts and their l i f e  support 
systems t o  long-duration missions t o  prepare for future ear th   o rb i t  and lunar 
flights. Spacecraft 5 remained i n  o r b i t  f o r  8 days and Spacecraft 7 remained 
i n   o r b i t   f o r  14 days ,  demonstrating man's capabi l i ty  in  a space environment. 
The Apollo lunar t r i p  i s  expected t o  take eight days. 
Precision Re-entry, Landing,. . e d  Recovery_. - To develop and exercise 
precision re-ehtry, landing, and recovery of manned spacecraft. From 
Gemini V I  on, all spacecraft landed within seven miles of the aiming point. 
The last five Gemini Spacecraft came  down within three miles of the target.  
A l l  landings were m a d e  i n  the ocean. However, early designs had provided fo r  
land landings, but the rate of technological development f o r  such landings 
did not keep pace with the remainder of the program so t h a t  the land landing 
capabi l i ty  for  the s p a c e c r e  was subsequently abandoned. 
Extravehicular Activity. - To undertake extravehicular activity to 
evaluate man's a b i l i t y   t o  perform t a s k s  i n  a zero g environment. Although 
EVA was not an original objective of the Gemini program, it was made possible 
by the design of personnel  hatches  with  mchanical  latches which enabled  the 
ast ronauts  to  open and close the hatches manually. Astronauts on Spacecraft 4, 
9, 10, ll, and 12 performed EVA. 
Scientific Investigations. - To u t i l i ze  the  Gemini Spacecraft as an 
experimental test platform for scientific investigations, including photog- 
raphy, biomedical experiments, communications, navigation, meteorology, etc. 
Experiments were carried on all manned Gemini Spacecraft. 
SPACECRAFT  DESCRIPTION 
The Gemini Spacecraft, designed t o  provide l i f e  support f o r  two orbit ing 
astronauts, is a 7000 l b  conical structure 18.82 f t  long and 10 f t  i n  diameter 
at i ts  base. It is composed of two maJor assemblies, a re-entry module and 
an adapter module. Both structural  bodies are a l l  metal, of stressed skin 
and semimonocoque construction. In addition, the re-entry module i s  designed 
t o  withstand the extreme heat of re-entry. The general arrangement of the 
Gemini Spacecraft i s  shown i n  Fig. 1. 
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4- SPACECRAFT I 
4 ADAPTER  MODULE -b RE-ENTRY  MODULE c 
Z 15.38 
ADAPTER 1 1  
z 68.44 
z 1d3.44 Z 173.97 
I RE-ENTRY I 
SYSTEM "I 
I I SECTION I I 
Z 236. 28  
c- I 
RENDEZVOUS - 8, RECOVERY-, 
SECTION 
RETROGRADE 
ABLATION SHIELD 
SECT ION A-A 
T Y  
SPACECRAFT/LAUNCH  VEHICLE 
MATING LINE 
FIGURE 1 SPACECRAFT GENERAL ARRANGEMENT 
BY 
The  methods of construction and the  materials  used  exemplify  the  care 
shown  by  McDonnell  engineers to guarantee  high  strength-to-weight  ratios.  The 
require&nt of heat  resistance  led to the  choice of titanium  and  magnesium as 
the  principal  metals  used  in  spacecraft  fabrication.  High-strength  titanium 
bolts  (Ti-6A1-4V) were used  extensively;  titanium was also used  for  the rings, 
stringers,  interior  skin,  and  bulkheads of the  re-entry  module.  Aluminum was 
used  inside  the  cabin  where  temperatures  are not structurally  critical. 
Stringers and longerons  were  spaced  around  the  circumference of the shell 
to carry nearly all axial and  bending loads and to stiffen  the  framework. To 
protect  against  distortion  to  large, thin gauge  panels,  chemical  milling 
rather than mechanical milling was employed. 
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For ease in  ident i fy ing  par t icu lar  areas, the spacecraft  is cut by two 
reference planes, one running longitudinally from adapter  to  nose, the other 
at r igh t  angles t o   t h i s  one. 
Inoking forward from t h e  end of the adapter, one may divide a section of 
the spacecraft  into four quadrants,  thus creating four cardinal  points  - 
!E (Top Y)  and BY (bottom Y) f o r   t h e  Y axis,  and FU ( r igh t  X) and LX ( l e f t  X) 
f o r  t h e  X axis. A part icular  locat ion on the c i r c l e  i s  measured in degrees 
from any one of these points. (Ref Fig. 3) 
The Z s ta t ion  locat ions are measured longitudinally from the r ea r  of the 
spacecraft (adapter) and increase in magnitude as one approaches the nose. 
For example, the separation point between the re-entry module and the adapter 
i s  s ta t ion  Z 102.00 (in. ); the  nose of the spacecraft is s t a t ion  2 239.53 
(2 239.28 plus 0.25 in. of ablat ive material). 
Re-entry Module 
The re-entry module, shown i n  Fig. 2, is composed of three primary sec- 
tions, the cabin, the re-entry control system (RCS),  and the rendezvous and 
recovery (R & R) sections. In addition, a heat shield is at tached to  the af t  
end of the cabin section, a nose f a i r ing  i s  f i t t ed  t o   t h e  forward end of the 
rendezvous and recovery section, and a horizon sensor fairing i s  attached on 
the  l e f t  side at the mating point of the cabin and the re-entry control 
system. 
The R & R section is 47.31 in. long including the nose fair ing.  The 
re-entry control system section i s  18.00 in. and the cabin section is 
70.53 in. long, at the outer edge of the  heat shield. 
Rendezvous and Recovery Section. - This section houses the rendezvous 
radar equipment and the drogue, p i lo t ,  and main parachutes. The forward 
portion of the R & R section is  a truncated cone, while the back portion is  
cylindrical .  When the spacecraft  was t o  dock with the  Agena Target Vehicle, 
the R & R section also comprised three docking latch receptacles,  a Fiberglas 
bumper, and a docking bar. A nose f a i r ing  made of Fiberglas-reinforced 
plastic laminate provides thermal protection for the sensi t ive radar equipment 
during the i n i t i a l  p o r t i o n s  of powered f l igh t .  This  fa i r ing  is  je t t isoned 
approximately 45 sec after igni t ion of t he  second stage engine of the launch 
vehicle by means of a short-time impulse pyrotechnic actuator. The R & R 
section is  at tached  to   the  re-entry  control  system section by 24 frangible 
bolts.  These b o l t s  are tension separated during re-entry by an explosive 
s t r i p  of mild detonating fuse (MDF) after deployment of the p i l o t  chute. 
Re-entry Control System Sectiog. - The RCS section is  contained between 
the  R & R section and the cabin section. This cylindrical section houses 
re-entry control system fuel and oxidizer tanks, and thrust chamber assemblies. 
I n  addi t ion   to  accommodating the re-entry control system, which controls the 
spacecraft  after the o rb i t   a t t i t ude  and maneuver system ( O W )  has been 
je t t isoned,  the RCS section also absorbs the loads induced by the deployment 
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FIGURE 2 RE-ENTRY MODULE STRUCTURE 
of the main parachute. The latter is at tached to  the parachute adapter 
assembly, which is ins ta l led  on the  forward face of the RCS section. 
I 
Cabin Section. - The cabin section lies between the RCS section and the 
adapter assembly. It i s  a truncated cone, 38.66 in.  in  diameter at the for- 
ward end and 90.00 in. i n  diameter at the aft end (with the heat shield 
attached). It consists of an in te rna l  pressure vessel, which is the crew 
s t a t ion   fo r  the two astronauts and equipment bays located outside the pressure 
vessel. The heat shield, a major s t ruc tura l  component of the cabin, i s  
discussed in Heat Protection, page 13. 
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A. Internal  Pressure Vessel. - The pressure vessel, in  add i t ion  to  housing 
the  Gemini crew, contains electrical and l i fe  support equipment and various 
experimental devices. Accessible volume in  . t he  crew compartment (with the 
crew aboard) is approximately 55 cu f't . 
The pressure vessel  consists of a fusion-welded titanium frame t o  
which are attached side panels, a hatch sill, and a fore and aft bulkhead. 
The side panels and pressure bulkheads are double thickness, thin-sheet tita- 
nium (0.01 in.), with the outer sheet beaded for   s t i f fness .  
In addi t ion  to   fusion welding, resistance spot and seam welding are 
employed extensively throughout the pressure  vessel   to reduce the poss ib i l i ty  
of leakage. Individual titanium fusion weldments are made under a controlled 
inert  gas atmosphere, then  s t ra in   re l ieved  to   obtain a f u l l y  s t ruc tura l  weld. 
Two hatches are hinged to the hatch s i l l  f o r   p i l o t  ingress and egress. 
llhe design of the pressure vessel not only provides an adequate crew 
station  but also gives  the pressure vessel  a proper water f lotat ion  a t t i tude.  
Structural   design  cri teria  for  the  pressure  vessel   require it t o  withstand an 
ultimate burst pressure of 12 p s i  and an ultimate collapsing pressure of 
three  psi. 
!Two hatches, contoured t o  the shape of the cabin exterior, are symmet- 
r i c a l l y  spaced on the top side of the  pressure vessel. Each hatch, hinged on 
the outboard side, is manually operated by means of a handle and a mechanical 
latching mechanism. I n  an emergency, the  hatches can be opened i n  a three- 
sequence operation employing pyrotechnic actuators. The actuators simulta- 
neously unlock and open the latches, open the hatches, and supply hot gases 
t o  igni te  the eject ion seat rocket catapults. 
An external hatch linkage fitting allows a recovery hatch handle t o  be 
inser ted  to  open the hatches from t h e  outside. The recovery hatch handle is 
stowed on the main parachute adapter assembly, located on the forward face of 
the RCS section. A hatch curtain i s  stowed along the hinge of each hatch. 
When the hatches are opened after a water landing, the curtains help keep 
water out of the cabin. 
Each hatch incorporates a window, which contains three panes of glass, 
with an air  space between each pane. The  command astronaut's window has two 
outer panes of 96% s i l i c a   g l a s s  and an inner pane of tempered aluminosilicate 
glass. For improved clarity while carrying out optical experiments, the inner 
pane of the  copi lot ' s  window is  a 964 sil ica  panel  with an optical  transmis- 
sion capability of more than 99$. The thickness of t h i s  pane has been 
increased from 0.22 t o  0.38 in .  to  make it as strong as the aluminosilicate 
glass. Each pane, with the exception of the outer pane, is coated t o  reduce 
reflection, glare, and ultraviolet  radiation. 
The personnel access hatches are of skin and beam construction. Sili- 
con rubber seals around each hatch s i l l  and around the two inner panes of 
glass prevent the leakage of cabin pressure. 
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B. Equipment Bays - IPhree major equipment bays, designed t o  contain a 
var ie ty  of e lec t r i ca l  and electronic equipment, are outside the  cabin pressure 
vessel. Two of these bays are outboard of the side panels and one bay is 
beneath the pressure vessel floor.  Unlike the Mercury Spacecraft, which had 
nearly all i ts  systems inside the pressure shell ,  the Gemini Spacecraft has 
most of i ts  system components i n  these unpressurized equipment bays. These 
components either require no pressurization  or are internally pressurized. 
Since equipaent is normally only one layer deep within the compartments, 
launch crews can reiuove an access door, quickly p d 1  out a malfunctioning unit, 
i n se r t  a new one, r e i n s t a l l  the access door, and proceed wi th  the launch. 
Two main landing gear wells are located below the side equipment bays. 
Originally these wells were intended t o  house equipment f o r  ground landings; 
however, t h i s  requirement was never put into practice. Consequently, the 
wells are used t o  house additional experiment equipment on some spacecraft; on 
other missions the wells carry  ballast   or.remain empty. 
Two etructural doors are provided on each side of the cabin t o  a l l o w  
access t o  the side equipment bays. The two main landing gear wells a lso have 
doors. On the bottom of the cabin, between the landing gear doors, two 
additional access doors are instal led.  The forward door allows access t o  the 
lower equipment compartment and the aft door provides access t o  the  environ- 
mental  control system (ECS) compartment . 
C. Hoist b o p  - A spring-loaded hoist loop, located near the heat shield 
between the hatch openings, is erected after landing t o  engage a hoisting 
hook f o r  spacecraft retrieval. 
Adapter Module 
The adapter module extends from the end of the re-entry module heat 
sh ie ld  to  the spacecraft launch vehicle mating line. A truncated cone, t he  
adapter assembly consists of three sections: the retrograde section, the 
equipment section, and the launch-vehicle mating section. The en t i re  assembly 
is g0.00 in. long with a forward diameter of 88.30 in. and an aft diameter of 
120.00 in. It contains the systems and equipment needed on long-duration 
o rb i t a l  flights and provides the interface between the spacecraft and the 
launch vehicle. The basic adapter structure is illustrated i n  Fig. 3 and 4. 
The adapter structure consists of circumferential aluminum rings, 
extruded magnesium a l l o y  stringers, and a magnesium skin. The free end of 
the T-shaped s t r ingers  is a tube. Liquid  coolant flows through t h i s  tube and 
t ransfers   hea t   to  the adapter skin for   rad ia t ion   in to  space. 
The adapter i s  joined to the  re-entry module by three titanium retaining 
straps external t o  the  s t ructure  of both the re-entry module and the adapter 
section. Pyrotechnic separation rings are provided between the retrograde and 
the equipaent Sections, and between the equipment and the launch-vehicle 
-mating sections. 
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Retrograde Section. - A t  the smal end of the adapter module i s  the 
retrograde section, 30 in. i n  length. The primary function of the retrograde 
section i s  t o  support the four retrograde rockets and s i x  of the O M  thrust  
chamber assemblies. To support the retrograde rockets, aluminum I-beams are 
assembled as a cruciform, with one retrograde rocket mounted i n  each quadrant. 
P r io r   t o   r e t ro f i r e  a flexible linear-shaped charge cuts the adapter, 
separating the equipment from the retrograde section. After r e t ro f i r e  the 
three titanium retaining straps are cut by three flexible linear-shaped 
charges, severing the re-entry module from the retrograde section. These 
retaining  straps are located to coincide with wire bundles and f lu id   l ines ,  
which are also cut by the shaped charges, thus minimizing the number of 
charges required. 
Equipment Section. - The equipment section, which comprises the  larger  
end of the adapter module, provides the space and the at tach  points   for   four  
major system modules, plus individual components. The four principal modules 
mounted i n  the equipnent section are the orb i t   a t t i tude  and maneuvering sys- 
tem ( O W )  propellant tanks, the fue l  ce l l  (or  ba t te ry)  modue, the environ- 
mental control system (ECS) primary oxygen supply, and the electronics module. 
These four modules are independent of one another, but their support panels 
and an access door combine t o  form a blast shield. This shield.protects  the 
(explosion-causing) heat i f  it is necessary t o  f i re  the retro-rockets in an 
abort . 
, equipment section and the dome of the T i t a n  launch vehicle from excessive 
In addi t ion to  the four principal equipment modules, t h i s  section also 
houses the coolant supply, the water storage tanks, and ten O M  thrust  
chamber assemblies. A gold deposited Fiberglas temperature control cover over 
the open end of the adapter protects the equipment from solar radiation after 
separation from the launch vehicle. 
Mating Section. - The spacecraft is mated t o  the Titan I1 launch vehicle 
by a forged and machined aluminum al loy ring, 120 in. in diameter. This ring, 
approximately three in. wide, is joined t o  the launch vehicle mating ring by" 
20 bolts. The launch vehicle mating ring has four index mapks, spaced at 
90 degree intervals  (a t  TY, BY, RX, and IX of the adapter), to insure proper 
alignment between the spacecraft and the launch vehicle. A flexible l inear-  
shaped charge i s  fired t o  sever the adapter section approximately 1-1/2 in. 
above the spacecraft/launch vehicle mating point. 
Heat Protection 
During re-entry the spacecraft f l ies with the heat shield forward. This 
protects  the forebody of the re-entry module from excessive heat flux during 
t h i s  c r i t i c a l  mode. The rest of the Spacecraft 'body is protected by two kinds 
of heat resistant shingles, Rene 41 and beryllium. 
I .  
Heat Shield. - The heat shield i s  a dish-shaped s t ructure  that  forms the  
large end of the re-entry module. The heat shield is an ablative device which 
protects the re-entry assembly from the extreme heat of re-entry into the 
ear th 's  atmosphere. It is at tached to  the aft end of the cabin section by 
eighteen 0.25-in.-diameter bolts.  Ninety inches i n  diameter, the shield has 
a spherical radius of 144 inches. 
The ablative substance of the Gemini heat shield is a paste-like material 
which hardens in standard atmosphere after being poured in to  a honeycomb form. 
Starting with a load-carrying Fiberglas sandwich structure consisting of 
two 5-ply faceplates of resin-impregnated glass cloth separated by an 0.65 in.  
thick Fiberglas honeycomb core, an additional Fiberglas honeycomb is  bonded 
t o  the convex side of the sandwich and f i l l ed  wi th  Dow-Corning DC-325 sil icone 
elastomer. The extreme edge of the heat shield is  a circular Fiberite ring. 
It is  interest ing to  note  t h a t  the  basic ablative substance of the heat shield, 
developed by the McDonneU Company, i s  now being produced for  commercial 
applications. 
Heat Resistant Shingles. - These overlapping Rene 41 and beryllium 
shingles, which provide both aerodynamic and heat protection, also hold shaped 
pads of flexible insulation in place. The beaded (corrugated) Rene 41 shingles 
(0.016 in. thickness) on the sides of the cabin are composed of 535 nickel, 1s chromium, 115 cobalt, 9.754 molybdenum, 3.154 titanium, 1.65 aluminum, 
0.095 carbon, 0.0054 boron, and less than 2.755 iron. The shingles are 
iden t i ca l   i n  composition and manufacturing technique to   those used on Mercury. 
Extra large holes at the attachment bolts allow the shingles t o  expand during 
aerodynamic and solar heating. Oversized washers cover these holes  to  minimize 
heat and air penetration. 
The R & R and RCS section surfaces are unbeaded shingles of cross-rolled 
beryllium. "he pla te  i s  supplied to McDonnell in several sheet sizes ranging 
in thickness from 0.300 in .  to  0.555 in. Shingles are finished by McDonnell 
t o  thicknesses, depending on spacecraft location, of 0.090 in. t o  0.280 in. 
The shingles are at tached  to  the spacecraft by beryllium retainers fabricated 
from similar plates. 
Beryllium shingles used on Project  &rcury were fabricated from hot- 
pressed beryllium blocks. The requirements for Gemini rendezvous f l i g h t s  
were almost twice the strength and impact resistance available with hot- 
pressed beryllium blocks and t h i s  was provided by the  cross-rolling  technique. 
Under the beryllium shingles are Thermoflex RF blankets  held  in  place by 
a titanium mesh attached to  the  s t r ingers .  The outer surfaces of the rings 
and s t r ingers  are insulated with 0.0015 in. Inconel-foil-encased Min-K i n  
Fiberglas channels. 
Both Rene 41 and beryllium shingles are coated on the  outer  surface  with 
a blue-black ceramic paint, t o  permit high thermal radiation from the space- 
craft. The inner surface of the beryllium shingles has a very thin gold coat- 
ing to  a t tenuate  thermal radiat ion into the spacecraft. The outer surface of 
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the adapter module is  coated with white ceramic paint and the inner surface 
is covered with aluminum f o i l  to  reduce emissivity. The heat protection 
devices are pictured in  Fig. 5. 
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Failure Summary And Analysis 
No s t ruc tura l  failures occurred during development or   qua l i f ica t ion  
testing. However, a change was incorporated i n  Spacecraft 6 and up as the 
result of an anomaly on Gemini IV in  the hatch manual control mechanism. This 
mechanism change is i l l u s t r a t ed  in  Fig. 6. The pinion drive shaft, which 
works the hatch latch linkages when the manual handle is operated, is driven 
by engagement of drive and gain pawls i n  a ratchet configuration. The.auto- 
matic return of drive and gain pawls failed to  operate  posit ively due t o  
frictional effects.  This necessitated manual operation of the  se lec tor  in  
Gemini IV. The efficiency of this mechanism has been greatly increased by 
reducing f r i c t iona l   e f f ec t s  and by increasing the return mechanical advantage 
by a factor  of 10. 
Furthemore, a sawtooth "gain hold" device is now ins ta l led  on the hatch 
s i l l  f o r  use w i t h t h e  hatch closing device, t o  assist i n  holding the hatch 
closed against seal pressure just  prior to the latching operation. 
The redesigned manual control mechanism w a s  sa t i s fac tor i ly  endurance 
tested i n  temperature and pressure environments f o r  over 1000 cycles. 
Also, after re-entry of Spacecraft No. 2 localized heating was apparent 
i n  one area. Two smal holes were burned i n  the shingles due to air flow 
around one of the umbilical fairings. To reduce localized heating the fa i r ing  
was reconfigured, the affected shingles were increased in hhickness t o  .025 in. 
and the angle of attack was lowered. 
STRUCTURAL QUALIFICATION !EST PROGRAM 
Most of the major Gemini s t ruc tura l  and s t ruc tura l  aynamic tests were 
performed between July 1963 and April 1965 on s t a t i c  No. 3 and s t a t i c  No. 4 
test a r t ic les .  Other representative static test  a r t i c l e s  were used t o  test 
the rendezvous and recovery section (R & R) and re-entry control system (RCS) 
section. 
Structural  Test Vehicles And Testing 
Test Vehicles. - In addition t o  building twelve flight a r t i c l e s  and seven 
target  docking adapters, McDonnell was responsible for the  manufacture of six 
boilerplate spacecraft  and four s ta t ic  a r t ic les ,  p lus  s ta t ic  adapters  and 
miscellaneous test  vehicles. A brief description of these major test  vehicles 
and their  history i s  included here. 
A. Boilerplate Re-entry Vehicles : 
1. Boilerplate No. 1 - Boilerplate No. 1 was a s t e e l  mock-up of the 
re-entry module which was used primarily i n  parachute development testing. 
Ballast was installed to simulate spacecraft  weight and cg. After fabrication 
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I -  
at the  McDonnell plant,  the uni t  was shipped t o  Northrop-Ventura on 31 July 
1962 and was thereaf ter  ass igned to  North American Aviation for testing. The 
uni t  was destroyed on 30 July 1963 while undergoing drop t e s t s  at El Centro, 
California. 
2. Boilerplate No. 2 - Boilerplate No. 2 was a welded steel mock-up 
of the pressurized cabin corresponding closely t o   t h e  flight a r t i c l e   i n  shape 
and volume. It was used for functional evaluations of the gaseous oxygen 
components of the environmental control system (ECS) under simulated mission 
environments; t he   e f f ec t s  of solar radiat ion and equipment heat exchange were 
especial ly  s ignif icant .  A complete ECS and re la ted  crew stat ion controls  were 
instal led.  The ECS w a s  instrumented t o  record and evaluate system performance 
during normal  and secondary modes of operation. Test conditions simulated 
regular mission phases as well as f a i lu re s  and other abnormal operations 
including crewman "ejection" during the  prelaunch and the re-entry modes. 
Boilerplate No. 2, with i ts  complete ECS instal led,  was first used 
in  eva lua t ion  tes t ing  in  the  McDonnell laboratory. On 9 April 1963, it was 
shipped t o  MSC, Houston, fo r  fu r the r  tests a t  that site. 
3. Boilerplate No. 3 - Boilerplate No. 3 was a welded s t e e l  mock-up 
of the re-entry module, aerodynemically similar t o  t h e  f l i g h t  a r t i c l e .  The 
boi lerplate  was u t i l i zed  fo r  e j ec t ion  sea t  development s led runs. It 
contained t h e  two seats,  t he  seat  rails, and the seat  actuat ing mechanisms. 
A removable f a i r ing  simulated the adapter retrograde section. Boilerplate 
hatches were of the correct shape, but were f ixed  in  the open posit ion because 
no hatch sequencing tests were intended. 
Boilerplate No. 3 was shipped t o  Weber Ai rc ra f t  i n  July 1962. The 
first sled drag run took place on 9 November 1962, when extensive damage t o  
the vehicle occurred due t o   t h e   f a i l u r e  of one of the pusher sled rockets. 
The uni t  was subsequently repaired and u t i l i z e d   i n  further sled tes t ing.  
4. Boilerplate No. 3 A  - Boilerplate No. 3 A  had essent ia l ly  the  same 
structure  as No. 3, modified by the  in s t a l l a t ion  of a production large pressure 
bulkhead, a seat rail torque box, two hatch sills, two side panels, two 
"light" hatches, and two f l i ppe r  doors. 
The uni t  was subjected t o  hatch firing functional tests a t  the 
McDonnell l abora tory  pr ior  to  de l ivery  to  Weber Aircraft. A t  Weber it under- 
went escape system qualification tests, comprising both SOPE (simulated off-  
the-pad ejection) tests and sled runs. Complete pyrotechnic system tests and 
sequencing were included in the program. These t;ests were performed at Weber 
during the greater  par t  of 1964 and continued in to   t he  first months of 1965. 
5. Boilerplate No. 4 - Boilerplate No. 4 was bui l t  by Weber Aircraft  
and del ivered to  McDonnell on 21 October 1963. O f  aluminum skin and s t r inger  
construction, it was designed to  car ry  ballast ad jus ted  to  the weight, cg and 
moment of i n e r t i a  of a production spacecraft. The or ig ina l  in ten t  was t o  
u t i l i z e  t h i s  boi lerplate  in  evaluat ing the skid landing gear. These tests 
were deleked, however, when the  ground landing mode was scrubbed f o r  the 
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en t i r e  Gemini program. Instead, boilerplate No. 4 was used i n  a series of 
drop tests at the McDonnell fac i l i ty .  
6 .  Boilerplate No. 5 - A welded steel mock-up of the re-entry module, 
boilerplate No. 5 was designed f o r  use i n   t h e  Gemini parachute development 
program. It contained provisions for ballast t o  simulate spacecraft weight 
and cg. The unit was shipped t o  Northrop-Ventura on 31 August 1962, and 
employed i n  parachute testing. Subsequent t o  these tests, boi lerplate  No. 5 
was refurbished and converted into static a r t i c l e  No. 4A (18 September lw), 
i n  which capacity it was-utilized  in  high-altitude-drogue  qualification tests 
along with i ts  counterpar t ,  s ta t ic  ar t ic le  No. 7. 
B. Sta t i c  Re-entry Vehicles: 
1. Sta t ic  No. 1 - Static a r t i c l e  No. 1 was cancelled by agreement 
between McDonnell and the  NASA; however, i t s  re-entry module and adapter were 
reassigned t o  Spacecraft 3A. 
2. Sta t ic  No. 2 - Static No. 2 was intended t o  be a manned re-entry 
module designed specifically for qualifying the NAA Paraglider. The uni t  was  
cancelled when the paraglider was deleted from the program. 
3. Sta t ic  No. 3 - Static a r t i c l e  No. 3 consisted of a complete re-entry 
module of the early paraglider configuration and an adapter module. The 
principal difference between it and the standard re-entry vehicle was the 
addition of the paraglider torque box structure, located between the hatches. 
(This torque box could accommodate parachute fi t t ings,  enabling the vehicle 
t o  be employed i n   e i t h e r  the  paraglider or the parachute configuration.) The 
uni t  was delivered to the NASA on 15 May 1963. S t a t i c  t e s t s  f o r  t h i s  vehicle 
included landing conditions, parachute support structure tests, launch, abort, 
re-entry and heat shield back-up s t ructure  tes ts .  For the launch and abort 
t e s t s  the k c t i n  No. 2 adapter w a s  mated to the re-entry module. Following 
the completion of i ts  tes t  program, s t a t i c   a r t i c l e  No. 3 was reassigned t o  
the Manned Orbital Laboratory (MOL) program for   tes t ing.  
4. Static No. 4 - Sta t ic  art icle No. 4 has the same structural config- 
uration as No. 3 except that in  addi t ion it contained dummy equipment t o  
simulate the mass and cg of the flight ar t ic le .  This vehicle was designed t o  
undergo dynamic response tests, t e s t s  of the seat and hatch back-up structure, 
and ultimate pressurization tests. In addition, hoist loop and support tests 
and water drop tests were performed. The uni t  was delivered on 18 April 1963. 
mer  completion of the test  program, this vehicle was reassigned t o  the 
MOL program. 
5. Static No. 5 - S t a t i c  a r t i c l e  No. 5 had a complete re-entry vehicle 
structure (i.e., no adapter) and was designed for  f lo ta t ion  stability tests 
and as an egress trainer.  All equpment exterior to the pressure vessel and 
c r i t i c a l   t o   f l o t a t i o n  was carefully simulated t o  assure the .proper water 
flotation att i tude.  In addition, ballast was ins t a l l ed  to  simulate the 
correct weight and cg as incorporated into the Spacecraft 3 configuration, 
the program's first manned vehicle. 
Ihe water f lo t a t ion  tests were successiully completed at the 
McDonnell f a c i l i t y  and the un i t  was subsequently modified to   t he  egress 
trainer configuration. %is modification included the installation of those 
systems normally operative at splashdown - i.e., a partial ECS and cop3plltnlca- 
t i ons  system. All inoperative equipment ex te r io r  t o  the pressure vessel wa8 
simulated i n  t h i s  configuration; ballast t o  sinailate correct weight and cg 
was also provided. The pressure vessel contained dummy eJection seats, a 
partially operative instrument panel and operating recovery equipment. Provi- 
s ions   for  the ins t a l l a t ion  of landing gear were included, although the gear 
was never installed. A t  the completion of the  modification, the uni t  was 
delivered  to the NASA f o r  egress training. 
6. S t a t i c  No. 6 - Sta t i c  No. 6 was t o  have been a back-up vehicle  to  
s t a t i c  No. 2, but was cancelled with deletion of the paraglider. 
7. Static No. 7 - S t a t i c   a r t i c l e  No. 7 consisted of a boilerplate  
pressure  vessel and heat shield and a production RCS section and an R & R 
section. Since the function of t h i s  uni t  was to qualify the parachute 
recovery system, no adapter module w a s  incorporated. However, a l l  systems 
required  to  completely qualify the drogue, p i l o t  and main parachute assemblies 
were instal led.  The uni t  was delivered t o  t h e  NASA on 2 January 1964. 
C. Sta t i c  Adapters: 
1. S ta t i c  Adapter No. 1 - Sta t i c  adapter No. 1 was designed f o r  
s t ruc tura l  dynamics and re la ted  s t ruc tura l  t es t s .  The uni t  was completed at 
the McDonnell plant and shipped t o  the " b i n  Company for   the test program 
early i n  1963. I n  December 1963 it was returned t o  McT)onnell f o r  a ser ies  of 
dynamic response t e s t s .  Ihmrmy equipment of proper weight and cg was then 
mounted in   the   adapter   to  check the response of the adapter shell. 
2. Static Adapter No. 2 - I n  October 1962 construction on s t a t i c  
adapter No. 2 was stopped due t o  budget considerations. With the  in i t i a t ion  
of the Popgun program (see 4, belov), however, adapter No. 2 was re ins ta ted  to  
replace static adapter No. 4 i n  the s t ructural  test program. 
After its fabrication, the retrograde rocket portion of the adapter 
was a t tached  to  s ta t ic  art icle No. 4 f o r  dynamic response testing. The equip- 
ment portion of the  adapter was l a t e r  added and fur ther  dynamic testing was 
accomplished. A t  the conclusion of these tests,  the adapter was returned to  
manufacturing for modification. Joined to re-entry test  uni t  No. 3, the 
adapter was used f o r  s t a t i c   t e s t s  of the "cold" launch condition. 
3. Static Adapter No. 3 - This uni t  was used to  s t ructural ly  qual i fy  
the equipment mounts, the retro-rocket support structure, the blast shield 
access door, and the adapter i tself '  i n  the "hot" launch condition. 
4. Static Adapter No. 4 - After undergoing one pyrotechnic separation 
t e s t  at s ta t ion  2 13, the adapter was assigned to Popgun testing. This test, 
which consisted of pyrotechnic separation at s ta t ion  2 69 and the firing of 
the retro-rockets, had inconclusive results since considerable damage was 
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sustained in the retrograde section due to rocket assembu' failure. The 
undamaged 52-33002-3 r ing  from the retrograde section was removed and u t i l i zed  
in the construction of a boi lerplate  adapter f o r  further Popgun testing. This 
tes t ing  showed no  Popgun effect .  The equipment section of t h e  s t a t i c  No. 4 
adapter was used in  another  pyrotechnic  separation test  a t  Z , l 3 .  
D. Miscellaneous  Test. Vehicles : 
1. Thermal'Qualification 'Pest Vehicle - This vehicle was a complete. 
production spacecraft utilizing the No. 3 A  re-entry module (one of the 13 
production units) and a t e s t  adapter. All systems and subsystems were flight 
worthy, qualified production items except for certain easily replaceable 
pieces of equipment such as the heat shield and the ejection seats.  With 
NASA approval, nonflight articles were subst i tuted for  the l a t t e r .  
Spacecraft No. 3 A  was  delivered  to the McDonnell laboratory on 
15 October 1964. The thermal qual i f icat ion test  program ran u n t i l  February 
1965 
The qual i f icat ion  tes t ing comprised mission simulation runs during 
which a l l  systems were operated t o  their  duty cycles. However, safety require- 
ments f o r  the vacuum chamber dictated the  avoidance of hypergolic8 and cryo- 
genic hydrogen; therefore inert fuels and bridgewire-type pyrotechnics were 
employed during these tests. In addi t ion to  these orbit simulation tests, 
special vibration a;nd spacecraft system test  (SST) t e s t s  were performed on 
Spacecraf't 3A. 
2. Electronics Systems Test Unit (ESTU) - The ESTU was a simplified 
re-entry module mock-up with provisions  for mounting all electronic components 
i n  their flight locations. Prototype and early production units were ins ta l led  
and interconnected t o  simulate the  spacecraft wiring conditions. Components, 
subsystems, and systems were at first operated component-by-component and 
then system-by-system t o  provide an ini t ia l   evaluat ion of each componet when 
integrated with other units. 
A configuration representative of tha t  used i n  Spacecraft No. 2 
was mounted and thoroughly investigated. The ESTU was also used t o  examine 
ear ly  problems and evaluate the corrective action. The ESTU was first put 
into operation on 19 November 1962. ( R e f  Development Program, page 76. ) 
3. Compatibility Test Unit (CTU) - The CTU was a Spacecraft mock-up 
employing standard spacecraft w i r e  bundles and having a structure  very similar 
t o  the flight a r t i c l e .  Prototype  spacecraft  systems w e r e  installed,  creating 
a test vehicle with operational systems representative of Spacecraft 1, 2, 3, 
and 3A. The objectives of the test  program involving the CmT were :  
a. Provide compatibility tests (including radio noise) of the 
b. Establish spacecraft and ground support equipment (GSE) 
spacecraft systems t o  assure interference-free combined operation. 
compatibility. 
C .  Furnish SST procedure evaluation and personnel training prior 
d. Provide a test  bed to evaluate spacecraft configuration changes 
t o  production spacecraft tests. 
and investigate problem areas. 
The compatibil i ty  test   unit  was delivered from manufacturing i n  
February 1963. The i n i t i a l  CTU tests were performed i n  the SST area  u t i l i z ing  
SST personnel, procedures and test equipment . ( R e f  Development Program, 
Page 76.) 
4. Specimen Hatch - This test  uni t  comprised a production hatch sill, 
side panels, hatches and la tch  mechanism mounted on a boilerplate box assembly. 
Latch rigging, functional, and leakage t e s t s  were performed on the unit ,  as 
well as s t a t i c  s t ruc tu ra l  tests of the  a f t  ho is t  loop  f i t t ing .  Hatch tes t ing  
was accomplished per TR 052-045.02. To perform the s t ruc tura l  tests, proper 
structural representation required the inclusion of a portion of the  large 
pressure bulkhead. This was subsequently  installed. The uni t  was delivered 
from manufacturing i n  July 1963. 
5.  R & R and RCS Pyro Test Unit - This uni t  w a s  composed of a full 
production R & R/RCS section equipped for the paraglider configuration. It 
was designed for pyrotechnic demonstration of the following operations: 
a. Drogue mortar 
b. Nose fairing separation 
c. MDF ring separation at s ta t ion Z 191.97 
d. Nose landing gear deployment 
e. Emergency docking release deployment, and 
f .  Docking bar assembly deployment. 
The pyro test  uni t  was originally scheduled for   del ivery from 
manufacturing i n  mid-December 1963, but the decis ion to  abandon the paraglider 
concept involved major modifications t o   t h e  test uni t ,   resu l t ing   in  a delivery 
date i n  the  first quarter of 1964. Tests involving the landing gear (d, 
above) were deleted. 
6. R & R and RCS Structural  Test Unit - This unit, originally designed 
t o  contain a paraglider type R & R section and a parachute RCS, was used t o  
structurally qualify the radar support structure, the RCS parachute support 
structure, and the nose f a i r ing  and support structure. Further tes t ing  
involved qualifying the drogue parachute structure under re-entry temperatures, 
and the performance of a pyrotechnic separation of the MDF r ing at Z 191.97. 
A t  the conclusion of these tests, the uni t  was ins ta l led  on s t a t i c   a r t i c l e  
No. 3 (Ref B. S t a t i c  Re-entry Vehicles, page 19 1 for parachute deployment 
tests at high temperatures. 
Structural  Testing. 
A. Rendezvous and Recovery (R & R) Section Tests - The drogue chute 
mortar  support structure was t e s t e d  t o  determine i ts  s t a t i c  strength, axial 
spring rate, and s t r a in  gauge calibration. The test  ar t ic le  consis ted of a 
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tandem drogue rendezvous and recovery section attached t o  a rigid support at 
s ta t ion  Z 191.97. A uniformly distributed axial load was applied t o  the test 
a r t i c l e  through the base of one of the mortar assemblies. When failure did 
not occur after the applied load had subatantially exceeded the design ulti- 
mate load, testing was considered successFully completed. 
B. Combined R & R/RCS llests - Ihe re-entry  heating test  of R & R - RCS 
structure w i t h  chute p u l l  off loads was conducted t o  demonstrate the struc- 
tural in tegr i ty  of the R & R and of the attachment jo in t   for   the  RCS section 
at s ta t ion Z 191.97. 
The s t ruc tura l  in tegr i ty  of the drogue parachute support structure 
during simulated re-entry heating and drogue parachute deployment loads also 
was demonstrated. The desired m a x i m u m  temperature of 1 6 0 0 ~ ~  was achieved on 
the beryllium shingles at a heating rate of 6OF per sec. A limit load of 
3550 l b  and an ultimate load of 4850 l b  were applied t o  the RX drogue cable 
at a loading rate of 3210 and 1735 l b  per sec, respectively. *sting at sea 
l eve l  atmospheric conditions instead of i n  a near-vacuum caused fires which 
resulted in   l oca l   s t ruc tu ra l  damage such as broken thruster nozzles, dislodged 
shingle retainers and a bol t  failure. However, test results indicated that 
the R & R attachment jo in t  at 2 191.97, and the drogue parachute support 
structure were s t ructural ly  adequate t o  withstand the re-entry temperatures 
and loads simulating deployment of the single drogue parachute. 
C. Re-entry Module Tests 
1. Structural  Demonstration of the  Re-entry Module f o r  Parachute 
Deployment Loads - Two load conditions, representing different parachute pull- 
off angles, were tested consecutively. For each condition, the RCS section 
and a small portion of the adjoining  conical  section were heated by a quartz 
infrared lampbank: prior to load application. Loading was in i t i a t ed  when a 
temperature of 2 6 0 ~ ~  was recorded on the web of a stringer located on BY at 
Z 181.5. The structure sustained design ultimate load f o r  both test conditions 
without failure. Several local fires during the heat t e s t  were a t t r ibu ted  to  
laboratory atmospheric conditions. 
2. Heating Test of Gemini Re-entry Module for   Cr i t ica l  Re-entry 
Temperatures - Two test  conditions were conducted t o  demonstrate the struc- 
tural integri ty  of the re-entry module fo r  the cr i t ical   re-entry temperatures. 
The two conditions consisted of heating (1) the upper center l ine in  the 
vicini ty  of the hatches, and (2) the lower centerline in the vicinity of the 
ECS, equipent  and landing gear doors. Temperatures and structural  deflections 
at several locations were recorded. Test results indicated t h a t  the conical 
section was adequate s t ruc tura l ly   for  the  re-entry heating conditions tested. 
3. Spacecraft Structural Evaluation f o r  Re-entry Uads - This test 
subjected a spacecraft re-entry module t o  loads simulating cr i t ical   re-entry 
conditions. Simulated aerodynamic pressure loads w e r e  appl ied to  the heat 
shield i n  5s increments t o  136s design limit load. fnads w e r e  reacted on the 
'af t  section of the re-entry module. No damage was sustained during the test. 
4. Stat ic   Test  of Ejection Seat an8 Back-up Structure - This test  
determlned the  adequacy of the   e ject ion seat support structure fo r   t he  
following conditions:. 
a. Condition B = oO, a = -150 Ejection 
b. Condition XI f3 L ls0, a = 0' EJection 
C. Condition vb Landing. 
The specimen sustained ultimate load (135s design limit load) f o r  
conditions M and XI without failure. 
For condition vb, a torque box f i t t i n g  failed at approximately 
go$ design limit load. me fitting was redesigned. Since conation vb was 
a paraglider requirement, no fur ther   tes t ing was required. 
5. S t a t i c  Test f o r  Re-entry Module Pressurization - The requirements 
of this test  were as follows: 
a. To determine i f  the conical section of the spacecraft was struc- 
turally adequate f o r  200 cycles of internal. burst pressurization from zero t o  
six psig. 
unlatch and open at approximately 5.5 psig during cycle 4 of the test  described 
i n  a above, and t o  repeat the  malfunction of the  l e f t  hatch opening under 
pressure with no changes t o  hatch rigging. 
s t ructural ly  adequate f o r  ultimate internal  burst pressurization (12 psig). 
s t ructural ly  adequate for ultimate external collapsing pressure (3 psig). 
b. To determine what caused the le f t  hatch on the spacecraft  to 
C.  To detelmine i f  the  conical section of the spacecraft was 
d. To determine i f  the conical section of the spacecraft was 
The specimen sustained 200 cycles of in te rna l  burst pressurization, 
ultimate in te rna l  burst pressure, and ultimate external collapsing pressure 
without failure or  s ignif icant  change i n   t h e  leakage rate. 
During the fourth cycle of the  200-cycle pressurization testing, 
the hatch mechanism ro ta t ed   t o  the unlatched position, and the hatch opened 
from internal pressure. Examination of the hatch mechanism showed t h a t  a 
bolt  in  the  hatch  torque box cover was interfering  with the hatch mechanism 
bellcrank assembly. The malfunction, which prevented the hatch mechanism 
from rotating full over center, was duplicated. The condition was eliminated 
by design change and the 200-cycle test was resumed without further malfunc- 
tion. The specimen was determined t o  be s t ructural ly  adequate f o r  all 
conditions tested. 
6. Spacecraft Water Impact Drop Tests - Simulated parachute landings 
on water were conducted t o  demonstrate the a b i l i t y  of the spacecraf't s t ructure  
t o  withstand impact loadings and t o  maintain a watertight crew compartment. 
The specimen was catapulted from a track  into a pond t o  shulate worst condi- 
tions involving local water surface angle due t o  wave action and impact velo- 
c i ty  resu l t ing  from wind and descent speed. !Fwo impact a t t i tudes  were 
tested; RCS section forward, then heat shield forward. The weight and balance 
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of the  unballasted 
moments of inertia 
test vehicle were determined experimentally. The mass 
of the  
accelerations along the 2 
The cabin was pressurized 
the  pressure decay during 
basic vehicle w e r e  d e t e k n e d  analy&ally. Impact 
(longitudiaal) and Y (vertical)  axes were measured. 
t o  5.0 psig before and after each drop t e s t ,  and 
a 30 min period was recorded i n  each case. The 
cabin was not  pressurized when dropped. 
On the heat shield forward drop, no s t ruc tura l  damage occurred. On 
the t e s t  with the RCS section forward, shingles were deformed on the conical 
section adjacent to the main landing gear doors. A subsequent pressurization 
check detected a small leak at the forward edge of the  ECS door. However, 
during a 39-hr flotation  period  following  the  drop  test, only 20 oz of water 
was taken aboard. The spacecraft was considerid structurally satisfactory 
to   sus t a in  water impact. 
7. S ta t i c  Test of Crew Hatch - These t e s t s  helped t o  evaluate the 
s t ruc tura l   in tegr i ty  of the  crew hatch and hatch support f o r  the following 
conditions: 
a. Condition I - Ultimate external airload against  the fl ipper 
b. Condition I1 - Ultimate air and i n e r t i a l  loads tending t o  door f o r  astronaut egress during an abort. 
rotate the hatch past 88 degrees full open, restrained by an extended simulated 
hatch actuator. This condition was c r i t i c a l  f o r  the hatch and hatch actuator 
support . 
pult  loads applied t o  hatches and support i n  the following sequence: 
C. Condition I11 - Ultimate air, i n e r t i a l  and ejection seat cata- 
Airloads were applied t o  both hatches when full open 88 degrees 
With ultimate airload applied t o  hatches, the ultimate ejec- 
and supported by simulated hatch actuators. 
t i o n  seat catapult load was appl ied to  the right ejection seat catapult 
f i t t i n g .  
catapul t   f i t t ing,  ultimate eject ion seat catapult load was appl ied  to  the 
le f t  e jec t ion  sea t  ca tapul t  f i t t ing .  
seat catapul t  f i t t ings,  the appl ied catapul t  load on the right catapult f i t -  
t i n g  was reduced to zero. 
With ultimate load applied to hatches and right eject ion  seat  
With ultimate  load  applied  to  the  hatches and both  ejection 
Results of the crew hatch test were :  
a. Condition I - The flipper door and adjacent' support sustained 
b. Condition I1 - The crew hatch and support structure reached 136s design limit load (6.2 psi) without failure. 
120$ design limit load before the hatch torque box skin failed.  "be crew hatch 
was strengthened by incorporating a mschined s t i f f ene r  and a doubler on the 
hatch torque box akin. When the condition was retested, the redesigned crew 
hatch  failed at 155s design  l imit  load. 
c. Condition I11 - The hatches and support withstood the ultimate 
test load (136s design limit load)  for  all four phases of the t e s t .  The 
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flipper doors, strengthened crew hatches, and the hatch support structure 
were adequate fo r  a l l  conditions tested. 
D. Adapter Section Tests 
1. S ta t i c  Test of the Retfograde Rocket Support Structure - This test 
helped t o  determine the  adequacy of the retrograde rocket support structure 
for  the cr i t ical  abort  condi t ion.  !%e structure sustained design ultimate 
load without failure. b a d  was applied simultaneously along the  thrust  axis  
of all four rockets, and no permanent deformation was observed. 
2. Sta t ic  Test of Gemini Equipment Modules and Module Support 
Structure - This test  evaluated the adequacy of the following adapter equip- 
ment modules and their  support  s t ructure  for  cr i t ical  launch and abort 
conditions: 
a. Orbital a t t i t ude  maneuvering system module. 
b. Fuel cell module, long mission. 
c. Environmental control system.oxygen module, long mission. 
d. Environmental control system coolant module. 
A l l  four modules and their  support structures sustained ultimate 
load (136$ design l j m i t  load) for the c r i t i c a l  launch condition without 
primary s t ruc tura l   fa i lure .  
When the simulated hydrogen bot t le  was removed from the fuel c e l l  
module after the  tes t ,  the press-fit sleeve and plug assembly, which res t ra ins  
side motion of the bot t le ,  had separated from the fuel cel l  blast -shield.  The 
oxygen bottle sleeve assembly also was loosened. The press-fit sleeve and 
plug assemblies were replaced by threaded  uni ts   pr ior   to   the  cr i t ical   abort  
tests. 
The f u e l   c e l l  module and orb i ta l   a t t i tude  maneuvering system module 
sustained design ultimate load  for   the  cr i t ical   abort  test without failure. 
A t  l3O$ design limit load, the simulated presswant bottle nearest  IX deflected 
enough t o  contact the module support structure, To correct this the pressurant 
bottle support was stiffened. The adapter equipment modules and adJacent 
Support structure were determined t o  be s t ructural ly  adequate for   the  launch 
and abort conditions tested. 
3. Sta t i c  Test of the Spacecraft Adapter fo r   Cr i t i ca l  Launch Condition 
wi th  Elevated Temperature - This test helped determine the s t ruc tura l  adequacy 
of the adapter for launch condition 2h (Ref: structural  design loads, 
McDonnell Report 9030), launch t ra jectory 333, which has a c r i t i c a l  combina- 
t ion  of load and elevated temperature, 
The test  adapter was mounted horizontally on the forward oxidizer 
s k i r t  of a Titan launch vehicle so tha t  the s t r inger  No. 40 of the  equipment 
section received maximum compression. The specimen was loaded axially (af't) 
in the  Z direction. Shear was introduced perpendicularly t o  the Z axis and 
ver t ica l ly  downward. Adapter radiator leakage was checked, and gaps between 
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the oxidizer s k i r t  and the adapter w e r e  measured before and during the test. 
The temperature cycle was run under three conditions of load: limit (lo($ Dm)., 
ultimate (136s DLC) and s t re tch  (1564 DU). 
The test  structure satisfactorily sustained the stretch load at 
1564 Dm. The adapter radiator did not leak, and gap deflections between the  
oxidizer skirt and adapter were negligible. 
The adapter was considered structurally capable of sustaining the 
stretch loads. 
E. Complete Spacecraft Test - llhe static test of Gemini Spacecraft for 
a cri t ical   abort   condition  verified the  s t ruc tura l  and functional  integrity 
of the spacecraft  for the 5.5 degree angle of attack. Two tests were con- 
ducted. During test  condition A, the specimen was subjected t o  both axial 
compression and bending moment about the Y-Y ax is  with t h e  right (RX) side of 
the spacecraft in compression. The specimen was loaded in  increments t o  
lo@ design limit load and the  hatches were opened by hatch actuators. Inspec- 
tion revealed no damage. 
For test  condition By the specimen was subjected to bending moment 
about the X-X axis  with the bottom (BY) of t he  spacecraft in compression, and 
a torque applied through the open hatches, as w e l l  as an axial load and bend- 
ing moment about the Y-Y axis. The specimen, instrumented t o  record strains, 
was loaded i n  increments t o  1364 DLL without deleterious effect. 
The spacecraft was considered functionally and s t ructural ly  adequate 
fo r  the  abort conditions tested. 
F. Gemini-Agena Target Docking Adapter (TDA) Test - The ultimate strength 
s t a t i c   t e s t   qua l i f i ed  the  c r i t i ca l   s t ruc ture  of the Gemini and Agena target 
docking adapter f o r  o rb i t a l  maneuvering ultimate loads. The t e s t  specimen 
consisted of  the following: 
1. A s t a t i c  target docking adapter. 
2. A rendezvous and recovery module. 
3. A static re-entry control system section. 
4. An Agena forward auxiliary rack. 
Two sets of loading conditions were tested. One consisted of bending 
wi th  ax ia l  compression which simulated maneuvering i n   o r b i t  w i th  full thrust ;  
the other consisted of bending without ax ia l  compression which simulated 
maneuvering i n   o r b i t  with zero thrust. 
Three t e s t s  were conducted wi th  TDA andthe R & R latched together and 
r ig id ized  to  their  maneuvering configuration. Loading conditions were as 
follows : 
1. Bending With Axial Compression - The bending was applied about 
the  X 0.00 axis placing the IX la tch  in   tension.  
2. Bending Without Axial Compression - The bending was applied about 
3. Bending With Axial Compression - The bending was  applied about the Y 0.00 axis placing. the BY l a t c h   i n  tension. 
Y 0.00 axis placing the BY, latch i n  compress'ion. Bending was increased t o  
failure . 
The Gemini and Agena TDA withstood ultimate loads f o r   o r b i t a l  manew 
vering imposed by the three tests. 
A primary and secondary failure of the  R & R occurred during test 3 
at 147s axial design limit loads and 2274 bending design limit load. The 
primary failure consisted of buckling the two stringers adjacent to the BY 
docking Sitting. Shingle retainer failure in  the  same area constituted the 
secondary failure. 
It was concluded that   the  Gemini and Agena TDA were s t ructural ly  
capable of withstanding ultimate loads f o r   o r b i t a l  maneuvering, and that the 
TDA was structurally  stronger  than the R & R when subjected t o  the loading 
conditions defined by t h i s  test  request. 
s t ruc tura l  Dynamics Tests 
Dynamic Response Test of Spacecraft and Equipment Under a Vibration 
Environment. - This test  helped t o  determine the following: 
A. Spacecraft beam frequency response, beam resonant mode, and resonant 
B. Equipment frequency response and equipment resonant acceleration 
C. Adapter shell resonant response mode characterist ics.  
mode damping decay characterist ics.  
response mode characterist ics.  
The specimen was tested in the following configurations: 
A. Abort Configuration - The abort module was suspended free-free at 
B. Re-entry Configuration - The re-entry module was suspended free- 
C. Landing Configuration - The landing module was suspended free-free 
stat ions 2 109 and 2 192. 
f ree  at s ta t ions Z 109 and 2 192. 
at s ta t ions 2 104 and 2 192, with the landing gear under test i n  the extended 
position. The nose landing gear was t e s t ed  in  both the compressed and 
extended  positions. 
Dynamic Response of the Spacecraft in the Moored Configuration. - This 
test  was conducted i n  the following three phases: 
A. Phase 1: Dynamic Response of the  Spacecraft i n   t h e  Moored Configura- 
t ion  - The spacecraft was subjected to a sinusoidal vibration environment i n  
i ts  X, Y and Z axes. The spacecraft was moored t o  a target  docking adapter 
(TDA) which was bol ted   to  an Agena forward auxiliary  rack  cantilevered from 
the laboratory floor. The first three e l a s t i c  body modes of the system f o r  
various static load conditions were determined f o r  all axes of excitation. 
These static load conditions simulated the compression and moment loads 
generated by the thrust  of the Agena engine. Phase 1 data include frequency 
response plots,  modal response data, and damping data. 
B. Phase 2: Determination of Moment of Ine r t i a  - The ine r t i a  of t he  space- 
c r a f t  was determined about its X and Y 8xes. The spacecraft was supported on 
knife edges at 2 s ta t ion  192 and was suspended with soft   springs of a known 
spring constant at 2 s ta t ion  13. The i n e r t i a  was calculated by knowing the 
weight, center of gravity, spring location, knife edge location, and frequency 
of oscil lation of the system. 
C. Phase 3: Dynamic Response of TDA Equipnent - The TDA was subjected t o  
a sinusoidal vibration environment i n  its X, Y and 2 axes. The TDA was 
attached t o  a fixture which vas at tached  to  an electromagnetic vibration 
exci ter  for  exci ta t ion in  each of three mutually perpendicular axes. Data 
presented for phase 3 included  transmissibil i ty  plots and modal response data. 
Full-scale Structural and Functional Tests of an Agena n>A and a Gemini 
R "- & R-Sction  Subjected t o  Mooring  Shock. - Tests simulating  orbital moorings 
between full-scale Gemini and Agena vehicles were conducted t o  demonstrate the 
s t ruc tura l  and functional  capabili t ies of a production Gemini R & R section 
and an Agena TDA when subjected to the mooring shock environment. Both the 
R & R section and TDA assembly were moynted on fabricated  structural  steel 
vehicles. Composite vehicle assemblies simulated the mass, cg location, and 
mass moments of i n e r t i a  of their respective production vehicles for an o r b i t a l  
configuration. 
Test vehicles were suspended as simple pendulums, 56.57 f t  i n  length w i t h  
a gimbal system at each cg, giving the  vehicles freedom in pi tch,  yaw, r o l l  
and translation. The Gemini tes t  vehicle  w a s  pulled back and then allowed t o  
s w i n g  forward through a predetermined distance to  attain  various  vehicle limit 
and ultimate closing velocities. Vehicle attitudes and locations of impacts 
a lso were controlled. "DA damper loads and strokes and the R & R section 
indexing bar  bending moments were recorded. 
The Agena TDA and the Gemini R & R section sustained a l l  shock loads 
imposed with no s t ructural  or  funct ional  failures. Al mooring systems that 
were operable during the test  performed sat isfactor i ly .  
RELIABILITY AND Q U U T Y  ASSURANCE PROCRAM 
The objective of the  Gemini r e l i a b i l i t y  and quality assurance progr- 
was t o   a t t a i n  the level of reliability required  for all aspects of ganned 
o rb i t a l  flight. The emphasis was  placed on achieving high mission depend- 
a b i l i t y  with maximum crew safety. A mission re l iab i l i ty   goa l  of .95 and a 
crew safety goal of -995 were therefore specified, i n  which mission relip 
a b i l i t y  i s  defined as the  probabili ty of accomplishing the objectives of the 
mission, and crew safety is defined as the probability of the  crew 
, 
surviving the mission. The methodology f o r  accomplishing these two goals 
w a s  : 
A. Review systems' design to  insure that the designs were inherently 
B. Suggest changes t o  design engineering t o  maximize system re l i ab i l i t y .  
C. Conduct t e s t s  throughout the Gemini program t o  demonstrate systems' 
D. Provide reliability estimates for various missions to quantitatively 
satisfactory. 
r e l i a b i l i t y  and to   ver i fy   sat isfactory  operat ing  character is t ics .  
express spacecraft and mission r e l i a b i l i t y  and to   i den t i fy  equipment o r  
systems which required reliability improvement. 
and correction of equipment malfunctions. 
inherent in the spacecraft design. 
E. Establish a control system which required the reporting, investigation, 
F. Develop a r igid  qual i ty   control  program t o  maintain the reliabil i ty 
Evaluation O f  Spacecraft Design 
The design of the spacecraft was evaluated to insure that t he  r e l i a b i l i t y  
goals could be met. Wherever a single failure could be catastrophic to the 
crew o r   t o  the spacecraft or could jeopardize mission success, redundant 
systems o r  back-up procedures were deemed necessary and were inst i tuted.  Some 
examples of these redundant features are : 
A. Every pyrotechnic function was supplied with redundant i n i t i a t ion  
B. Two independent re-entry control propulsion systems were supplied 
C. Redundant horizon sensors and rate gyros were provided for   the  
D. Six fuel  cel l  s tacks were ins t a l l ed  to  supply e l e c t r i c a l  power; only 
circui t ry  and redundant cartridges. 
for re-entry safety. 
guidance and control system. 
three t o  five stacks were required for nominal mission performance. 
Rel iabi l i ty  Reviews. - Reliability engineers reviewed designs independ- 
ent ly  of the in i t i a to r s   i n   o rde r   t o   i n su re  an objective evaluation for 
r e l i a b i l i t y  and crew safety. These reviews were begun as soon as t h e  i n i t i a l  
design was established and were continued throughout the design phase. Sur- 
veillance of the prime contractor 's  suppliers was also maintained i n  design, 
par ts  select ion and appl icat ion,  re l iabi l i ty  act ivi t ies ,  and i n  proposed 
design problem solutions. In addition, specification and procurement documents, 
schematic and ins ta l la t ion  drawings, stress analyses, and design data sheets 
were evaluated t o  determine the i r  e f f ec t s  on reliabil i ty.  Detailed studies 
were performed to evaluate system configurations for possible design imwove- 
ment. Some examples of these studies and their  results are: 
A. Reliabil i ty analysis of the environmental control system resu l ted   in  
the ins ta l la t ion  of a redundant heater  in  the primary oxygen tank. (On 
Spacecraft 10, ll, and 12 these redundant heaters allowed both the ECS and the 
RSS t o  share a single, enlarged oxygen tank.) 
B. A study w a s  performed t o  determine the effect  of the instrumentation 
signal conditioners upon maneuvering and a t t i tude  cont ro l  re l iab i l i ty .  The 
study indicated tha t  spacecraft control would not be significantly degraded 
by the failure of the instrumentation equipment, s ince   e lec t r ica l   i so la t ion  
between the systems was par t  of the design concept. 
C. Analysis of the  flight director controller, located on the spacecraft 
right-hand instrument panel, resulted i n  including ON-OFF switch f o r  the 
thrusters  and related units. This conserved and improved r e l i a b i l i t y  by not 
requiring the units t o .  be continuously powered. 
Failure Mode and Failure Effect Analysis. - A detailed failure mode and 
failurFe?fFct- analjl;sis &s conducted on al l   funct ional   spacecraf t  equipment. 
The analysis included the following steps: 
A. A description of the failure mode. 
B. "he ident i f icat ion of the mission phases i n  which the failure was 
C. An estimate of how the  fa i lure  would affect  the system and the mission. 
D. A review of the failure indications available t o  the crew and t o  the 
E. An estimate of the maximuxu time the mission could be continued after 
l i k e l y   t o  occur. 
ground. 
a fai lure .  This estimate measured the seriousness of the failure. 
The analysis provided a means t o  estimate the impact of a failure upon 
mission success and crew safety. In addition, it helped determine the need 
for design changes to eliminate those fa i lures  which significantly jeopardized 
mission success or crew safety. Finally, the analysis  led to  a reexamination 
of the adequacy of failure indications.  Single point failure modes and 
fa i lure  e f fec ts  were analyzed fo r  every manned mission. Action was taken 
(1) to eliminate the failure mode( s), or  (2) t o   j u s t i e   t h e  design and recom- 
mend precautionary procedures or crew ac t ions   to  minimize the likelihood of 
failure. 
A n  abort time study was made to   help determine whether recovery forces 
were adequately distributed. The probability of an abort ,  and the  probabili ty 
of permitting the flight t o  continue f o r  a specified time after an abort- 
causing failure were estimated. If a failure occurred which required an abort, 
the study indicated tha t  there was a 90% probabili ty that at l ea s t  1.5 orb i t s  
could be completed prior to spacecraft re-entry. 
Test Program For Rel iabi l i ty  And Quality Assurance 
The Gemini test program consisted of development, qual i f icat ion,  re l i -  
ab i l i ty ,  and equipment flight simulation tests (the last ut i l iz ing both 
estimated and real mission environmental data). Development tests used 
engineering models t o  e s t a b l i s h  the  f eas ib i l i t y  of the design concepts. Prior 
to  qua l i f ica t ion  testing, the functional performance and s t ruc tura l  in tegr i ty  
of production hardware were demonstrated. Qualification requirements were 
established for a l l  spacecraft equipment, and suff ic ient  tes t ing was then 
performed t o  prove tha t  a production unit m e t  the design requirements, Quali- 
f ica t ion  tests included simulated mission conditions, during which the equip- 
ment was operated t o  the duty cycles and i n   t h e  modes expected during flight. 
The environmental levels to which the equipment was subjected were based 
on the ant ic ipated pref l ight ,  flight, and post-landing conditions. However, 
these environmental levels were revised whenever f l i g h t  experience or  other 
data revealed tha t  the  or iginal  environmental requirements were too  stringent.  
Production equipment was also subjected to overstress testing, i n  which the 
equipment was operated under conditions more severe than the design 
requirements . 
Tests were conducted on a l l  flight a r t i c l e s   t o  assure t h a t  the  design 
reliability had not been degraded in the fabrication, handling and ins ta l la -  
t i on  of the hardware. These tests comprised: 
A. Receiving Tests - Parts were inspected by x-ray, spectrograph, and 
other techniques where appropriate, and functional tests were performed. 
B. Production Tests - Inspection and t e s t s  were performed at various 
stages of equipment assembly to   detect   def ic iencies   ear ly   in  the  manufacturing 
process. 
at the vendor 's  plant prior to delivery to the prime contractor   or   to  the 
customer. 
D. Re ins t a l l a t ion  Acceptance Tests (PIA) - Equipment performance was 
rever i f ied   p r ior   to   ins ta l l ing   the  equipnent i n  the Spacecraft. 
E. Spacecraft Systems Tests (SST) - Individual and integrated systems 
t e s t s ,  simulated flight tests, and a l t i tude  chamber tests were performed after 
systems' i n s t a l l a t ion  in  the spacecraft. 
F. Spacecraft/Launch Vehicle Joint  System Tests - Systems tests were 
performed at the launch site pr ior  t o  mating the spacecraf t  to  the launch 
vehicle. After spacecraft mate, integrated systems tests, simulated flights, 
and abort mode tests were conducted, u t i l i z ing  the  Mission Control Center, the 
Manned Space Flight Network, and the flight crew. 
systems to   ver i fy  their flight readiness. 
C. Redelivery Acceptance Tests (PDA) - Equipment performance was ver i f ied 
G. Countdown Tests - A f i n a l  series of functional tests was performed on 
Limited design assurance tests (DAT) and r e l i a b i l i t y  assurance tests (RAT) 
were conducted; however, the qual i ty  and conclusiveness of the overall  test 
program were suf f ic ien t   to  demonstrate equipment performance and f l i g h t  
worthiness. 
Estimates Of Reliabi l i ty  Requirements 
The r e l i a b i l i t y  requirements were established with regard for each system's 
mission function and i n  keeping wi th  the  overal l   spacecraf t   re l iabi l i ty  goal 
of .95. These requirements were consistent with the re la t ive  reliabilities of 
similar Project Mercury equipment. Each system's inherent reliability was 
then estimated, based primarily on component failure rate data. These esti- 
mates were appl ied   to   re l iab i l i ty  models which cal led  for  a two-day rendezvous 
and a two-week o r b i t a l  flight; the results indicated  that  the  design would 
meet the  reliability goals for mission success and crew safety. 
As par t  of the continuing evaluation, a r e l i a b i l i t y  estimate of mission 
success and crew safety was made p r i o r   t o  the flight of each manned mission. 
These estimates were based on the latest test  and flight data. The close 
agreement of these estimates with the actual mission performance gave addi- 
t ional  assurances  that  succeeding missions would be accomplished successfully 
and safely. 
Mnitoring And Analysis Of Equipment h l func t ions  
A "closed loop'' program of failure reporting, failure analysis, and 
subsequent corrective action was established to   ident i fy  all equipment mal- 
functions and anomalies and to   insure   that   correct ive measures were taken. 
All malfunctions were recorded, from the first tes t ing  of engineering models 
up through the operation of a l l  flight items. A material review board deter-. 
mined the disposition of the  equipment fo r  failure analysis, corrective action, 
and subsequent use. 
The failures were analyzed a t  the vendor's plant, the McDonnell plant, 
o r  at Kennedy Space Center, depending upon the nature of the  failure and the 
ava i lab i l i ty  of f a c i l i t i e s .  Complex equipment was returned t o  t h e  vendor 
when the analysis required special engineering and technical skills or special  
test equipment. 
Failure analysis laboratories w e r e  established at  the Kennedy Space Center 
and at the McDonnell p l an t   t o  provide rapid detailed analysis of the cause 
of the failure. Laboratories were equipped w i t h  precision measuring devices, 
environmental chambers, and sensitive detectors. By the program's end, the 
McDonnell laboratory had performed 882 of these analyses. 
Al recommended corrective actions were evaluated and those deemed 
appropriate were implemented. The required corrective actions ranged from 
changes i n  design and manufacturing to  revised  qual i ty  control techniques and 
testing cr i te r ia .  A "current status" summary of all trouble reports was 
maintained, i n  which each anomaly o r  failure was &scribed, and the s ta tus  of 
the  analysis and corrective action w a s  indicated. This l ist  was continually 
reviewed by the customer and the contractor to insure acceptable and timely 
corrective measures; action was accelerated in those areas i n  which failure 
would have a significant effect on pending flights. 
DeveloEooent O f  Quality Control 
A r igid  qual i ty   control  system was developed t o  maintain the r e l i a b i l i t y  
inherent  in  the spacecraft design. This system required that flight equipment 
be produced, handled, and ins ta l led  i n  a manner calculated  to  maintain a 
qualified configuration. A configuration control program was established 
which required that a l l  changes t o  the spacecraft be docmented, approved, 
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implemented, and ver i f ied by quality control. This method permitted rapid 
changes accompanied by rigorous inspection. No change. was  made t o   t h e   t o t a l  
configuration  unti l  it had been submitted t o  a management change board which 
evaluated the impact of the change upon the program cost and the schedule. 
Each flight a r t i c l e  was ident i f ied by part number, and a l l  assemblies 
and components (such as pres'sure regulators and electronic boxes) were 
serialized, recorded, and accountable. Certain materials, such as pyrotechnic 
explosives, were kept track of by l o t   t o  permit their  ident i f icat ion i f  it 
was determined tha t  the materials used were substandard. 
A l l  manufacturing and inspection personnel who required a specified s k i l l  
l eve l  were especially  trained and the qual i ty  of their work was periodically 
examined by means of proficiency tests. Parts and fabricated assemblies were 
inspected to maintain the  spacecraft quality. Al discrepancies found by t h i s  
inspection and tes t ing  were recorded and corrected, despite their  apparent 
insignificance. 
All equipment ins ta l la t ion  and removal required inspection approval 
p r i o r  t o  changing the system configuration. Formal acceptance reviews were 
conducted by the customer and the contractor at c r i t i ca l  s tages  of the  space- 
c ra f t  assembly and tes t ing to  isolate  def ic iencies  t h a t  might have reduced 
spacecraft performance. 
SPACECRAFT FLIGHT PERFORMANCE 
Six major objectives were defined for the Gemini manned spacecraft 
program. Stated simply, these  objectives were: 
A. Expose two astronauts and t h e i r   l i f e  support systems t o  long-duration 
B. Develop aud exercise precision re-entry, landing, and recovery of 
C. Rendezvous and dock with a second orbiting vehicle and then perfom 
D. Undertake extravehicular activity to evaluate man's a b i l i t y   t o  perform 
E. Util ize  the Gemini Spacecraft as an experimental test  platform for 
F. Provide a continuation of manned spaceflight operation at minimum 
missions in preparation for future earth orb i t  and lunar f l ights .  
manned spacecraft. 
combined maneuvering. 
tasks i n  a weightless environment. 
scientific investigations.  
cost wi th  major milestones t o  be complete as soon as practical .  
"he following synopses present the  flight performance of each spacecraft 
and describe how the program achieved all of the  major objectives, except 
land landing. A l l  Gemini Spacecreft were launched from Complex 19, Cape 
Kennedy, Florida. The Gemini launch vehicle was a modified T i t a n  I1 ICBM, 
"man-rated" fo r  Gemini usage . 
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Gemini I Mission 
The first Gemini mission was an unmanned o rb i t a l  flight, launched success- 
f u l l y  from the C a p e  on 8 April 1964. The objectives for t h i s  first mission 
were : 
Gemini I - Primary Objectives. 
A. To demonstrate the Gemini launch vehicle performance and t o  flight 
qualify the vehicle subsystems f o r  future Gemini missions. 
B. To determine the exit heating conditions on the spacecraft and 
launch vehicle. 
C. To determine the s t ruc tura l   in tegr i ty  and compatibility of the 
combined spacecraft and launch vehicle through orbital insertinn. 
D. To demonstrate the a b i l i t y  of the Gemini launch vehicle and ground 
guidance systems t o  achieve the  required orbital insertion conditions. 
E. To monitor t he  switchover c i r cu i t s  on the Gemini launch vehicle and 
to   evaluate  their sufficiency for mission requirements. 
F. To demonstrate the switchover function i f  anomalies occur within 
the primary autopilot or hydraulic systems that would require the use of the 
secondary autopilot or hydraulic systems. 
G. To demonstrate the malfunction detection system. 
H. To ver i fy  the s t ruc tura l  in tegr i ty  of the Gemini Spacecraft. 
Gemi.ni I - Secondary Objectives. 
A. To evaluate the operational procedures used in   es tabl ishing the  
B. To demonstrate the performance of the  launch and tracking networks. 
C. To verify orbital  insertion conditions by tracking the C-band 
D. To provide training for the f l i g h t  dynamics, guidance switchover, 
E. To demonstrate the operational capability of the prelaunch and 
Gemini launch vehicle trajectory and cutoff conditions. 
transponder system in the spacecraft. 
and malfunction detection systems flight controllers. 
launch f a c i l i t i e s .  
The first production Gemini Spacecraft was u t i l i z e d   f o r  t h i s  f l i g h t  but 
it did not carry complete Gemini flight systems because the mission was 
primarily a t e s t  of structural  integrity.  Spacecraft  1 was launched at 
11:OO a.m., EST. The mission was declared successfully concluded four hours 
and 50 min after l i f t -o f f .  Tracking, however, was continued by the Goddard 
Space Flight Center until the spacecraft re-entered on the 64th orbi ta l   pass  
over the southern Atlantic Ocean. 
Two subsystems employed on the Gemini I mission were the C-band radar 
transponder and the three telemetry transmitters. The transponder aided i n  
accurate ground tracking of the spacecraft during the mission; the transmitters 
provided data on spacecraft heating, structural loading, vibration, sound 
pressure levels, and the temperatures and pressures encountered during the 
launch phase. 
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Miscellaneous equipment ins ta l led  on the spacecraft consisted of a 
24-volt M: silver-zinc battery, a cabin pressure relief valve, a prelaunch 
cooling system, and three spacecraft-to-ground umbilicals. Dummy equipment, 
having a mass and moment of i n e r t i a  equal t o   t h e  missing flight systems, was 
i n s t a l l e d   i n  the spacecraft. 
The spacecraft/launch vehicle second stage combination was inser ted into 
an o rb i t  having a perigee of 86.6 nautical  miles and an apogee of 173 naut ical  
miles. These figures were within the design tolerance; the perigee was 
actually only 0.4 nautical  miles short of the desired al t i tude.  A 20 f’ps 
overspeed condition at orbi ta l   inser t ion produced an increase of ll naut ical  
miles in the apogee. 
Although the  t ra jectory was designed f o r  an orbi ta l   l i fe t ime of several  
days, the Gemini I mission was considered complete after three orbital  passes 
over Cape  Kennedy. All primary and secondary mission objectives were 
accomplished. 
Gemini I1 Wssion 
The second Gemini mission was an unmanned suborbital flight launched at 
9:  04 a.m., EST,  on 19 January 1965. The spacecraft was recovered by the 
primary recovery ship, the a i r c ra f t   ca r r i e r  Lake Champlain, at lO:52 a.m. , 
EST. Splashdown was within three miles of the target.  The major objectives 
of the Gemini I1 mission were: 
A. To demonstrate the basic  s t ructural  integri ty  of the  unit  throughout , 
B. To verify the adequacy of the re-entry heat protection under the 
C. To achieve sat isfactory performance of v i t a l  flight control systems, 
the f l i g h t  environment. 
most severe conditions. 
l i f e  support systems, retrograde rocket system, recovery and landing systems, 
and other systems c r i t i c a l   t o  flight safety and mission success. 
D. Verify systems checkout and launch procedures. 
E. Evaluate back-up guidance steering signals throughout launch. 
Spacecraft 2 contained production units of all equipment used on the 
later manned missions with the exception of the rendezvous radar, the drogue 
parachute system, and the auxiliary tape memory. A f u e l  c e l l  was also 
installed  but the hope for engineering evaluation of flight performance was 
not accomplished because a prelaunch f a c i l i t y  malfunction made timely activa- 
t ion  impossible. An automatic sequencing device was ins t a l l ed  in  the  space- 
c raf t   to   cont ro l  the operation and the sequencing of the Gemini systems 
throughout the  f l igh t .  The major spacecraft functions performed during t h i s  
mission were spacecraft/launch vehicle separation, controlled 180 degree 
turnaround, adapter equipment section jett ison, retrofire,  retrograde section 
jettison, controlled zero lift re-entry (10 degrees roll rate f o r  150 sec) 
and parachute landing. The spacecraft was recovered 1848 nautical  miles down 
range from the launch site. 
All  major mission obdectives were accomplished except f o r  the performance 
of tests on the fuel cel l .  Due t o  the unpredictability experienced with fuel 
c e l l  performance up t o  the time of Spacecraft 2 f l ight   the   decis ion was made 
t o  use t h e   f u e l   c e l l  as a separately loaded parer source for engineering 
evaluation purposes rather than a source of spacecraft power on the Gemini I1 
flight . 
Two minor anomalies occurred on the mission. During the re-entry mode,  
temperatures near the adapter interconnect fairing on the cabin section w e r e  
higher than the planned values. This resulted i n  damage t o  two of the Rene 41 
shingles, one washer, and a circumferential strap. No damage was experienced 
by the underlying insulation, however. The corrective action taken for 
Spacecraft 3 and up was to increase the thickness of the shingles   in  this 
area, employ smaller diameter washers as fasteners, and thicken the circumfer- 
ent ia l  s t rap.  Also, temperature reduction was accomplished during the re-entry 
mode by reducing the design angle of attack which resulted  in  the  center of 
gravity being off-set  from e = -196 in. t o  e = 1.35 in. on Spacecraft 3, plus 
similar reductions on subsequent spacecraft, w i t h  an accompanying loss  of 
footprint capability. No further d i f f icu l ty  w a s  experienced i n  t h i s  area. 
An indicated error in the i n e r t i a l  measuring uni t  (IMU) accelerometer 
output  ( iner t ia l  guidance system) of approximately 66.5 f p s  i n  the X axis 
was received at secondary engine cutoff. After failure analysis, corrective 
action was taken t o  redesign the rate network t o  accept saturated inputs. 
This change was made in   t he  X loop only fo r  the Gemini I11 configuration; 
huwever, on Gemini IV and all subsequent flights all accelerometer loops 
incorporated the redesign. 
Gemini I11 Mission 
The third Gemini flight and the program's first manned mission was 
launched at 9:24 a.m., EST, on 23 March 1965. The 'planned three-orbit mission 
had the  following principal objectives: 
A. Demonstrate manned o r b i t a l  flight i n  the Gemini Spacecraft and 
further qualify both spacecraft and launch vehicle systems fo r  future long- 
duration  missions. 
B. Rvaluate the Gemini design and its ef fec ts  upon crew performance. 
C. Exhibit and evaluate operation of the worldwide tracking network wi th  
D. Demonstrate precise   orbi ta l  maneuvering using the o rb i t  attitude and 
E. Verify O W  Capability to perform re t ro  back-up. 
F. Evaluate the performame of major spacecraft systems. 
G. Demonstrate the ab i l i t y   t o   con t ro l  the re-entry flight path and t o  
H. Verify systems checkout, prelaunch, and launch procedures f o r  a 
I. Recover the spacecraft and appraise the recovery system. 
the spacecraft. 
maneuver system (OW)  
arr ive at a predetermined landing point. 
manned spacecraft. 
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The f l i g h t  crew successfully completed the mission, during which they 
employed seve ra l   t h rus t e r   f i r i ngs   t o  al ter the spacecraft  orbit  and t o  
perform small out-of-plane maneuvers. Both the OAMS and the spacecraft guid- 
ance and control system performed satisfactorily  during  the flight, with no 
significant anomalies. 
The only primary objective unachieved during the Gemini I11 mission was 
a landing close to the recovery force. The actual landing point was about 
58 nautical  miles short of the planned retrieval point.  A study indicated that 
the angle of  attack had been slightly lower than predicted; however, the main 
reason fo r  the  short  trajectory appeared t o  be a considerably lower l i f t  
coefficient and a corresponding reduction i n  the touchdown footprint. The 
flight data appeared to   indicate  a difference between the actual  and the wind- 
tunnel-derived aerodynamics of the re-entry configuration. !J!he experience 
acquired from t h i s  mission and the Gemini I1 flight were correlated with wind 
tunnel data t o   a r r i v e  at a more accurate prediction of the l i f t - to-drag  ra t io  
and corresponding footprints for later flights. 
The mission was successfully concluded with recovery of the spacecraft 
by the prime recovery ship, the aircraft carrier U. S. S. Intrepid, a t  
5:03 p.m.,  EST. Two of the principal benefits accruing from the Gemini I11 
mission w e r e  the   qual i f icat ion it gave the worldwide tracking network and the 
experience it provided to operations personnel for longer missions. 
Gemini N Mssion 
The Gemini IV flight, scheduled f o r  a four-day mission, was launched 
from Cape  Kennedy at 10:16 a.m., EST, on 3 June 1965. The primary and 
secondary objectives of the mission were: 
Primary Objectives. 
A. Evaluate the e f fec ts  of prolonged exposure t o  the space environment 
B. Demonstrate and evaluate the  performance of the Gemini Spacecraft 
C. Evaluate previously developed procedures f o r  crew rest and work 
of the two-man flight crew in preparation for  longer missions. 
systems fo r  four days i n  space. 
cycles, eating schedules, and real-time f l i g h t  planning for  long flights. 
Secondary Objectives. 
A. Demonstrate extravehicular  act ivi ty  in  space and evaluate attitude 
B. Conduct s ta t ion  keeping and rendezvous maneuvers with the expended 
C. Conduct further .evaluation of spacecraft systems as out l ined  in  the 
D. Demonstrate the capabili ty of the spacecraft and f l i g h t  crew t o  make 
and position  control  using  the hand-held propulsion  unit  or the te ther   l ine.  
second stage of the Gemini launch vehicle. 
in-fl ight sys-cems test  objectives. 
significant in-plane and out-of-plane maneuvers.. 
, E. Demonstrate orb i ta l   a t t i tude  and maneuver system ( O W )  capab i l i t y   t o  
operate as a back-up for the retrograde rocket system. 
F. Execute 13 in-fl ight experiments. 
The flight demonstrated effectually the   as t ronauts '   ab i l i ty   to   ad jus t  
perfectly t o  a weightless environment and t o  perform a l l  mission tasks with 
efficiency; both astronauts w e r e  in excellent physical condition at the 
conclusion of the  flight. O f  13 scheduled in-fl ight experiments, the  Gemini 
crew successfully conducted 11. 
A l l  primary mission objectives w e r e  met; however, a problem was encoun- 
tered  in  the  48th  revolution wherein the  computer would not sequence off when 
the computer on/off switch was operated. Because of this condition a 
computer controlled (closed loop) re-entry could not be attempted and a zero 
l i f t  re-entry was flown instead. Due to dispers ions in  re t rof i re  attitude, 
r e t ro f i r e  time, and OAMS thrust ,  the landing point was 50 nautical  miles short  
of the predicted retrieval point. Failure analysis revealed that  the computer 
turnoff anomaly was intermittent and seven postulated  failure mechanisms were 
identified. The exact cause of failure was never isolated however available 
evldence suggested that contamination of the on/off switch was the most 
probable cause. The corrective action was t o  i n s t a l l  a manual shutdown 
sequence switch which would circumvent all the postulated failure modes should 
the problem reoccur. 
An anomaly was also found t o  have occurred during re-entry when a brief 
period of excessive current drain was observed from the  re-entry  batteries. 
Failure analysis revealed that t h i s  anomaly was caused by e lec t r ica l   a rc ing  
between the computer +25 volt regulator transistor terminal and the computer 
case. To remedy th is ,  an epoxy glass insulator strip was attached t o  the 
inside of the computer cover t o  provide an e lec t r i ca l  and mechanical barrier 
between the t ransis tors  and computer cover on a l l  subsequent f l i gh t  units. 
Late i n  the first revolution, the decision was m a d e  not t o  attempt the 
rendezvous with the Gemini launch vehicle second stage because the  allocated 
propellant f o r  the O M  had been consumed during the  station keeping exercise 
with the second stage. 
Two thruster  anomalies were experienced on the Gemini IV mission; how- 
ever, neither was considered detrimental to mission success or to crew safety. 
No. 5 thrus te r  on the re-entry control system (RCS) B-ring fa i led  to  opera te  
during re-entry. Post-flight inspection revealed a broken wire t o  an elec- 
t r i c a l  connector between the at t i tude control  e lectronics  (ACE) package and 
the thruster solenoid valve. I n  addition, a loss of thrust  was experienced 
ea r ly  in  the mission from one a f t - f i r ing  O M  thruster.  The most probable 
cause of t h i s  apparent loss of th rus t  was that the crew had inadvertently 
thrown the No. 9 c i r cu i t  breaker t o  O F F  during the f i n a l  30 min of the first 
orbi t .  During the 61st orbi t ,  when the No. 9 thruster  was again required, i ts  
operation appeared satisfactory. 
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The f l i g h t  crew reported  diff icul ty   in   c losing and latching  the  hatch 
after EVA. This anomaly, and the corrective action employed, are f'ully 
discussed in Failure Summary And Analysis, page 16 of this! report. 
The mission was successfully concluded on 7 June 1965. Recovery of the  
spacecraft was made by the prime recovery ship, the aircraft ca r r i e r  U. S.S. 
Wasp, at 2:28 p.m., EST. With minor changes, the Gemini Spacecraft was 
considered  flight-qualified  for  longer  missions. 
Gemini V Mssion 
The f i f t h  Gemini mission, launched a t  9:OO a.m., EST, 21 August 1965 w a s  
the first long-duration flight t o  use f u e l   c e l l s  as the principal source of 
spacecraft power. The primary mission objectives were: 
A. To demonstrate an eight-day flight capability. 
B. To evaluate the performance of the rendezvous guidance and navigation 
C. To determine the  e f fec ts  of prolonged weightlessness upon the f l i g h t  
system i n  conjunction with t h e  rendezvous evaluation pod (HEP) . 
crew, i n  preparation for even longer missions. 
A secondary objective w a s  t o  demonstrate a controlled re-entry to a 
predetermined landing point. 
During the first two orbi ts ,  a l l  spacecraft systems were checked, a 
nominal perigee adjust maneuver was conducted, and the rendezvous evaluation 
pod was ejected on schedule. 
Two of the three principal mission objectives were achieved; however, it 
was not possible to perform the radar evaluation wi th  the REP because of t he  
necessi ty  to  power down the spacecraft  early in the mission. Power conserva- 
t ion  was deemed necessary because of a loss of pressure i n   t h e  fuel c e l l  
oxygen supply tank. The cause of the pressure decrease was believed t o  be i n  
the reactant supply system (RSS) oxygen tank heater wiring. Since the  cryo- 
genic tanks, heaters, and associated wiring could not be recovered f o r  
analysis, it was impossible t o  determine the actual  failure mode.  However, 
a l l  available development and qualification test data show the cryogenic tanks 
and hea ters  to  be rigidly constructed and.of sound design. Nevertheless, 
corrective action was implemented for Spacecraft 7 and all other   f l igh ts  
u t i l i z ing  fue l  ce l l s .  Redundant heater w i r i n g  was provided t o  the RSS hydrogen 
tank, and a crossfeed was ins ta l led  between the RSS and environmental control 
system (ECS) oxygen tanks t o  enable oxygen t o  be supplied t o  the f u e l   c e l l s  
or  the ECS loops i n  the event of heater malfunction. (See RSS Flight  
Performance, page 63 a ) Despite the loss of oxygen pressure,  the fuel cells  
received adequate operating pressure t o  supply necessary e l ec t r i ca l  power fo r  
the duration of the mission. 
A t  the end of revolution 17 the spacecraft was powered up t o  a high load 
condition, and a successful rendezvous radar t e s t  was conducted by tracking 
a transponder on the  ground at Cape Kennedy. Further radar tests were 
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conducted throughout the mission t o  evaluate the rendezvous system i n   l i e u  of 
the REP exercises. A simulated Agena rendezvous w a s  conducted on the th i rd  
day which indicated that the spacecraft could have been placed within 0.3 
nautical miles of an Agena Target Vehicle (ATV). 
During the mission, f ive  O M  attitude thrusters functioned abnormally, 
providing low or  zero thrust. Though the astronauts made two in-fl ight 
attempts to restore operation, they were not successful. A post-flight study 
indicated t h a t  the  probable cause of the  thruster failures was propellant 
freezing, due t o  the long periods of valve heater and l i n e  heater inaction. 
To preclude future thruster fai lures ,  redundant heaters and c i r cu i t s  were 
ins ta l led  on the next long-duration configuration (Spacecraft 7). In addition, 
thermocouples were provided t o  monitor the temperatures of the thrust  chambers 
t o  assure satisfactory heater operation. 
Spacecraft systems functioned normally during the re-entry mode, but 
ground transmission of incorrect navigational coordinates resulted in a 
landing 89 nautical  miles short of the  planned retrieval point.  The spacecraft 
was recovered on 29 August 1965 by the a i r c ra f t   ca r r i e r  U.S.S. W e  Champlain. 
The experiment program f o r  the mission was very successful; 16 of the 17 
planned experiments were conducted, and a high percentage of desired data was 
accumulated. 
Gemini V I  Mission 
The flight of Gemini V I  constituted the first rendezvous mission of the 
program. The mission's primary objective was t o  achieve an orb i t a l  rendezvous 
with Spacecraft 7, which became the target vehicle due t o   t h e  Agena's failure 
t o  achieve orbit on 25 October 1965. 
Spacecraft 6 was successfully launched at 8:37 a.m., EST, on 15 December 
1965, 11 days after the launch of Spacecraft 7. A "closed loop" rendezvous 
was achieved approximately s i x  hr after launch. Nine maneuvers were 
performed by Spacecraft 6 t o   e f f e c t  rendezvous. I n i t i a l  radar lock-on with 
Spacecraft 7 occurred at a range of 248 nautical  miles, with. continuous 
lock-on beginning at 235 nautical  miles. After rendezvous, s ta t ion  keeping 
vas performed f o r  about 3-l/2 orbits, with the spacecraft as close as one f t  
apart  . The command p i lo t  of Spacecraft 6 performed an in-plane fly-around 
maneuver, maintaining a distance of 150 t o  250 f t  from Spacecraft 7. Separa- 
t ion  maneuvers w e r e  performed and the v i s i b i l i t y  of Spacecraft 7 as a ta rge t  
vehicle was evaluated. The flight progressed normally and was ended by a 
nominal re-entry and landing on 16 December within seven nautical  miles of 
the  planned retrieval point. The recovery ship was the a i r c ra f t  carrier, the 
U.S.S. Wasp. All primary mission objectives w e r e  accomplished. 
Gemini V I 1  Wssion 
me Gemini V I 1  mission, a maximum duration flight, was launched at 
2:30 p.m. EST2 on 4 December 19-65. The primary mission objectives were t o  
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demonstrate a manned o rb i t a l   f l i gh t  of 14 days, and t o  evaluate the effects 
of the prolonged mission upon the crew. Secondary objectives included a 
rendezvous with Spacecraft 6, s ta t ion  keeping wi th  tha t  spacecraft and with 
the second stage of the launch vehicle, and the carrying out of 20 in-fl ight 
experiments. 
Additional equipment on t h i s  flight included an L-band transponder which 
was used wi th  the Spacecraft 6 radar t o  provide target position data f o r  
rendezvous. 
After insertion, the  spacecraft performed s ta t ion  keeping wi th  the launch 
vehicle, maintaining distances of between 60 and 150 f t  fo r  15 min. A closer 
approach was not attempted because of the high tumbling rate of the launch 
vehicle. On the f i f t h  day of the mission, the  spacecraft was maneuvered in to  
a favorable orbit  for the rendezvous wi th  Spacecraft 6. No further adjust- 
ments t o  t h i s  orb i t  were required. 
An additional accomplishment of t h i s  flight WRS the crew's demonstrated 
a b i l i t y  t o  perform many of the mission requirements while not wearing their  
pressure suits. Comfort and mobility were greatly increased with the  suits 
removed;  no detriment t o  e i t h e r  crew health o r  mission success resulted. The 
ECS provided a nominal atmosphere throughout the flight. 
Fuel cells provided the principal power source f o r  Gemini V I I .  These 
performed nominally throughout the greater part  of the mission; however, at 
286:57 hr  ground elapsed time, two of t h e  stacks (2A and 2C) were shutdown 
because they were producing less than  the specified current. The remaining 
stacks provided sufficient electrical  power until  re-entry.  No corrective 
action was taken because the remaining Gemini flights were scheduled f o r  a 
m a x i m u m  of four days o r  less than 100 hr, about one-third the time t o  failure 
on the Gemini V I 1  mission. 
Post-f l ight   invest igat ion  a t t r ibuted  the  fuel   cel l  problem t o  a blockage 
i n  the water management system late in  the  mission. Since the rest of the 
fuel c e l l  system continued to operate with nominal performance, the anomaly 
was not deemed a system fai lure .  An analog presswe transducer was neverthe- 
less ins ta l led  on Spacecraft 8 t o  provide a better  monitoring  capabili ty  in 
the event of a recurrence of this failure. 
Another anomaly occurred when the operation of the No. 3 and No. 4 yaw 
r ight  O M  thrusters  was degraded during the last 47 h r  of the flight. How- 
ever, performance was not seriously affected because the crew was able t o  
re ta in  yaw right control. through the use of a maneuver thruster. Post-flight 
investigation  indicated t h a t  the  degraded thruster  performance was probably 
due t o  an obstruction in the  propellant flaw or to propellant contamination. 
Since the anomaly was believed to have occurred as a result of long-duration 
operation, no change was made t o  the  system configuration. 
The 14-day mission was successfully completed and controlled  re-entry was 
demonstrated by landing the spacecraft within 6.4 nautical  miles of the 
planned retrieval point on 18 December 1965. Recovery was made by the 
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carrier U.S.S. Wasp. AU. primary and secondary mission objectives were 
accomplished. 
Gemini V I 1 1  Mission 
The eighth Gemini mission was the first rendezvous and docking mission 
with an Agena Target Vehicle. Spacecraft 8 was launched successfully at 
9:OO a.m., EST on 16 mrch  1966, following the launch of the Atlas-Agena 
Target Vehicle one hr  and 40 min earlier. 
The primary  objectives  for the Gemini V I 1 1  mission were: 
A. Brform rendezvous and docking wieh the Gemini Agena Target 
B. Conduct extravehicular activit ies.  
Vehicle (GATV). 
The secondary objectives for the mission were: 
A. 
B. 
system. 
C. 
D. 
E. 
F. 
G. 
H. 
I. 
Rendezvous and dock with the GATV during the fourth revolution. 
Perform docked-vehicle maneuvers using the GATV secondary propulsion 
Perform systems' evaluation. 
Conduct ten experiments. 
Carry out docking practice. 
'Perform a rerendezvous maneuver. 
Evaluate the auxiliary tape memory unit. 
Evince a controlled re-entry. 
Park the Gemini Agena Target Vehicle i n  a 220-nautical-mile 
c i rcular   orbi t .  
The primary objectives of rendezvous and docking were accomplished during 
the  fourth spacecraft revolution. The secondary objectives of evaluating the 
auxiliary tape memory uni t  and demonstrating a controlled re-entry were also 
accomplished. Because the mission was terminated early, extravehicular 
ac t iv i ty  was not performed and only two of ten scheduled in-fl ight experiments 
could be conducted. 
The Agena Target Vehicle w a s  inserted into a 161.3 nautical  mile circular  
orb i t  by its primary propulsion system. Spacecraft 8 performed nine maneuvers 
t o  rendezvous with the target  five h r  and 58 min after spacecraft   l if t-off.  
The spacecraft docked with the target vehicle after approximately 36 min of 
s ta t ion  keeping. Once docked, a 90 degree yaw maneuver was performed using 
the Agena at t i tude control  system. 
A t  7:00:30 h r  ground elapsed time, unexpected yaw and r o l l  rates developed 
while the two vehicles w e r e  docked, but the command p i l o t  was able t o  reduce 
these rates to  essent ia l ly  zero. However, after he had released the  hand con- 
t ro l l e r ,  the rates began to increase again and the crew found it d i f f i cu l t  
t o  con t ro l  the  spacecraft without using excessive amounts of propellant. The 
spacecraft was undocked and the  yaw and r o l l  rates then  increased  to 
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,approximately 300 degrees per sec, causing the crew to   &act iva te   the   o rb i t  
a t t i tude  and maneuver system ( O W )  and t o  use both rings of the re-entry 
control system t o  reduce the  rates. The problem was i s o l a t e d   t o  No. 8 0- 
th rus te r  which fired continuously because its c i r c u i t r y   f a i l e d   i n  an ON 
condition. Post-flight investigation subsequently concluded tha t  t he  anomaly 
was caused by a shor t  c i r cu i t  i n  t he  wiring t o  the thruster.  To provide for 
immediate shutdown of all th rus te rs  in case of malfunction on subsequent 
spacecraft, a single switch was ins ta l led  which interrupted power t o  all 
t h rus t e r  e l ec t r i ca l  systems. In t h i s  way, a systematic check of each system 
could be made per established procedure after individual.systems were shutdown 
and the single switch closed. Inspection procedures were modified t o  reflect 
the engineering change. 
Because the re-entry control system had been activated, the mission 
was terminated during the seventh revolution in the secondary 
recovery area i n  the western Pacific Ocean. Retrofire was on time at 
10:04:47 hr  CET, and the re-entry was nominal, r e su l t i ng   i n  a landing within 
seven nautical  miles of the planned retr ieval  point .  The crew and spacecraft 
were recovered by the U.S.S. Leonard Mason approximately three   h r  and 11 min 
after landing. 
Gemini M - A  Mission 
The ninth Gemini flight was a rendezvous and docking mission wi th  the 
augmented target  docking adapter (ATDA), used as the target vehicle after the 
Atlas f a i l e d  t o  i n s e r t  the Agena in to  orb i t  on 17 May 1966. The ATDA consisted 
of a target docking adapter (TDA), a c y l i n d r i c a l   e q u i p n t   s e c t i o n ,  a re-entry 
control system for  a t t i tude  s tab i l iza t ion ,  a bat tery module, and an ascent 
shroud. 
The ATDA was successfully launched on 1 June 1966, in to  a nearly circular 
o rb i t  of 161 nautical  miles. The Gemini Spacecraft was launched successfully 
at 8 :39 a.m., EST, on 3 June 1966. 
The primary objectives  of  the Gemini M-A mission w e r e  : 
A. Perform rendezvous and docking maneuvers with the target vehicle. 
B. Conduct extravehicular activit ies.  
me secondary objectives of the mission w e r e :  
A. Rendezvous and dock during the th i rd  revolution. 
B. Accomplish systems evaluation. 
C. Perform an equiperiod rerendezvous. 
D. Achieve rerendezvous from above. 
E. Demonstrate a controlled re-entry. 
F. Perform docking practice. 
G. Conduct seven in-f l ight  experiments. 
Rendezvous with the ATDA was accomplished by performing seven maneuvers 
during the spacecraft 's third revolution. The first three maneuvers w e r e  
conducted using ground-computed data. The terminal phase i n i t i a t e  maneuver 
was conducted using information from the onboard computer, ground computer, 
and onboard charts. The f i n a l  three maneuvers were  conducted v isua l ly  w i t h  
the assistance of the onboard computer and displays. 
It was impossible t o  dock with the ATDA because the ascent shroud on the 
ATDA had not separated 88 planned. Subsequent inspection revealed that the 
quick-disconnect lanyards had not been properly attached. Two additional 
rendezvous were therefore performed i n  accordance with the  alternate plan. The 
first was an equiperiod rendezvous ( i n  which the spacecraft has t he  same 
orbi ta l   per iod as the  target) and the second was  a rendezvous from above, 
which was t o  simulate conditions which could resu l t  if the  Apollo command 
module were required to rendezvous with a disabled lunar module. A two-hr 
EXA was  accomplished, but evaluation of the  astronaut maneuvering uni t  was 
not performed due t o  fogging of the pi lot ' s   v isor .  
On the  t h i rd  day several of the uncompleted in-fl ight experiments were 
performed. A nominal re-entry in the  primary recovery area resul ted in  a 
landing one-third mile from the planned retrieval  point on 6 June 1966. 
Recovery 
The 
wi th  the 
was made by the  a i rc raf t   ca r r ie r  U.S.S. Wasp. 
Gemini X Mission 
primary objective of the Gemini X mission was t o  rendezvous and dock 
target vehicle. Secondary objectives comprised: 
A. Perform the  rendezvous and docking operation during the fourth 
B. Utilize large propulsion systems i n  space (by using GATV primary 
C. Accomplish extravehicular operations. 
D. Perform docking practice. 
E. Conduct 14 in-fl ight experiments. 
F. Perform systems evaluations. 
revolution. 
and secondary propulsion systems i n  an attempt at dual rendezvous). 
The tenth Gemini flight marked the second successful rendezvous and 
docking mission with an Agena Target Vehicle. The Agena was successfully 
launched on 18 July 1966 at 3 :39 p.m., EST; Spacecraft 10 was successfully 
launched approximately one hr  and 40 min later a t  the beginning of a 35 sec 
launch window. The Agena was placed i n  a nearly ci rcular  orbi t  with an apogee 
of 162.0 nautical  miles and a perigee of 156.6 nautical  miles. After space- 
craf t  inser t ion,  the insertion velocity adjust  routine (WAR) of the onboard 
computer was used to   calculate  the necessary velocity increment t o  achieve 
the planned orbit .  Only a single velocity increment of 26 as at insertion 
was required; t h i s  w a s  applied by the  crew and resulted i n  a spacecraft orbit 
of 145.1 nautical  miles apogee and 86.3 miles perigee. These a l t i tudes  were 
only 0.1 mile low at apogee and 0.4 mile low at perigee, compared with 
planned al t i tudes.  
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The crew completed the rendezvous during the fourth revolution as 
planned, at 5:23 hr  ground elapsed time. Approximately 30 min later the space- 
c r a f t  docked wi th  the Agena Target Vehicle. Since more propellant was used 
during the terminal phase of the rendezvous than had been predicted, docking 
practice was not performed in   o rder   to  conserve the remaining propellant. 
The spacecraft remained docked with the target vehicle for approximately 
39 hr, during which a bending mode test was conducted t o  determine the 
dynamics of the docked configuration. In addition, a 49 min standup EVA was 
accomplished, which included several photographic experiments. The Agena 
primary and secondary propulsion systems were used to  successfully accomplish 
six maneuvers i n  the docked configuration  in  preparation , fo r  a passive 
rendezvous wi th  the Gemini V I 1 1  Agena Target Vehicle. 
Approximately three hr after separating from the Agena ( a t  48 h r  ground 
elapsed time), the Gemini Spacecraft achieved i ts  second  rendezvous. The 
Agena for Spacecraft 8 was found t o  be i n  a s table  a t t i tude;  t h i s  allowed 
the flight crew t o  bring the spacecraft very close to the passive ATV. A 
38 min EVA was performed during this s ta t ion  keeping period. A s  par t  of this 
EVA, the   p i lo t   re t r ieved  the micrometerorite packaged which had been stowed 
on the ATV. 
The planned three-day mission was accomplished successfully and was 
followed by a nominal re-entry on 21 July 1966. Touchdown was within three 
nautical miles of the  planned retr ieval   point   in   the primary landing area. 
Gemini X I  Mission 
Gemini X I  was launched from Cape Kennedy on 12 September 1966 at 
9:42 a.m., EST.  The  Agena Target Vehicle, with which it was t o  rendezvous 
and dock, had been launched one h r  and 37 min earlier. The primary objective 
of t h i s  mission was t o  rendezvous and dock with the Agena Target Vehicle 
during the first revolution. The secondary mission objectives were: 
A. Conduct docking practice. 
B. Perform extravehicular operations. 
C. Accomplish 12 in-fl ight experiments. 
D. Conduct maneuvers with the Agena Target Vehicle while i n  the docking 
E. Perform a tethered vehicle test. 
F. Demonstrate an automatic re-entry. 
G. Place the Agena Target Vehicle i n  a parking orbit. 
configuration. 
A l l  primary and secondary mission objectives were achieved; however, 
because of astronaut fatigue after ins ta l l ing  the  tether l ine,  the mi6 
minimum react ion  powr  tool  experiment was not attempted. 
Following spacecraft insertion, five maneuvers were performed by the crew 
t o  achieve the f i r s t -o rb i t  rendezvous with the target vehicle. Docking with 
the Agena occurred at approximately 1 :34 GET. A t  40 : 30 GET, using  the 
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Agena's primary propulsion eystem, the   f l i gh t  c r e w  increased the apogee of 
the  docked vehicles  to  741.5 nautical miles. while at th i s  altitude, sequences 
of photographic and sc i en t i f i c  experiments w e r e  performed. 
The spacecraft was undocked at 49:55 GET t o  begin the tether  evaluation. 
The 100 f t  te ther  line, which the p i l o t  had at tached  to   the docking bar on 
the previous day's EVA, was unreeled. A light tension was maintained on the 
tether and a slight spinning motion was imparted t o  create a smal l  gravity 
field. . Initial at t i tude  osci l la t ions began t o  damp slowly, and' after 20 min 
the rotat ing combination had become stable. Performance demonstrated tha t  
the  rotat ion of two tethered vehicles was an economical and feasible method 
of achieving long tenn, unattended station keeping. Approximately three h r  
after in i t i a t ion  of the maneuver, the crew fired the aft th rus t e r s   t o  remove 
the tension on the tether line. The docking bar was then pyrotechnically 
jettisoned, releasing the tether. 
A t  6 5 : q  CET, maneuvers were begun t o  perform the coincident-orbit 
rendezvous with the target vehicle. Station keeping was accomplished at 
66:40. 
The re-entry operation was conducted very precisely using the automatic 
mode. Splashdown was 2.5 miles from the prime recovery ship, the U.S.S. Guam. 
There were two significant anomalies that occurred during the Gemini XI 
f l igh t .  These were a failure i n  the radar transponder and a failure of 
stack 2C of the  fue l   ce l l .  
R a d a r  !Cramponder - Infomation taken from the technical debriefing, the 
air t o  ground voice transmissions, and spacecraft and target vehicle telemetry 
showed tha t  i n i t i a l l y  the transponder was operating properly. This data did 
show that the  transponder transmitter was gradually deteriorating. The first 
rendezvous was completed sat isfactor i ly;  however, i n i t i a l  s igns  of failure 
were evident. Eventually complete transmitter failure occurred coincident 
with a failure i n  the  antenna switching circuit. An analysis of the c i rcu i t  
indicated that a failure of diodes ~ ~ 6 1 0  and CR6U in circui t ry  common t o  the 
high voltage enable and s p i r a l  disable functions was  the cause of the  antenna 
switching failure. The nature of t h i s  failure coupled with transponder flight 
performance history  indicated that arcing occurred within the sealed trans- 
mitter assembly. The most probable cause of failure was concluded t o  be a 
leak i n   t h e  sealed transmitter assembly allowing the assembly t o  reach 
cr i t ical  pressure and, thereby, sustain arcing. 
Fuel Cel - Fuel ce l l  s tack  2C failed 54.5 h r  in to  the mission. The 
f ive  remaining stacks operated sat isfactor i ly  in  sharing the  t o t a l  load; how- 
ever, during two periods it was necessary to   ac t iva te  one of the spacecraft 
main batteries to  insure tha t  proper voltage levels were maintained. Post- 
flight analysis led t o  the conclusion tha t  a fire had developed i n  the stack, 
due t o  spontaneous combustion between the  oxygen and hydrogen. However, a 
check valve upstream of the fue l  ce l l  prevented additional hydrogen from 
entering the stack, thus isolat ing the failure. A reevaluation of the stack's 
fabrication and ins ta l la t ion  did not reveal any anomalous conditions; neither 
had continual  monitoring of' stack  pressure  given any indication of impending 
failure. This malf'unction was therefore deemed a random failure. 
Gemini XI1 Mission 
Gemini X I 1  was launched at 3 :46 p.m., EST, on U November 1966. The 
mission's primary objectives were: 
A. Rendezvous and dock with the Agena Target Vehicle. 
B. Perform extensive extravehicular activity. 
The secondary objectives w e r e :  
A. Achieve rendezvous with the ATV during the third revolution. 
B. Conduct docking practice. 
C. Accomplish 13 in-f l ight  experiments. 
D. Conduct a tethered gravity - gradient test wi th  the Agena ta rge t  
E. Perform a successful automatic re-entry. 
F. Perform systems' evaluation. 
G. Utilize large propulsion systems f o r  space maneuvers (by employing 
vehicle 
GATV primary and secondary propulsion systems). 
The spacecraft was inser ted  into an orbi t  with a 151.9 nautical mile 
apogee and a perigee of 86.9 nautical  miles. Rendezvous and docking were 
accomplished during the th i rd  revolution as planned, over the tracking ship 
U.S.S. Coastal Sentry, south of Japan. 
. .  
By applying a retrograde burn of 43 fps using the Agena's secondary 
propulsion system, the configuration was placed i n  a 154 nautical  mile orbi t ,  
so tha t  it could phase with the 12 November t o t a l  solar eclipse over South 
America. A second eclipse - phasing maneuver was subsequently performed, 
enabling the crew to obtain the  first solar eclipse photographs taken from 
space . 
During the course of the mission, t he   p i lo t  performed a t o t a l  of f ive  hr, 
37 min of extravehicular activity, including the  longest duration single EVA 
(two hr, nine min) t o  date. Included i n  t h i s  record was the performance by 
the p i l o t  of measured work tasks at the ATV and at a work s ta t ion  setup  in  
the Gemini adapter section. 
The gravity gradient mode of the tethered vehicle exercise (Ref Gemini 
XI Missiop, page 46 and Stable Orbit Rendezvous, page 293) was successfully 
completed; the entire tethered exercise lasted four hr and 17 min. 
The spacecraft splashed down at 2:21 p.m., EST, on 15 November 1966, 
within 2.7 miles of the planned retrieval point, providing a fur ther  demon- 
s t ra t ion  of the accuracy of the automatic re-entry mode. 
A l l  primary mission objectives w e r e  successfully accomplished, and 
almost all secondary objectives w e r e  achieved as well. The requirement for  
evaluation of the  astronaut maneuvering wit (AMU) was deleted before the 
commencement of the mission; In addition, the plan t o   u t i l i z e  the Agena 
propulsion system t o  reach a 460 mile a l t i tude  while over the U.S. was deleted 
due t o  a suspected problem with the ATV. 
A t  approximately 60:oo GET, during the rendezvous maneuver, the space- 
c r a f t  rendezvous radar/transponder ceased t o  function. Since the R & R was 
not recovered subsequent t o  flight, a posi t ive  ident i f icat ion of the failure 
mode could not be made. A t  the time of the preparation of t h i s  report, a 
review of Spacecraft 8, 11, and 12 launch and qualification test vibration 
data are being conducted. The vendor is also performing transponder tests t o  
further investigate failure modes. 
Eerformance of the fie1 cells was normal during the launch count. A t  
5:45 GET, a water management system problem was revealed by the illumination 
of both section oxygen-water delta pressure lights. A l l  available data 
indicate that the storage volume f o r  water had been depleted by an oxygen leak 
in to  the  water system. This deplet ion resul ted in  per iod of  fuel  cel l  
flooding . 
The f u e l   c e l l   e l e c t r i c a l  performance was affected  to  the extent t h a t  two 
stacks had t o  be shutdown (stacks 2B and 1C) and two others experienced a 
s ignif icant  loss  of power. Both failed stacks exhibited a rapid drop of open 
circuit voltage potential, an indication of a burnout mode. Nevertheless, 
the remaining stacks and batteries provided suf f ic ien t   e lec t r ica l  power t o  
achieve a l l  mission objectives. Development and ground test  data on fue l  
c e l l  anomalies are given i n  McDonnell Report F-205, Gemini Fuel Cell Fkrfor- 
mance Analysis. 
A t  approximately 40 h r  through the mission, the crew reported degraded 
performance of OAMS thrust  chambers Nos. 2 and 4. Tests performed later i n  
the mission with the th rus t  chambers, and post-fl ight analysis of data 
revealed degraded performance from a l l  OAMS a t t i tude  thrusters. The best 
appraisal  of the available  facts  points  to  propellant flow res t r ic t ion  as the 
cause of the performance loss.  "his restriction could have resulted fram 
propellant contamination or the precipitation of i ron  ni t ra te  from the oxi- 
dizer. McDonnell 'Report, F-206, Gemini .%A Anomaly Investigation is  being 
prepared  for  submittal  to NASA. 
Immediately after arming of the RCS A - r i n g ,  regulated pressure rose 
to- a high of 415 psia  (nominal is 295 psia).  Following thruster  Ini t ia t ion,  
however, the regulated pressure decreased t o  normal levels  and standard 
regulator performance was indicated. Post-flight inspection and P I A  tests of 
the regulator revealed no anomalies. Subsequent disasbembling of the regula- 
t o r  at the failure analysis laboratory provided no positive explanation of 
the malfunction; however, scratches were found on the bellows, a metal flake 
was found on the valve seat, and contaminant material was discovered on the 
regulator spring. 
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The contaminant was sent  to  KSC for analysis. Since nomal purging of 
the ring seemed t o  remove the contaminant from the regulator seat and nomal 
system operation was restored, no further  investigation of t h i s  anomaly was 
deemed necessary. 
A t  78:30 GET the pressure in the hydrogen vessel of the RSS rose t o  a 
high of 35'0 psi .  After the f l i g h t  crew had been directed to  posi t ion the 
heater switch t o  O F F  and the heater   c i rcui t  breaker was opened, the pressure 
declined and the mission w a s  able t o  proceed with no further hydrogen malf'unc- 
tion.  Post-flight  investigation of the switch  revealed no  anomaly. ( R e f  
RSS Flight Performance, page 63. ) The cause of the H2 pressure rise was 
assumed t o  be intermittent short pulses of power, less than 2.4 sec in 
duration. This power application may have been due t o  an unstable hydrogen 
tank pressure switch. Reliability data on the pressure switch indicate that 
the unstable mode of t h i s  switch is the most l i ke ly  failure mode. ( R e f  
E lec t r ica l  Memo No. PC-5236, dated 9 January 1967. ) Since the H2 heater has 
a redundant manual back-up, t h i s  anomaly is  not considered c r i t i ca l .  
MAJOR SYSTEMS 
EIECTRICAL SYSTEM 
Power Sources 
The bas ic   e lec t r ica l  power i n  the Gemini Spacecraft i s  provided by 
bat ter ies ,  supplemented by f u e l  c e l l s  on  most missions. Power is supplied 
through a multiple bus DC system in  the  range of 22 t o  30 VDC. Subsystems 
which require closely regulated DC or  AC voltage contain their  own power 
conversion components, thus permitting optimum compatibility during flight 
operations as well as more intensive development and qualification programs. 
The spacecraft parer systems consist of a,main bus, two squib buses, and 
one control bus. The f l i gh t  crew can control interconnection of these sources, 
thus  providing  additional redundancy and maximum power u t i l i za t ion  from a l l  
onboard supplies. 
Pr ior  to  launch, the spacecraft  gets external electrical  power through 
the umbilical to prevent undue depletion of the spacecraft power supply. For 
Spacecraft 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6, batteries provided all the parer required for 
electrically operated equipment. Fuel cells  and battery parer were used on 
a l l  other flights. 
In  addition, ample bat tery power was available for operations two h r  
before launching, and fo r  36 h r  after landing t o  operate recovery equipment. 
The ba t te r ies  can also provide emergency power t o  operate the su i t  compressor 
f o r  12 hr  after landing. 
Fuel C e l l  System. - !the General Electric fue l  ce l l  provided the main 
supply of e lec t r i ca l  power f o r  seven Gemini Spacecraft (Spacecraft 5 and 7 
through 12). The fuel c e l l  subsystem i s  made up of two GE fuel cel l  sections 
and an AiResearch reactant supply system (RSS) . (See Fig. 7. ) Both fue l  
cel l   sect ions and the  RSS are located  in the adapter equipnent section of 
the spacecraft. The RSS i s  discussed in Reactant Supply System, page 59 of 
t h i s  report. 
The fuel cell ,  supplied with necessary reactants and coolant, provides 
the main bus parer (renging from 22 t o  30 VDC) f o r  all mission requirements 
from inser t ion  unt i l  switchover. During the prelaunch and the launch phases, 
the fuel cel l  operates  in parallel with the main silver-zinc batteries, 
insuring parer continuity in the  event of the latter malfunction. 
A. Fuel Cell Technology - A f u e l   c e l l  is an electrochemical device that 
converts the energy of a fuel and an oxidant  into  electricity by sustaining 
a continuous chemical reaction. Reversing the process of electrolysis ,  the 
fue l   ce l l   c r ea t e s  water as a by-product in a hydrogen-oxygen ion exchange that 
liberates e l ec t r i ca l  energy. 
The electrolyte  of the GE fuel c e l l  is a thin, treated sheet of 
polymer plast ic .  A catalytic electrode structure is bonded t o  each side of 
this sheet t o  stimulate ion-electron flow at relat ively low temperatures. The 
fuel  cel l  contains  an anode and a cathode. When hydrogen fue l  is brought in to  
contact with the anode and a catalyst ,  the  hydrogen atom releases an electron 
t o  the load drawn by the anode, and also releases ions. A so l id  polymer 
electrolyte  keeps the  hydrogen and oxygen gases separate, but allows the 
hydrogen ions to migrate through to the cathode, where they combine with oxygen 
and with electrons that have passed through the external   c i rcui t ,   thus  pro- 
ducing water. 
Balance is maintained by the migration of electrons through the 
e lec t r ica l  loads  and the  migration of ions through the  electrolyte.  Inter-  
ruption of the electron flow in the external  e lectr ical  c i rcui t  s tops the 
reaction. 
The cell   converts chemical energy t o   e l e c t r i c a l  energy with about 50% 
efficiency. The remainder of the energy is largely rejected as heat. For 
dissipation of t h i s  waste heat, the   fue l   ce l l s   a re   d i rec t ly  connected t o  the 
environmental control system coolant loops. The temperature of t he  coolant 
entering the fuel ce l l   sec t ions  i s  controlled by an ECS vernatherm valve, 
which mixes coolant returning from the spacecraft radiator with coolant coming 
d i rec t ly  from the pump packages, thus maintaining a temperature balance. 
The water created by the fuel c e l l  must be removed as the reaction 
continues. The pressure i n  t h e  oxygen cavi ty  in  the Fuel c e l l  (approximately 
22.2 ps i )  i s  used to   d r ive  the water through the porous sintered glass 
separator plates into the water collection basins beneath the cell .  The 
pressure  in these basins i s  maintained at about 20 p s i  and regulated by an 
ECS pressure regulator. 
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The Gemini f u e l   c e l l  system comprises six e lec t r i ca l ly  independent 
power-producing units (stacks). (See Fig. 8. ) Each stack consists of 32 cells, 
connected e l ec t r i ca l ly  i n  series. The stacks are housed, i n  groups of three, 
i n  two cylindrical  containers 0.610 meter long and 0.305 meter i n  diamter. 
Operating together, the two sections produce up t o  2 kw at peak power. The 
crew can  %hut  dom  individual  stacks at w i l l ,  o r   se lec t  any combination of 
stacks within the system. Each fuel ce l l  sec t ion  weighs 68 l b  and produces 
up t o  1 kw of DC power at 26.5 V, minimum load, o r  at 23.3 V, peak load. The 
latter values are exhibited at the end of rated life. In i t ia l  vo l tage  is 
approximately 2 V higher i n  each case. 
The fue l   ce l l   sec t ion  is the smallest field-replaceable power- 
producing uni t  of the Gemini f u e l  c e l l  system. An interface plate,  which 
contains the hydrogen, oxygen, and water valves, the coolant ports, and the 
e l e c t r i c a l  connectors is mounted on each cylindrical container. 
To prevent a malfunction from impairing the en t i re  system operation, 
stack is isolated and independently supplied wi th  regulated gaseous hydrogen 
and oxygen. In addition, each stack within a section had i ts  own hydrogen 
i n l e t  and purge valves. One oxygen purge valve is also provided f o r  each 
section. Although purging is normally performed by section, individual stacks 
can be hydrogen-isolated o r  purged on the command of cabin control equipnent. 
The water collection basins, one beneath each stack, are connected in 
series; their  output can be isolated from the spacecraft water system by means 
of a f u e l   c e l l  latch solenoid valve. 
B. Developent and Qualification Tests fo r  the Fuel C e l l  - A significant 
advance i n  the state-of-the-art involved in the fuel c e l l  was accomplished 
wi th  the aid of an extensive development and qualification test program. 
E a r l y  development tests concentrated principally upon var ious  cel l  
designs, arranged in configurations of fewer than 32 ce l l s  each. These tests 
served the dual purpose of developing ef f ic ien t  assembly techniques and 
verifying, on a small scale ,  cel l  performance for various current densities, 
coolant temperatures, and other operational parameters. 
Performance investigations were conducted on t h i s  configuration, at 
the section level, to evaluate operational procedures, cel l  and stack temp 
profiles,  purge flow rates, total  heat rejection, vibration and l i f e  l imiting 
factors  . 
These tests culminated i n   t h e  first production-type sections of the 
P2B design. 
Qualification testing  of  the P2B cel l  design included vibration, 
acceleration and shock tests. The P2B test  sections were successfully tested 
under the conditions producing en e lec t r i ca l  load consistent w i t h  Gemini 
mission requirements. 
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F U E L   C E L L  STACK CONTAINING INDIVIDUAL 
FUEL CELL ASSEMBLIES 
HYDROGEN SIDE OF INDIVIDUAL CELL WITH OXYGEN SIDE OF INDIVIDUAL CELL ASSEMBLY 
MEMBRANE AND ANODE INSTALLED PRIOR  TO  MATING  WITH  THE  MEMBRANE 
FIGURE 8 FUEL CELL STACK AND CELLS 
Based on the service l i f e  expectance of the p2B design, a number of 
design improvements w e r e  developed and were incorporated  into a new configura- 
tion, known as the p3 design. Verification tests of the new design were 
conducted t o  determine such items as coolant and pressure level requirements, 
and operating life. The qualification test program imposed conventional limits 
of acceleration, low temperature, temperature-pressure, and vibration. Three 
simulated mission performance evaluation tests were conducted which demon- 
s t ra ted   tha t  t he  p3 design would meet operational requirements. 
Separate  qualification test  programs were conducted on c r i t i c a l  com- 
ponents such as valves, membrane and electrode assemblies, and manifolds. 
Deficiencies encountered were resolved on an individual basis and components 
were retested as necessary t o  prove the  designs. The f u e l  c e l l s  were 
integrated with an RSS and a simulated spacecraft   distribution system and 
were operated in   several  ambient tests and under temperature-pressure and 
vibration conditions. The fuel  cel l  sect ions performed adequately i n  these 
tests, although a design problem involving water valve corrosion was encoun- 
tered. 
A stack storage program was conducted t o  determine any performance 
degradation or leakage. The results indicated that the storage time after 
in i t i a l   ac t iva t ion  of the f u e l   c e l l  stacks must be limited, since performance 
decreases in direct proportion to storage time. It was also determined, how- 
ever, that the  voltage at second activation (at launch) is greater than the 
voltage level at first activation. 
Therefore, the following procedure was employed. A t  the time of 
premate, the system was  ini t ia l ly   act ivated,  and then drained of product water 
and flushed wi th  dist i l led water t o  reduce corrosion hazards. The old water 
shutoff valve was replaced wi th  a new valve pr ior  t o  flight. This i n i t i a l  
activation conditioned the stack electrodes, thus providing higher VoJtage 
levels during second activation. Experience gained from labora tory tes t s  
(and Spacecraft 5 f l i g h t )  demonstrated no lo s s   t o  system performance fo r  at 
least 30 days after the first exposure t o  product water. The techniques 
evolved held fuel   cel l   degradat ion  to  limits of the original acceptance 
c r i te r ia .  
C. Reliabi l i ty  and Quality Assurance Program Results - The r e l i a b i l i t y  
and quality assurance program on the fuel cells comprised essentially  four 
series of tests: (1) a nine-stack forced-failure test  program, (2) a 5 s  
sampling of the manufactured stacks, (3 ) a valve endurance test  program, and 
(4) a number of stress-margin tests. 
The nine-stack forced-failure test  program was run at loading and 
environmental conditions that were w e l l  beyond specification limits. These 
tests showed that the  most s ignif icant   res t ra int  on fuel cell   operation was 
temperature. Ibnger l i f e  resulted as the  coo lah  inlet temperature was 
lowered. The tests a l so  showed that performance was lowered when the operati= 
pressure of t h e  hydrogen was reduced even though stack l i fe  w a s  not signifi- 
cantly  affected. 
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The manufacturing consistency and quality of production  cells was 
monitored by sampling e lec tp ica l  performance capabili ty of 596 of the  stacks 
during l i f e  endurance tests. These stacks had an average l i f e  of 1086 hr, 
which well exceeded the  requirements  for a 14-day Gemini mission. 
Endurance (cycling) tests were performed on the oxygen, hydrogen, and 
water valves and the pressure bellows to determine their  endurance and t o  
ascertain w e a r  out pattern and failure rate. Al three bellows were tested 
t o  129 x 103 cycles and the three 02 purge valves were tested t o  194 x 103 
before failure occurred, Each i n l e t  and purge valve was t e s t e d   t o  21 x lo3 
cycles. Fifty percent of these failed, but  resul ts  compared favorabu  with 
the 15 x 103 cycles quoted by the switch manufacturer. The H N  valve was 
subjected t o  8 x 103 cycles and no discrepancies were encountered. 
Stress margin tests were conducted'on the water separator assembly 
t o  .determine the ex ten t  to  which pressure, temperature, flow, and vibration 
would a f fec t  i ts  operation. These tests demonstrated that the assembly could 
withstand stresses i n  excess of the SCD 52-79700 specification for normal 
operation. O f  the  e ight  uni ts  tested, f ive  were tested for leakage under 
normal condition and exceeded specification limits of 50 cc/hr. !The remaining 
uni t s  were subjected to   t h ree  tests: high temperature r&dom vibration, pres- 
sure cycling, from both the water and the oxygen sides, and imposition of a 
water pressure 20.5 p s i  greater than the oxygen pressure (reverse pressure). 
These tests indicated that the assemblies could withstand conditions 
i n  excess of the required limits before leakage above the established specifi-  
cation was evident. 
D. Significant Anomalies and Corrective Action f o r  Fuel Cells - The major 
anomalies encountered during several Gemini missions and the corrective action 
taken are presented in the following paragraphs. 
Spacecraft 2 - Elec t r ica l  power for Spacecraft 2 was supplied by four 
silver-zinc main batteries, three silver-zinc squib batteries, and four si lver- 
zinc special  pallet  batteries.  Al fuel ce l l  s tack  hydrogen inlet  valves were 
closed  pr ior   to  launch because a prelaunch f a c i l i t y  malfunction made timely 
activation impossible, the  hoped for engineering evaluation of f l i g h t  perfor- 
mance was not accomplished. However, in-flight information was obtained on 
launch ef fec ts  on the  pressurized static reactant supply system. The fue l  
cel l  sect ions of the first (P2B) design, as used i n  t h i s  mission, are mentioned 
i n  Development and Qualification Tests f o r  the Fuel Cell, page 53. 
Spacecraft 5 - In preparation for Spacecraft 5 delivery and launch, 
tests indicated an activation and storage limitation. Corrosion of the fue l  
cell shutoff valve and the  spacecraft plumbing was eliminated by changing the 
material of the valve and water connections and by flushing and drying the 
system afer the first activation. (Ref  Development and Qualification Tests 
fo r  the Fuel Cell, page 53.) In addition, a valve fo r  product water was 
installed.  This valve was improved for  later missions. 
Contamination of t he  by-product water, primarily by organic acids, 
resulted i n   t h e  withdrawal of the plan t o  use by-product water for  drinking. 
(Ref Product-Water Potability, page 59 . ) Therefore, a storage tank was 
ins ta l led  between the by-product water out le t  and the ECS.pressure regulator. 
A three-ply Teflon bladder i n  t h i s  tank isolated  the by-product water from 
the cabin water supply. 
During the .Spacecraft 5 f l igh t ,   the  fuel ce l l  performance was nominal, 
although system problems led. t o  unusual modes of fue l  ce l l  operation. The 
following changes w e r e  therefore m, on later spacecraft : (1) coolant pump 
inverters w e r e  redesigned t o  give a high o r  low flow capabi l i ty   for  each loop, 
thus conserving power, and (2) coolant loops w e r e  reconnected to   e s t ab l i sh  an 
independent coolant flow t o  each section. 
Attention  during the mission was focused on the water management 
system when calculated water production rates created concern over adequate 
storage volume. Actions result ing from t h i s  on later flights were t o  improve 
measurement of astronaut water consumption thus improving water production 
rate determination and the storage capacity required for maintaining the  water 
pressure at acceptable levels was greatly increased. 
Spacecraft 7 - The fuel cell configuration on Spacecraft 7 w a s  essen- 
tially the same as that for Spacecraft 5. During the mission, an apparent 
blockage or   res t r ic t ion  developed i n  the water management system, which 
periodically affected the performance of the three stacks of one f u e l   c e l l  
section. The evidence did not indicate a system design problem, however, and 
all phases of the mission were accomplished sat isfactor i ly .  
Pictures taken of Spacecraft 7 in orbit disclosed an ice formation 
at the hydrogen vent port. Modifications w e r e  made t o  the vent on later space- 
c r a f t   t o  prevent t h i s  icing. 
Spacecraft 8 - The Spacecraft 8 f u e l   c e l l  system was  the same as the  
Spacecraft 7 system, except f o r  the hydrogen vent modification. Flight perfor- 
mance of the f u e l   c e l l  during t h i s  mission was nominal. 
Spacecraft 9 - The fuel cell  configuration installed on Spacecraft 9 
was the same as that used on Spacecraft 8. The stacks were activated about 
15 h r  before the scheduled launch on 17 My 1966. However, failure of the 
Agena Target Vehicle t o  achieve orbit resulted i n  a two-week postponement of 
the mission. 
Because of apprehension that the  twice-activated stacks would produce 
a reduced voltage (Development and Qualification Tests f o r  the Fuel Cell, 
page 53), a new fuel cell  system was ins ta l led  and was launched on 3 June 
1966, as par t  of the Spacecraft 9 mission. This system was nominally activated 
and performed without  malfunction  throughout the mission 
Spacecraft 10 - To make room in the adapter section of Spacecraft 10 
f o r  two addi t ional   orbi t   a t t i tude and maneuver system ( O m )  bottles,  modifi- 
cations w e r e  made t o  the f u e l  cell  system. The l i f e  support oxygen supply, 
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which had provided oxygen only t o  the cabin, was redesigned t o  supply the 
fue l  cell, also. The ins ta l la t ion  and activation of t he  f l i gh t  system was 
accomplished without problems, and system performance was nominal throughout 
the mission. 
SpacecraFt 11 - The Spacecraft 11 f u e l   c e l l  system was the same as 
those on Spacecraft 7 through 10. In preparation for the first stack activa- 
t ion  at premate, the system originally installed in Spacecraft  ll received an 
inadvertent overpressurization of oxygen. This imbalance was found t o  be 
caused by a malfunctioning aerospace ground equipment (ACE) regulator. The 
f l i gh t   fue l   ce l l   s ec t ions  were therefore replaced and the AGE regulator 
repaired; the old fuel cel l  sect ions were se t - a s ide   fo r  bench tes t ing in  order  
t o  determine their condition. 
During the first activation load check of the replacement sections, 
an AGE valve failure caused helium t o  be introduced on the hydrogen side of 
the cells of both stack sections. The problem area was isolated from the 
system and hydrogen was reintroduced, whereupon a normal deactivation was 
begun. 
It was subsequently discovered that ,  due t o  a procedural error, 
approximately 20 h r  of deactivation were accomplished without coolant flow 
being circulated through the sections. An investigation was undertaken with 
the following results: (1) the sections were adjudged acceptable fo r  flight; 
(2) the AGE components were given a special inspection and preventive mainte- 
nance measures were taken; (3) part icular  a t tent ion was given t o   f u e l   c e l l  
protective procedures. 
The launch of Spacecraft 11 was twice delayed due t o  launch vehicle 
problems. During the delay, the f u e l  c e l l s  remained activated and were 
operated at three amp per stack. Once into the mission, the C stack of Sect. 2 
failed at 54 h r  and 31 min elapsed time. Review of the flight data revealed 
t h a t  t h i s  was a rapid failure, most probably a t t r ibu tab le   to  burnout; no 
indication of impending failure had been received. It was impossible from 
the mission data t o  determine a single cause for t h i s  failure. Even with the 
failed stack, the e l e c t r i c a l  power generating capability of the f u e l   c e l l  
system was nominal, and all mission requirements f o r  power were met. 
Spacecraft 12 - Fuel cell  ins ta l la t ion  and activation (Ref Development 
and Qualification Tests for the Fuel Cell, page 53) proceeded normally. All 
data indicated normal performance during the launch count. A t  5 :45 in to  the 
mission, both section oxygen-water delta pressure lights displayed t h e  
presence of an anomaly in the water management system. While no f i n a l  deter- 
mination of the fa i lure  mode can be m a d e ,  indications are tha t  a depletion of 
the  water storage volume, used t o  maintain pressure control, had occurred. 
The cause of the depletion was most probably the leakage of oxygen into  the 
water system. A s  a result of the loss, fuel c e l l  floodinR occurred. 
The e l e c t r i c a l  performance of the f u e l   c e l l  was affected t o  the extent 
that during the mission two stacks had t o  be shut d m  (stacks 2B and 1C) and 
two others experienced a s ignif icant  loss  of power. Both fa i led s tacks 
exhibited a rapid drop of open circuit   voltage  potential  - an indication of a 
burnout mode.  However, the remaining stacks and batteries provided sufficient 
e l ec t r i ca l  power t o  achieve a l l  mission objectives. A t  the time of t h i s  
writing, McDonnell Report F-205, Gemini Fuel C e l l  Performance Analysis, i s  
being prepared for  submi t ta l  to  NASA. It provides a detailed study of fuel 
c e l l  performance and corrective action. 
E. Product-Water Potabili ty - Because of the o r ig ina l   i n t en t   t o   u t i l i ze  
f u e l  cel l  product water for  astronaut consumption, a tank for  storage of the 
product water was mounted on the ECS oxygen module on Spacecraft 2. However, 
p r i o r   t o  the Gemini V flight (the next mission t o   u t i l i z e  the fue l   ce l l s ) ,  
tes ts   indicated contamination of the  by-product water by organic acids. 
Neutralization of the corrosive and acidic   qual i t ies  of the product 
water was attempted by using ion exchange columns. These columns were t o  be 
mounted on the f u e l  c e l l  module, one  column f o r  each section. However, 
significant  diversity appeared among the product water samples obtained i n  
testing; experimentation with different   res ins  failed t o  produce an ion column 
which would be sui table  for  a l l  applications. Therefore the decision was made 
t o  store the fuel c e l l  product water and provide additional containers for 
potable water. 
!lbe following storage provisions were therefore made: 
1. On Spacecraft 5, two  20411. diameter tanks were installed.  The 
A tank contained drinking water inside a bladder, pressurized by gas. The 
B tank contained drinking water inside a bladder, and both product water and 
gas outside the bladder. 
tank, containing the drinking water, was pressurized by product water and the 
B tank contained gas i n  the bladder and fuel c e l l  water outside. Because of 
the Long duration of t h i s  mission, a th i rd  tank was instal led,   in  which 
drinking water was pressurized by oxygen. 
product water was pressurized by nitrogen, i n  the other drinking water sur- 
rounded a bladder containing product water. 
-
2. The same tanks were u t i l i zed  on Spacecraft 7, except that the A 
3. On Spacecraft 8 and up,  two tanks were provided. In  one, f u e l  c e l l  
A more detailed analysis of t h i s  problem is presented i n  McDonnell's 
design note History of the Gemini Drinking Water System, dated 6 July 1966. 
Reactant Supply System. 
A. Design Concept - Reactant supplies for the f u e l   c e l l  are located in  
the adapter section of the spacecraft  in two double walled, vacuum insulated, 
spherical containers. The reactants, oxygen and hydrogen, are s tored in  
these containers at supercrit ical  pressures and at cryogenic temperatures. 
They provide a "single phase" fluid (i.e., neither a gas nor a liquid.) t o   t h e  
heat exchangers and to  the  dua l  @-Hz pressure regulators. Upon reaching the 
heat exchangers, each flu3.d i s  converted t o  a gas, and supplied t o  the fue l  
cells at operating temperatures. 
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Several advantages accrue t o  system design through the  use of t h i s  
cryogenic storage. Because this  s torage can be accomplished at lower pres- 
sures than would be feasible with a similar quantity of gas  s tored  in   the 
88me amount of space, the  danger of s t ruc tura l  failure is great ly  reduced. For 
the  same reason, associated components can be fabricated from l igh te r  materiala 
Furthermore, waste heat from the ECS coolant  circuits is u t i l i zed   in   the   hea t  
exchangers, instead of being vented overboard. 
If, on the other hand, the reactants were stored as low-pressured 
liquids, an additional system to   c r ea t e   t he  necessary delivery pressure at 
high flow rates would be required; another disadvantage of t h i s  method would 
be that weightlessness and certain  acceleration  forces  mighbat times provide 
a two phase (gas and l iquid) or unstable,  supply of reactants t o  the heat 
exchangers. 
RSS oxygen is s tored in  the spacecraft at approximately -297OF at 
14.7 psia; RSS hydrogen is stored at approximately -423OF at the same pressure. 
The tanks are i n i t i a l l y  f i l led with the hydrogen and oxygen gas which is 
replaced wi th  cryogenic reactant l2 t o  24 h r  before launch. Because the tanks 
are f i l l ed  from the bottom, it is impossible t o  drive out a l l  the gas. This 
results i n  what i s  known as a two phase condition (i. e . , gas and l iquid)  In 
order  to  res tore  the s ingle  phase condition, the heaters within the tanks 
are energized, causing the cryogenic liquid t o  expand. Since this expansion 
takes place in a closed tank, the internal pressure rises. The gas molecules 
are pressure driven into a homogeneous association with the   l iqu id  molecules. 
This campressed f l u i d  state i s  the single phase condition which i s  necessary 
f o r  optimum system operation. 
The heaters remain ON until normal operating pressures are reached 
(approximately 910 p s i  f o r  oxygen, 240 p s i  f o r  hydrogen). Maximum bot t le  
pressure is carefully maintained by the relief  valves on the heat exchangers. 
A t  both high and low reactant density (i.e., during the  i n i t i a l ,  and f i n a l  
phases of the mission), minimum heater activation is  required. When the 
reactants are at approximately a middle density, at the midpoint of the flight, 
natural  heat leak from the storage containers supplies minimum cryogen flow. 
The flow of reac tan ts   to  the fuel c e l l  system is reduced to   de l ivery  
pressures by the dual 02-H~ pressure regulators and dual relief valves. The 
pressure regulators use the regulated gas pressure in the by-product water 
storage tank as a reference t o  regulate the hydrogen pressure, which in   tu rn  
i s  used as the reference to regulate the oxygen pressure. (A schematic of 
the RSS system i s  i l l u s t r a t ed   i n  Fig. 9. ) 
The system senses the generation of product water, and permits suffi- 
cient reactant flow to the fue l   ce l l   c av i ty   t o  maintain a constant pressure on 
the porous glass separator plates above the water basins. (Ref Fuel Cell 
Technology, page 51. ) Product water pressure is maintained at approximately 
20 psi. Hydrogen pressure i s  reduced t o  approximately 21.7 p s i  f o r  delivery 
to  the  fue l  ce l l ;  oxygen pressure is reduced t o  approximately 22.2 psi. Thus 
the regulators  are set t o  maintain a hydrogen pressure of approximately 1.70 
psi  greater  than  the  product water pressure, and an oxygen pressure 
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FIGURE 9 FUEL  CELL RSS SCHEMATIC 
approximately 0.5 p s i  greater than the hydrogen pressure. These pressures 
are  read cnd; on the  differential   pressure meter i n  the cabin and on ground 
telemetry. 
The temperature of the reactants provided t o   t h e  fuel c e l l  i s  con- 
t ro l l ed  by the reactant supply heat exchangers, located immediately downstream 
of the  storage tanks. mese heat exchangers automatically control the reactant 
temperature by absorbing and transmitting heat from the recirculating  coolant 
f luid.  When leaving the storage tanks, the temperature of the oxygen i s  i n  
the range of -297OF t o  -1600~; the temperature of the hydrogen ranges 
between 423OF and -3600~. Before the  reactants are supplied t o  the f u e l  
cells, the heat exchangers ra i se  their  temperatures t o  a minimum of 50°F and 
a maximum of IJ+O°F. 
Normal operation of the fue l   ce l l   requi res  t ha t  the system be purged 
several times during a mission. Purging removes ine r t  gases that accumulate 
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within the cells and res tores   fue l   ce l l   opera t ion   to  near its original  level.  
The frequency of the  purgesis  in  proportion  to the section current being 
drawn. For section currents of 18 t o  30. amp, a purge is required every four 
hr; for currents of 30 t o  45 amp, a purge is necessary every two hr. The 
normal section purge takes approximately ll sec  for  hydrogen and two min f o r  
oxygen. 
I n  addi t ion to  the components mentioned, provisions for servicing the 
system require shutoff valves which i so la te  the and H2 storage tanks from 
the rest of the  RSS, and check valves which permit gaseous reactants t o  be 
introduced from AGE sources. 
B. Development Test for  the  Reactant Supply System - The components of 
the RSS were developed t o  meet the specific applications of a cryogenic, 
supercr i t ical  environment. Subjected t o  extensive development tes t ing  were 
the cryogenic storage tanks, the water and gas pressure regulators, the heat 
exchangers, the control, check, and relief valves, and the gauging systems. 
This development t e s t ing  evolved the a b i l i t y   t o  use the same type of 
heat exchanger i n  both hydrogen and oxygen systems. In addition, since the 
oxygen portion of the  RSS was similar t o   t h a t  of the environmental control 
system (ECS), an interchange of information and hardware was possible in 
cer ta in  areas. 
Development tes t ing  of both the hydrogen and oxygen high pressure 
relief valves revealed internal leakage and an out-of-tolerance condition 
caused by w e a r  on internal operating parts. New valves which held tolerances 
t o  required specifications were therefore tested; in addition, revised inspec- 
t i on  and cleaning procedures were adopted. 
Tests conducted on the hydrogen cryogenic containers revealed the need 
fo r  a redesign because the internal retaining nuts were backing off under 
vibration. Additional testing verified that new locking techniques would 
withstand  vibration. 
C. Qualification Tests for  the  RSS - Wherever possible, qual i f icat ion 
of the reactant supply system was demonstrated at the sys.tem as w e l l  as at 
the component level, due t o  the close interrelationship of all components i n  
supplying  satisfactory performance. 
The RSS qual i f icat ion test  s ta tus  is  swmarized i n  Table 2. All 
subassemblies and components were successfully subjected to the complete test 
program, which includes environmental, dynamic and temperature-altitude 
testing. 
I n  addition t o  t h i s  program, both the oxygen and hydrogen subsystems 
were successfully subjected t o  six 14-day simulated missions. Test conditions 
covered the  full range of f lu id   quant i t ies ,  system pressures and internal-  
'heater duty-cycles expected i n  Gemini f l ights .  In  addition, fuel-cell purge 
cycles were simulated t o  include the effect  of sudden, brief flow rate 
excursions. 
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TABLE 2 QUALIFICATION STATUS - REACTANT SUPPLY SYSTEM 
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D. RSS Flight Performance - The RSS performed with only minor anomalies 
on Spacecraft 2, 7 and 8. Shortly after the launch of Spacecraft 5, the 
oxygen pressure control heater failed. As a resul t ,  oxygen pressure decreased 
below the normal control range; however, the system continued t o  perform 
sa t i s f ac to r i ly  at the lower pressure level. It was not possible t o  determine 
whether t h i s  failure occurred within the heater  or i n  the spacecraft w i r i n g .  
The following corrective action was therefore taken: 
1. Redundant wiring was provided to   t he  oxygen heater. 
, 2 , - A  high-pressure crossfeed was ins ta l led  linking the ECS oxygen 
supply tank and the fuel cel l  oxygen reactant tank. lhis crossfeed comec- 
t ion,  made downstream of the heat exchangers, allowed yarm oxygen f r o m  the 
ECS tank t o  be supplied t o  the RSS tank i n  the event of an RSS heater malfunc- 
tion. Pressurization from one tank would be sufficient to pressurize both 
systems with the crossfekd on. The possibility of another failure was 
minimized, since the ECS oxygen tank has redundant heaters. 
The long-mission hydrogen tank in  spacecraft  7 was modified t o  improve 
its thermal performance .by adding a regenerative cooling line, insulated 
container mounts, and an external wrapping of several layers of Mylar. A 
pyrotechnic pinch-off tube cutter was added t o  blow open a valve i n  the outer 
hydrogen vessel iil the event of heat leak during the mission. Blowing t h i s  
valve allowed the pressure of the space vacuum to   r e s to re  the vacuum between 
the inner and outer   bot t les  of the hydrogen vessel, thus holding the  heat 
leakage t o  a minimum. 
Subsequent t o  Gemini VII, all spacecraft  uti l ized the short-mission 
hydrogen vessel and either a short-mission RSS oxygen vessel cross-connected 
t o  a long-mission ECS oxygen vessel (Gemini VI11 and IX) or  a shared long- 
mission ECS oxygen vessel alone (Gemini X through X I ) .  m o t e c h n i c  pinch-off 
tube  cutters were added t o  each of the hydrogen vessels  for a l l  remaining 
spacecraft. 
A t  26:58 in to  the Gemini IX mission, the hydrogen vessel indicated 
zero fluid quantity, both on the cabin readouts and through telemetry. Post- 
flight investigation revealed tha t  the panel gauge, i ts  internal  telemetry 
potentiometer, and the gauge-control output circuitry w e r e  operating properly. 
It was therefore concluded that the failure had occurred i n  the quantity 
sensor  or  in  the sensor-to-controller w i r i n g .  Since both of these potent ia l  
failure points   are   in  the equipment adapter, further failure analysis was 
impossible. However, since all other data indicated that the RSS conkinued t o  
function properly, loss of hydrogen quantity indication was f e l t  t o  be an 
insignificant anomaly, and the mission continued with no need t o  u t i l i z e  
either back-up systems or  alternate procedures. 
Special operating procedures were written  for  experimental  in-flight 
use of the hydrogen pinch-off-tube cutters on Spacecraft 9 through 12. bss  
of the hydrogen quantity readout on Spacecraft 9 prevented precise assessment 
of the thermal performance improvement. The cut te r  was again successfully 
blown on Spacecraft 10 but the lack of long-duration constant-extraction-rate 
periods prevented accurate performance determinations. On Spacecraft 11 the 
hydrogen vessel exhibited a 9.5 improvement (heat-leak decrease) 24 h r  after 
blowing tha valve; on Spacecraft 12 flight data confirmed a 22s improvement. 
It is apparent t h a t  valve blowing i s  ef fec t ive   in  improving vessel performance 
t o  the original as-built  level,  thereby nullifying the degradation which 
occurs i n  the months pr ior  t o  flight. There is no indication, however, tha t  
t h i s  action improves the vessel beyond the or iginal  performance limits. 
A t  78:30 h r  in to  the Gemini XI1 mission, the pressure i n  the hydrogen 
vessel of the RSS rose t o  350 psi (240 psi is the normal operating pressure). 
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. This si tuat ion was corrected by directing the crew to reposit ion the heater 
switch f'rtnn AU!K) t o  OFIF. Subsequently the  Hz02 heater circuit  breaker 'was 
opened. Analysis demonstrated tha t  t he  heater had been intermittently 
activated over a lCQ-min period during the H2 pressure increnient. However, 
flight data revealed that after switch operation the tank pressure gave 
indicat ions of  decl ining-prior  to  the opening of the circuit breaker. Post- 
flight  investigation  included  an  inspection of the  connector potting, .of the 
w i r e  bundles, and of the  switch mounting. No shorting conditions were 
revealed. The heater switch was then removed f o r  failure analysis, during 
which it was subjected t o  x-ray inspection, contact IR drop measurements, 
cycling, dielectric testing, and dissection. No discrepancies w e r e  found as 
a result of t h i s  investigation. Because of adapter loss, it was not possible 
t o  determine if  failure i n  the pressure-switch o r   i n   t h e  adapter loss, it 
was not possible t o  determine i f  failure i n  the pressure-switch o r   i n   t h e  
adapter wiring had caused the anomaly. Once the heater had been deactivated, 
the mission was able t o  proceed with no f" ther  RSS incident. 
Batteries. 
A. System Concept - Three types of silver-oxide zinc Eagle Picher 
batteries were employed on Gemini Spacecraft. The standard complement was 
four 45 amp/hr main batteries,  located in  the re-entry module, three 15 amp/hr 
squib batteries, stowed i n  the spacecraft right hand equipment bay, and, f o r  
spacecraft which did not employ fue l   ce l l s ,  three 400 amp/hr batteries 
in s t a l l ed  in  the adapter section. (See Fig. 10. ) A l l  the  batteries are 
activated and sealed at sea level pressure; all are capable of operating in 
any a t t i t ude   i n  a weightless state. 
Each battery case has a pressure relief valve t o  permit the escape 
of gases. Battery temperatures are controlled by mounting the battery cases 
in direct  contact wi th  spacecraft coldplates. 
In every case, prime consideration was given t o  the maximum power-to- 
weight and power-to-volume rat ios ,  and t o  high reliabil i ty,  storage,  and 
activated life. Simplified activation and test  procedures, plus minimized 
handling requirements, were important factors in the design and development 
of these batteries. 
A significant advancement i n  the state-of-the-art was the use of 
titanium instead of s ta in less  steel as the case material i n  both the main 
battery and the squib battery. This substi tution resulted i n  a weight 
decrease of 16% or  more with no loss of bat tery strength. 
B. Main Batteries - The four batteries in s t a l l ed   i n  the re-entry module 
supplied a portion of the main bus parer during launch and all of the main 
bus power during the re-entry, landing, and post-landing phases of t he  mission. 
Each of these batteries has a rated capacity of 45 amp/hr at a discharge rate 
of 20 amp and an activated stand l i f e  of 30 days. An analysis of individual 
bat tery performance based on telemetered data and post-mission tes t ing  
indicated tha t  each battery  possessed an average capacity of 49.32 amp/hr 
at potent ia ls  up t o  20 volts. 
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FIGURE 10 ADAPTER BATTERY MODULE 
The change to titanium cases increased the performance at 24 vol t s  
from 45 h r  per pound of bat tery weight t o  54 h r  per pound. Estimated mission 
loads on the four  batteries  varied from 32.0 amp/hr on Gemini V t o  118.01* 
amp/hr on Gemini XII, with an average mission load of 55.12 amp/hr per space- 
craft through the Gemini XI1 f l ight .  (-is figure includes fuel cell  back-up 
usage pr ior   to   re t rof i re .  ) 
C. Squib Batteries - The three squib batteries supply power f o r  squib- 
activated pyrotechnic devices throughout the mission; in addition, they 
provide power t o   t h e  common control bus for the relays and solenoids t o  the 
environmental, communication, instrumentation, and propulsion  systems. These 
batteries are mechanically and e lec t r ica l ly   i so la ted  from all other batteries 
i n  the system. 
To provide a redundant power supply in the event of t he  malfunction 
of the squib battery section, the astronauts can connect squib c i r c u i t r y   t o  
the main bat ter ies .  
Each squib battery has a rated capacity of 15 amp/hr, an activated 
stand l i fe  of 14 days, and a power-to-weight r a t i o  of 42 watt-hr per pound 
of bat tery weight. Post-flight discharge testing on each battery indicated 
an average capacity of 14.73 amp/hr. An additional property of t h i s  ba t t e ry  
i s  i ts  a b i l i t y   t o  respond rapidly t o  high loading conditions, making it 
especially effective in firing high-load, short-duration squibs. 
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I Power delivered  to  the.   spacecraft  by the  three  squib batteries was 
estimated t o  range from a low of 6.0 amp/hr on the Gemini V I  mission t o  a 
high O f  27.4 amp/hr on the  Gemini V mission. 
I n  addi t ion   to  the ins ta l la t ion  on the Gemini Spacecraft, two 15 amp/ 
h r  squib batteries were mounted i n  the augmented ta rge t  docking adapter (ATDA) 
;.' for  the  Gemini M A mission. Their purpose was t o  supply power t o  the squib 
:' bus for ATDA/launch vehicle separation, for shroud separation, and for RCS 
pyrotechnic devices. 
D. Adapter Batteries - Adapter batteries were used i n  Spacecraft 3, 4 
and 6 .  Spacecraft 3 and 6 each had three 400 amp/hr batteries ins ta l led  i n  
the adapter section; these batteries provided the primary source of e l ec t r i ca l  
power f o r  the two relatively short  missions. Spacecraft 4, the only spacecraft 
t o  f ly  an extended mission (four days) without fuel cells ,  required six 400 
amp/hr batteries. 
On the three missions in which these batteries were uti l ized, they 
provided power to   t he  main bus fo r  the communications, environmental, guidance, 
and instrumentation systems, as well as cabin and EVA lighting and power for  
customer experiments. 
The discharge rate of each 400 amp/hr battery is between 20 and 25 
amp; each has an activated stand l i f e  of 30 days. By using magnesium for  the 
battery case, a power-to-weight r a t i o  of 83 watt-hr per pound of battery 
weight was achieved. Power delivered to the spacecraft by the  adapter 
ba t te r ies  was estimated t o  range between 265 amp/hr f o r  the Gemini I11 mission 
and 2032 amp/hr fo r  the  Gemini IV mission. Neither the ATDA nor the adapter 
sections were recovered; therefore no post-flight measurement of the capacity 
of the flight batteries was possible. 
Three 400 amp/hr ba t te r ies  were instal led on the ATDA f o r  t he  
Gemini IX A mission. These ba t te r ies  provided primary power t o  the main bus 
for the following systems and functions: the d i g i t a l  command system (DCS), 
the at t i tude thrusters ,  two C-band radar transponders, the TM subsystem, the 
rendezvous radar transponder, and the docking, latching and unrigidizing 
operations. 
E. Qualification and Rel iabi l i ty  Test Program for   Bat ter ies  - Eleven 45 
amp/hr batteries, eleven 15 amp/hr batteries, and nine 400 amp/hr ba t te r ies  
were used i n  the qualification and r e l i a b i l i t y  test program. 
The philosophy of the  qualification test program was to   dupl icate ,  
as closely as possible, maximum-duration mission conditions, from battery 
activation through spacecraft recovery. For t h i s  purpose, batteries w e r e  
subjected to a sequence of environmental tests, including vibration, high 
temperature, landing loads, and shock tests. In addition, the stand l ife and 
mission  duration  capabilities of the batteries w e r e  rated. 
The r e l i a b i l i t y  tests demonstrated that the three types of batteries 
could withstand extremes of environment and activated stand l i f e  and still 
produce the rated capacity. Additional tests on the 400 amp/hr battery indi- 
cated that the battery's  ability t o  deliver the rated capacity is impaired 
after a stand l i fe  i n  excebs of 30 dsys. 
Extra t e s t e  demonstrated the load sharing character is t ics  of the 
45 amp/hr and the 400 emp/hr batteries when connected in parallel. Results 
indicated a combined capacity of t he  two batteries which ranged from 500 emp/ 
hr  t o  509 amp/hr. Until  it was pract ical ly  expended, the 45 amp/hr battery 
contributed almost the same portion of the t o t a l  load current. as the larger 
battery. This test  effectively demonstrated the compatibility of the two 
batteries. 
Power Distribution and Management 
mer is fed from the primary power sources t o  the main, squAb, and 
control bus systems for Spacecraft 3 through 12. The systems used on 
Spacecraft 1 and 2 were unique, and therefore are discussed i n  separate 
paragraphs. 
Main Bus System. - Power f r o m  the main bus i s  fed through c i r cu i t  breakers 
or  fuses  t o  the using equipmnt. Astronauts control onboard equipnent powered 
from the main bus based on an evaluation of instrument panel display o r  at the 
direction of mission control. 
Squib/Control Bus System. * The squib/control bus system consists of three 
diode-isolated 15 amplhr s i lver   z inc batteries, which provide power t o  two 
isolated and redundant squib buses and t o  the control bus through the series 
diodes. As an emergency measure, "bus tie" switches on the instrument panel 
permit application of power t o  the squib and control buaes from the main bus. 
Circuit  protection  for  squib/control  bus  loads is provided by fus i s to r s   fo r  
pyrotechnic firing c i r cu i t s  and by c i r cu i t  breakers for control circuits.  
Power management fo r  t h i s  system is similar t o  that fo r  the main bus system. 
Spacecraft 1 Paver Distribution and .Wagement. - All power f o r  Space- 
c ra f t  1 systems was supplied by one &5"/hr s i lver   z inc  bat tery through 
circuit breakers. Since a l l  equipment was powered continuously f r o m  l i f t -o f f ,  
no in-flight switching was required. Hawever,  power control was provided 
via   umbil ical   to  the blockhouse for  prelaunch  activities, and by an ON-OFF 
switch for earlier ground operations. 
Spacecraft 2 Power Distribution and Wagement. - In addi t ion to  the 
main and squib/control bus system~pnoted above,two sequencer buses with 
c i r cu i t  breaker overload  protection were provided on Spacecraft 2 t o  power 
the flight sequencers. During flight, equipment was powered either by the 
preset sequencers or by ground command via  the d ig i t a l  command system. 
Problems Encountered and Resolution. 
A. Ammeter and Voltmeter Fluctuations - A review of films from cameras 
on Spacecraft 2 showed fluctuations of the ammeter and voltmeter needles after 
landing. The films also showed fluctuations of the a t t i tude  bal l  corresponding 
i n  frequency t o  those of the  emmeter and voltmter- It wa8 concluded that the  
osci l la t ions were induced by wave motion af'ter sphshdown. The m8gnitude of 
the motion overrode the mechanical damping capabili ty of the measuring instru- 
ments.. To verify the conclusion, a stock ammeter was tested and it was 
determined tha t  movement paral le l   to   the  meter-sensi t ive axis resulted i n  
fluctuations similar to  those shown i n  t h e  films. Since any recurrence would 
be recognized and would have no deleterious effect on mission accomplishment, 
no fur ther ' ac t ion  was taken. 
B. Fuse Block Moisture Penetration - Several fuse blocks showed evidence 
of moisture penetration when opened for-post-recovery inspection. An improved 
water proofing technique was used on all fuse blocks, starting with Space- 
c ra f t  4. In addition, the inertial guidance system fuses and primary 02 
heater fuses w e r e  moved downstream of the control switches for Spacecraft 7 
and subsequent spacecraft. With th i s  c i rcu i t ry ,  employment of a power-down 
procedure s h o r t l y  after impact would remove power from all fuse blocks and 
eliminate any adverse e f f ec t s  due t o  salt water penetration. 
C. Circuit Breaker Opening - Post-flight inspection of Spacecraft 2 
indicated  that  a number of c i r cu i t  breakers were i n  the tripped  position even 
though they had functioned properly during the flight. It w a s  found that the 
c i r cu i t  breakers in   the  re-entry control system had been tripped by salt water 
shorting at the thruster solenoid disconnects due t o  an undersize O-ring 
seal. All other tr ipped circuit  breakers w e r e  inadvertently actuated by the 
recovery team during power-down. To eliminate salt water shorting after 
landing, astronauts were instructed to  turn off  all switches and c i r cu i t  
breakers associated with hot circuits. O-rings of t he  proper size were 
ins ta l led  on the re-entry control system thruster solenoid valves, starting 
with Spacecraft 3. 
D. Post-landing Indications of Main Bus Power Fluctuation - For Space- 
c r a f t  9 and 10, telemetered data indicated excessive variations in main bus 
power. Considerable post-mission t e s t  and ef for t  were expended but the cause 
could not be determined. On Spacecraft 11, a determined e f fo r t  was made t o  
monitor main bus voltages and currents after landing, and t o  review the 
telemetered data. Here, there was  no indication of abnormal operation. 
A rereview of available information included static fire sea tests 
and instrumentation system immersion qualification tests. It was concluded 
that the improper indications were the result of salt water inrmersion of the 
instrumentation system. Control of the environment of each spacecraft prior 
t o  flight assured t h a t  missions would not be affected. Further e f fo r t  became 
the concern of the instrumentation system rather than the  power and the power 
dis t r ibut ion system. 
E. Inadvertent Circuit Breaker Openings - On Spacecraft 9A, 10, ll and 
12, various circuit  breakers were found open at times of greatest astronaut 
act ivi ty ,  such as EVA. In a l l  cases, these circuit breakers were reset and 
remained closed during the rest of the mission. 
Sequential Systems 
There were no sequential system requirements for Spacecraft 1. For Space- 
craft 2 through E!, the  sequential systems were u t i l i z e d   t o  separate spacecraft 
modules, j e t t i son  aerodynamic fairings, igni te  the retro-rockets, &ploy 
parachutes, and perform numerous other functions. The sequential systems are 
discussed i n  the following paragraphs. 
Boost, Insertion, and Abort Sequent ia lSys t~- .  - This system enables the 
astronauts  to  separate the spacecraft from the launch vehicle and t o   j e t t i s o n  
the nose and horizon scanner fairings. In case of an abort during launch the 
system provides f o r  shutdown of the booster engines and separation from the 
launch vehicle. 
Retrograde Sequential System. - This system igni tes  the retro-rockets, 
separates the equipment adapter and retroadapter modules, and je t t i sons   the  
horizon scanner heads. The as t ronauts  in i t ia te  all retrograde sequential 
events except for the igni t ion of retro-rockets, which are ignited automati- 
ca l ly  by the TR signal from the  time reference system with manual back-up by 
the astronauts at "R + 1 sec. 
Landing and Post-landing Sequential System. - Astronauts init iate 
landing and post-landing sequential events based on their evaluation of instru-  
ment panel displays. The system deploys the drogue, pilot ,  and main parachutes, 
actuat.es the cabin air  inlet door, separates the rendezvous and recovery 
section, jett isons the main parachute, and extends the recovery hoist loop and 
flashing light. On Spacecraft 2, the drogue stabilization chute was not 
installed.  
Flight Sequencers. - Spacecraft 2, was adapted for unmanned f l i g h t  by 
ins ta l l ing  two redundant f l i g h t  sequencers t o   i n i t i a t e   func t ions  which would 
normally be performed by the astronauts. The sequential systems described 
above were not altered t o  accommodate the   f l i gh t  sequencers. 
Docking Sequential System. - A docking sequential system was ins ta l led  
on Spacecraft 6 and 8 through l2 t o  incorporate rendezvous and docking func- 
tions. The docking system controls enable the astronauts to extend the index 
bar, t o  separate from the Agena vehicle in an emergency, t o   i n i t i a t e  the 
rigidizlng and unrigidizing sequences, and t o  a m  the Agena vehicle engine. 
The index bar i s  jett isoned and the doors are closed over the latch receptacle 
when the p i lo t  j e t t i sons  the retroadapter. If the docking latches have not 
been je t t isoned  or   the index bar has not been extended, these functions also 
are performed with retroadapter jettison. To accommodate the Gemini-Agena 
te ther  experiment, the docking system on Spacecraft 11 and 12  a l so   j e t t i sons  
the index bar and latches, and closes the doors over the latch receptacle 
independently of je t t i son  of the retroadapter. 
Problems and Resolutions in Sequential Systems. - Listed below are 
major problems encountered in   sequent ia l  systems operation during flight or 
post-flight inspection. Action taken t o  preclude reoccurrence is also 
presented. 
A. Retropackage Separation Sensor Failure - Instrumentation parameter 
ADdt, retropackage separation, was not received on Spacecraft 2. Post-flight 
inspection revealed that retroseparation limit switches 2 and 3 had not been 
actuated. A failure analysis revealed excessive corrosion on one of the  
f a i l ed  switch assemblies. A s  a resu l t  of t h i s  corrosion excessive external 
force was needed t o  operate the switch. On Spacecraft 3 the switches were 
deactivated and on Spacecraft 4 and up the switches were removed. 
B. Uss of P i lo t  Chute Deploy Instrumentation Parameter - Telemetry 
indication parameter AE02, p i l o t  chute deploy, was not received. An inspection 
of the toggle switch which senses the p i l o t  chute deploy revealed that the 
lanyard had become untied. The length of lanyard recovered was su f f i c i en t  t o  
allow it t o  be t i e d   t o  the switch bat handle with adequate slack remaining. 
Closer attention was paid t o  the t i e  procedure f o r  subsequent spacecraft. 
C. Thruster Activity After Impact - Spacecraft 2 recovery forces 
reported RCS th rus te r  ac t iv i ty  in  the water. Post-flight inspection of the 
at t i tude  control   e lectronics  package indicated that an aerospace ground equip- 
ment disconnect was  not adequately waterproofed, thereby causing thruster 
f i r i n g  due t o  salt water shorts. The following action was taken effective 
Spacecraft 3 and up t o  prevent reoccurrence of the problem: 
1. The AGE disconnect was waterproofed. 
2. Astronauts were ins t ruc ted   to  open all RCS th rus te r   c i rcu i t  
3. Motor operated shutoff valves were incorporated in   t he   fue l  and 
breakers after impact. 
oxidizer   l ines   to  be closed  pr ior   to  impact. 
D. Loss of Manual Fire  Retroinstruentat ion Parameter - Telemetry indica- 
t i on  of parameter 6, manual f i re   re t ro ,  was not received on Spacecraft 4. 
Investigation revealed that relay K4-37, manual retro latch relay,  was not 
latched in. The manual r e t ro f i r e  c i r cu i t  and associated items were thoroughly 
checked and found satisfactory.  The anomaly could be duplicated only by not 
pushing the switch through the  operate point. No further action was taken. 
E. Loss of Equipment Adapter Separate Instrumentation Parameter - Telem- 
etry indicat ion of parameter ADo2, equipment adapter separate, was not received 
on Spacecraft 4. Investigation revealed that relays ~4-66, and K4-67, abort 
discrete  latch relays, which are energized by the equipment adapter separation 
sensor switches, were not latched in. These relays, plus all w i r i n g  associated 
with the equipment adapter separate sensing circuitry that was recovered, 
were thoroughly che’cked and no discrepancies w e r e  found. Since a l l  recovered 
c i rcu i t ry  checked out, the most l i ke ly  cause of failure was the separation 
sensor switches. On Spacecraft 5 and up, the only function of the equipnent 
adapter separate sensing switches is to i l luminate the SEP ADAFT telelight 
green and t o  provide telemetry indication.of separation. The telelight 
switch ds usedin place of the  separation sensor switches t o  provide the abort 
d i sc re t e   t o  the  computer. 
F. Optical Sight Malfunction - On Spacecraft 5, the r e t i c l e  l i gh t  on the 
opt ica l  sight did not illuminate. The failure was t r aced  to  an open w i r e  i n  
t h e   u t i l i t y  cord that provided power t o  the opt ica l  s igh t  re t ic le  light. The 
cord failed because of excessive  strain that was applied when the cord was 
extended. A design change added a s t r a i n  relief clamp at the connector back 
shell, insuring suff ic ient  wire slack. 
G. Docking Pyro Igniter Failure - Post-flight analysis of Spacecraft 6 
revealed that the latch release, latch door release, and index bar j e t t i son  
ign i t e r s  powered from squib bus No. 1 had not fired. A l l  pyro devices m c -  
tioned nolPLally due to  ign i t i on  of the redundant squib bus No. 2 igni ters .  A l l  
unfired igni te rs  are normally fired at retropackage jettison i f  the nose 
fairing has been previously jettisoned. The firing signal  is interlocked by 
a la tch  re lay which is latched  in  when the astronaut depresses the jettison 
f a i r ing  switch. It was determined tha t  relay a-86, nose fairing j e t t i son  
latch relay,  had not been latched in, thereby locking out the squib bus No. 1 
firing signal. !!%e fa i lu re  was i so l a t ed  to  the nose fairing j e t t i son  switch, 
par t  No. 52-79719-7, during component tests on the switch. An operational 
test at reduced pressures revealed t h a t  one pole of the switch was inoperative 
due to canting of the switch actuator plate. For Spacecraft 8, a l l  switches 
w e r e  replaced with uni t s  which had been subjected  to a 48 h r  soak at 10-5 psi 
and a 48 h r  soak at f ive  psi  with a funct ional  tes t  conducted each hr. On 
Spacecraft 9 and up, all switches were replaced wi th  un i t s  which had been 
modified t o  permit an additional 0.015 in. of p l  er  t ravel .  In  addi t ion,  
a l l  switches are subjected t o  a 48 h r  soak at 10ypsi, with a f'unctional 
t e s t  conducted each hour during exposure. 
H. Amber IND RETRO ATT Telelight Anomaly - On Spacecraft 8, the astro- 
nauts reported tha t  the IND RE390 ATT t e l e l i g h t  failed to  i l luminate amber 
at TR-256 sec. When the telelight switch was depressed, the green light was 
i l l d n a t e d  as expected. The c i rcu i t ry  is such tha t  i f  the TR-256 sec signal 
from the time reference system is not received, neither the green nor the 
amber light will illuminate. Therefore, the failure was r e s t r i c t ed  to  the  
light assembly o r  t o  the wire connected t o  the amber te le l igh t .  All c i rcu i t ry  
and the  telelight  switch were examined af te r  flight and no discrepancies 
were found. No further act ion was taken. 
I. O W  Yaw Thruster No. 8 Anomaly - This thruster intermit tent ly  f i red 
without comand f o r  17.5 min while Spacecraft 8 and the Agena were docked 
and undocked. The exact cause of failure was never determined and is con- 
sidered t o  be complex. To prevent a recurrence, a switch was ins t a l l ed  on 
the astronaut's control panel in Spacecraft 9 through 12 t o  cut off e l e c t r i c a l  
power t o  all 16  att i tude and maneuver thrusters.  
J. Inss of Automatic Control of Hydrogen Tank Heater - A t  approximately 
75 h r  of Spacecraft 12's mission, the H2 tank pressure could not be controlled 
with the H2 heater switch i n  AUTO position. The H2 heater switch was placed 
t o  O F F  and C r y 0  02 and H2 HTR circuit  breaker OPEN. Post-flight analysis 
revealed no discrepancies in the recovered portion of the   c i rcu i t  and indicated 
that the most l i ke ly  cause of the malfunction was a f a i l ed  H2 tank pressure 
switch. 
K. Summary - There were no major problems associated with the  overal l  
program in  the  power dis t r ibut ion and management or sequential  systems. Hard- 
ware,  design, manufacturing  and  operational  failure were minimal and  random 
in nature. Cause of several of the failures'  could not be determined, either 
because the circuits  functioned  properly on post-fllght  inspection or because 
the failed component was not  recovered. 
COWUNICA!l!ION AND TRACKING SYSTPM 
The  communication  and  tracking  system  provides  two-way  voice cornmica- 
tion,  ground-to-spacecraft c0-d link,  spacecraft-to-ground  telemetry trans- 
mission, radar tracking  signals  and recoery aids. Subsystems  consist of 
telemetry,  tracking,  voice  communications, digital comnand,  antennas,  and 
recovisy 'aid&.  (See  Fig. 11 and 12:) mese subsystems  are  discussed  in 
Voice  Communications,  page 73 through mjor ,Problems Encountered.with  Delivered 
MIS Tape Recorders,  page- 109 of this report. 
Voice  Communications 
"he  voice  communications  subsystems  include  the  voice  control center,
two UHF voice  transmitters-receivers  (transceivers) and one HF voice  trans- 
ceiver. The UHF transceivers  have  a  transmitter  output  of  three  watts  each. 
The €IF transmitter  output is five  watts. 
The  voice  communication  system  provides  communication  between  the 
astronauts,  between  the  blockhouse  and  the  spacecraft  during  launch,  between 
ground  stations  and  the  spacecraft  from  launch  through  re-entry,  and  between 
the  astronauts  and  the  frogmen  during  the  water recovery.  The  voice  subsystem 
also supplies  communication  between  the  spacecraft  and  recovery  forces  during 
landing  and  post-landing. 
The  voice  control  center (VCC),  located  on the  spacecraft  center 
instrument  panel,  is  the central  control  and  distribution  point f o r  the  voice 
communication  system.  The VCC  provides  for  intercommunication  between  the 
astronauts, for  control  and  distribution of audio to and  from  the  trans- 
ceivers,  intercommunication  with  the  ground  complex  prior  to  launch,  and a 
tone  for  direction finding. 
The  voice  communication  system  is  designed to furnish  independent  or 
"time-shared"  capability  in  either UHF or HF voice  links to the astronauts. 
Each astronaut has redundant  microphone  and  headset  amplifiers,  mode  switches 
and  volume  controls.  Controls  common to both  astronauts are the HI? and UHF 
select  switches,  voice  tape  recorder  control  switch,  squelch  controls,  keying 
mode  switch,  and a silence  switch  for  use  during  sleep  periods. 
Electro-Voice  noise  cancelling  microphones are supplied to NASA for  use 
in  the  helments.  Lightweight  Electro-Voice  headset  assemblies  are  also  pro- 
vided  for  use  when  the  helmets  are off. 
"he  redundant UHF voice  radios  provide  increased  reliability.  Only  one 
HF radio  is  employed,  however,  because of its  limited  use.  The UHF and €IF 
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systems are complementary in   that   l ine-of-s ight  communications w i l l  u t i l i z e  
UHF and HF w i l l  be used f o r  over-the-horizon spacecraft-to-ground communica- 
tion. These uni t s  are i so l a t ed  e l ec t r i ca l ly  to  minimize failure modes. 
Subsystems and Spacecraft-  Evaluation. 
A. Subsystem Evaluation - A l l  the  components used in  the voice system 
were subjected t o  extensive tes t ing pr ior  to  instal la t ion in  the spacecraft. 
The vendor performed a predelivery acceptance test on each unit. This con- 
sisted of a low-temperature/high-temperature test, a v ibra t ion   tes t  and a 
complete e l ec t r i ca l  performance test. After delivery to Mcbnnell, the uni t  
was again subjected to a complete e l e c t r i c a l  performance test  before it was 
ins t a l l ed   i n   t he  Gemini Spacecraft. 
B. Spacecraft Evaluation - After installation in the spacecraft, voice 
comunications operation was evaluated at the system level. Time c r i t i c a l  
parameters such as RF power, center frequency, audio distortion and receiver 
sens i t iv i ty  were monitored throughout the spacecraft testing at both St. Louis 
and at C a p e  Kennedy for possible equipment replacement. 
Design, Development and Qualification Program. 
A. Design Program - The voice subsystem components (HF and UHF trans- 
ceivers and the VCC) were designed and b u i l t  by Collins Radio Company t o  
McDonnell's specifications. System design was based on the design uti l ized 
for Project Mercury. Problem areas encountered during the lYercury program 
were reviewed and corrective action was taken to avoid a recurrence on Gemini. 
An extensive development test program was init iated  during the  early design- 
phase t o  uncover possible problem areas requiring redesign. 
B. Development Program - During the design phase, the individual voice 
system components were subjected to development tests in those environments 
which were considered c r i t i ca l .  A summary of the environments used to  qua l i fy  
the uni ts  i s  attached as Table 3. In  addi t ion  to  the component t e s t s ,  
extensive development tests have been conducted at the system level. These 
programs are summarized i n  Table 4. A brief description of the tests 
performed follows: 
1. Electronics Systems Test Unit (ESTU) - The ESTU was a laboratory- 
fabricated spacecraft mock-up.  The objective of this test  was t o  assemble all 
electronics systems and determine i f  any interface problems existed. Various 
systems were operated simultaneously t o  determine the amount of interference 
among them. 
This tes t ing  revealed several problems. Among these were inverter 
noise coupling into the audio lines, feedback between the cabln speaker and 
the astronaut's helmet, and incorrect audio levels in the VCC. Corrective 
action consisted of installing double-shielded wiripg for the audio; ultimate 
elimination of the cabin speaker, and vendor testing and modification of the 
vcc 
2. Compatibility Test Unit (Cru) - The Cmr was a more sophisticated 
spacecraft mock-up used to  gain  f'urther.information on systems performance. 
This mock-up employed standard spacecraft w i r e  bundles and had a s t ructure  
similar t o  a prdduction spacecraft. 
The problem areas discovered  during ESTU testing mre further 
investigated during the CTU tests. %st methods and procedures t o  be used 
during production spacecraft system tes t ing  (SST) w e r e  finalized. 
3. RF Compatibility Test - The RF compatibility test  was performed 
on a screen w i r e  mock-up equipped with all the spacecraft antennas and the  
spacecraft and Agena RF components. The RF sources were operated t o  determine 
if any RF' interference existed between the systems. 
The test  results indicated that RF interference existed on the 
UHF receiver when the spacecraft and the Agena telemetry  transmitters were all 
operating. This condition would never ex is t  during a normal mission, since 
only two of the three telemetry transmitters are operable at the same time 
during flight. For t h i s  reason, the Rl? interference was not considered a sys- 
tem incompatibility. 
4. Tracking Station Fly-Over Tests - The fly-over program, i n  which 
the voice communication system was instal led in  an a i rc raf t ,  was conducted t o  
verify station operation and check the  compatibility of the spacecraft equip- 
ment with the ground s ta t ions '  equipment. No problems were encountered with 
voice system operation during these tests. 
C. Qualification Program - Al of the voice system components success- 
fully completed the qualification program. A detailed summary of the quslifi- 
cation program i s  contained i n  Table 3. 
Reliabi l i ty  and Quality Assurance Program. - In order t o  maximize the 
r e l i a b i l i t y  of the voice. system components, the vendor incorporated a l l  of 
the standard reliability procedures into the program. These consisted of 
vendor surveillance, qualification testing, parts screening, reliabil i ty 
estimates, design review, and failure analysis and reporting. 
The reliabil i ty assurance test consisted of two p a r t s :  (1) voltage and 
temperature overstress, and (2) vibration overstress. Performance degradation 
caused by the overstress conditions was noted on several parameters, but it 
was determined tha t  the degradation was not significant enough t o  jeopardize 
successful voice communications. 
Flight Results. - The only flight failure of a voice system component 
was an HF voice transceiver anomaly on Spacecraft 2. The HI? unit  failed t o  
operate properly after splashdown. It was removed from the spacecraft and 
returned t o  the vendor f o r  failure analysis; subsequent investigation revealed 
that the failure was caused by a shorted diode. Tests indicated that at turn 
on, the peak-inverse voltage (PN) of the diode was exceeded, causing the 
failure. This problem was corrected on all remaining HF radios by substitu- 
t i ng  a diode wi th  a higher PIV. No further anomalies were encountered. 
TABLE 3 QUALIFICATIONS TESTS 
COMMUNICATION AND TRACKING 
A - SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED WITHOUT RERUN 
B - FAILED INIT IAL TEST BUT PASSED RERUN.WITHOUT EQUIP.  MODIFICATION 
C - EQUIP.  HAD TO BE MODIFIED TO PASS TEST 
D - TEST REP.  HAD TO BE WAIVED OR LOWERED 
G - RETEST REP.  DUE TO UNRELATED EQUIP.  MODIFICATIONS 
F  - T E S T  REQ. BUT HAS NOT BEEN PERFORMED 
m j o r  Problem Associated wi th  Program. - During the development program 
on the UHF radios, a problem was encountered with the 8185 power amplifier 
tubes. The tubes exhibited "cathode slump" and fatigue of the mica spacers. 
The result was a drop i n  RF power. The corrective action employed was t o  
incorporate an improved type tube with a modified spacer and different 
(Class C)  "burn-in" procedures. 
During ins ta l la t ion  of the evacuation tube on the HF and UHF radios, 
solder balls were inadvertently introduced into the case. This problem was  
corrected by employing a new case design and sealing process. 
Antennas 
Spacecraft and Subsystems Evaluation. - The antenna subsystem provides 
transmission/reception capability for the communication system. Radiation 
DOC-1 - SIMILARITY TO S-BAND ANTI.  (REQUAL) 
DOC-2 - SIMILARITY TO C-BAND ANT. 
DOC-3 - SIMILARITY TO MERCURY 
DOC-4 - SIMILARITY TO DIPLEXER 
DOC-5 - SIMILARITY TO QUAORIPLEXER 
DOC-6 - SIMILARITY TO DESCENT ANTENNA 
DOC-  DOCUMENTED 
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coverage requirements vary wi th  the mission phase depending upon spacecraft 
s tab i l iza t ion  mode and ground coverage requirements. The antenna system 
provides   rol l  symmetrical radiation coverage f o r  C-band tracking and UEIF voice, 
telemetry and command during the launch phase. During s tabi l ized orbi t  
a t t i tude ,  the antenna system provides yaw symmetric& horizon-oriented radia- 
t i on  coverage. HF voice and DF capabili ty is provided by an IIF whip antenna 
on the  adapter  for  orbit   use and on the re-entry module for post-landing use. 
For d r i f t i ng   f l i gh t  wi th  uncontrolled spacecraft attitude, the antenna system 
provides complementary yaw symmetrical and r o l l  symmetrical coverage. The 
astronauts select  the antenna system usage to   ob ta in  the optimum coverage f o r  
voice, telemetry and tracking. During the re-entry phase, C-band and UHF 
coverage is u t i l i zed  and is similar t o  the  launch phase coverage. The recovery 
phase requires antenna capability for HF' and UHF frequencies. The antenna 
systems are  comprised of high efficiency, high r e l i a b i l i t y  antennas and RF 
components which are of minimum w e i g h t  and volume. The C-band tracking 
antenna system consists of three cavity he l ix  antennas, a power divider, a 
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TABLE 4 DEVELOPMENT TESTS 
COMMUNICATllONS - RADAR - TIME REFERENCE. SYSTEM 
COMMUNICATIONS 
1. INTEGRATED SYSTEM TESTS - ELECTRONIC SYSTEM TEST UNIT (ESTU),  
COMPATIBILITY  TEST  UNIT  (CTU).  
2. RFI  COMPATIB IL ITY  TEST - LOCKHEED TEST, TOWER TEST. 
3. RECOVERY TEST - B O I L E R   P L A T E  NO. 3. 
4. FLY-OVER RANGE TESTS - 
5. RELIABILITY ASSURANCE TESTS (OVER-STRESS). 
6.  GEMINI /AGENA PLAN X TEST 
1. INTEGRATED SYSTEM TESTS - ELECTRONIC SYSTEM TEST UNIT.  
2. RFI  COMPATIB IL ITY  TESTS - LOCKHE ED TEST (IN PROGRESS), TOWER TEST. 
3. WHITE SANDS FLIGHT TEST - 
4. NEW MEXICO  STATE  ACCURACY  AND  ANTENNA  VERIFICATION. 
5. GEMINI /AGENA PLAN X TEST. 
TIME REFERENCE SYSTEM 
1. INTEGRATED SYSTEM TESTS - ESTU, CTU. 
2. FLY-OVER RANGE TESTS - 
3. INTERFACE  TESTS - COMPUTER, DCS AND DTS. 
4. GEMINI /AGENA PLAN X TEST. 
phase shifter and associated power supply, and an annular slot type antenna. 
The UHF antenna system consists of the  nose stub, forward adapter whip, aft 
adapter whip, descent and the recovery antennas and four RF coaxial switches, 
a quadriplexer and a diplexer. The HF antenna system consists of two HF whip 
antennas and an R F  coaxial switch. 
State-of-the-Art Advances. - The UHF nose stub antenna is located on the 
radar ground plane on the nose of the  spacecraft and may be exposed t o  impact 
during spacecraft rendezvous and t o  impact by a parachute cable during single 
point release. The antenna is, therefore, designed to be self-erecting after 
having been impacted and flexed i n  any direction and in  addition  to  survive 
re-entry heating and air loads. The upper section of the antenna mast pivots 
about a mating socket when impacted. A compression spring is preloaded so 
t h a t  when the antenna is  flexed the  action of the spring and a cable assembly 
w i l l  exert  a force   to   res tore  the  mast t o  its normal in-line position. 
"he UHF adapter whip antenna is  a quarter-wave stub, which is unique i n  
t h a t  it is  self-extendible. It consists of a t h i n  s t r i p  of specially heat 
treated beryllium copper which is *led in to  a cylindrical  housing under 
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tension. There i s  sufficient stored energy t o  eject a retaining cap and 
latching  post assembly and t o  automatically extend itself t o  form a tubular 
quarter-wave stub antenna matched t o  a 50 dhm feed system. The cap and 
latching  post assembly is e l ec t r i ca l ly  released when a solenoid  actuated 
latching mechanism is energized. The element requires manual re t ract ion by 
proper f’urling in to  the housing. 
Design, Development-Ground and Qualification Program Results. - The 
criteria for  the  design and development of the ..antemas and RF components was 
based on operational requirements in predicted critical environments. Modifi- 
cations were made as the test program revealed design deficiencies. and resulted 
in  per t inent  components qua l i f ied  to  the environments. Table 3 shows the 
qual i f icat ion test  program f o r  each antenna and RF componenli The comprehen-. 
sive test  program and quality assurance surveillance resulted i n  high reli- 
a b i l i t y  components. 
Results of Flight Mission. - There have been no problems r e l a t ive   t o  
the UHF and C-band antenna systems during the  launch, orbit, re-entry and 
recovery phases of the f l i gh t  missions. The use of HF antennas for emeriments 
during the orbital phase of the  missions has been successful. The re-entry 
HF whip antenna encountered problems during the post-landing phase of the 
ear ly  missions; however, modifications sealed the unit  and corrected the 
problem fo r  later missions. 
Discussion of Major Problems. Associated with Overall Program Problem. - 
Potential  damage t o  the UHF nose stub antenna i f  impacted during either 
rendezvous or  by parachute cable at single point release during re-entry due t o  
its location on the radar ground plane. 
Corrective Action - Redesign t o  an antenna w i t h  a five in. long section 
on the end that can be f lexed in  any direction i f  impacted. A socket assembly 
with a cable and spring under tension inside the antenna body returns the 
antenna section to i t s  normal inline posit ion afterrhaving been flexed. 
Problem - The HI? whip antenna (located on the re-entry module ) failed t o  
radiate the RF signal during the post-landing phase because sea water leaked 
in shorting out the radiating element and antenna RF feed system. 
Corrective Action - The antenna assembly case was sealed and a special  
pressure equalizing breather cartridge was attached. The t i p  plug which 
contains the ablative section for closing the antenna element egress hole i n  
the spacecraft skin was modified so that it could seal against the muzzle end 
of the antenna assembly i n  its fully retracted posit ion.  In addition, a lexan 
polycarbonate (plastic) guide block replaced the metal one at the muzzle end 
t o  prevent grounding and cellulose sponge sections were ins t a l l ed   i n  the 
muzzle and the silicone rubber splash boot t o  absorb sea water resulting from 
spray 
Problem - The UHF adapter whip antenna element f a i l e d   t o  extend due t o  
improper furling when manually retracted after ground tests. 
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Corrective Action - The metal cap which re ta ins   the  furled antenna 
element was replaced with a clear lexan polycarbonate (high temperature 
p l a s t i c )  cap so that proper furling of the antenna element i n to  the housing 
can be observed through the cap pr ior  to  la tching.  Proper furling allows the 
antenna element t o  automatically extend at spacecraft separation when the  cap 
latching mechanism is e l ec t r i ca l ly  released. 
Electronic Recovery Aids 
The electronic recovery aids consisted of one UHF recovery beacon, 
52-85719 and one flashing recovery light, 52-85720. The UHF' recovery beacon 
provided a homing s igna l   for  the recovery forces to locate the spacecraft 
after re-entry and the flashing recovery light provided a visual aid t o  pin- 
point the location of the spacecraft  in the event of recovery after dark. Both 
the R F  beacon and the  light (if  required) are turned on at approximately 
10,000 ft. 
Subsystem and Spacecraft Evaluation. - Pr ior   to   ins ta l la t ion  i n  the  space- 
c r a f t  each subsystem was subjected to temperature, vibration and a complete 
e l e c t r i c a l  test  at the vendor's f a c i l i t i e s  and t o  a complete e l e c t r i c a l  test  
a t  McDonnell. 
After in s t a l l a t ion   i n  the spacecraft, the c r i t i c a l  parameters were 
monitored throughout spacecraft testing to assure acceptable operation. 
Design, Development and Qualification Program. 
A. Design Program - ACR Electronics Corporation was the  vendor f o r  both 
the  UIIF recovery beacon and the flashing recovery light. 
The recovery light was almost i den t i ca l   t o  the one used on Project 
Mercury and the design changes were minimal. 
The UHF recovery beacon was a hybrid  uti l izing  transistor  regulator,  
X-DC converter, and pulser with a vacuum tube transmitter. 
B. Development Program - During the design phase each subsystem was 
evaluated and tes ted  in all c r i t i c a l  environment which included temperature, 
altitude-immersion, and vibration. These tests uncovered problem areas which 
are described i n  Problems Associated with Program, page 83. In the integrated 
system tests summarized i n  Table 4, both the recovery beacon and the  f lashing 
l i gh t  caused excessive interference t o  both radio and audio frequencies. A s  
a result, an RF bandpass f i l ter  was added t o  the output of the recovery beacon 
and shielded wires were used in   the  spacecraf t   to   carry  the  f lashing  l ight  
signals. 
A fly-over test  was run using  the UHF recovery beacon to   ve r i fy  its 
.range  capability  using  both beacon type  receiver and the  standard ARA-25 
direction finders. 
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C. Qualification Program - Each subsystem was subjected  to   qual i f icat ion 
t e s t s  as noted i n  Table 3. A l l  t e s t s  were successArlly completed with the 
exception of RFI on the recovery beacon. This requirement was waived and 8s 
noted in B. Development Program, page 82, an external bandptlss filter was 
added t o  the beacon output. 
F l i&  Results. - There .have been no f l i g h t  failures of any electronic  
recovery aid subsystem. 
Problems Associated with Program. 
A. Recovery Beacon - I n  development testing, the 6939 output tube failed 
under vibration. The corrective action was to strengthen the internal struc- 
t u re  of the tube and the mounting structure supporting the tube. 
During qual i f icat ion  tes t ing,   the  beacon f a i l e d   t o  pass b e r s i o n  
tests after being subjected to vibration. The corrective action was a 
complete redesign of the case incorporating an O-ring seal   instead of epoxy. 
After qualification testing, a catastrophic   fa i lure  mode of the 
regulator was discovered. The fa i lu re  caused the regulator to go out of 
regulation when the input power was turned off and back on very quickly. The 
fa i lu re  was t raced   to  an RC time constant in the regulator which became mar- 
g ina l  under complex variations in temperature, warm-up time and the elapsed 
time between turnoff and tiarnon. 
For Spacecraft 2, a temporary f i x  was made by adding a capaci tor   to  
the RC c i rcui t  to  increase the time constant. This f i x  provided reliable 
operation in all except extreme combinations of t he  c r i t i ca l  c r i t e r i a .  For 
Spacecraft 3 and up, the regulator was redesigned t o  be completely fail-safe.  
B. Flashing Recovery Light - During the al t i tude immersion par t  of 
qual i f icat ion tes t ing,  the lamp fa i led to  operate  during the immersion environ- 
ment. Failure analysis revealed an air bubble seepage path through the epoxy 
inside  the lamp which allowed the water t o  form an e lec t r ica l   pa th  between 
the case and a high voltage terminal. The corrective action was t o  modify 
the  pott ing procedure which included performing the potting i n  steps and sub- 
ject ing  the epoxy t o  a vacuum pr io r  t o  curing. 
Tracking 
The tracking system consisted of one C-band beacon, 52-85707, one S-band 
beacon and one acquisit ion aid beacon, 52-85706. 
Effective S acecraft  4 and up the S-band beacon was replaced by a second 
C-band beacon. ("A Motorola DPN/&. ) The acquisit ion aid beacon provided an 
RF link from the spacecraf t   to   the ground tracking station t o  f a c i l i t a t e  
spacecraft acquisition. 
The C and S-band radar beacons provided very accurate tracking data. 
Subsystem and Spacecraft Evaluation. - Pr io r   t o   i n s t a l l a t ion   i n   t he  space- 
craft, each subsystem was subjected to temperature, vibration and complete 
e l e c t r i c a l  test at the vendor and a complete e l e c t r i c a l   t e s t  at Mclknnell. 
Additionally, the C and S radar beacons were leak  tes ted at the vendor. 
After instal la t ion in  the spacecraf t ,  the c r i t i c a l  parameters were 
monitored throughout spacecraft test.ing t o  assure acceptable operation. 
Design, Development and Qualification Program. 
A. Design Program - I n  the development of the acquisit ion aid beacon it 
was decided t o  u t i l i z e  a standard TM transmitter to provide the low l eve l  CW 
output required. In this application the modulation capability was not used. 
The re-entry C-band beacon is basical ly  an improved and repackaged 
version of the radar beacon used on the Mercury flights. 
The S-band beacon is  very  nearly  identical t o  the C-band beacon with 
the exception of necessary frequency dependent differences. The operation 
capabilities, construction, development and test of the S-band beacon are  
ident ica l  to  the  C-band beacon. I n  fact ,  all the frequency independent sub- 
assemblies were interchangeable between the two units. Therefore, the subse- 
quent discussion of the C and S-band beacons w i l l  be handled as a single item 
except where specified differences are noted. 
The adapter C-band beacon (which replaced the S-band beacon Spacecraft 
4 and up) was procured as an "off the shelf" item. It was a s l igh t ly  modified 
version of the AN/DPN-66 manufactured by Motorola. 
B. Development Program - The acquis i t ion aid beacon, the re-entry C-band 
beacon, and the S-band beacon were a part of the system t e s t s  shown i n  
Table 4. There were no changes required as a r e su l t  of the system integration 
tes t s .  
The adapter C-band beacon (AN/DPN-66) was not being utilized at the 
time the system t e s t s  of Table 4 were being made. Of course, it was given 
a system in tegra t ion  tes t  as a par t  of an actual spacecraft. There were no 
system compatibility of interference problems with the AN/DPN-66. 
C. Qual i f icat ion Program - Each uni t  was subjected t o  the  qual i f icat ion 
t e s t s  as noted in  Table 3. Al t e s t s  were successfully completed although 
some equipment modifications were required. A discussion of problems 
encouniered in   qual i f icat ion  tes t ing-is   included i n  Problems Associated with 
Program, on the following page. 
Flight Results. - There have been no f l i g h t  failures of any radar beacon 
or  acquisit ion  aid beacon. 
" Problem Associated w i t h  Program. 
A. Acquisition Aid Beacon - The acquisit ion aid beacon f a i l e d   t o  meet 
the  R F I  requirements during qualification testing. There were two problem 
areas; the more serious was excessive spurious output at VSWR and the other 
was the radiation and conduction of interference from the power l ines.  The 
spurious output was corrected by a redesign of the RF filter, and a l i ne  f i l t e r  
was added t o   t h e  power leads t o  eliminate the radiated and conducted 
interference. 
B. Re-entry C and S R a d a r  Beacons - The MECA module packaging technique 
proved t o  be quite  fragile under. random vibration. A s  a result it was 
necessary to: 
1. Rigidize the mother board by applying epoxy t o  the bottom and 
2. I n s t a l l  neoprene foam pads above and below the MECA modules. 
3. Rigidize the beacon cover over the MECA modules by adding ribs 
each of the side rails. 
across the cover. 
The local   osci l la tor   tube  in  the re-entry C-band beacon developed leaks 
after unpredictable lengths of time. The result was catastrophic failure of 
the beacons. Corrective action was t o  change from the 6299 vacuum tube t o  a 
7486 vacuum tube. Effect ivi ty  w a s  Spacecraft 6 and up. 
C. Adapter C-Band Beacon - Insofar as use of the AN/DPN-66 beacon on the 
Gemini program, there have been no serious problems. The DPN-66 was qualified 
and used on many other  vehicles and has been proven t o  be a reliable beacon. 
RENDEZVOUS RADAE3 SYSTEM (RRS) 
System Description 
The rendezvous radar system consists of the rendezvous radar range and 
range rate indicator,  and command link encoder a l l  ins ta l led  on the Gemini 
Spacecraft. The units of the system ins t a l l ed  in  the  target docking adapter 
of the Agena Vehicle are the transponder, boost regulator, dipole antenna and 
s p i r a l  antennas. Fig. 13 depicts the system  block diagram. Fig. 14 shows 
the equipment ins ta l la t ion  on the Agena Vehicle. 
The rendezvous radar system is  a pulsed system that u t i l i z e s  a trans- 
ponder for  re turn  responses. The radar operates on a frequency of 1528 mc/sec 
with a pulse width of 1.0 Nsec and a pulse  repeti t ion frequency (PRF) of 
250 PPS. Upon interrogation by the radm-, the transponder delays the return 
pulse   for  2.0 psec and transmits a 6.0 *set reply  pulse on a frequency of 
1428 mc/sec. The internal  delay in  the transponder allows for operation t o  
essentially  zero range. 
The radar u t i l i z e s  the interferometer principle to determine target angle. 
This is accomplished by measuring the difference of phase of the  return beacon 
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signal a t  two separate radar antennas. Three broad beam, circularly polarized 
spiral  antennas are used for two interferometer pairs. (One antenna i s  common 
f o r  both interferometers. ) The radar and antennas are or iented in  the space- 
c ra f t  so that the antenna boresight axis is  pa ra l l e l   t o   t he   spacec ra f t   ro l l  
axis. One interferometer lies i n  the pitch plane and determines target  
elevation; the other interferometer is i n  the yaw plane and determines target  
azimuth. A fourth spiral  antenna i s  ut i l ized for  t ransmit t ing.  
The transponder receives and transmits as a result of the radar inter-  
rogation either through the two spiral  antennas or the dipole antenna. The 
radar, upon receipt of the  6.0 psec reply pulse from the transponder, extracts 
range and angle information from each pulse. 
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The range and range rate indicator displays range from zero t o  50 nautical  
miles, and range rates from -100 t o  +500 f p s .  Digital  range and angle infoma- 
t i o n  is  supplied t o t h e  digi ta l  computer i n  serial binary form. The radar 
provides target azimuth and elevation information on the flight director  
indicator (FDI) . 
The rendezvous radar system includes the following command link capa- 
b i l i ty .  Pr ior  to  docking, the radar system provides for pilot  command control 
of the Agena Vehicle and Agena systems by pulse  position modulation of the  
radar transmitter. The receipt of a val id  message is acknowledged by pulse 
width modulation of the transponder transmitter. The  Gemini-TDA umbilical 
provides a means f o r  command control over the Agena systems after docking, 
In the radio frequency (FW) command  mode of operation, the rendezvous 
radar i s  modulated at a FBI? of 256 cps by the command l ink  encoder through 
timing signals generated by the time reference system. To transmit a comand, 
the crew se lec ts  one of 128 possible commands by positioning three switches 
on the encoder con t ro l l e r   t o  correspond t o  the three d i g i t s  of the command. 
The switch positions are read out t o  the  encoder and the  encoder codes the 
message in to  a d i g i t a l  format. 
The digital message, with a 0 representing one time s l o t  and a 1 another 
time s lo t ,  i s  transmitted t o  the transponder by a pulse  t ra in  of 60 pulses. 
The message is  received by the transponder where an automatic phase lock 
loop is used t o  demodulate the command. The command message is then trans- 
mitted t o  the Agena programmer f o r  decoding. When the Agena programmer 
recognizes a command, a signal is sen t  to  the transponder t h a t  results in  the  
pulse width modulation of the transponder reply and a receipt of message 
indication is provided the crew. 
In the hardline mode of operation, after docking, the astronaut's comands 
are t ransfer red  to  the  Agena programmer v ia  the Gemini-TDA umbilical. The 
receipt of message indication is  also provided through the umbilical. 
This Agena  command capabili ty was not used on Spacecraft 5 ,  6 and 9. 
Systems Which Differed From Standard RRS. - The following systems differed 
from the standard rendezvous radar system described above. 
A. Spacecraft 5 R a d a r  System - The standard system was uti l ized but  the 
Agens components were packaged i n  a rendezvous evaluation pod (REP). The IiEP 
was stowed in the adapter section of Spacecraft 5 and was ejected  for   pract ice  
rendezvous exercises. 
B. Project 7/6 R a d a r  System - The standard system w a s  ins ta l led  on 
Spacecraft 6 except t h a t  the transponder, boost regulator and one sp i r a l  
antenna were in s t a l l ed   i n  the rendezvous and recovery section of Spacecraft 7. 
C. Spacecraft 9 Radar System - The standard system was util ized, but t h e  
Agena components were packaged in   t he  augmented target docking adapter (ATDA). 
A transponder antenna switch control was added t o  the ATDA t o   f a c i l i t a t e  radar 
tracking of the tumbling ATDA. The switch control anticipates loss of lock 
and switches the transponder antenna for maximum received signal. In addition, 
a simplified command link was added which provided the crew with one real time 
COImnand. 
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Development Tests For RRS 
Development tests for the RRS w e r e  performed by the vendor, by McDonnell, 
Snd by NASA. 
RRS Vendor Tests. 
A. Prequalification Test - The radar, transponder, range and range rate 
indicator, boost regulator, command l ink  encoder and antennas were subjected 
t o  launch vibration and high and low temperature environments p r i o r   t o  formal 
qualification testing. Integration tests w e r e  made between the radar and 
range and range rate indicator, the radar and the command l ink  encoder, the 
radar and transponder, and the transponder and boost regulator. 
B. Modification of Antennas - A series of omnipatterns, mutual coupling, 
cross coupling, and phase l i nea r i ty  tests on the radar antenna resulted i n  
the addition of Eccosorb (an RF absorbing material) t o  the radar ground plane 
t o  reduce the  cross coupling between the azimuth and elevation angle channels. 
An extensive test  program was required on the dipole antenna array t o  develop 
a design that could be manufactured with repeatability. 
RRS McDonnell Tests. 
A. Electronic System Test Unit (ESTU) - An engineering prototype radar 
was tes ted  as part of the ESTU. During t h i s  t e s t  the engineering prototypes 
of t he  guidance and control system were interfaced in a simulated spacecraft. 
Interconnecting cables of the proper length and type were used to   insure  tha t  
the radar interfaces with the guidance and control system were compatible. 
The radar command link interface was demonstrated by interconnecting 
the time reference system (TRS), command link encoder, encoder controller, 
and rendezvous radar i n  the ESTU mock-up wi th  a transponder for both RF and 
hardline operation. The test  included the  transmission of RF commands, 
receipt of RF message acceptance pulses (MAP), transmission of time c r i t i c a l  
commands, docked mode operation (hardline), and evaluation of the  TRS in te r -  
face pulse shapes. 
B. R a d a r  Boresight and Angle Linearity - The boresight of the radar was 
measured on an outdoor antenna range at New Mexico State University t o   g e t  a 
basis of comparison of radar boresight and angle l inear i ty .  This data was  
compared t o  data from the same radar i n  the Westinghouse anechoic chamber and 
the NASA radar antenna range on Merritt Island (KSC). The test also evaluated 
the e f fec t  of spacecraft configuration on the radar boresight, t h e  reference 
radar radiation  pattern, and the Agena vehicle antenna pattern and e l l i p t i c i ty .  
NASA ._ Tests. 
A. Command Link Test at mckheed Missile and Space Center ( W C )  - A 
TDA-Agena interface test  at LMFiC demonstrated the compatibility of the rendez- 
vous radar transponder and the Agena programmer. The capabili ty of the  trans- 
ponder to  opera te  in  the Agena RFI environment was insured. Also, the 
operation of the transponder was tested during the f i r i n g  of the Agena main 
engine . 
B. Gemini/Agena RF and Functional Compatibility and Mission Simulation 
(Plan-X) - Functional compatibility of the  Gemini and Agena vehicles in the 
docked and near-docked positions was demonstrated during "Plan-X." This was 
the first test  i n  which the complete radar command l ink  (i.e., TRS, encoder 
controller, encoder, radar transponder, and Agena programmer) was used t o  
command the Agena. All commands were transmitted successfully. 
C. Rendezvous Radar Fl ight  Test Program - The dynamic performance of the 
radar was demonstrated i n  a flight test at White Sands Mssile Range, 
New Mexico. The transponder and sp i r a l  antenna were mounted on a T-33 a i r c ra f t  
and flown over the  radar which was mounted i n  a ground test  stand. By varia- 
t i on  of a i r c r a f t  altitude and speed, the range rate and angular tracking rate 
of the rendezvous radar was exercised. 
Qualification Tests fo r  RRS 
Table 5 lists the various environments t o  which the uni t s  of the radar 
system were subjected. 
Radar. - The radar boresight shifted during the humidity portion of the  
qualification tests. "he s h i f t  was attributed to moisture being absorbed in 
the Eccosorb and entering the reference antenna assembly. Measures were taken 
t o  keep the Eccosorb dry p r i o r   t o  flight, and the  reference radome was sealed. 
R a n g e  and Range Rate Indicator. - Al tests were  passed successfully 
without retest o r  redesign. 
Command Link Encoder. - Al t e s t s  were passed successfully without 
r e t e s t   o r  redesign. 
Transponder. - Problems encountered during humidity testing were 
resolved by sealing the transponder t o  prevent moisture from get t ing  into the  
casing. Extensive difficulty then was experienced in  the  low pressure environ- 
ment. The transmitter cavity was pressurized to  prevent  e lectr ical  breakdown. 
In addition, a l l  microwave components and connectors in   the  RF transmitting 
path were vented t o  prevent corona discharge. Also added was a plug which 
was removed p r i o r   t o  launch, allowing the transponder t o  outgas at an 
accelerated  rate after launch. 
Spiral  Antenna. - Ekposure of t he   sp i r a l  antenna t o   t h e  low pressure 
environment required venting of the balun and connector t o  prevent corona 
discharge. Al other tests were successfully completed without retest o r  
redesign. 
Dipole Antenna. - A l l  tests were passed successfully without retest or  
redesign. 
TABLE 5 RENDEZVOUS RADAR QUALIFICATION TEST 
1 ENVIRONMENTS 
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I- 
U 
Z 
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0 
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N I P  
" 
z 
U 
D! 
. 
RADAR 
. "_ ___" 
R 8 R INDICATOR 
COMMAND LINK ENCODER 
~- .~ 
TRANSPONDER 
~~ 
SPIRAL ANTENNA 
X 
- 
N  /A 
N/A 
. .. 
N /A 
N/A N /A 
X 
~ 
X 
N / P  
N /A X 
N/A 
D 
X 
N /A 
N / b  X 
DIPOLE ANTENNA D D 
~~ 
BOOST REGULATOR N/b N/A - 
X - TEST  PERFORMED 
D - TEST  DOCUMENTED 
N/A - TEST  NOT  APPLICABLE 
Boost Regulator. - Exposure t o  humidity required the addition of a con- 
formal coating t o  the internal chassis and components. Al other tests were 
completed successfully without retest or redesign. 
Flight Mission Results Of The RRS 
The rendezvous radar system has been implemented i n  the following config- 
urations . - S acecraft 5 - "he system flown is described i n  Spacecraft 5 R a d a r  System, page Ejection of the rendezvous evaluation pod from the space- 
craft was nominal and radar system operation and performance w a s  nominal. The 
practice rendezvous exercise was terminated a short time after REP ejection 
due t o  a spacecraft fuel cell difficulty. On the second day of the mission, 
the radar system was exercised  in a Cape Kennedy fly-over test with a ground- 
based transponder. Radar performance was nominal f o r  t h i s  test. On the fourth 
and subsequent days of the  mission, fly-over tests were conducted and a d i g i t a l  
range  problem  developed. The maximum digital range was 24,W ft. The 
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problem was a t t r i b u t e d   t o  low temperature operation. Additional temperature 
tests were added t o   t h e  test  cycle for Spacecraft 6 and up. 
- The system flown is  described i n  Pro Sect 7/6 Radar System, 
Page system  performed the closed-loop  rendezvous maneuver. 
Radar performance was nominal f o r  a l l  phases of the mission. 
Spacecraft 8. - The system flown is  described in System Description, 
page 85.. R a d a r  system performance was nominal fo r  the  majority of the first 
rendezvous maneuver. A problem developed from 46 nautical  miles t o  22 
nautical  miles i n  t h e  approach t o   t h e  Agena.  The crew reported fluctuations 
of the target angles on the flight director indicator (FDI). The fluctuating 
display did not prevent the crew from maintaining boresight on the Agena 
vehicle and did not hamper the rendezvous exercise. A subsequent analysis of 
all pertinent data revealed that a high frequency e l ec t r i ca l  breakdown caused 
the diff icul ty .  As a resul t ,  all of the !FDA coaxial connectors associated 
with the transponder were packed with a low vapor pressure grease. 
b acecraft  9. - The system flown is described in Spacecraft 9 Radar System, page The radar used for   the first and th i rd  rendezvous  and radar 
system performance was  nominal f o r  a l l  phases of the mission for the  tumbling 
ATDA target vehicle. The high lobe structure of the tumbling ATDA antenna 
patterns caused variation in received signal strength and variation i n  target  
e l l i p t i c i t y  with a corresponding fluctuation i n  radar AGC voltage and approxi- 
mately one degree peak t o  peak excursions of the FDI needles. This was as 
anticipated. 
+ S acecraft 10 - The system flown i s  described in System Description, page 5 The radar system  performed the rendezvous maneuver. Radar perfor- 
mance was nominal fo r  a l l  phases of the mission. 
Spacecraft 11. - The system flown i s  described in System Description, 
page 85. Radar system  performance was nominal fo r  the  first orb i t  rendezvous 
except fo r  the  transponder transmitter output which began t o  degrade i n  the  
lat ter stages of the rendezvous. The transmit ter  fa i led later i n  the f l i gh t .  
The most probable cause of fa i lure  was a t t r ibu ted   t o  a leak in the t ransmit ter  
osc i l la tor  assembly which allowed the pressure t o  decrease t o  a point where 
RF arcing occurred. Additional procedures were added t o  Spacecraft 12 check- 
out t o  insure the in tegr i ty  of the osc i l la tor  assembly pressure seal. 
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S acecraft 12 - The system flown i s  described in System Description, 
page I n l t i a l  lock-on was obtained at a range t o  Agena of  approximately 
236 nautical  miles. Spacecraft angle and range information was qorad ic  
throughout the f l i g h t  and consequently the radar was not used as the primary 
source of rendezvous range and angle data. The sporadic range and angle 
information was due t o  an erratic transponder transmitter. The most probable 
cause of the t ransmit ter  fa i lure  was concluded t o  be arcing within the sealed 
transmitter oscYllator assembly. The evidence indicates the pressure seal 
did not survive the  s t resses  of  Agena launch. 
The arc-over could occur within the transmitter cavity pressure vessel 
i n  the following areas: 
A. From the high voltage feed-through to   the  pressure  vessel  case. 
B. From the high voltage terminal on the  t ransmit ter   cavi ty   to  case. 
C. From the transmitter tube plate ring of the osci l la tor   cavi ty  to case. 
D. From the cavity plate (high voltage) to the tube grid ring of the 
E. A DC arc-over within the tube. 
cavity. 
The most probable areas of occurrence are A, By and C. 
DIGITAL COMMAND SYSTEM 
System Description 
The d i g i t a l  command system (DCS) 52-85714 consists of one receiver/ 
decoder package and three relay packages. The DCS receives, decodes, and 
t ransfers   to   us ing  systems d i g i t a l  commands transmitted from ground stations.  
Comands are categorized as either real-time comands ( R E )  for spacecraft 
equipment selection or stored program commands (SPC) t ha t  consist  of data  for  
the time reference system or  the  d i g i t a l  computer. The system contains two 
FM receivers,  ei ther of which i s  capable of supplying sufficient output for 
proper decoder operations. The decoder ver i f icat ion circui t ry  provides  for  
subsystem reset  when invalid messages are detected or when data t ransfer  i s  
not accomplished within a fixed time duration. The probabili ty of the decoder 
re ject ing a val id  message is less   than 1 x 10-3 w i l e   t he   p robab i l i t y  of 
accepting an invalid message is  less  than 1 x 10' . 8 
DCS Subsystem And Spacecraft Evaluation 
The receiver/decoder and relay units were subjected t o  extensive tests 
pr ior  to  instal la t ion in  the spacecraf t .  A predelivery acceptance test was 
performed by the vendor on each unit. These t e s t s  included: 
A. V i s u a l  and mechanical inspection. 
B. Operation during and after random vibration. 
C. Low temperature operation. 
D. H i g h  temperature operation. 
E. Room temperature operation. 
Typical tests while at temperature extremes include message reject ion 
r a t e s  and s igna l   to   no ise   ra t io  measurements. 
After receipt at McDonnell the uni t  was fur ther   tes ted  for :  
A. Bandwidth and center frequency of receivers. 
B. Quieting. 
C. Improper vehicle address rejection. 
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D. Stored program command processing. 
E. Real-time command processing. 
F. Telemetry voltages. 
After installation on the spacecraft, the operation of the DCS was again 
verified. The DCS was used t o  update the  time reference system and computer 
with stored program information. In addition, the real-time comand capa- 
b i l i t y  was used to control various spacecraft functions. 
DCS Design, Development And Qualification Program 
Design Program. - The d i g i t a l  command system was designed and b u i l t  by 
Motorola's Western Military Division, Scottsdale, Arizona. 
The need f o r  a command system was real ized  ear ly   in  the Mercury program. 
A tone command was used f o r  real-time commands throughout Project Mercury. 
The stored program capab i l i t y   t o  update the computer and time reference 
systems was unique t o  the Gemini mission. The real-time capabili ty was a 
carry-over from the Mercury system. The cormnand system was designed especially 
fo r   t he  Gemini requirements. 
Development Program. - All component parts used i n   t h e  DCS were subjected 
t o  extensive qualification and reliability assurance testing. Standard logic 
design practices of logic diagrams, t i m i n g  diagrams and circui t  analysis  were 
employed to   l oca t e  marginal design areas. 
The DCS was interfaced  with  the  electronic timer and computer ear ly  i n  
the  program to  ve r i fy  the  system integrity.  The DCS was fur ther  subjected to 
ESTU, CTU and fly-over range tests with no problems. 
Qualification Program. - The 52-85714-15 receiver/decoder and the 
52-85714-21 and -23 relay packages were qual i f ied as a system. 
The command systems' only problems were encountered during random 
vibration testing of the  'decoder package. The problems were numerous wi th  
approximately 350 min of vibration time accumulated before successful comple- 
t ion  of testing. Problems such as contaminated solder j o in t s  and wire breakage 
were uncovered. A s  a result of t h i s  test  the w i r i n g  harness, deck p la te  
mounting technique was redesigned. 
DCS Reliabi l i ty  And Quality Assurance Program 
hbtorola   ut i l ized  the  s tandard  re l iabi l i ty   techniques  of   re l iabi l i ty  
estimates, failure mode and effect  analysis  and an internal  failure reporting 
and corrective action system in order to achieve a reliable product. In 
addition, hbtorola centered much of their program around the i r   p iece   par t s  
program. A l l  pa r t s  were procured by Wtorola part numbers t o  Motorola "high- 
' reliabil i ty" specifications.  These specifications required in addition to 
extensive screening that a l l  par t s  be ttburned-in." 
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Overstress Tests. - A n  overstress test  was performed on the  d i g i t a l  
command system t o  further add confidence t o  the system integrity.  Environments 
investigated were acceleration, vibration, low temperature and low voltage, 
and high temperature and high voltage while overstress testing disclosed a 
relay contamination problem and led t o  change i n  manufacturing process by 
relay vendor. 
Flight Results 
Analysis o f ' f l i g h t  data verif ied tha t  t he   d ig i t a l  command system performed 
i ts  function with no malfunctions. 
System Description 
The time reference system (TRS) is the  central  timing system of the  
Gemini Spacecraft. The system consists of an electronic timer, an event timer, 
a GMT clock, an Accutron clock, a mission elapsed time d i g i t a l  clock, and a 
time correlation buffer. (See  Fig. 15. ) The system is defined by McDonnell 
Report 8664 and A641. 
Electronic Timer. - "he electronic timer is  a crystal  controlled digi ta l  
counter w i t h  a specification  accuracy of 25 parts  per  mill ion  per day 
(roughly 53 sec/day) . Through a ser ies  of countdown chains and storage regis- 
ters, it keeps track of elapsed time (time since l i f t -off) ,  time t o  go t o  
re t rof i re  (TR) and time t o  go t o  equipment reset  (TX). The basic timing unit  
of the timer is  1/8 sec intervals and all counting functions are kept t o  
within t h i s  1/8 sec interval. 
The electronic timer is  approximately 5-l/2 in. high, 5-l/2 in. wide 
and 8 in. long. It weighs about 9.3 l b  and consumes seven watts of  power. 
The electronic time TR and l X  values can be updated by the ground complex 
(by use of the  d ig i ta l  command system) o r  by the crew (by use of the manual 
data insertion unit). The value of elapsed time cannot be altered. To prevent 
inadvertent or premature countdown t o   r e t r o f i r e  as a result of equipment 
failure or personnel error during updating, the  timer will not accept any new 
time value less than a preprogrammed number. (512 sec or 128 sec dependent 
upon timer configuration.) 
The timer provides timing information for the computer, mission elapsed 
time d ig i ta l  clock and PC telemetry system. It also provides timing pulses 
f o r  the radar. 
Event Timer. - The event timer provides a digital stopwatch fo r  the crew. 
The display capacity of the timer is  59 min and 59 sec with a resolution of 
0.2 sec. The timer w i l l  count up o r  down. It may be p rese t  t o  a value and 
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started o r  stopped by use of f ront  mounted switches. It normaUy starts 
counting automatically up from zero at l i f t -o f f  by receiving  the  l if t-off 
signal from the electronic timer. 
The timer i s  approximately two in. high, four in. long and f o u r a n d  one- 
half in. deep. It consumes  two watts of power. 
Greenwich &an Time (GMP) Clock. - The clock displays Greenwich mean 
time i n   h r  and min. It is a modified a i r c r a f t  clock with a standard 24-hr 
face. As additional features a stopwatch and calendar day are provided. The 
clock also contains two markers by which the crew can mark significant events. 
Clock accuracy is c15 - sec/dsy. 
Accutron Clock. - This clock displays GMT t o  the command pi lot .  The 
display is  a 24-hr type with a sweep second hand. The accuracy is  +3, sec/day 
at 5.1 psia. It was used in Spacecraft 4 through E. 
- 
Time Correlation Buffer. - The buffer provides time correlation to the 
biomedical and voice tape recorders. It accepts elapsed time and TR from the 
electronic timer and a f t e r  format changes sends them t o  the applicable 
recorder. It was used in Spacecraft 4 through 12. 
Wssion E-@psed Time Digital Clock. - This clock provides a continuous 
display of mission elapsed time from l i f t -of f .  The display capability of the 
clock is  999 hr, 59 m i n  and 59 sec. The clock accepts timing pulses from the  
electronic timer, making i t s  accuracy the same as the electronic timer. The 
clock i s  started automatically at l i f t -of f .  It has the  capabili ty of being 
stopped, s e t   t o  a time value, and restarted by the use of f ront  mounted 
switches . 
The digital  clock was requested by NASA (per RFECP 231) because of the 
difficulty experienced by t h e  crew i n  converting GMT t o  mission elapsed time. 
Since a l l  spacecraft maneuvers and work tasks are defined i n  mission elapsed 
time, it was fe l t  t h a t  an immediately available readout of t h i s  time was 
essential .  Therefore, effective Spacecraft 6, the d i g i t a l  clock was ins ta l led  
i n  a l l  spacecraft, although the GMC clock was not deleted. Identical elec- 
t ronic  modules, mechanical design and construction techniques were used in  the  
digital  clock and the event timer. Because of the sameness of the components, 
only the event timer was subjected to  actual  qual i f icat ion tes t ing.  The 
d i g i t a l  clock experienced no problems i n  SST o r   i n  flight. 
Time Reference Subsystem And Spacecraft Evaluation 
Al the  individual equipments used in   the  time reference system were 
subjected t o  extensive tests p r io r  t o  in s t a l l a t ion  in  the  spacecraft,. The 
vendor performed a predelivery acceptance test on each unit. This consisted 
of a low-temperature test, a high temperature test, a v ibra t ion   tes t  and a 
complete e l ec t r i ca l  performance test  including 24-hr accuracy. After ins ta l -  
l a t ion  on the  spacecraft, the operation of the time reference system was 
again verified. The operation of the electronic timer was ver i f ied through i ts  
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interface  circuitry  while an operational and accuracy test was performed on 
the other components. 
Iksign, Development And Qualification Program 
Design Program. - The time reference system excluding the  GMT and 
Accutron clocks was designed and bui l t  by McDonnell's electronic equipment 
division. The Accutron was supplied by Bulova Watch and the GMT was furnished 
by Aerosonic Corporation. 
The need f o r  a cent ra l  timing system was .dictated by the use of 
controlled  re-entry. 
Development Program. - During the design phase the components of the TRS 
were subjected to  extensive qual i f icat ion and rel iabi l i ty  assurance tes t ing.  
A breadboard electronic timer was fabricated and interfaces were simulated i n  
order to achieve confidence in the design integrity of the system. Numerous 
refinements and eliminations of possible problem areas were made during t h i s  
phase of the program. 
The ESTU was a laboratory fabricated spacecraft mock-up.  The objective 
of t h i s  test  was t o  assemble all electronic systems and determine i f  any 
interface problem existed. The electronic timer was subjected t o  t h i s  t e s t  
and sa t i s fac tory  resu l t s  were obtained. No problems were encountered wi th  
CTU tes t s   o r   f ly -over  range tests. 
Qualification Program. 
A. Electronic Timer - The AO5AOOl7 e lectronic  timer configuration was 
qualified. S m r y  of significant events of t h i s  tes t ing  i s  as follows: 
1. Oxygen Atmosphere - Oscil la tor  fa i lure  which was due t o  tempera- 
ture sens i t iv i ty  of osc i l la tor  c i rcu i t .  The in te rna l  packaging of the osci l -  
l a t o r  was redesigned from printed  circuit   boards  to  terminal board construc- 
t ion.  The re s i s to r s  used in  the  osc i l la tor  were changed from Daven 1/10 watt 
metal film type t o  I.R.c.' 1/10 watt metal film type. 
2. Vibration - During the vibration test two separate problems were 
uncovered. The crystal osc i l l a to r  broke loose from i ts  mounting and sheet 
metal heat fins were fractured. The c rys t a l  o sc i l l a to r  broke loose from i ts  
cement bond which held it t o  module No. 1 causing a broken wire. It was found 
that the tinned surface of the osci l la tor  (area cemented t o  module No. 1) 
should be e tched  pr ior  to  the bonding operation. Sheet metal heat  f ins  which 
form a par t  of the base p la te  assembly were fractured during the vibration 
environment. It was found t h a t  the heat  f ins  had become b r i t t l e  as a resu l t  
of a brazing operation used during their  fabr icat ion.  The base plate was 
redesigned to   ut i l ize   r iveted  ra ther   than  brazed  heat   f ins .  
B. Event Timer - The A05A0018 event timer was the qual i f icat ion test 
unit. A summary of significant events of t h i s  tes t ing  is  as follows: 
1. Vibration - Failure in vibration was  due t o  a broken wire lead from 
the electronics  to  the s tepper  motor. Corrective action consisted of adding 
additional wire ties t o   t h e  wire bundle. After incorporating the additional 
t i e s   t h e  timer successfully completed the vibration test .  
2. Humidity - Unit passed the humidity test  after revising the method 
of applying the humiseal coating  to the  electronic modules. 
C. GMT Clock - The JO5AOOO2 clock was the qual i f icat ion tes t  uni t .  A 
summary of significant events of this testing is as follows: 
1. Salt-Fog - This t e s t  uncovered a problem with the g lass   to   beze l  
seal. The bezel gasket had t o  be modified and the face glass had t o  be 
sealed  with epoxy to   the  bezel .  
2. Vibration - Throughout the vibrat ion tes ts  numerous failures were 
encountered due to slippage of the elapsed time minute hand during the vibra- 
t i on  environment. After much tes t ing  and corrective action, it was decided 
that t h e  elapsed time minute had would always be susceptible to the vibrational 
environment. The spcecification was changed allowing slippage of the hand 
during vibration as long as the clock function operated properly after removal 
of the environment. 
3. Humidity - Corrective action resulting from t h i s  test was plat ing 
the knob shafts t o  preclude their  rusting. 
D. Accutron Clock - No qual i f icat ion tes t ing was required on t h i s  item. 
E. Mission Elapsed Time Digital  Clock - The clock was  qual i f ied by 
s i m i l a r i t y   t o   t h e   ~ 0 5 ~ 0 0 1 8  Event Timer. 
F. Timer Correlation Buffer - The TCB was subjected t o  a qual i f icat ion 
test  program l imited to  the environments of vibration, temperature altitude 
and RET. No problem areas were uncovered. 
Time Reference Rel iabi l i ty  And Quality Assurance Program 
In   o rder   to  maximize the   r e l i ab i l i t y  of the uni t   the  vendor incorporated 
a l l  of the standard reliabil i ty techniques into his program. Such items as 
r e l i a b i l i t y  estimates, failure mode and effect analysis, worst case analysis 
and an internal   fa i lure   report ing and corrective action system were imple- 
mented. In addition, the piece parts used within the timer were carefully 
screened. A l l  piece parts were environmentally qualified at the  par t  l eve l  
and l o t  acceptance as well as 1- screening inspection was performed. 
Overstress Tests.- Overstress tes t ing  was  performed on the electronic 
timer and event timer. 
A. Electronic Timer - Acceleration, vibration and temperature overstress 
environments were investigated. Test results verified the existence of a 
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failure mode at temperatures above 250°F due t o  solderable NYIEZ, (Fhelps 
Dodge Copper Products) 44 gauge core windings and the material used for 
encapsulation of the  magnetic sh i f t  reg is te rs .  A t  such temperatures, these 
materials became pliable, r e su l t i ng   i n  the poss ib i l i ty  of shorts between the 
core windings i n  the magnetic shift registers.  No other failure modes were 
revealed as a result of environmental stress levels  above the design 
requirements . 
B. Event Timer - Acceleration, vibration and temperature overstress 
environments were investigated. The actual vibration test  was not run as the 
uni t  was qual i f ied at a vibration  level of 12.6 g RK3 i n   l i e u  of the 8.8 g 
Rh5 level, which demonstrated an adequate safety factor. The timer operated 
sat isfactor i ly   in   the  overstress  environments of acceleration and temperature. 
Both environments w e r e  approximately l25$ of the qualification  level. 
Time Reference Flight Results 
The flight of Spacecraft 4 disclosed t h a t  the Accutron clock l o s t  approxi- 
mately five sec per day. The specification limit f o r  t h i s  clock was +3 sec 
per day. Investigation disclosed that the clock was not calibrated f& the  ' 
zero g environment. After a change in  the  ca l ibra t ion  procedure flight results 
were w e l l  within the required accuracy. No other problems in  the  TRS were 
uncovered by flight data. 
INSTRTJMEXTATION AND RECORDING SYSTEM 
The Gemini instrumentation system may be divided into two categories, 
(1) signal sources and (2) the data transmission system, both of which have 
been fu l ly   qua l i f ied   for  manned f l igh t .  
Signal Sources 
DC-DC Converter ~05~0048.  - The DC-DC converter regulator supplies prime 
regulated power t o  the instrumentation pulse code modulation ( P C M )  system 
tape recorder and associated signal sources such as pressure, temperature and 
synchro repeaters. 
The design offered no major problems nor was there any significant 
advancement of t he  state-of-the-art. 
During qual i f icat ion  tes t ing with salt spray and humidity, bubbling and 
flaking of the protective coating on the magnesium case were detected. This 
problem was t raced  to  improper application of the protective coating. Addi- 
t ional inspection steps were added to the painting process to correct this.  
Several such uni t s  were considered for reflight, but the case of each was found 
t o  be severely damaged by salt water. The successful solution was t o  replace 
the surface paint by an epoxy base paint. 
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The converters were manufactured by Conductron-Missouri i n  accordance 
with a r i g i d   r e l i a b i l i t y  and quality  assurance program i n i t i a t e d  by M C D O M e l l /  
NASA. A l l  performed satisfactorily during missions with one exception. During 
the flight of Spacecraft 3, S/N ll9 DC-Dc converter malf'unctioned due t o  a 
loose nut causing an in te rna l  e lec t r ica l  shor t  c i rcu i t .  The loose nut was 
a t t r i b u t e d  t o  the failure of a star lochasher  to  lock the nut .  This anomaly 
revealed that component locking devices were a major problem area. "he con- 
t r ac to r  reviewed all. Gemini spacecraft equipment f o r  star lockwasher use, and 
took the following corrective action on the DC-DC converter: 
A. All future applications involving screws, studs or equivalent 
employed only sp l i t   type  lockwashers, unless the application was for other than 
vibration  resistance. 
B. All DC-DC converters were reworked using epoxy t o  bond the locking 
devices. 
A similar Conductron-Missouri converter was used t o  supply power t o  the 
Gemini biomedical instrumentation system. 
Temperature Sensors. - Platinum-resistive element sensors and thermo- 
couples- are  the two types of temperature sensors. Thermocouples, manufactured 
by McDonnell, were used wi th  the McDonnell reference junction box t o  monitor 
s t ruc tura l  and skin temperatures on Spacecraft 1 through 4. Platinum element 
sensors, supplied by Rosemount Engineering Company, were used on a l l  spacecraft 
and were defined in McDonnell specification control drawing (SCD) 52-88721. 
The un i t s  were ins ta l led  by McDonnell on spacecraft structure skin, in 
f l u i d  l i n e s ,  on f lu id  l i nes ,  and other subcontractor-supplied equipment. The 
platinum element sensors represent the recognized state-of-the-art methods of 
manufacturing rel iable ,  s t ra infree,  and accurate sensors. 
Several problems were encountered i n  the qualification program. Per 
specifications, the  desired repeatabil i ty i s  0.2%. Two units experienced 
values of 0.285. These readings were considered tolerable since the overall 
accuracy remained within the  required LO$, and the later i s  t h e   c r i t i c a l  
cri terion. 
The inline sensor failed under vibration during re l iab i l i ty   overs t ress  
testing. Failure analysis disclosed the  platinum sensor had ruptured due t o  
cantilever mounting. The problem was resolved by eliminating the cantilever 
mount . 
Credit i s  given to excellent vendor workmanship fo r  temperature sensors 
which performed so we l l  i n  f l ight .  Over 500 devices were used t o  sense the 
various physical phenomena on the Gemini program, with only one s ignif icant  
flight fai lure .  In  t h i s  instance, suit temperature data for Spacecraft 7 were 
erroneous after ll days in  orbi t .  This failure was caused by water which 
accumulated i n  the su i t   c i r cu i t  and penetrated the ceramic coating of the 
element. Per NASA direction, no corrective action was taken because no sub- 
sequent long-duration Gemini missions were planned. 
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Some  problems  were  encountered  with  small  platinum  sensors  which  have 
delicate  lead  wires  between  bridge  and  element.  These  sensors  occasionally 
were  damaged  in  the  course of additional  work  in  the  area.  These  sensors  were 
kept small for  the  following  reasons: 
A. To preclude  error  from  their  effect  as a heat  sink. 
B. To guarantee  rapid  response  to  temperature  changes. 
C. To minimize  weight. 
Pressure  Transducers. - Two types of transducers,  potentiometric  and 
variable  reluctance,  are  used  to  monitor  the  various  parameters.  Many of the 
potentiometer  types  are  supplied  with  the  spacecraft  subsystem,  such  as  the 
environmental  control  system  (ECS)  and  the  orbit  attitude  and  maneuver  system 
(OM). In addition,  potentiometer  units  for  suit  and  cabin  pressure  and 
static  pressure,  were  supplied  by  Fairchild  Controls  Corp.  in  accordance  with 
McDonnell  SCD 52-88705 . 
The  vendor  adapted  existing  designs  to  the  requirements  with a minimum 
of development,  and  there  were  essentially  no  advances  in  the  state-of- 
the art. 
Qualification  testing  showed  no  significant  problems.  One  unit  did 
experience  slight  out-of-tolerance  readings  during  acoustic  noise  testing. 
Analysis  revealed  the  wiper-to-potentiometer  pressure  was  insufficient. 
Manufacturing  and  quality  assurance  standards  were  revised  to  insure  proper 
workmanship.  The  transducers  performed  well  in  flight  with  no  significant loss 
of data. 
Subsequently,  two  problems  were  encountered  with  the 52-88705 transducers. 
Solder  contamination  within  the  pressure  bellows  resulted  in  out-of-tolerance 
calibrations.  This  was  overcome  by  revising  the  assembly  of  the  bellows, 
changing  the  brazing  material,  and  providing a f al  x-ray  examination. 
The  second  problem  consisted  of  calibration  shift  after  extensive  shelf 
life.  Potentiometer-type  transducers  tend  to  acquire a small amount of set 
in  the  bellows  flexure  through  lack  of  exercise.  Therefore,  these  units  were 
retested  every s i x  months. 
Variable  reluctance-type  transducers,  supplied  by  Consolidated  Controls 
Corp.,  are  defined  in  McDonnell  SCD 52-88722 and  monitor  fuel  cell  pressures. 
The  transducers  performed  without  failure  in  qualification  tests  and  during 
flights.  Their  special  use  on  Spacecraft 2 o  monitor  local  static  pressures 
during  re-entry  constituted  an  advancement  of  the  state-of-the-art.  One  range 
was zero  to  ten mm of mercury,  and  accurate  performance  was  required  during 
elevated  temperatures and re-entry  vibrations.  These  units  performed  remark- 
ably  well  with  no  loss of data. 
One  significant  problem  developed  late  in  the  program. All units 
exhibited  susceptibility  to  external  magnetic  fields.  This  susceptibility  was 
traced  to  the  transformer  in  the  oscillator  circuit.  Redelivery  acceptance 
and  preinspection  acceptance  testing  insured  that  the  susceptibility  would  be 
within  allowable  limits  for  accuracy. 
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Accelerometers. - The accelerometers used on the Gemini vehicle were the  
force balance or servo type supplied by Gulton Industries, Inc. i n  accordance 
with McDonnell specification control drawing 52-88712. This SCD also covers 
l inear accelerometers for spacecraft  static accelerations and systems fo r  
low frequency vibration measurements. "his accelerometer did not represent 
an advancement in the state-of-the-art  but the use of completely e l ec t r i ca l  
damping'was a significant development. The basic design has been i n  use f o r  
several  years and proved t o  be highly accurate. 
One failure occurred during qualification tests. After vibration, the 
uni t  was not accurate during a s ta t ic  accelerat ion test. Analysis showed a 
lead wire to the seismic system sensing vane had parted. The wire was repaired 
and the unit  operated satisfactorily.  
During vibration testing of Spacecraft 3, the static accelerometers 
revealed vibration noise. The seismic system which is  the sensor portion of 
the accelerometer i s  supported by a jewel pivot. Investigation traced the 
vibration noise to excessive pivot to Jewel clearance i n  t h e  sensor. To 
correct th i s ,  a l l  uni ts  were vibration-tested f o r  proper clearance during the 
vendor and McDonnell t es t s .  No accelerometer failures were noted during 
spacecraft flight. Data were used by aerodynamics and s t ructural  dynamics 
personnel to evaluate the spacecraft performance. 
Sy-nchro Repeater (52-88723). - Three synchro repeater assemblies in each 
spacecraft monitor the synchros on the IGS platform gimbals. Each synchro 
repeater output i s  a DC signal proportional t o  the spacecraft r o l l ,  yaw, and 
p i tch   a t t i tude   in  terns of platform coordinates. 
Design and development of the synchro repeater offered no major problems 
nor any significant advancement in the state-of-the-art. 
During qua l i f ica t ion   tes t s  a mechanical sealing problem occurred on the 
(-5) repeater. The external configuration was modified, using electron beam 
welding to seal the repeater hermetically. 
Another qualification unit ,  serial No. 26, fa i led vibrat ion due t o  a 
broken motor shaft .  The failure was t raced  to  fau l ty  machining in  the  motor 
shaft. Manufacturing and inspection procedures were revised to insure proper 
workmanship. Ser ia l  No. 22 replaced serial No. 26 and the vibration test w a s  
passed successfully, along wi th  other phases of the qualification test. 
A major problem l a t e   i n   t h e  program was damage of the synchro gears by 
electron beam welding. Although visual inspection of the sealed-in gears i s  
not possible, most of those delivered suffered some gear damage during welding. 
Corrective action included requalifying the electron beam process and burning- 
in  the  synchro gears for several  hours. Synchro repeaters provided satisfac- 
to ry  data on all Gemini missions. 
Signal Conditioners. - The signal conditioners on the Gemini program 
consist of DC voltage monitors, AC voltage monitor, AC frequency sensor, phase 
sensit ive demodulator, attenuators, DC mill ivol t  monitor, and other specialized 
cards. These cards were designed and manufactured by McDonnell with the 
exception of the one type of phase sensit ive demodulator and DC mill ivol t  
monitor which was designed and manufactured by Eclipse-Pioneer  Division of 
Bendix C o r p .  Problems encountered during the qualification.program concerned 
the  drift of several percent of a number of modules during  vibration  testing. 
To-correct   th is ,   the   internal  package connectors were modified t o  assure more 
positive contact. 
No signal conditioner problems were encountered i n  flight. Most of t he  
instrumentation packages recovered for  post-fl ight  analysis had remained 
sealed and none contained salt water. A l l  the packages and signal conditioners 
passed a thorough post-fl ight checkout, and several conditioners were allocated 
f o r  reflight i n  subsequent spacecraft. 
CO2 Partial Pressure System (52-88715) - The detector, mounted on the 
E C S  p-the sFacecrafC crew seats, monitors the condition of the 
carbon dioxide absorber i n  the  ECS. An eight cc/min sample of the  heat 
exchanger effluent is supplied t o  t h e  C 0 2  sensor. After measurement the gas 
passes into the compressor inlet .  The concentration of C 0 2  is displayed on 
an indicator in the cabin and is  transmitted to the ground via the Gemini PCM 
telemetry system. Within the detector the stream i s  divided into two sub- 
streams. One, the reference stream, passes through a f i l t e r  which removes 
C02. The other, the measurement stream, feeds through a passive f i l t e r  which 
does not remove C02.  Both streams then pass through identical ion chambers 
that contain a smal amount of radioactivity which ionizes the gas. Since 
C 0 2  ionizes more readily than 02, the ion current from the  measurement stream 
w i l l  be higher than that from the reference stream. The ion currents are 
subtracted by the bridge c i r cu i t  formed by the ion chambers, polarization 
voltage sources and a high megohm resis tor .  The difference current flowing 
through the high megohm res i s to r  i s  proportional to the  amount of C 0 2  i n  the  
measurement stream. 
This measurement technique and i ts  associated equipment advanced the 
state-of-the-art, and proved successful in the Gemini  program. During the 
mission simulator phase of the qualification program, the sensor did not 
respond properly  to C 0 2  i n   t h e  presence of a high percent of water vapor. 
The problem was eliminated by reducing the gas flow, thus reducing the water 
vapor t o  a leve l  t h a t  could be absorbed by t h e  f i l ter .  
This device passed a l l  other phases of the  qual i f icat ion  tes t ,  and 
provided satisfactory data on all Gemini missions. 
PDA and PIA tests on the  P C 0 2  detectors revealed out-of-tolerance zero 
s h i f t  and pressure sensitivity. This problem was eliminated by changing the 
radioactive sources t o  an americium isotope. Subsequent tes t ing  showed in- 
tolerance zero drift and pressure sensitivity. 
Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) Telemetry 
This technique of data transmission utilizes digital (binary) coded pulses 
to  t ransmit  the  sampled data. After measurements are encoded, they are 
transmitted  over a radio  link  to  ground  receiving  stations.  The E M  data 
system  is  supplied  by  Electro-Mechanical  Research. 
Red- W-Jata Transmission System. - The  Gemini  data  transmissiol.1 
system  consists of: 
A. A pulse  code  modulation  subsystem. 
B. A FM transmitter. 
C. A spare FM transmitter. 
The  transmitters  are  arranged so that  the  spare  unit  may  be  used  to 
transmit  real  time  data  (in  the  event of r al  time  transmitter  failure),  on 
command  from  the  astronaut  or  on  command  from  the  ground  station  digital 
command  system (ES). 
This  system  sampled a maximum of 368 parameters.  The  system  will  receive 
and  transmit: 
A. 106 High level analog parameters 0 to +5 v 
B. 117 Low level analog parameters 0 to +0.020 v 
C. 1 8 bit  digital  time  word 
D. 24 24 bit  digital  words 
E. 88 Bilevel - one  bit  indications +24 v or 0 V 
F. 32 Bilevel pulse - one bit +24 V or 0 V (on - off) 
(on - off) 
The PCM system  consists  of a programmer,  two  high  levelmultiplexers,  and 
three  low  level  multiplexers.  If  the  maximum  system  capacity  is  not  required 
for a specific  mission,  any  or  all  of  the  remote  multiplexers  may  be  removed 
without  affecting  the  rest  of  the  system.  The  parameter  monitoring  capacity 
of individual  system  components  is  shown  on  page 11.1 of  specification  control 
drawing 52-85713. 
State-of-the-art  construction  and  packaging  techniques  were  used  in  the 
construction  of  the  first  production  models.  The  state-of-the-art  of  the 
multilayer  printed  circuit  board  may  have  been  advanced  by  solutions  to  the 
problems  encountered  in  the  construction  of  programmer  mother  cards. The 
state-of-the-art  for  low  signal  level,  solid  state DC amplifiers  was  advanced 
by  the  development  of  the  amplifier-clamp  and  sample-and-hold  circuitry. 
The  transmitter  design  advanced  the  state-of-the-art  by  development  of 
fully  transistorized  2.5-watt  transmitters,  with  adequate  heat  sinking  of 
components  and  without  temperature-controlled  components. 
A typical  production  unit  of  each  data  transmission  system ("S) item 
was  subjected  to  the  qualification  environment  specified  for  Gemini. 
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A. Problem Areas Detected During Wl i f i ca t ion   Tes t ing  
TEST WHERE 
PROBLEM 
UNIT UNDER TEST APPEARED FAULT 
1. PCM programmer I n w  Data er ror  as 
L.L. multiplexer Temperature a function of 
H. L. multiplexer  temperature. 
2. Low l eve l  
multiplexer 
3. Lox l eve l  
multiplexers 
multiplexers 
High leve l  
4. LOW l eve l  
multiplexers 
multiplexers 
High level 
5. P C M  programmer 
6. Transmitter 
I n W  Cold solder 
Temperature jo in t s  i n  
and H i g h  solder  pins 
Temperature of wiring 
harne s s . 
Vibration Lockwashers 
did not hold. 
CORRECTNE 
ACTION 
Specification was 
widened t o  accept 
t h i s  error. 
Wires were crimped 
in  pins. 
Lock nuts were used 
and epoxy was applied 
t o  bo l t  and nut 
assemblies. 
Humidity Water collected  Silicone  rubber 
inside  case 
Salt water Water seeped 
immersion in to  the  case. 
H i g h  Transistor 
Temperature failure. 
compression gasket 
was added t o  O-ring 
seal. 
Internal  printed 
c i r cu i t  boards were 
impregnated with a 
resil ient varnish,  
connectors f i l l e d  
with si l icone 
grease . 
Redesign of output 
t rans is tor  heat 
sink . 
B. Major Problems Encountered with Delivered Data Transmission Systems 
PART NUMBER FAULT CORRECTIVE ACTION 
1. 52-85713-475 H i g h  offset  on several Zar level  amplifier  fre- 
channels when multi- quency response  adjusted 
p lexer   ins ta l led   into  a control bandwidth 
adapter  location.  for  noise  elimi ation. 
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PART NUMBER FAULT 
H i g h  Level Multiplexer 
Erroneous resets encoun- 
tered from noise on 
control  l ines.  
Inadequate counterdrive 
and leakage encountered 
i n  landing phase of 
flight and d i f f icu l ty  
encountered i n  handling 
multiplexers in space- 
c ra f t  assembly area. 
Water leakage encountered 
in post-fl ight phase of 
mission. 
Data Transmission System 
5. 52-85713-63, A i r  leakage occurring 
-65, -67 and during exposure t o  
-69 o rb i t a l  environment 
caused corona t o  
disable transmitter. 
Noise on ground l ines  
caused high data error. 
-&age encountered in  
programmers used i n  
Spacecraft 3 f l igh t .  
Multiplexers were 
erroneously reset by 
noise on the control 
l ines.  
Um Level Multiplexer 
9. 52-85713-85 Leakage occured  uring 
salt water immersion. 
CORRECTIVE ACTION 
Diode quad inser ted   in  
reset  base circui t .  
Decrease series resis- 
tance in counterdrive 
circuitry.  
Redesign case t o  accom- 
modate cover holddown 
screws. 
Gasket formed in place 
wi th  RTV 891 s i l a s t i c .  
Al sea l  screws and 
connectors were coated 
with epoxy sealing 
materials . 
Changes grounding philo- 
sophy of shielded w i r i n g  
carrying control signals 
t o  remote units. 
Conformal coating seal 
appl ied  to   the mother 
boards and DC-4 grease 
appl ied  to  connectors. 
Leakage t e s t  of a l l  pro- 
grammers ini t ia ted.  
Increased the power 
supply drive capability 
and inserted new N gate 
i n  reset drive circuitry.  
Seal around l i d  was 
improved. 
PART NUMBER FAULT COREiECTIVE ACTION 
Vibration caused discon- 
t i n u i t y   i n   i n t e r n a l  con- 
nectors. 
10. 52-85713-385, Erroneous resets encoun- 
-485 te red  from noise on con- 
t r o l   l i n e s .  
11. 52-85713-75 Difficulty  encountered 
i n  handling multi- 
plexers in spacecraft  
assembly area. 
12. 52-85713-375 Inadequate  counterdrive 
and leakage encountered 
i n  flight. 
Electronic   c i rcui t ry  was 
encapsulated i n  
res i l ient   pot t ing.  
Diode-quad inserted i n  
rese t  emitter c i r cu i t  
and in reset  base 
c i r cu i t  . 
Redesigned case t o  
accomodate cover 
holddown screws . 
Decreased se r i e s  resis- 
tance in counterdrive 
c i rcu i t ry  and improved 
s i l a s t i c  gasket. 
Delayed Time Data Trqsmission._Sy-stem. - The Gemini delayed time data 
system consists of a tape recorder, a FM transmitter, and the spare FM trans- 
mitter. The recorder accepts a l l  low sample rate data from the P C M  i n  the 
RZ data form, converts it t o  a diphase signal, and stores it on magnetic tape. 
When the spacecraft comes within R F  range of a data handling ground station, 
the recorder may be commanded to   p lay  back the recorded data, which is  trans- 
mitted t o  t h e  ground s ta t ion  in  the  NRZ's data form. The transmitters are 
arranged so that the spare unit may be used to transmit delayed time data on 
command from the astronaut or on  command from the ground s ta t ion  digi ta l  
command system (OCS) 
The state-of-the-art was advanced in obtaining a bit-packing density of 
2600 t o  3000 bits/ in.  The art was advanced a l so  by the  mechanical handling 
of the tape using negator springs to maintain tension between the  reels  and 
using mlar b e l t s   t o  prevent backlash of the tape drive mechanism. 
A. Major Problems Encountered i n  the Tape Recorder - The tape recorder 
qual i f icat ion test revealed a severe problem with high frequency b i t  r a t e  
s t a b i l i t y  when data was recorded while the  uni t  was being vibrated. 
Any vibration which is  transmitted to the tape transport causes 
f l u t t e r  of the tape as it passes over the record head. Flutter causes the 
data b i t s  t o  be deposited unevenly along the tape. Since t h i s  recorder did 
not use an  output storage register, but played back d i rec t ly  from the tape to  
the NRZ's converter, the  output data string presented a b i t  j i t t e r   s i t u a t i o n  
which was not acceptable t o   t h e  ground s ta t ion  decommutation system. 
Spacecraft 6 and 7 experienced a stopped condition of the tape 
recorders while operating in the normal o rb i t a l  phase of the mission. Post- 
f l ight   invest igat ion of both recorders revealed a frozen bearing in identical  
locations in each of the recorders, The frozen bearing was failure analyzed 
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and was determined t o  be an application and design fault, rather than a 
bearing fault. The problem was solved by redesigning the shaf t  collar located 
next t o  a l l  bearings in   the  c lutch mechanism. 
In Spacecraft 5 systems tes t ing,  dr ive bel ts  i n  the tape recorders 
broke, causing recorders to   s top  running after approximately 100 hr  i n  opera- 
tion. The problem was a t t r ibu ted  to  the  manufacturing process involved with 
forming the  be l t s  from flat Mylar stock. This problem was corrected by 
t ighter   qual i ty   control  on the manufacturing process and by careful handling. 
B. Tape Recorder Problems Detected During Qualification Testing 
1. "ape recorder  Vibration 
Thermal shock 
Redesign of tape drive 
system t o  employ dual 
capstan drive, plus 
addition of in te rna l  
isolat ion mounts. 
Reflective tape was 
applied t o  cover. 
C. mjor Problems Encountered wi th  Delivered DTS Tape Recorders 
RECOFUIF,RS FAULT CORRECTIVE ACTION 
1. 52-85713-31 Excessive j i t t e r  of data Interim f i x  was  t o  operate 
recorded during vibration recorder in high speed 
environment (2 g random). record mode. 
2. 52-85713-35 Internal  connection of Isolated grounds within 
signal ground t o  power the  recorder and incor- 
ground fed noise back porate a f loat ing power 
into  spacecraft grounding  supply. 
system. 
Vibration environment Vibration isolation mounts 
(6 g) produced excessive were installed  within  the 
j i t t e r  on playback of recorder case to  separate  
data. the tape handling trans- 
port from the vibrating 
case . 
3. 52-85713-37 Data format prevalence of Recorder playback c i r -  
zeros caused lo s s  of sync cui t ry  was modified t o  
of ground s ta t ion caused  provide NRZ' s data format. 
by absence of t ransi t ions 
used f o r  sync lock. 
4. 52-85713-41 Spacecraft 6 and 7 experi- Redesigned the  clutch 
-39 enced a failure of  bearings shaft and bearing 
mechanism. 
i n  the .tape  drive  clutch  retainer. 
RECORERS FAULT 
mlar drive belt broke 
after re la t ive ly  f e w  
operating hours. 
Negator-spring not 
adequately wound during 
manufacture o r  during 
one of the service 
periods. 
Clutch bearing froze 
during normal operating 
conditions in Space- 
craft 11 SST. 
CORRECTIVE ACTION 
Improved the   be l t  manufac- 
tur ing procedure and 
strengthened the qual i ty  
control  of  the  belt hand- 
l ing  practices.  
hbdified the test  proce- 
dures t o  include a pre- 
f l i g h t  checkout per RCA 
Doc. No. 564-125, i n  
which the winding of the  
negator-springs i s  
checked. 
AU. recorders were 
returned  to RCA f o r  new 
bearings, and lubricated 
with J-type o i l   p r i o r   t o  
prelaunch tests. 
GUIDANCE AND CONTROL SYSTEM 
The Gemini guidance and control (G & C)  system consists of subsystems 
which perfom onboard navigation and at t i tude  control  of the spacecraft. 
Fig. 16 presents a block diagram of the G & C subsystems. 
Design And Development 
The program objectives of long duration, rendezvous, and controlled 
re-entry missions have placed special requirements on the spacecraft guidance 
and control systems. mese objectives required m a x i m u m  r e l i a b i l i t y  and 
f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  t h e  equipment. This was accomplished by u t i l i za t ion  of simple 
design concepts, and by careful selection and multiple application of the sub- 
systems t o  be developed. The guidance and control subsystems and t h e i r  
development problems are briefly described hereunder. 
I n e r t i a l  Measurement Unit (IN). 
A. IMU System Description - During ini t ia l  evaluat ion of the  Gemini 
mission the inertial  measurement uni t  evolved into equipment consisting of an 
i n e r t i a l  platform, platform mount (including coldplate), system electronics, 
and i n e r t i a l  guidance system power supply. Major requirements for  individual  
elements were : 
1. Inertial  Platform 
a. A l l  a t t i t ude  freedom. 
INERTIAL MEASUREMENT 
UNIT 
INERTIAL GUIDANCE SYSTEM 
POWER SUPPLY 
GIMBAL STATIC 
CONTROL POWER 
ELECTRONICS SUPPLY 
SYSTEMS ELECTRONICS 
PACKAGE 
-. . 
r 1 
INERTIAL PLATFORM 
I 1 
PRECISION POWER 
SUPPLY 
ATTITUDE 
DISPLAY GROUP 
HORIZON SENSOR I 
SYSTEM I 
ACE - ATTITUDE  CONTROL  ELECTRONICS 
ACPU - AUXILIARY COMPUTER POWER UNIT  
ATM - AUXIL IARY TAPE MEMORY 
I V I  - I NCREMENTAL  VELOCITY  INDICATOR 
MDlU - MANUAL DATA INSERTION UNIT 
OAME - ORBIT ATTITUDE AND MANEUVER ELECTRONICS 
ATTITUDE  CONTROL  AND 
MANEUVER ELECTRONICS 
ACE PACKAGE 
OAME PACKAGE 
RATE GYRO 
PACK  AGE 
~~ 
POWER INVERTER 
HANDCONTROLLER 
POTENTIOMETERS 
COMMAND EXCITATION 
TRANSFORMER 
FIGURE 16 GUIDANCE AND CONT-ROL BLOCK DIAGRAM 
b. Dual analog gimbal angle readout for pitch, yaw, and ro l l ;  one 
s i g n a l   t o  be a synchro output and one s igna l   t o  be conver t ib le   to   d ig i ta l  
representation. 
c. Accelerometers t o  be compatible with digital rebalancing. 
d. Capable of operation in space vacuum, wi th  in-orbit  turn on/off 
and o r b i t a l  alignment capability. 
2. Platform Mount - Provide temperature control for the i n e r t i a l  
platform. 
3. System Electronics - Provide accelerometer rebalance loops t o  
receive accelerometer analog signals, compensate as required, and convert 
rebalance current t o  d i g i t a l  representation for the computer. 
4. S t a t i c  Power Supply - Convert spacecraft bus power, as required, 
t o  supply a l l  i n e r t i a l  guidance system components. 
5.  G i m b a l  Control Electronics - Contain all circuitry associated with 
the  gimbal servo loops. 
B. IMU Development Tests - Aside from breadboard testing, developmental 
t es t ing  was conducted on four engineering model IMU's, which were fabricated 
and allocated as ESTU, CTU, CCTU, and HI t e s t  bed units. 
1. Electronic System Test Unit  (ESTU) - This IMU was used at McDonnell 
i n  a spacecraft mock-up t o  evaluate system and electr ical  interface capabi l i ty  
and to verify spacecraft  wiring and test procedures. This system was a lso  
used f o r  dynamic analysis and astronaut familiarization. 
2. Compatibility Test Unit (CTU) - This IMU was used a t  McDonnell i n  
a production prototype spacecraft to assess complete spacecraft compatibility. 
The CTU tests included evaluation of coldplate performance, system/telemetry 
compatibility, and system/aerospace ground equipment compatibility. 
3. Configuration Control Test Unit  (CCTU) - I B M  used this IMU f o r  
IGS integration and f o r  developing equipment and procedures employed i n  produc- 
t ion  testing of IMU-computer integration. 
4. H I  Test Bed - This engineering model, al located for use at 
Honeywell, was used in i t i a l ly   i n   func t iona l  and output signal verification 
t e s t s  and for preliminary interface testing. It was used also in exploratory 
environmental tests t o  evaluate thermal and vibration design capabilities. 
C. IMU Problems Located During Developmental Tests 
1. Sta t i c  Power Supply (SPS) Problems - The problems which were 
encountered with the static power supply are:  
a. Computer DC Voltages - Computer loading introduced noise and 
t ransients  on the output voltages which caused malfunctions. This was cor- 
rected by rais ing computer Dc voltages 3% which compensated fo r   t he  poor s t a t i c  
set point on t h i s  section. Additionally, the Engineered Magnetics 1262 SPS 
112 
r 
was modified for Spacecraft 2 t o  accommodate the auxiliary computer power 
uni t  (ACPU). 
b. Computer Section Leakage Voltages - Computer malfunctions were 
caused by leakage voltages through semiconductor switches on the  computer M= 
lines during IMU turnon. The SPS leakage voltage problem was corrected by 
the incorporation of a relay  into  the computer 20.7 VDC l ine.  
C. 26 Volt - 400 cps Section - Because of a power factor  mismatch, 
the 400-cycle section performed out of specification when maximum 400-cycle 
IGS loads were applied. The 400-cycle section of the EM 1262 supply was 
improved by incorporating a parallel   inductor  to  tune the SPS t o  the load. 
d. Cross-Coupling Between SF5 Sections - Computer dynamic loading 
on the parer supply caused cross-coupling effects. Pulsating computer loads 
caused a low frequency noise which was reflected back through the  SPS, onto 
the spacecraft bus, and back into the IMU and AC sections. 
e. Power Supply Damage - Several parer supplies were damaged by 
low resistance loads on the output lines. The Engineered Magnetics 1262 SPS 
design afforded overload protection for the application of hard shorts,  but 
fo r  low resistance loads the  SPS would overheat and damage parer t rans is tors  
o r  cause them t o  fail. 
For problems N and V, EM 1262 SPS was modified t o  the EM 1 2 6 2 ~  
configuration which incorporated the following changes: 
The PWR frequency response was converted from 2400 cps t o  
15 KC and magnetic amplifiers were replaced with transistorized switching 
circui ts .  These changes  reduced dynamic loading and cross-coupling problems. 
load. 
minimize the e f fec ts  of inadvertent overloads and short circuits during ground 
handling. The individual SPS sections were fused so t h a t  an in-flight short 
would disable only the  affected section. The 400-cycle section w a s  modified 
t o  incorporate an overload protection circuit with an automatic reset  capa- 
b i l i t y  which remained in   e f f ec t  during flight. 
The 400-cycle section components were selected to  match the 
Overload protection w a s  added only fo r  ground operations t o  
2. I n e r t i a l  Platform Problems - The problems which were encountered 
wi th  the iner t ia l   p la t form were: 
a. Vibration Problems 
During low leve l  (+2 g peak) sinusoidal vibration and random 
( to  6.2 g RMS) vibration, excessiv: e l e c t r i c a l  lead breakage was experienced. 
This was corrected by improving w i r e  routing and by securely  attaching  circuit 
elements. 
During subsequent low level sinusoidal vibration and random 
vibration up t o  12.6 g RMS, additional mechanical problems were encountered. 
Also, excessive gyro drift rates and losses of gimbal reference were experi- 
enced. Tests revealed t h a t  rotary components introduced w e a k  spring constants 
in to   the  gimbal support system, causing unequal spring rates across a gimbal. 
These conditions  resulted i n  inner gimbal motion with crosstalk and rocking. 
Consequently, the  rotary components were s t i f fened and the bearing6 were 
changed t o   u t i l i z e  higher contact angles and preloads. 
vibration up t o  12.6 g RhE the platform still indicated gimbal No. 3 l o s s  of 
reference, high gyro drift rates, and nonrepeatability of results. However, 
s t ruc tura l   in tegr i ty  and performance through 6.2 g RMS were considered 
acceptable. 
Under additional low-level sinusoidal vibration and random 
b. Synchro Phase Shif t  Problem - Phase shift on the platform synchro 
outputs introduced excessive deadband i n  the  ACME control. The platform was 
modified to include an inductance-capacitance phase s h i f t  network, which cor- 
rected the phase shift from 15 degrees t o  9 degrees. 
C. S l ip  Ring Problem - Problems were caused by s l ip   r ings  which 
intermittently opened. The platform sl ip  r ings had been noted e a r l i e r  as a 
possible problem area and funds were allocated at cont rac t   in i t ia t ion   for  a 
s l i p  r i n g  improvement program. This program was expedited and the Improved 
(Gemini-NASA) s l ip   r i ng  was incorporated i n  a l l  platforms. 
3. Gimbal Control Electronics Problems - GCE Problem with -30 VDC 
Regulator - The GCE was exposed t o  a temperature of 50°F. A t  fast heat drop- 
out all gimbals would break in to  +1 degree osc i l la t ions  because of low current 
gain in the -30 VDC regulator, whFch would not turn on at low temperatures. 
Since t h i s  output served as a supply voltage for the GCE rate and summing 
amplifiers,  the loop stabil ization compensation was degraded and osc i l la t ion  
resulted. The corrective action consisted of modifying the -30 volt regulator 
c i rcui t .  
4. System Electronics - Horizon Sensor Ignore Delay Problem - The 
platform was driven out of alignment whenever the horizon sensor reacquired 
the horizon after a loss-of-track condition. The System Electonics was 
modified t o  generate a time delay upon a signal that the horizon sensor had 
regained track. The ignore relay was delayed i n  dropout for  seven t o  t e n  sec. 
D. IMU Design Problem 
1. Gimbal Control Electronics - During predelivery acceptance tests on 
the  first production IMU, a gimbal osc i l la t ion  problem occurred. The problem 
originated from 400-cycle pickup from the spin motor appearing on the gyro 
signal generator. Coupling resulted because of perpendicularity between 
separate gyro input and output axes. Corrective action consisted of adding 
a notch f i l t e r  c i r c u i t   i n   p a r a l l e l  wi th  the summing amplifiers. 
Attitude Control and Maneuver Electronics. 
A. ACME System Description - The basic att i tude control and maneuver 
electronics (ACME) system consists of an att i tude control electronics (ACE) 
package, an o rb i t  a t t i t ude  and maneuver electronics ( O M )  package, a power 
inverter, and two ra t e  gyro packages. In t h i s  discussion the command excita- 
tion transformer and three hand controller potentiometers are included i n  the 
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ACME system. The redundant rate gyro packages, along with the internal 
redundancy of the  ACE and O M  packages, provide a high system r e l i a b i l i t y  
f o r  prolonged  missions. 
1. Attitude Control Electronics (ACE) - The ACE package contains the 
c i r cu i t ry  which translates input  s ignals  into thruster  command signals. The 
command signals, at the discretion of the astronauts,  may be used to   ac t iva t e  
solenoid valve drivers (SVD) in  e i ther  the  re -en t ry  cont ro l  system (RCS) o r  
t he  o rb i t  a t t i t ude  and maneuver system (OM). 
The various modes of operation provide the astronauts with 
special ized control  for  a l l  phases of the mission. Modes of operation are: 
a. Direct - A manual mode wherein switches i n   t h e   a t t i t u d e  hand 
b. Pulse - Same as direct ,  except that  ACE limits the thrus t  t o  
c. Rate Command - Combines astronaut commands from the hand 
controller activate the appropriate SVD's. 
20 m s  f o r  each activation. 
controller potentiometers with the rate gyro signals to provide position and/ 
o r  rate control. 
t o  maintain the spacecraft pitch and r o l l  8xes r e l a t ive  to  the  horizon. Yaw 
control i s  the same as i n  the pulse mode. 
e. Platform - (Not used in Spacecraft 3 and 4.) An automatic, 
closed-loop control mode that es tab l i shes  thrus te r  f i r ing  for  a l l  axes as a 
function of both att i tude signals from the platform and rate sign signals 
from the  rate gyros. 
i s  coarser and includes a roll-to-yaw rate cross coupling feature. 
computer ro l l  s igna l  i n to  th rus t e r  commands t o  achieve the desired downrange 
and crossrange impact point. 
d. Hor Scan - Util izes  posi t ion s ignals  from the horizon sensor 
f .  Re-entry Rate Command - Same as rate command  mode, but control 
g. Re-entry - A closed-loop mode t r ans l a t e s  rate signals and the  
2. Orbit Atti tude and Maneuver Electronics ' ( O M )  - The OAME package 
provides solenoid valve drivers for the O M  a t t i tude  thrus te rs  and f o r   t h e  
OAMS maneuver thrusters for Spacecraft  2, 3, and 4. ACE a t t i tude  thrus te r  
commands and bias power ac t iva te  the  a t t i tude  SVD's; the maneuver SVD's are 
controlled by the  maneuver hand controller.  For Spacecraft 5 and up, t he  
maneuver thrus te rs  are direct ly   control led by the maneuver hand controller.  
3. Power Inverter  (P I )  - The PI package is  used t o  provide 26 VAC 
when the  IGS inverter  is not energized. 
4. Rate Gyro Package (RGP) - The RGP (two per spacecraft ) contains 
three orthogonally-mounted rate gyros and associated circuitry.  Each gyro 
within the package requires independent 26 VAC, 400 cps excitation and has 
both a self-test torquer and a spin motor rotat ion detector  (SMRD) f o r  ground 
checkout 
5. Hand Controller Potentiometer - The hand controller potentiometer 
consists of three ganged sections. One section provides rate command s ignals  
t o  ACME, another section provides an output  s ignal  to  telemetry, and t h e   t h i r d  
is not used. The a t t i t ude  hand controller contains three potentiometers, one 
f o r  each axis. 
6. Command Excitation Transformer - The command excitation transformer 
steps down the 26 V, 400 cps t o  15 V for  exci ta t ion of the ra te  command sec- 
t ions  of the hand controller potentiometers. 
B. ACME Development Tests - McDonnell performed the fol lowing tests on 
ACME hardware : 
1. Interface Breadboard (IBB) - The ACPB IBB consisted of the  c i rcu i t ry  
necessary t o  provide: 
a. Proper loading f o r  the at t i tude hand controller, horizon 
b. Generation of simulated r a t e  gyro signals. 
C. Complete selection of a l l  ACME modes of  operation. The ACME 
sensor, platform, computer, and radar. 
IBB was interconnected wi th  similar IBB's  of the other guidance and control 
equipment. No problems affecting the ACME were uncovered. 
2. Electronic Systems Test Unit (ESTU) - The ESTU tests, while not 
revealing any new ACME problems, did provide an excellent t e s t  bed to   inves t i -  
gate anomalies discovered i n   e a r l i e r  phases of the Gemini program. 
3. Compatibility T e s t  Unit  (CTU) - No ACME problems were uncovered 
during the CTU testing. 
4. Thermal Qualification - The CTU was subsequently redefined as 
Spacecraft 3A and subjected to a thermal qualification test. The ACME 
performance was satisfactory. 
5. Dynamic Testing - ACME hardware from the ESTU and CTU programs 
was used in three dynamic t e s t  programs: 
a. Fixed base simulator. 
b. Three-axis motion. 
C. A i r  bearing table. ACME performance was satisfactory. 
c. ACME Design Problems 
1. ACE Package 
a. Early testing revealed that the sensi t ivi ty  of the half-wave 
demodulator t o  harmonics and quadrature was such that the switching deadbands 
converged when high a t t i tude  and rate  error  s ignals  were summed.  The problem 
was resolved by incorporating a full-wave demodulator. 
selection of any mode except hor scan caused momentary spurious j e t   f i r i n g  
pulses. A capacitor was added to  the  mode ACE logic  c i rcui t  to  prevent  the 
spurious pulses. 
C. Low temperature t e s t s  revealed that the minimurn pulse generator 
would not always turn off. A coupling capacitor was found t o  cause excessive 
b. Due to  the  "break before make"  mode switch i n  the spacecraft, the 
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attenuation of the turn-off signal. The problem was eliminated by increasing 
the value of the coupling capacitor. 
t ha t  false thrus te r  firings could be generated. This defect was eliminated 
by using the horizon sensor "loss of track'' signal t o   ac t iva t e  a mode logic  
relay. 
The problem i n i t i a l l y  was resolved by u t i l i z ing  reworked relays. Later 
package configuration used welded can relays. 
switch could temporarily disable the single pulse generator input circuit. 
The deficiency was eliminated by modifying the generator input circuit. 
d. An analysis of the pitch axis hor scan mode operation revealed 
e. Solder particles were found inside several Babcock power relays. 
f. It was determined that excessive bounce i n  the  hand control ler  
2. o m  
a. The Babcock la tching  re lays   fa i led  to   withstand prolonged dry 
circuit  operation. The replacement  relay,  manufactured by C. P. Clare, was 
expressly designed for low current circuits.  
the major trunks of wire harness. This was accomplished by the application 
of RTV 7228. 
The problem i n i t i a l l y  was resolved by u t i l i z ing  reworked relays. Later 
package configuration used welded can relays. 
b. Vibration tests revealed tha t  additional support was needed f o r  
C. Solder particles were found inside several Babcock power relays. 
3. Power Inverter - The suscept ibi l i ty  of other systems to  t r ans i en t s  
dictated the need for suppression of the output turnon transient. The suppres- 
sion was accomplished by ins ta l l ing  back-to-back zener diodes. 
4. Rate Gyro - L i f e  t e s t s  uncovered a bearing problem t h a t  caused an 
unpredictable reduction i n  the  gyro l i f e  span. The problem was solved by 
switching to bearings with impregnated phenolic re ta iner  rings.  
5. Hand Controller Potentiometer 
a. The potentiometer failed completely during the salt-fog exposure 
of the qualification testing. This problem was eliminated by sealing the 
potentiometer. 
b. Sl ight  shifts i n  the deadband tap locations occurred during 
qualification vibration testing. The tap deadband was widened t o  circumvent 
potent ia l  problems due to  shif t ing.  This relaxation has no measurable e f fec t  
on spacecraft operation. 
- Computer  System. 
A. Computer System Description - The computer system is  comprised of t he  
spacecraf t  digi ta l  computer and supplementary equipment which consists of the 
manual data insertion unit, the incremental velocity indicator, the auxiliary 
computer power unit ,  and the  auxiliary tape memory. 
1. Computer - The spacecraft d igi ta l  computer i s  a binary, fixed point, 
stored program, general purpose computer t h a t  operates at a 500 KC arithmetic 
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b i t  rate. It interfaces with the inertial platform, platform electronics, 
IGS power supply, awciliary computer power unit, manual data   inser t ion  uni t ,  
incremental velocity indicator, rendezvous radar, time reference system, 
d i g i t a l  command system, data acquisit ion system, a t t i tude  cont ro l  and maneuver 
electronics, GLV autopilot, console controls and displays, auxiliary tape 
memory, and aerospace ground equipment. 
The computer provides the guidance and control outputs required for 
the spacecraft during various mission phases. 
The computer memory is  a random access, coincident current, non- 
destructive readout ferrite array, which has a 250 KC cycle rate. The  memory 
array provides for 4096 words of storage or 159,744 b i t s .  Al memory words 
of 39 bi ts  are  divided into three syl lables  of 13 bits. Instruction words 
(13 bits) are intermixed i n  a l l  th ree  sy l lab les .  Data words (25 b i t s  p l u s  
sign) are located i n  syllables zero and one. 
The operational computer program contains interleaved diagnostic 
subroutines that permit malfunctions t o  be detected during operation. When 
a fault i s  detected, a computer malfunction lamp i s  lit on the astronaut 's  
control  panel. 
2. Incremental Velocity Indicator (NI)  - The IVI was designed t o  
provide a visual indication of the  incremental longitudinal, lateral, and 
ver t ical  veloci ty  components and the associated sign for each to be imparted 
to the spacecraft  by the maneuver thrusters.  
The NI has three digital  displays with a range of 0-999.  Each 
display consists of three counters, which can be set automatically by knobs on 
the front of the computer. 
The IVI accepts two types of inputs from the computer: 
a. Information Pulses - Each pulse corresponds t o  a one fps incre- 
ment of spacecraft velocity. 
b. Zero Set Pulses - A "zero set" pulse triggers 50 PPS fixed 
osc i l la tor  in  the  IVI which drives the indicators to zero a t  the rate of 
50 fps. 
3. Manual Data Insertion Unit  - The manual data  inser t ion unit (MDIU) 
consists of a manual data keyboard (MDK) and a manual data readout (MDR) unit .  
The MDK inserts decimal numbers into the spacecraft  digital  computer. The 
manual data readout displays address and data as a readout from the computer. 
The MDIU can inser t  up t o  99 words into the computer and display the same 
number from it. All interface of the manual data keyboard i s  made w i t h  the 
manual data readout, which i n  turn interfaces wi th  the manual data readout, 
which i n  turn interfaces  wi th  t he   d ig i t a l  computer. 
4. Auxiliary Computer Power Unit  (ACPU) - The ACPU operates i n  conjunc- 
t i on  with the IGS power supply. It maintains stable input voltages a t  the 
d ig i t a l  computer during spacecraft bus transients and depressions to prevent 
a l terat ion of the computer memory.  The ACPU contains a bat tery which provides 
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regulated voltage to the computer converter within the IGS power supply during 
spacecraft bus transients of 100 m s  o r  less. The ACPU a lso  sends a signal 
t o  shutdown the  I B M  computer when the  t ransient  exceeds 100 ms. 
5. Auxiliary Tape Memory (ATM) - The ATM operates i n  conjunction with 
the spacecraf t  digi ta l  computer. It provides additional program storage for 
which is  stored within it. The programs are stored on magnetic tape. Data 
are transferred from the ATM t o   t h e  computer under computer control with sum 
checks and pa r i ty  checks eliminating any erroneous data. 
' .  the  computer and can load the computer memory with any operational program 
The ATM was first ins ta l led  on Spacecraft 8. 
B. Computer System Development Tests - During the development stage, 
e lectronic  systems test  uni t  (ESTU) and compatibil i ty test  unit  (CTU) tests 
were performed on the computer system (excluding the ATM). The  ESTU tests 
included a mission simulation t e s t   t o  determine the operational compatibility 
of the guidance and control, communications, telemetry, and sequenctial systems 
by approximating the system combinations and sequences of events during a 
rendezvous mission. No changes in the design of the spacecraf t  digi ta l  
computer were required as a d i rec t  result of the mission simulation test. 
The CTU t e s t  program operationally verified each of the computer's 
interfaces. During the computer/ACPU te s t s ,  a computer turnon - turnoff 
osc i l la t ion  was caused by normal ACPU operation i n  the presence of a c r i t i c a l  
bus voltage which was affected by computer loading. 
The corrective action for Spacecraft 2 w a s  a wiring change in   the  
52-89723-7 ACPU, which disconnected the low voltage sensor from the spacecraft 
bus and connected it to  the  "low voltage sense" output going to  the  I B M  
computer. 
C. Computer System Design F!roblems 
1. Computer - No major problems were encountered during the qualifica- 
t ion  tes t ing.  
2. IVI - Hardware changes resul t ing from design problems included 
changing the switch stepping rates from 1 through 10 and 50 fps t o  1, 2, 5 ,  10, 
and 50 fps; increasing the rigidity of the case to  improve sealing; and 
incorporating new transistors to eliminate short  circuit ing.  
4. ACPU - Design problems included failure of the. t r ickle  charger  
c i r cu i t  and the high frequency oscillation under load. Both problems were 
corrected by c i r cu i t  changes. A modification was made to  increase the 
battery capacity. 
5. ATM - An excessive error rate was caused by insuff ic ient  write 
current. The e r ro r  rate was decreased t o  one-tenth of i t s  former r a t e  by 
decreasing  the  pole  t ip width and by modifying the write amplifiers  to  increase 
the write current by 50%. 
During prequalification vibration testing, the f lu t te r   to le rance  
specification was not m e t .  Subsequently, t he  tolerance specification was 
increased. The vibrat ion levels  were reduced t o  meet the new requirements by 
using brass flywheels and weights on the tape reels. 
The first attempt t o  operate the ATM wi th  the unit  sealed and 
pressurized w i t h  nitrogen failed due to  e lectrostat ic  discharges which a l te red  
the data read from the tape. The problem was eliminated by using a gas 
mixture of 70% nitrogen, 20$ freon and 10% helium. 
Horizon Sensor System. 
A. System Description - Each horizon sensor system consists of a sensor 
head and an electronics  package. The system establishes a spacecraft  att i tude 
reference to  ear th  local  ver t ical ,  and generates error signals proportional 
to  the  d i f fe rence  between spacecraft  att i tude and the local  ear th  ver t ical .  
Atti tude error signals are used to  a l ign ei ther  the spacecraf t  or  the 
iner t ia l  p la t form to  earth local  ver t ical .  Two sensor systems are  ins ta l led  
on each spacecraft. The second  system i s  redundant. 
The horizon sensor system operates by receiving, detecting, and 
tracking are infrared radiation gradient between space and earth. The system 
employs infrared optics, infrared detection, and three closely related servo 
loops. The sensor head contains equipment that scans, detects, and tracks 
the infrared gradient. The electronics package contains the circuitry that 
provides azimuth, and search or  t rack  log ic  s igna ls  to  the sensor head, and 
c i rcu i t ry  t h a t  provides att i tude error signals t o  ACME and platform systems. 
B. Horizon Sensor Development Tests - The McDonnell conducted system 
interface tes t ing (ESTU and CTU) provided the opportunity to modify the space- 
craft  wiring and the vendor supplied subsystems before a major spacecraft 
problem developed. Problems which were uncovered i n  development tes t ing  
included radio frequency interference (RF’I) suscept ibi l i ty ,  suscept ibi l i ty  to  
power t ransients ,  and interface incompatibility. RFI: susceptibil i ty required 
modifications to the spacecraft  wiring (shielding) and to the horizon sensor. 
A suppressor network was incorporated into the horizon sensor to eliminate 
the  e f fec t  of starting transients  on the 26 VAC. The horizon sensor’s output 
impedance was reduced t o  make it compatible with the loads. 
C. Horizon Sensor Design Problems - Problems which were encountered i n  
the  qual i f icat ion program and the development progrem were: 
1. The horizon sensor output impedance in   t he  ESTU was too high.for 
t o t a l  guidance and control system requirements. To correct t h i s ,  the output 
c i r cu i t s  were redesigned t o  provide an output impedance of less than 100 ohms. 
2. Because of the  distributed line capacitance, the low output 
impedance units shorted out when connected t o  spacecraft cabling. Circuit 
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changes were incorporated into the horizon sensor t o  enable it t o  operate 
into actual spacecraft loads. 
3. Star t ing  t ransients  caused by the spacecraft 26 VAC inverters  
overstressed the regulated power supply of the horizon sensor. A t ransient  
suppressor  circuit was designed and incorporated into production hardware. 
4. The pivots of the flexure-pivoted positor fractured during vibration 
i n  the predelivery acceptance test. Studies traced the failure t o  high 
magnification ratios in the head-to-positor interface. After the casting 
material and the pivot configuration had been modified, the vibration  require- 
ment was, met. 
5. Redesigned preamplifier and signal amplifier modules were incorpo- 
ra ted  into the infrared detection circuits. 
6. A design analysis indicated that the extreme operating temperatures 
of the sensor head would cause interference between the bearings and shafts 
or seat. Sensor head bearings were changed to increase radial play, increase 
seat clearance, and ser ia l ize  the bearings. 
Attitude Display Group. 
A. System Description - The att i tude display group provides an all- 
a t t i tude  unambiguous display of spacecraft attitude using attitude information 
from the  Gemini iner t ia l   p la t form and command information from the  i n e r t i a l  
platfonn, the  d i g i t a l  computer, t he  rendezvous radar and the rate gyros. The 
att i tude display group consists of the  a t t i tude  director   indicator  and flight 
director controller.  
The three-axis sphere of the  attitude director indicator contains 
360 degrees of freedom about three axes. It i s  driven by signals from synchro 
cont ro l   t ransmi t te rs   in   the   iner t ia l  measurement unit. 
The flight director needles of the att i tude director indicator display 
a t t i tude  e r rors  and r a t e  commands. The information displayed by the needles 
is selected by the flight director controller and consists of t he  following: 
1. Computer Data 
a. Ascent Mode - Roll, pitch, and yaw at t i tude error  s ignals  
b. Catchup and Rendezvous Mode - Pitch and yaw a t t i tude  e r ror  indicative of Gemini launch vehicle attitude errors. 
signals. Roll signal indicates Spacecraft deviation from platform zero r o l l  
reference. 
yaw, and bank command or  bank rate command fo r   ro l l .  
C. Re-Entry Wde - Downrange and crossrange errors for pitch and 
2. Radar Data - Radar-generated pi tch and yaw error signals of the 
spacecraft with respect to the target. 
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3. Platform Data - Platform-generated rol l ,  p i tch,  and yaw synchro 
at t i tude error  s ignals .  
4. Rate Gyro Data - Roll, pitch, and yaw spacecraft body rates. The 
Gemini a t t i tude  indicator  was adapted with a minimum of modification from the 
k a r  Siegler, Inc. Mdel 4 0 6 0 ~  Attitude Indicator. Over 1000 similar instru- 
ments were produced f o r  the USAF’, USN, and RCAF for  use  in  X-15, CFl&, and 
F-4 aircraft, thus demonstrating the indicator capability. 
B. Attitude Display Group Development Tests - The at t i tude display was 
t e s t e d   i n  ESTU and CTU; i t s  interface compatibility wi th  other systems was 
sa t i s fac tor i ly  demonstrated. No changes were required as a result of 
development t e s t s .  
C. Attitude Display Group Design Problems - Because of random vibration 
t e s t  problems, stems and needles were changed t o  beryllium and supporting 
struts were added on meters. A new meter movement (giving five degree full- 
scale deflection) was added. 
A scale   factor   or  range switch which was added to   the   beze l  of the 
indicator  increased  pitch and yaw range by a factor  of two and r o l l  range by 
a factor  of three to give a wider display range capability. 
During acceptance vibration tests, the needle structure of the 
at t i tude indicator  was not sufficient to maintain needle displacement at the 
specified values. A modification reduced needle movement. 
During qual i f icat ion tests, o i l  leaked from the flight director  
controller modules. The problem was corrected by f i l l i n g   t h e  modules with a 
silicone resinous material and by a new module sealing methcd. 
Precision Power Supply. 
A. Description - A special, precision frequency, low power inverter was 
designed and fabricated for Spacecraft 2 only. The special  unit  was required 
because in s t ab i l i t y  i n  the  400 cps voltage source caused unstable phase s h i f t  
resolver gimbal angle readouts. The problem was la ter  corrected by a modifi- 
ca t ion   to  the  EM 1262 s t a t i c  power supply, but the interim type correction 
was immediately required. The interim unit  was ins ta l led  i n  the pressurized 
area of the spacecraft and tee-type cabling was employed t o  accommodate the 
instal la t ion.  The unit consisted of audio filtering, countdown, regulation- 
inversion, and output  f i l ter ing elements. 
B. Precision Power Supply Development Tests and Design Problems - The 
precision power supply was not   u t i l i zed   in  any developmental t e s t s  and no 
design problems were encountered. 
GCS State-Of-Art Advances 
In general, t he  guidance and control system required no breakthroughs i n  
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the state-of-art design concepts or manufacturing processes. However, the 
auxiliary tape memory concept can be considered an advancement i n   t h e   f i e l d  of 
highly reliable onboard bulk storage media for spacecIcft  computer operational 
programs. The ATM achieves data accuracies of 3 x 10 b i t s  pe r  e r ro r  by 
using  t r iple  redundant recorded data and a slow data t ransfer  rate of 200 b i t s  
per sec. 
GCS Qualification Program Summary 
Qualification Status. - The guidance and control system was considered 
functionally qualified at the time of the Spacecraft 2 f l ight .  I n  the brief 
summary of  the qual i f icat ion s ta tus  for  each system that follows, the term 
"resolved" indicates that tests were no longer outstanding, as a r e su l t  of 
completion, deletion, or waiver. 
A. IMU - A l l  environmental tests except vibration were resolved prior 
to the Spacecraft  2 f l igh t .  Based on vibrat ion tes t  resul ts  on design 
approval test units, t h e  IMU was considered acceptable for flight. The formal 
vibration requirement was completed i n  February 1965. 
B. ACME - A l l  environmental t e s t s  were resolved prior to the Spacecraft 2 
f l i gh t  . Final approval of t h e  t e s t  r e s u l t s  (documentation) was not given 
un t i l   a f t e r   t he   f l i gh t   bu t   t h i s  was due t o  omission of data and did not 
r e f l ec t  upon the qualification status.  
C. Computer System - All t e s t s   fo r   t he  manual data insertion unit  and 
the computer were resolved prior to the Spacecraft 2 f l igh t .  The incremental 
velocity indicator lacked tests f o r  decompression, temperature-altitude, 
fungus and high tes t  pressure at the time of the Spacecraft 2 f l igh t ;  a l l  
t e s t s  were resolved prior to the spacecraft  3 f l igh t .  A t  t he  time of the 
Spacecraft 2 f l ight ,  the  auxi l iary computer power unit lacked salt fog testing, 
which was resolved prior t o  the Spacecraft 4 f l igh t .  All t e s t s  f o r  the 
auxiliary tape memory were resolved prior t o  t h e  Spacecraft 8 f l igh t ,   the  first 
mission i n  which the ATM was used. 
D. Horizon Sensor -.All environmental t e s t s  except high temperature, low 
temperature, humidity and salt fog were resolved. It w a s  decided that  these 
t e s t s  were not necessary for the Spacecraft 2 because of i t s  short  f l ight .  
Al t e s t s  were completed by July 1965. 
E. Attitude Display Group - All environmental t e s t s  were resolved prior 
to the Spacecraft  2 f l igh t .  
F. Precision Power Supply - All environmental t e s t s  were resolved prior 
to the Spacecraft  2 f l igh t .  
GCS Qualification Test Problems. 
A. I n e r t i a l  Measurement Unit 
-.. - . . . . . . 
1. Humidity - After exposure t o  humidity, the IMU showed considerable 
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corrosion at a l l  magnesium-to-aluminum interfaces. It was apparent tha t  the  
IMU units would not pass salt sea atmosphere tests, either.  The modifications 
recommended by the vendor t o  provide humidity and salt sea atmosphere in tegr i ty  
would have delayed the Gemini IMU schedule and would have increased costs. 
Therefore, McDonnell advised the NASA (TWX 306-16-8317 dated 7 December 1964) 
tha t  no additional humidity o r  salt spray efforts would be expended on the 
IMU. This agreed wi th  the NASA's request of 10 August 1964 v ia  GP-54886. 
2. Vibration - During design tests at a 6 g level,  gimbal No. 3 
changed reference (approximately 700 arc sec) two times. The IMU was then 
exposed t o  a l a t e r a l  axis, ascent orientation, random vibration of 6.2 g RMS 
and gimbal No. 3 changed reference approximately 3.3 degrees during one min. 
The platform was then exposed t o  a special, unit level, acceptance type 6.2 g 
RMS vibrat ion tes t ;  gimbal No. 3 changed reference approximately 600 arc sec 
during one min, confirming t h a t  the platform had degraded since formal 
acceptance testing. Use of the platform was discontinued when p a r t i a l  dis- 
assembly showed extensive damage to  the rotary component s t i f fener  and s l i p  
ring damage. A second platform was substi tuted and the IMU was subjected to 
DAT vibrat ion in  the lateral axis  with the gimbals positioned to the ascent 
orientation. Inertial  reference was lost  during five min of 6.0 g ' s  random 
vibration, result ing i n  an X-gyro drift ra te  which was equivalent to 180 
degrees/hr.  In  order to  evaluate  the IMTJ, spec ia l  t e s t s  were performed. Con- 
clusions reached from these   t es t s  were: 
a. The  maximum random vibration level t h a t  the S/N l O 5 / H - l l  
platform could take without l o s s  of iner t ia l  reference was 5.0 g ' s .  
b. Loss of reference was re la t ive ly  independent of the platform 
gimbal orientation. 
C. IMU performance was sat isfactory (no loss of reference) when 
vibrated at levels  up t o  8.8 g's with the power spectral  density minimized 
in the platform resonant frequency region. 
McDonnell invest igated the feasibi l i ty  of lowering the spacecraft 
s t ruc tura l  resonance in the platform mounting area to permit use of a notched 
spectrum as a rea l i s t ic  v ibra t ion  environment. Dead weight was added to  the  
platform t o  reduce the spacecraft structural resonant frequency i n  the plat-  
form mounting area. 
Tantalum platform end covers were mounted on the tes t  uni t .  Subse- 
quent testing showed no mechanical problems o r  gimbal l o s s  of reference, but 
the gyros showed excessive drift rates. 
The platform was vibrated along each of three axes with and with- 
out the tantalum end p la tes  at both ascent and acceptance t e s t  procedure 
gimbal angles. The resul ts  indicated mechanical integri ty ,  no loss of refer- 
ence, and no significant difference i n  performance between the weighted and 
unweighted platform. Subsequent tes ts  revealed that  s t ructural  resonance 
could be reduced by a three-point mount. A three-point configuration, without 
weights, was used on Spacecraft 5 and up. 
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€3. A C m  Qualification Test Problems 
1. Vibration - The i n i t i a l   v i b r a t i o n  of the ACE and OAME resulted in 
multiple failures which required structural redesign. Redesigned uni t s  
were successfully subjected t o  vibration. 
2. Hand Controller Potentiometer 
a. Deadband Shi f t s  - During the qualification vibration test, 
s l i gh t  shifts occurred i n  the deadband tap locations. The deadband was 
increased from 6.0 degrees t o  6.6 degrees. 
specified valve after salt fog exposure. The salt fog test was then conducted 
on two additional potentiometers with the terminal areas sealed. Both un i t s  
corroded badly. 
b. Sa l t  Fog Test Failure - Insulat ion resis tance fel l  below the 
Changes were incorporated which enabled the potentiometer t o  
pass the salt fog requirements. 
C. Computer System Qualification Test Problems 
1. Incremental Velocity Indicator 
a. Random Vibration - After two vibration runs i n  each of the 
unit axes, the unit had an excessive leak rate. The uni t  was modified and was 
then successfully subjected to random vibration. 
requirements. The uni t  was twice repaired, retested and f a i l e d  t o  meet leak 
rate requirements after decompression  and temperature-altitude testing. The 
modified unit w i th  a redesigned case-to-bezel seal was then successfilly 
subjected to the t e s t .  
b. Temperature-Altitude - The un i t  f a i l ed  to  meet the leak rate 
2. Manual Data Insertion Unit 
a. Humidity Test - The manual data keyboard malfunctioned when 
using the keyboard to  in se r t  d ig i t s  i n to  the  un i t  t e s t e r .  The uni t  was 
returned t o  manufacturing and reworked. The uni t  was then retested in  the 
humidity environment and passed a l l  functional requirements. 
3. Auxiliary Computer Power Unit 
a. Operational Life Test - During the temperature-altitude opera- 
t ion  l i f e  portion of the design approval test (DAT) the main power t r ans i s to r  
in  the  regula tor  c i rcu i t  avalanched, causing the battery to discharge.  The 
c i r cu i t  w a s  redesigned  for  better  operation a t  elevated temperatures and 
potting was added t o  aid heat conduction. After the modification, the ACPU 
successfully completed the test. 
4. Auxiliary Tape Memory - During prequalification vibration testing 
of the engineering model No. 1 tape transport, the or ig ina l  f lu t te r  to le rance  
specification of 35 peak-to-peak at the orbi t  vibrat ion level  was not met. A 
study resulted i n  an increased  f lut ter   to lerance  specif icat ion of 5s 
peak-to-pealc at a reduced orb i t   v ibra t ion   leve l  of 0.003 g2/cps f r o m  20 t o  
200 cps and 0.0015 g2/cps from 200 t o  500 cps with an overall   acceleration 
l eve l  of one g M. Several tape transport configurations were used i n  the 
e f f o r t  t o  reduce f lu t t e r  t o  th i s  accep tab le  limit. Brass flywheels and weights 
on t h e  tape reels provided the best configuration and were i n s t a l l e d ‘ i n  a l l  
flight units. 
D. Horizon Sensor Qualification Test Problems 
1. Vibration - Horizon sensor system (-307) consisting of a -17 sensor 
head and a -15 electronics package failed the vibration requirement. The 
electronic package and the sensor head were modified. The reworked system 
passed random vibration. 
E. Attitude Display Group Qualification Test Problems 
1. Attitude Display Indicator - The at t i tude display indicator  was 
not subjected t o  a formal qual i f icat ion test program because it was similar t o  
the Lear Siegler, Inc. 4060~ at t i tude indicator ,  which had been subjected t o  a 
comprehensive qua l i f i ca t ion   t e s t  program for   the  USAF. 
However, a random vibration test (8.6 g RMS), performed to   ve r i fy  
that the indicator could meet Gemini standards, revealed a structural  design 
def ic iency in  the rol l  gimbal support. Structural modifications were made t o  
the unit .  Additional vibration tests (6.5 g RE, each ax i s  fo r  15 min) then 
were performed successfully. 
2. Flight Director Controller 
a. Sa l t  Fog Test - Salt  fog caused out-of-specification outputs 
from the  FDC. Investigation revealed salt residue on the  terminal board and 
around module header holes. A silicone rubber gasket was added on top of the 
module mounting plate,  thus sealing leaks under the  module headers. The uni t  
then passed the salt fog tes t .  
material and fabrication procedures were changed. The r e t e s t  was successful. 
leak in  the  power supply module caused by a break in  the solder  seal. A change 
i n  the module f i l l i n g  and sealing procedure enabled the unit to  pass  the t e s t .  
b. Humidity - After the FM: f a i l ed  humidity testing, the gasket 
C. H i g h  Temperature Test - Investigation after testing revealed a 
F. Precision Power Supply Qualification Testing - No problems were 
encountered with qual i f icat ion tests. As an interim unit  used only on 
Spacecraft 2, the PPS was not processed t o  a l l  tests normally specified for 
cabin-mounted equipment. Upon sat isfactory completion of high temperature 
tes t ing,  the PPS was accepted as qual i f ied  for  a suborbital, nonmanned, f l igh t .  
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Rel iab i l i ty  Program Summary f o r  GCS 
The guidance and cont ro l   re l iab i l i ty  programs had as their   object ives:  
A. To achieve system designs capable of meeting o r  exceeding the system 
r e l i a b i l i t y  requirement. 
B. To produce system hardware capable of meeting these requirements under 
field  operation. 
I n e r t i a l  Measurement Unit Rel iabi l i ty  Program. - Overstress testing for 
the was planned  only f o r  t h e  i n e r t i a l  guidance  system power supply  and the  
system electronics. The iner t ia l  platform was omitted because the platform 
i s  temperature-controlled and not amenable t o  temperature overstress testing. 
I n  addition, no data was available to correlate vibration overstress with 
extended iner t ia l  component l i f e  data. 
A. System Electronics Vibration - A system electronics package was 
submitted i n i t i a l l y   t o  an exploratory/quality  verification  test  and then was 
subjected to overstress vibration. After completion of 15.1 g RMS exposure, 
two switching relays were inoperative. 
A new relay module was ins ta l led  and the system electronics package 
was vibrated at a 12.6 g RMS random leve l   fo r  15 min. i n  each of i t s  three 
mutually perpendicular axes; the same relays failed again. The relays required 
a modi'fication t o  t h e  c o i l  attachment. With modified relays, the systems 
electronics performed satisfactorily during overstress vibration. 
B. System Electronics Temperature/Altitude - A system electronics package 
was submitted to overstress temperature/alt i tude testing. This test  had no 
measurable e f fec t  on the operation of the system electronics. 
C. IGS Power Supply Vibration - An EM 1262 s t a t i c  power supply was mated 
with a gimbal control electronic and subjected to overstress vibration. After 
1.5 min of vibration at 9.7 g RMS, a noise with a 60-80 cycle frequency 
appeared on the  s t a t i c  i nve r t e r  DC and AC output voltages; it continued 
throughout the 10.2 g vibration period. Before starting the 10.6 g vibration, 
the input voltage was ra i sed  to  30 VDC. The 60-80 cycle noise was not present 
when the input voltage was maintained at the 30 VDC level. No other discrep- 
ancies occurred W i n g  t h i s  t e s t .  Inherent regulation instabil i ty,  which was  
corrected in the EM 1 2 6 2 ~  SPS, caused the noise. 
D. IGS  Power Supply Temperature/Altitude - ing  the first turnon,  with 
the   a l t i tude  chamber at a pressure of 1.47 x lO-esia, the 400 and 1200 cycle 
outputs were out of regulation on both amplitude and frequency. Problem 
isolation revealed that a capacitor (large can) had faulted with an internal 
open lead. This capacitor presented a high impedance t o  t h e  sync osc i l l a to r  
which distorted the switching output. This distortion resulted in overstress 
and damage t o  a l l  pulse width regulator circuits. The capacitor failure was 
at t r ibuted  to   the  extensive  vibrat ion  that   the  power supply had previously 
undergone. 
A. ACME Operating L i f e  Tests - A combined mission simulation and operating 
l i f e  test  was conducted on the ACME sys em f o r  1200 hr, of which more than 
1000 h r  were at a pressure of 1.0 x lo-' psia. The performance of the system 
was satisfactory throughout the test. 
The ACME hand controller potentiometer was subjected t o  a 500-hr 
operating l i f e  t e s t  at 8 0 O ~  and 6 ps ia  i n  a loo$ 02 environment. A cycling 
rate of f ive  cycles/min was maintained throughout the test. The r e su l t s  were 
satisfactory. Two ACME comand excitation transformers were subje t t o  a 
500-hr ope ra t ing   l i f e   t e s t  a t  160°F wal temperature and 1.0 x psia. The 
r e su l t s  were satisfactory.  
B. ACME Overstress Tests - The ACME system passed the following overstress 
t e s t s :  
1. Combined Temperature - Altitude/Hi-Low Voltage 
a. Chamber pressure: 1.47 x psia, maximum. 
b. Chamber shroud temperature: 165 + 5OF. 
c. Coldplate i n l e t  temperature: 165-+ 5OF t o  205 + 5OF (ACE, OAME, 
d.-Coolant flow-rate: 50 lb/hr maximum. 
e.  Supply voltage: 18.0 VDC t o  30.5 VDC. 
PI), and 125 + 5OF to 165 + 5OF  (RGP). - - 
2. Voltage and Frequency Stab i l i ty  
a. AC voltage: 21 VAC t o  31 VAC 
b. AC frequency: 388 cps t o  412 cps 
3. Vibration - Although no formal overstress vibration tests were 
conducted, t e s t s  conducted ear ly  i n  the qualification program demonstrated 
that  the system could withstand overstress vibration. 
Two command excitation transformers were subjected to overstress tests 
which consisted of 12-1/2 cycles, each cycle lasting 20 hr,  al ternately at 
-55OC and 125OC with units operating at  125% of rated load. During the 20-hr 
periods, the samples were cycled with power "on" for  40 min and power "off" 
f o r  80 min. A t  the conclusion of each 20-hr cycle, the transformers were 
removed from t h e   t e s t  chamber and l e f t  deenergized at room ambient for   no t   l ess  
than  four  hr  pr ior  to  s ta r t ing  the  next cycle. The r e su l t s  were satisfactory.  
Computer System Rel iab i l i ty  Program. I__ 
A. Computer Rel iab i l i ty  Program - The spacecraf t  digi ta l  computer was 
subjected t o  a low temperature threshold test, a high temperature threshold 
test  and a 200°F re-entry profile evaluation. 
1. Low Temperature Threshold Test - This t e s t  was performed a t  the 
following test  conditions:  
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a. Internal  chamber pressure: 1.47 x 10-5 psia. 
b. Thermal shroud m e a n  temperature: OOF. 
C. Computer coldplate inlet  temperature: Varied from 6 0 O ~  t o  35OF 
i n  5OF increments. 
No computer malfunction o r  performance degradation was experienced 
during t h i s   t e s t .  
2. High Temperature Threshold Test - This test  was conducted at the 
following test  conditions: 
a. Internal  chamber pressure: 1.47 x 10-5 psia. 
b. Thermal shroud mean temperature: 1 6 0 ~ ~ .  
C. Computer coldplate inlet temperature: Varied from 95OF t o  
120°F i n  5OF increments. 
A malfunction occurred during testing a t  a temperature of llO°F. The 
failure was a t t r i bu ted   t o  power l ine   f luc tua t ions   in  test equipment, which 
resulted in the imposition of t ransients  on the computer chassis. No computer 
malfunction was  noted during subsequent testing above llO°F. 
chamber pressure of 1.47 x lo-? psia  and the shroud and coldplate  inlet  
temperatures init ially stabil ized at 1 6 0 ~ ~  and 88OF, respectively. The coolant 
flow through the coldplate w a s  then halted and the mean temperature of the 
shroud was increased to 200°F. Simultaneously with t h e  shroud temperature 
increase,  the internal chamber pressure was increased t o  the micron range and 
maintained for the duration of the tes t .  
3. 200°F Re-Entry Prof'le Evaluation - This t e s t  was conducted at a 
A malfunction which occurred prior to the attainment of a mean shroud 
temperature of 200°F was a t t r i bu ted   t o  a t e s t  equipment power l ine fluctuation. 
The t e s t  was repeated without computer malfunction. 
B. Incremental Velocity Indicator Reliability Program 
1. High Temperature Test - The powered-up uni t  was subjected to 120$ 
of t h e  design approval high temperature t e s t  l e v e l  (192OF) f o r  four hr.  A t  the 
end of this  per iod the uni t  was tested functionally. The t e s t  caused no 
damage to  the  uni t .  
120% of the design approval vibration test level for 15 min i n  each axis. This 
was repeated i n  each axis. 
voltage (nominal operating) and 120% undervoltage for ten min. Thereafter a 
performance test  was conducted w i t h  voltages maintained. 
4. Pressure Test - The IVI was placed in a pressure chamber at a 2.0 
atmosphere level.  Then the chamber was depressurized suddenly t o  a one- 
atmosphere level, thus leaving a pressure differential  of one atmosphere 
appl ied to  the IVI case. The IVI was monitored for leakage and passed the tes t  
with no damage or deterioration of performance. 
2. Vibration Test - The IVI (power-on) was subjected successfully to 
3. Power Test - The uni t  was subjected successfil ly to 120% over- 
C. Manual Data Insertion Unit Rel iab i l i ty  Program - Overstress testing 
on the manual data inser t ion uni t  was deleted on a unit  basis .  Rel iabi l i ty  
analysis stress-data was submitted on the MDN on a component par t  basis. This 
data  summarized and recommended stress levels  and application information for 
the electronic components used i n   t h e  MDIU and the I B M  component pan   de ra t ing  
practice employed on the unit. 
Horizon Sensor Rel iabi l i ty  Program. - For contractual reasons, overstress 
t e s t i w G d  on a complete horizon sensor system nor was it 
performed on e i the r  of the two uni t s  of the system. However, a l l  major par t s  
and assemblies were individually subjected to various overstress tests. The 
t e s t s  were of two general categories: Module overs t ress  tes t s  and e lec t r ica l -  
mechanical overstress  tes ts .  
Module tests consisted of the following, although all modules were not 
necessarily subjected to a l l  t e s t s :  
A. H i g h  temperature storage. 
B. H i g h  o r  low temperature and voltage overstress test  and/or thermal 
C. Vibration (sinusoidal) . 
D. Transient noise or transient voltage. 
shock. 
The error amplifiers and the  dr ive  amplif ier   fa i led test B above and had 
t o  be  redesigned.  Retest r e su l t s  were satisfactory.  Other  discrepancies were 
minor and were e i the r  t he  result of par t s  which had not been burned in   o r  were 
readily corrected by the addition of t r i m  res i s tors ,  diode suppressors, etc. 
Electrical-mechanical tests consisted of the  following and a l l  modules 
were not necessarily subject to the same t e s t :  
A. 1000-hr l i f e  t e s t .  
B. Temperature cycling. 
C. Vibration (sinusoidal). 
The only failure consisted of a torsion rod which fa i led   the  1000-hr 
l i f e  t e s t .  A modified torsion rod passed the test. 
Attitude Display Group Rel iabi l i ty  Program. - Overstress testing on the 
a t t i tude  display group was confined t o  the fl ight director controller.  Testing 
of t h i s  type-had been previously accomplished on the at t i tude  display  indicator  
on other programs. 
The following tests were performed t o  determine the effect of extreme 
environmental conditions on the performance of the controller:  
A. H i g h  Temperature - The unit passed a test  i n  which it was energized 
and subjected t o  a temperature of 210°F f o r  a soak period of four hr.  
B. Overpower - The controller was energized with nominal input voltage 
(26 VAC, 400 cps) and outputs were monitored. Input voltage was then increased 
t o  30 VAC, 400 cps and maintained f o r  15 min, after which the controller 
outputs were again monitored and the uni t  was inspected for damage. No damage 
was incurred by the unit. 
The unit  was subjected t o  a vibration test, which consisted of 110% design 
approval t e s t   l e v e l   f o r  15 min i n  each of the three mutually perpendicular 
axes. The controller passed the vibration test. 
GCS Quality Assurance 
I n e r t i a l  Measurement Unit. - The type of quality assurance test  performed 
on elements of the IM.U varied with items. The tes t ing  was as follows: 
A. System Electronics and Gimbal Control Electronics - A n  engineering 
specification (ES) test was performed t o   s e t  a l l  adjustments and gains and t o  
ver i fy  that  overal l  uni t - level  performance was within specification. The  ES 
test tolerances were generally less than those permitted i n  higher leve l  tests. 
A unit level acceptance test  including vibration testing was performed 
wi th  Government and McDonnell witnessing. Upon satisfactory completion of 
t h i s  test  and accumulation of 100 h r  of operation, a uni t  was considered f l i g h t  
worthy. If the uni ts  were integrated in a system and submitted t o  an IMU 
acceptance t e s t ,  the  100-hr operate time applied upon completion of system 
level acceptance testing. 
B. Sta t i c  Power Supply Quality Assurance - The SPS was fabricated and 
tes ted  by Engineered Magnetics Division of Gulton Industries. P r i o r  t o  ship- 
ment from EM t o  Honeywell, each s t a t i c  power supply was tested, and the  tes t  
was witnessed by Government and Honeywell representatives. A t  Honeywell, the 
SPS was processed t o  a receiving inspection test. This test was a duplicate 
of the predelivery test performed at EM. Each SPS was submitted t o  an individ- 
ua l  vendor acceptance t e s t  which included vibration; Government and McDonnell 
witnessing was required. Upon satisfactory completion of t h i s  test  the SPS 
w a s  processed through a system leve l  acceptance test as par t  of an IMU, or 
shipped f o r  f i e l d  use. In  e i ther  case, 100 h r  of operate time was required a t  
shipment . 
C. I ne r t i a l  Platform Quality Assurance - Each platform was processed t o  
a Honeywell ES test, including adjustment of gains, optical and mechanical 
.'alignment, and gimbal f r i c t ion  and balance checks. The platform level 
acceptance test depended upon whether the unit  was t o  be integrated and tes ted 
at the IMU level or accepted and shipped as a platform. I n  either case, 
Government and McDonnell witnessing was required. 
fie-IMU acceptance testing consisted of unit level vibration, acceler- 
ometer loop gain checks, synchro e r ror  and s t a t i c  accuracy checks, cube t o  case 
alignment checks, synchro transmitter output checks, and gas leak and pres- 
surization checks. 
If a platform was t o  be accepted for shipment on the  basis  of IMU level  
t e s t s ,  it received a l l  tes t ing  performed i n  a pre-IMU test, and additionally 
was processed t o  testing designed t o  assure satisfactory system l eve l  
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performance. This testing included loop phasing checks, gyro open loop gain 
checks, and pre and post cool down i n e r t i a l  parameter checks. Essentially, the 
platform was evaluated for system performance, u t i l i z ing  test s ta t ion  power 
sources and control loops. The gyro control loops do not duplicate system per- 
formance, and analog ( i n   l i e u  of digital) accelerometer rebalance loops are 
employed. 
The platform level acceptance test was intended primarily as a proce- 
dure f o r  evaluating and accepting individual platforms returned from the  f i e l d  
f o r  rework where system performance has been verified previously. 
D. IMU System Level Quality Assurance - Each platform accepted for 
Gemini was processed through an IMU acceptance t e s t ,   i n  which a l l  equipment of 
an IMU system was integrated and t e s t ed  to  ve r i fy  f l i gh t  worthiness. Except 
in  rare  instances (i.e., when a spare SF'S, s t a t i c  power supply; SE, system 
electronics;  or GCX, gimbal i s  required on short  notice),  items of an IMU were 
accepted as par t  of some IMU acceptance t e s t  procedures. 
The system leve l  test includes verification of acceptable  iner t ia l  
component parameters, gyro and accelerometer loop performance, caging and 
gyrocompassing loop performance, mode relay verification, and acceptabili ty 
of a l l  system interfaces. 
Upon sat isfactory completion of t h i s  t e s t   t he  IMU was ready for ship- 
ment t o  McDonnell for  spacecraf t  ins ta l la t ion  or  to  IBM f o r  IGS integration. 
ACME System Quality Assurance. - - The l i s t i n g  below appl ies   to   the   a t t i tude  
control electronics,  orbit  at t i tude and maneuvering electronics ,  ra te  gyro 
and power inverter packages and does not include any t e s t ing   p r io r   t o   t he  
i n i t i a l  assembly of the individual package. The tests l i s t e d  i n  A through L 
below were the vendor's engineering specification (ES) t e s t   p ro f i l e  and were 
performed in the order listed except the high temperature and low temperature 
tests were sometimes interchanged.  Unless  otherwise  stated,  the  following 
t e s t s  were appl icable   to   the  four   l is ted ACME packages. 
A. I n i t i a l  Room Temperature - Complete functional check of unit. 
B. High Temperature (ACE, O M ,  PI) - Four-hr soak at 160'~, nonoperating, 
C. High Temperature (RGP) - Same as B above except the gyros were 
D. Operational Check - Perform specific operational test  at room 
E. Low Temperature (ACE, O M ,  PI) - Four-hr soak at OOF, nonoperating, 
F. Low Temperature (RGP) - Same as E above except the gyros were energized 
G. Operational Check - Same as D above. 
H. Vibration - Three-axis random vibration test, one min/axis duration. 
followed by specific operational test while s t i l l  at 1 6 0 ~ ~ .  
energized during the soak and the temperature was 120°F. 
temperature. 
followed by specific operational tests while s t i l l  at OOF. 
during the soak and the temperature i s  -lO°F. 
The vibration spectrum was i n  keeping with Gemini requirements wi th  an overal l  
l eve l  of 6.2 g R N .  Limited functional tests were performed during the 
vibration. 
I. Vibration - The RGP. for Spacecraft 2 and the PI'S for Spacecraft 2 and 
3 were subjected to  three-axis  sinusoidal  vibration  instead of random vibration. 
The vibration consisted of a logarithmic scan of 15-2000-15 cps f o r  15 min/ 
axis. 
J. Operation Check - Same as D(Operational Check) on preceding page . 
K. Remaining Burn-In - If the total  operat ing hours  to  this  point ,  plus 
the  anticipated  operational  time fo r  final room and predelivery acceptance 
tests did not equal o r  exceed 100 hr, the additional operation time was 
accrued at this   point .  
L. Final Room Temperature - A preselloff f'unctional check of the  unit. 
M. Predelivery Acceptance (PDA) - This was the formal selloff tests, 
run to the appropriate McDonnell approved acceptance test procedure (ATP) a t  
the vendor 's  faci l i t ies .  
N. Preinstal la t ion Acceptance (PIA) - Similar  to  M above but run at 
McDonnell t o  a McDonnell/NASA-approved service engineering department report 
(SEDR). Following the PIA test  the equipment was installed in the spacecraft .  
The following t e s t s  were performed on the two remaining items in   t he  
ACME, the hand controller potentiometer and the command excitation transformer: 
A. Predelivery acceptance testing at the respective vendor's facilities. 
B. Preinstallation acceptance testing per McDonnell SEDR 360 at 
McDonnell, St. Louis. 
Computer . . System Quality Assurance. 
A. Computer - The following t e s t  programs were conducted a t  D M ,  Owego, 
New York, on the spacecraft  digital  computer p r i o r   t o  i t s  ins ta l la t ion  in to  the  
spacecraft. These t e s t  programs are  performed at IBM, Owego,  New York. 
1. Preacceptance Test - The preacceptance tes t  consis ted of a 
cont inui ty  tes t ,  an interface tes t ,  a diagnostic test ,  a memory evaluation 
t e s t ,  a pretemperature test and a previbration test .  
t e s t ,  a temperature tes t ,  the  interface measurements t e s t  and a diagnostic 
t e s t .  
3. IGS Integrated Acceptance Test - The integrated acceptance test 
consisted of an  IGS interface tes t ,  IGS computer mode tes t ing,  system power, 
voltage, and frequency testing, an IMU/computer interface voltage transient 
t e s t ,  and an auxiliary computer power uni t   t es t .  
2. Acceptance Test - The acceptance tes t  consis ted of a vibration 
B. Incremental Velocity Indicator Quality Assurance - The following t e s t s  
were performed on the incremental  velocity indicator prior to i t s  in s t a l l a t ion  
i n  the spacecraft: 
1. Preacceptance test at Lear Siegler, Inc. 
2. Predelivery acceptance t e s t  a t  Lear Siegler, Inc. 
3. Acceptance t e s t  a t  IBM (for D M  acceptance). 
4. Predelivery acceptance t e s t  a t  I B M  ( for  McDonnell acceptance). 
5. IGS integration test  at IBM. 
C. Manual Data Insertion Unit Quality Assurance - The following t e s t s  
were performed on the manual data readout and manual data keyboard p r i o r   t o  
the i r  ins ta l la t ion  in  the  spacecraf t :  
1. Preacceptance t e s t  at IBM. 
2. Acceptance test  at IBM. 
3. IGS integration test  at IBM. 
D. Auxiliary Computer Power Unit Quality Assurance - The ACPU was tes ted  
by the vendor per the McDonnell approved acceptance test  procedure. If t h i s  
tes t ing  was witnessed by McDonnell Engineering, no PIA tes t ing  was performed 
on the unit before i ts  installation into the spacecraft .  When the ATP was 
not witnessed by McDonnell Engineering, a PIA test was performed at McDonnell. 
E. Auxiliary Tape kmory  Quality Assurance - Raymond Engineering Labora- 
t o r i e s  conducted an I B M  acceptance t e s t  on each unit. IBM then conducted a 
McDonnell acceptance t e s t  on each unit. The McDonnell acceptance test was 
the same as the IBM acceptance test but includes temperature/altitude and 
vibrat ion  tes ts .  
Compatibility of the ATM with the spacecraft  digital  computer was 
ver i f ied by tes t ing  an engineering model and the first production model i n  an 
IGS system at IBM. 
Horizon Sensor System Quality Assurance, - The vendor predelivery accep- 
tance (PDA) t e s t  was performed to  assure  tha t  the materials, workmanship, and 
performance of un i t s  programmed fo r   de l ive ry   t o  McDonnellwere not faulty and 
that   the  units had been manufactured t o  approved drawings and specifications. 
The horizon sensor systems were tes ted   for  compliance with the detailed 
functional requirements of the McDonnell approved PDA t e s t  procedure. These 
t e s t s  included:  physical  inspection,  weight,  squib  continuity check, power 
consumption, pi tch and r o l l  output null and scale factor,  pitch and r o l l  output 
cross coupling, loss-of-track, output time lag, temperature environment, and 
random vibration environment. 
Attitude Display Group QualityAssurance. - The following tests were 
performed on the   a t t i tude   d i sp lay   insca tor  and f l ight  director  control ler  
pr ior  t o  the i r  ins ta l la t ion  in  the  spacecraf t :  
A. Preacceptance t e s t  at Lear Siegler, Inc. 
B. Predelivery acceptance t e s t  a t  Lear Siegler, Inc. 
C. Preinstallation acceptance test  at McDonne11. 
Precision Power Supply Quality Assurance. 
A. Unit Level Tests - The precision power supply was processed t o  
B. System Level Tests - The S/N 100 PPS was processed through the IBM acceptance t e s t s  a t  both Engineered Magnetics and at Honeywell, Florida. 
acceptance t e s t .  During t h i s  phase the PPS was tested exp?..icitly for voltage 
amplitude and frequency. I n  addition, it was veri f ied as a resu l t  of gimbal 
angle accuracy t e s t s .  
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The  PPS went through the  IGS integration tests at I B M  pr ior   to   de l ivery  
t o  McDonnell for spacecraft  installation. 
GCS J3quipment Evaluation 
I n e r t i a l  Measurement Unit Evaluation. - The i n e r t i a l  components consti tute 
the time c r i t i c a l  items t h a t  a f fec t  IMU performance. The gyros have an 
allowable l i f e  of 3000 h r  and the accelerometers have an allowable l i f e  of 
5000 hr. 
For the gyros, the gravity sensit ive and gravity insensit ive drift 
parameters were measured and evaluated throughout the l i f e  of the platform. 
For the accelerometers the scale factor, bias, and input axis alignment were 
measured and evaluated. 
ACME System Evaluation. - The following parameters were evaluated, by 
means of time his tory  plots ,  as an indication of overall  ACME performance: 
A. ACE - Rate command  mode switching levels (RCS and OAMS) : re-entry and 
re-entry rate command  mode switching levels; orbit mode pulse widths and 
frequencies; bias power supply voltages; RCS spike suppression. 
B. OAMS - OAMS spike suppression. 
C. PI - Output voltage and frequency. 
D. RGP - Run up times; run down times; i n  phase n u l l s  . 
Computer System Evaluation. 
A. Computer - The spacecraf t  digi ta l  computer contains no time c r i t i c a l  
parameters. The computer memory, however, was ver i f ied a minimum of four 
t imes  pr ior   to  launch. 
Analog voltage output deviation curves were p lo t ted  for  each unit. A 
l i s t  of these curves i s  
1. Deviation of 
2. Deviation of 
3. Deviation of 
4. Deviation of 
5. Deviation of 
6. Deviation of 
7. Deviation of 
8, Deviation of 
channel. 
channel. 
channel. 
pi tch channel. 
channel. 
channel 
pi tch channel. 
channel. 
presented below. 
GLV signal versus theoretical value-computer pi tch 
GLV signal  versus  theoretical  value-computer r o l l  
GLV signal versus theoretical value-computer yaw 
f ine  AC signal versus theoretical  value-computer 
f ine  AC signal versus theoretical value-computer r o l l  
f ine  AC signal versus theoretical value-computer yaw 
coarse AC signal versus  theoretical  value-computer 
coarse AC signal versus  theoretical  value-computer r o l l  
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9. Deviation of coarse AC signal versus theoretical  value-computer 
yaw channel. 
B. Auxiliary Computer Power Unit Evaluation - The bat tery  in   the ACPU 
should be charged a f t e r  14 days of nonoperation. The ATM, the  NI and the MDIU 
have no time c r i t i c a l  parameters which are monitored p r i o r   t o  launch. 
Horizon Sensor System Evaluation. - Selected horizon sensor system param- 
e t e r s  were monitored after instal la t ion into the spacecraf t ,  to  insure 
unchanged operational performance. These parameters included pitch output, 
r o l l  output, loss-of-track output, position detector output (primary system 
only), and  azimuth  overshoot  output  (primary  system  only). The a t t i t ude  
display group and precision power supply had no time c r i t i c a l  parameters. 
GCS Flight Perfonnance 
Gemini 11. - During the ascent phase, t he  ine r t i a l  guidance system 
indicated errors when compared to tracking data.  The anomaly was evidenced as 
an out-of-tolerance downrange e r ro r  and it appeared as erroneous X-accelerometer 
velocity signals near BECO and SECO. Tests confirmed that the errors  were 
caused by saturation effects within the rebalance loop. 
Gemini I11 Performance. - During the ascent phase of Gemini I11 the 
i n e r t i a l  guidance system indicated errors when compared with tracking data. 
The anomaly was evidenced as out-of-tolerance errors in the downrange and 
ver t ica l  ve loc i t ies  as indicated in  TRW-STL report 4160-6047-TCOOO(NAS9-2938) - 
"Gemini GT-3 I n e r t i a l  Guidance System Evaluation Trajectory Reconstruction." 
Post-flight failure analysis revealed t h a t  the ascent velocity error was 
due to  sca le  fac tor  and bias in s t ab i l i t y  i n  the X-accelerometer loop. Further 
examination related t h i s  i n s t a b i l i t y   t o  an interim modification which was 
employed on the X-accelerometer loop. For corrective action to the Gemini I11 
and IV configurations, (See Gemini I1 Mission, page 3 6 ) .  
Post-flight analysis also revealed a gyro problem which caused pi tch  axis  
d r i f t .  This problem was caused by a defective header seal which allowed 
fluorolube t o  escape and subsequently allowed air t o  be drawn into the gyro. 
When the acceleration vector changed d i rec t ion  re la t ive  to  the gyro, such as 
at 180 sec in  the Gemini I11 mission, the air  bubbles caused torques which 
resu l ted  in  t rans ien t  drift.  The defective seal was considered t o  be an 
isolated case and no design changes were implemented. However, a tilt t e s t  
was incorporated at the vendor 's  faci l i t ies  and at Cape Kennedy to  insure 
detection of t h i s  problem should it occur on subsequent units.  
For additional information, refer t o  McDonnell report €3984, "GT-2 and 
GT-3 IGS Ascent Anomaly Investigation (U)  , ' I  and McDonnell guidance and.contro1 
mechanics Gemini design note 298. 
The horizon sensor system experienced many losses of track during the 
Gemini I11 mission. However, it was able to align the platform and t o  provide 
hor scan mode control without difficulty. Post-flight analysis of telemetry 
' records revealed that the Gemini horizon sensors lost track 382 times during 
the mission. The t o t a l  accumulated loss of t rack time was 366.1 sec out of 
the 4 hr, 28 min and 3 sec between i n i t i a l  lock-on and deenergization of the  
horizon sensors. O f  t ha t  t o t a l ,  291 losses of t rack (293.7 sec ) were explained 
through the"corre1ation of excessive spacecraft attitude, switching between 
sensors, sunset, and sunrise. Correlation studies were undertaken i n  an 
attempt t o  relate clouds and special thruster firings t o  losses-of-track, but 
the results were inconclusive. Testing which w a s  later conducted on a 
horizon sensor system proved that the sun w i l l  cause losses of t rack when it 
is  located between the  earth's  horizon and approximately ten  degrees above 
the horizon, if  the sun is within the azimuth coverage of the sensor. To 
isolate additional causes of horizon sensor losses-of-track, plans were made 
t o  add special  TM parameters t o   t h e  horizon sensor system on Spacecraft 4. 
Gemini N Performance. -During the flight the astronauts experienced 
d i f f icu l ty   in   tu rn ing   the  computer off using the computer ON/OFT switch. 
Removal of the IGS power supply 28 V input  fa i led to  shutdown the  computer. 
Special tests confirmed t h a t  the computer was not operating properly and the  
flight continued without the  use of the computer. 
Post-flight analyses to determine the cause of the  anomaly included 
analyses of the telemetry data and of the voice transmissions. Post-flight 
tes t ing  was of considerable magnitude and at considerable expense, and 
comprised uni t  tests on the computer, a system t e s t  which employed an ACPU 
and a power supply, and a disassembly and analysis of each of the components 
which might have been re la ted  to  the  fa i lure .  All tests and analyses failed 
to  revea l  the  cause of the fa i lure .  
Post-flight tests of the computer indicated that an e l ec t r i ca l   a r c  
between the computer 25 volt  regulator transistor terminal and the computer 
case caused an overload condition i n  the I G S  power supply and failed a t rans is -  
t o r  component i n  the I G S  supply. This problem was unrelated to  the TURN-OFF 
fa i lure  . 
Detailed information regarding this fa i lure  may be found i n  the following 
reports : 
A. McDonnell report E193, "Final Report - Gemini Spacecraft 4 Post-Flight 
B. D M  No. 65-928-93, "Final Report on the  Post-Flight GT-4 Failure 
C. McDonnell report El&, "Final Report - Gemini Spacecraft 4 Post-Flight 
Failure Investigation IGS Sta t i c  Power Supply Re-Entry Failure." 
Analysis." 
Failure Investigation Compute Power Sequencing Anomaly." 
The special horizon sensor TM post-fl ight data analysis of Gemini IV 
confirmed tha t  certain cloud conditions can cause horizon sensor output varia- 
tions. These data confirmed the Gemini I11 post-flight analysis. 
Gemini V Performance. - The performance accuracy of the ACME platform 
mode was questioned by the crew. A comprehensive post-fl ight test  program 
indicated t h a t  the  platform mode operated satisfactorily during the mission. 
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The crew also  reported an anomaly associated with the  flight di rec tor  
ind ica tors  of  the  a t t i tude  d isp lay  group. With the  range switch i n  t h e  LO 
posi t ion the downrange (pitch) needle was displaced full-scale,  but wikh the  
range switch i n  H I  the needle was displaced less than half-scale. Post-flight 
tes t ing   revea led   tha t  a difference existed between the  electrical ful l -scale  
limits and the meter mechanical limits which accounted f o r  the apparent 
discrepancy. 
The primary horizon sensor became inoperative during the Gemini V f l igh t .  
The anomaly w a s  i so la ted   to   the   sensor  head, which is j e t t i s o n e d   p r i o r   t o  
re-entry. Post-flight analysis of the telemetry data revealed that the yoke 
azimuth motion became uncontrolled. 
Gemini V I  Performance. - The astronauts  reported that  the downrange 
(pitch) needles on both f l ight  director  indicators  def lect  2-1/2 needle widths 
below the miniature airplane dot after r e t r o f i r e  ( the needles should have been 
centered on the dot) .  Post-f l ight  tes t ing was performed on both att i tude 
display groups, the d i g i t a l  computer, and the No. 2 instrumentation package. 
The reported anomaly was never duplicated. 
Gemini V I 1  Performance. - It was noted tha t  the  removal of the  AC power 
from the ACME caused a l l  e ight  OAMS t h r u s t e r s   t o  f i r e  f o r  a short  (less 
than 300 m s )  period. Post-flight analysis proved t h a t  t h i s  was charac te r i s t ic  
of the system and t h a t  it does not affect system performance. 
Gemini V I 1 1  Performance. - Shortly after docking with the Agena Target 
Vehicle the spacecraft experienced an uncommanded firing of OAMS thruster No. 8. 
This might have been caused by a f a i l u r e  i n  the O M  package. However, post- 
f l igh t  ana lys i s  of the telemetry data indicated t h a t  a failure of any of the  
c r i t i c a l  OAME components did not f i t  a l l  of  the  fa i lure  modes. Therefore, 
it was concluded t h a t  t h e  OAME package did not fail. 
The astronauts reported that  t h e i r  first attempt t o  use the ATM on 
Gemini V I 1 1  was unsuccessf'ul because t h e  ATM run light and the IVI's did not 
respond as had been expected. The astronauts had observed t h i s  same anomaly 
in  the mission t ra iner .  Post-f l ight  analysis  has not  posi t ively ident i f ied 
the cause of the anomaly but the most probable cause i s  t h a t  the MDIU cancel 
button was inadvertently depressed while the insert  button was depressed. 
Gemini IX Performance. - Early in  the mission the crew experienced an 
anomaly which caused the same e f fec t s  as a continuous START COMP discrete.  
Subsequently the problem cleared i tself .  
Pos t - f l igh t  tes t s  were conducted on the  computer, the COW-START switch 
and the Manual FETRO switch (connected i n  parallel with the COMP-START switch). 
No indications were found as to the possible cause of the anomaly. 
Gemini X, X I ,  and X I I .  - There were no s ignif icant  equipment changes o r  
anomalie s. 
. ._ . . 
PROPULSION SYSTES 
There are three propulsion systems on Gemini. Two of them, the orbi t  
a t t i tude  and maneuver system ( O W )  and the re-entry control system (RCS), are 
liquid propellant systems. The retrograde rocket system is  a solid propellant 
system. 
Orbit Attitude and Maneuver System 
Design Concepts. - During the orbi t  phase of t h e  mission the OAMS provides 
(1) attitude control torques about the spacecraft pitch, yaw, and r o l l  axes, 
and (2) translational thrust  along these same axes. The system i s  located in  
the adapter section of the spacecraft, as shown i n  Fig. 17. 
A. Thrust Engine Design - Attitude control i s  obtained by f i r ing  se lec ted  
pa i rs  of the eight thrust engines arranged around the spacecraft periphery. 
Each chamber f i r e s  i n  a fixed direction with a constant thrust level, nominally 
23.5 lb. The spacecraft i s  maneuvered by f i r ing  thrus t  chambers of higher 
output (two of 79 l b  output and s ix  of 94.5 lb )  which are oriented so tha t  the  
thrus t  ac t s  through the vehicle center of gravity. Two of the 94.5 l b  chambers 
f i re  together to provide forward thrust, while the other four f i re  r a d i a l l y   t o  
yield up and down or side-to-side translation. A f t  thrust  i s  obtained by 
f i r ing   the   pa i r  of 79 lb  thrust  chambers, which are pointed forward but are 
canted obliquely t o  prevent the exhaust plume from damaging the spacecraft 
skin. 
The at t i tude control  chambers are fired in short ,  variable length 
pulses. In order to achieve precision in attitude control, very short pulse 
length capability i s  required. High response propellant valves and small 
injector  volumes meet t h i s  requirement. The maneuver chambers are operated 
f o r  comparatively longer periods and therefore the.hlgh response i s  not 
required. 
B. Thrust Chamber Temperature Control - The thrust  chambers a re  ins ta l led  
below the spacecraft skin, with the exhaust nozzles terminating flush with the 
vehicle exterior. The submerged instal la t ion,  adopted  because of aerodynamic 
considerations required that the temperature of the exterior walls of the 
thrust  chambers be limited t o  avoid damage t o  neighboring systems and struc- 
tures.  This was achieved by using ablative material i n  the construction of 
chamber walls. Heat is dissipated by being absorbed into the chamber w a l l  
where the ablative material chars and releases gaseous products back into  the 
chamber and out the exhaust nozzle. 
C. Propellant Design Concepts - Tank propellant weight i s  kept at a 
minimum by the use of a high energy bipropellant, monomethyl hydrazine, as 
f u e l  and nitrogen tetroxide as oxidizer. These propellants are hypergolic 
with each other; therefore no ignition provision is  required. The propellants 
have additional advantages: they do not require special conditioning, such as 
refrigeration, for storage,  and they do not degrade with time. Disadvantages 
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FIGURE 17 PROPULSION SYSTEMS-OAMS, RCS, RETRO 
LOCATION IN SPACECRAFT 
also exist:  the prdpellants are highly toxic and, par t icular ly  in  the case 
of the oxidizer, corrosive. 
In  order   to  combat corrosion, a l l  pa r t s  exposed to  propel lants  are 
made from corrosion resistant steel, except for the elastomeric materials,  in 
which Teflon emerged as the only suitable material. Toxicity i s  dealt with 
by s t r ic t  cont ro l  of leakage so that the propellants are securely contained 
within the system. This containment is insured by welding a l l  c losures  in  the 
various components (with a very few exceptions) and by using brazed joints 
(as opposed t o  threaded connections) between components. Access ports needed 
for servicing and ground tes t ing  cannot be welded, but are double o r   t r i p l e  
sealed against leakage. In addition to control of external leakage, the 
propel lants  are  isolated in  their  s torage tanks unt i l  the  system is  activated. 
I n  t h i s  way, potential leakage locations are held  to  a minimum p r i o r   t o  system 
use. Such techniques have resulted i n  a system with extraordinarily low 
leakage characteristics. 
The propellants are stored i n  spherical tanks of all-welded titanium. 
In the absence of gravity the propellant i s  expelled by pressurant gas acting 
upon the outside surface of bladders which contain the propellant. This pres- 
surant gas (helium stored at high pressure) flows through a regulator and a 
ser ies  of check valves before it is  introduced into the propellant tanks. A s  
i n  the case of the propellant, the pressurant i s  stored behind isolation valves 
t o  reduce potential leakage locations. The pressure regulation i s  redundant; 
i f  the primary regulator fails, the crew can regulate the system feed pressure 
manually by switches and valves. 
O M  Function. - The orb i t  a t t i tude  and maneuver system i s  arranged 
schematically as shown i n  Fig. 18. 
A. Pressurant Storage - Pressurant helium i s  stored at a nominal 3000 p s i  
i n  spherical titanium tanks, isolated before use by a cartridge-actuated valve 
i n  the component package A, immediately downstream of the pressurant tanks. 
A manual access valve i n  t h i s  same package provides a means of pressurant 
loading. The gas pressure, called "source pressure," i s  monitored by a pres- 
sure transducer which provides inputs t o  a cabin display and t o  ground 
telemetry. This transducer i s  upstream  of the cartridge valve. 
B. Pressure Regulator - Upon activation of the system by f i r ing  car t r idge  
valves, gas flows unimpeded through component package E to the pressure 
regulator, which reduces the pressure t o  295 psig, the system feed pressure. 
Malfunction of the regulator, so t h a t  it is  unable t o  limit the downstream 
pressure, i s  detected by a pressure switch in package E. When t h i s  occurs, a 
normally-open cartridge valve, also i n  package E, i s  f i r ed  to  in t e r rup t  t he  
supply of high pressure gas to  the regulator  inlet .  The crew may repressurize 
the regulator inlet  by opening a solenoid valve which bypasses the now closed 
cartridge valve. If the regulator failure blocks the pressurant gas flow, a 
regulator bypass valve (cartridge-actuated) can be f i red  by the crew and 
pressure can be regulated by crew operation of the same solenoid valve. The 
regulator override equipment has a l l  been collected  into package E. 
PRESSURIZING GROUP 
PRESSURANT COMPONENT 
STORAGE TANK (He) 
COMPONENT 
PACKAGE E 
NOTE: 1 A L L  COMPONENTS EFFECTIVE ON S/C 2-12 
A N O T  ON S/C 3 
UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED. 
REGULATOR/ 
TCA THRUST  CHAMBER  ASSE LY LEGEND + CONNECTED + NOT  CONNECTED SOLENOID VALVE (NORMALLY CLOSED) 
PRESSURE SWITCH TI,T2 TEMPERATURE (TRANSMITTED TO PROPELLANT 
8 T~ TEMPERATURE  AND PRESSURE INDICATOR OR 
INSTRUMENT PANEL) (T ALSO TRANSMITTED TO OAMS 
PANEL) 
PROPELLANT PUANTIT: INDICATOR OR INSTRUMENT CHECK  VALVE 
p1 a p2 PRESSURE (TRANSMITTED T O  PROP. TEMP. AND FILTER 
PRESSURE INDICATOR ON INSTRUMENT PANEL) -1 GROUND TEST CONNECTION 
QUANTITY INDICATOR ON INSTRUMENT PANEL) PROPELLANT SHUTOFF VALVE (MOTOR OPERATED) 
P, PRESSUREVRANSMITTED T O  OAMS PROPELLANT 
0 23 LE. THRUST TCA (YAW, PITCH a ROLL) 
CARTRIDGE-ACTUATED  VALVE  (NORMALLY  CLOSED) 0 95 LB. THRUST TCA  (TRANSLATE FORWARD) 
CARTRIDGE  -ACTUATED  VALVE  (NORMALLY  OPEN) @ 
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER 
RELIEF  VALVE a 7 9  LE.  THRUST TCA  (TRANSLATE  AFT) 
a 95 LB.  THRUST  TCA  (TRANSLATE  RIGHT,  LEFT, UP, 
OR DOWN) 
- . ". ~_ 
FIGURE 18 ORBIT ATTITUDE AND MANEUVER SYSTEM SCHEMATIC 
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FIGURE 18 ORBIT ATTITUDE AND MANEUVER SYSTEM SCHEMATIC (Continued) 
143 
C. Pressure Transducer and Relief Valves - Pressurant emerging from 
the pressure regulator flows through component package B to the propellant 
tanks. In package B the flow streams divide and pass through check valves 
which i so la te  the  fuel and oxidizer gas systems from each other. A pressure 
t ransducer   in   th i s  package senses regulated pressure for cabin display and 
telemetry. Relief valves on both the oxidizer and fuel sides of the package 
prevent propellant overpressurization. These rel ief  valves  are  isolated from 
the  helium system by burst  diaphragms which rupture at a pressure approximately 
equal  to  the relief valve cracking pressure. Thus the system is  hermetically 
sealed until a diaphragm ruptures and no relief valve leakage is  possible 
u n t i l  an overpressure condition actually exists. 
D. Propulsion Tank Operation - The pressure from the gas system i s  applied 
to   the   l iqu ids  by means of an  intervening expulsion bladder, made of two 
p l i e s  of Teflon f o r  the oxidizer tanks and three  p l ies  of Teflon for the fuel 
tms. The l iquids  are isolated within these tanks by a cartridge valve 
located in  component package C on the oxidizer side and i n  component package D 
on the fuel side. These packages also contain the manual valves needed fo r  
servicing and t e s t ing  of the tanks and the downstream system components. Motor 
operated valves are located i n  the main feedline and are  used, i f  needed, 
t o  shut off flow t o  the thrus t  chamber assemblies (TCA's) The E A ' S  have 
fast-acting solenoid valves in the feedline for each propellant. These valves 
can be opened t o  permit the propel lants  to  f low to t h e  thrust  chamber injector; 
a t  t h i s  point they are fed into a combustion chamber where they ignite hyper- 
golically. The combustion products are then expanded through a converging- 
diverging nozzle t o  provide reaction thrust. Flow rates are controlled by 
fixed orifices in the propellant valve inlets. 
F i l te rs  a re  d is t r ibu ted  throughout the gas and l iquid systems t o  
protect sensitive elements from part iculate  contamination. The oxidizer, 
nitrogen tetroxide, has a comparatively high freezing point, 12OF, and heaters 
a re   ins ta l led  on the TCA oxidizer valves and the oxidizer feedlines to prevent 
freezing. 
E. Measuring Remaining Propellant - The  amount of propellant remaining i n  
the OAMS i s  estimated by measuring the pressures and temperatures of the 
pressurant gas in the high pressure and regulated pressure regions of the gas 
system. By knowing the  in i t i a l  quan t i ty  of pressurant and by measuring 
subsequent temperatures and pressures, t h e  principle of conservation of mass 
i n  the gas system can be appl ied to  compute the gas volume increase i n  the 
propellant tanks. From t h i s  result  the propellant volume and mass change can 
be derived. Source temperature and pressure signals are combined t o  provide 
a propellant quantity cabin readout. This indication can be corrected, using 
regulated pressure and temperature values, to  ref ine the quant i ty  es t imate .  
Throughout the Gemini program the trend has been to increase the 
available propellant in the OAMS. The  number of tanks has ranged from two t o  
six. The tankage combinations and the i r  e f fec t iv i t ies  a re  ind ica ted  i n  Fig. 18 
and summarized i n  Table 6. 
F. Reserve Tank - On later  spacecraf t  (7 through g ) ,  a small, cylindrical  
reserve tank and an F package were added t o  t h e  system. The tank provides a 
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TABLE 6 GEMINI OAMS PROPELLANT TANKAGE 
Re-entry Control System 
Design Concept. - The re-entry control system (RCS) provides for att i tude 
control torques about the spacecraft pitch, yaw and r o l l  axes after separation 
of the equipment section of the adapter, during the firing of the retrograde 
rockets, and during re-entry. E i g h t  thrust  chambers each rated at 23.5 l b  
thrust  supply the output of each of two independent and completely redundant 
rocket engine systems. The two systems are  i n  the re-entry section of the  
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vehicle, as i l l u s t r a t e d  in Fig. 17. The eight %A's of each system are 
arranged, as in   t he  O M ,  about the periphery of the vehicle. 
The RCS i s  similar i n  design concept t o   t h e  OAMS i n   t h a t   t h e  TCA's are 
f i r e d  i n  pa i r s  and are submerged beneath the spacecraft skin. They are 
ablat ively cooled, pulse-operated, and are fixed in thrust level and in   t h rus t  
vector location. The  same propellants used in the O W ,  monomethyl hydrazine 
and nitrogen tetroxide, are used in   t he  RCS, but nitrogen is  subst i tuted for  
helium as the pressurant  to  minimize leakage. No regulator redundancy is  
employed beyond that afforded by the duplication of systems. System re l i ab i l -  
i t y  i s  maintained by the  isolat ion of propellants and pressurant behind 
cartridge-actuated valves until shortly before re-entry, thereby minimizing 
the effects  of leakage and propellant exposure. The re-entry phase of the 
mission is relat ively short  and the quantity of propellant i s  l e s s  than in   t he  
O W .  However, e i ther  of  the two  RCS's is f'ully capable of meeting re-entry 
requirements . 
RCS System Function. - The system i s  arranged schematically as shown i n  
Fig. 19. The function of the RCS i s  ident ical  to  the funct ion of the O M ,  
( O M  Function, page 141) with the following exceptions. 
A. Since redundancy in pressure regulation is  not provided, no  component 
B. Reserve propellant provisions are not provided, hence there is no 
C. There are no maneuver TCA's i n   t h e  RCS. 
D. Each propellant tank i s  cyl indrical  and has approximately one-tenth 
package E i s  found i n   t h e  RCS. 
component package F. 
the capacity of the spherical  OAMS propellant tank. Both the fuel  and the 
oxidizer bladder in the RCS are  made of two p l i e s  of Teflon. Only  one fuel, 
oxidizer, and pressurant tank i s  provided i n  each RCS. 
component packages C and D, but not on the propellant feedlines. 
E. Electrical heaters are provided on the TCA oxidizer valves and on the 
RCS and OAMS Development Program. - The development programs on both the 
OAMS :T were run t o  permit evolution of the 
various designs to the point at which they could survive the DAT (design 
approval tests)  planned. Numerous problems were encountered and solved in the 
course of this evolution. In general, development problems were concerned 
with leakage, l i f e  capab i l i t y  and vibration resistance. These problems usually 
yielded to straightforward solutions.  In addition to these,  however, there 
were other more sophisticated solutions, some of which are c i ted  below. 
A. TCA Development - Early TCA development was aimed at achieving high 
performance ( Isp) and long l ife.  Problems were encountered with delamination 
of the ablative chamber, throat erosion, and ablative material glass migration. 
These problems were not fully solved on the early spacecraft TCA, although 
the %A's were fully adequate t o  meet the requirements of the ear ly  missions. 
A reconfiguration was introduced i n  which the mixture ratio and performance 
were reduced and the l i f e  span was greatly increased. A t  t h i s  time other 
improvements were introduced, such as ablative material with differently 
oriented wrapping and an attachment of the E A  valves to   the   in jec tor ,  which 
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TABLE 7 DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM - PROPULSION SYSTEMS - OAMS, RCS 
I T E M  I 
A  P A C K A G E  
C  P A C K A G E  
B  P A C K A G E  
D  P A C K A G E  
E  P A C K A G E  
M O T O R   S H U T - O F F   V A L V E  
R E G U L A T O R  
P R E S S U R A N T  T A N K S  
P R O P E L L A N T T A N K S  
C A R T R I D G E S  
C A R T R I D G E   V A L V E S  
T H R U S T  C H A M B E R  A S S Y  - 25 L B  
P R E S S - T E M P  I N D I C A T O R  
T H R U S T  C H A M B E R  A S S Y  - 8 5  L B  
T H R U S T  C H A M B E R  ASSY - 25 L B  
T H R U S T  C H A M B E R  A S S Y  - 100 L B  
I OAMS SYSTEM RCS  SYSTEM 
T E S T S  P E R F O R M E D  
- ." "_ .~ 
~ 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11 
1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 1 1  
1 , 2 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 1 0 , l l  
1 , 2 , S , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 1 0 , 1 1  
1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 9 , 1 O , 1 1 , 1 2  
1 ~ 2 ~ 3 ~ 4 ~ 5 ~ 6 ~ 7 ~ 8 ~ 9 ~ 1 1 ~ 1 3 ~ 2 2 ~ 3 1 ~ 3 2  
1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 8 , 9 , 1 1 , 1 2 , 1 3  
1, 5, 7, 9, 11 
1 ~ 2 ~ 3 ~ 4 ~ 6 ~ 7 ~ 9 ~ 1 1 ~ 1 5 ~ 1 6 ~ 1 7  
1, 3, 4, 5,  8, 11,  12, 13, 22, 25 
1 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 8 , 9 , 1 1 , 1 2  
1, 3, 4. 12 
1, 4, 11, 19, 20. 27, 28, 35, 36, 37, 38 
3, 4, 11 ,  20, 26. 28, 29. 35, 36. 38, 39 
1, 4. 26. 27. 28. 29. 37 
11, 14, 21, 23, 24, 30 
11, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24 
1, 3, 4, 11,20, 28, 33, 36, 37 
" - ~ -~~ - " "_ 
"~ "" .. _____ 
SYSTEM A 
"~ 
OAMS-RCS 
OAMS-RCS 
OAMS-RCS 
OAMS-RCS 
OAMS-RCS 
OAMS-RCS 
OAMS-RCS 
OAMS-RCS 
OAMS-RCS 
OAMS-RCS 
OAMS-RCS 
RCS 
OAMS 
OAMS 
OAMS 
OAMS I - " ~" 
RCS 
~ ~~~ 
L E G E N D :  
1. V I B R A T I O N  
2. S E R V I C E   L I F E  
4. LOW TEMP 
3. H I G H  T E M P  
6. C O M P A T I B I L I T Y  
5. MECH SHOCK 
7. A C C E L E R A T I O N  
8. S A L T   S P R A Y  
9. BURST 
10. C A R T R I D G E  F I R I N G  
11. A M B  F U N C T I O N A L  
12. E L E C T R I C A L  
13. H U M I D I T Y  
14. F I L L ,  D R A I N ,  C L E A N  
15. SLOSH 
16. B L A D D E R  L I F E  
17. E X P U L S I O N  E F F I C I E N C Y  
18. MDC-LOW  TEMP 
19. M D C - L O W  T E M P / A L T  
20. M D C - H I G H  T E M P I A L T  
22. A L T I T U D E  
21. O V E R T E S T   E L E C  
23. H O T   F I R E  33. TEMP  SHOCK
24. S K I N   H E A T I N G  34. B A S E   H E A T I N G  
25. A U T O   I G N I T I O N  35. M O C - A L T I T U D E  
26. I N V E R S I O N  
27. O F F - M I X T U R E   R A T I O  37. LOW  SUPPLY  PRESS 
28. P U L S I N G  
29. S T U C K  V A L V E  
30. M A N  R E G U L A T I O N  
32. C O N T A M I N A T I O N  
31. SAND, DUST 
36. T H R U S T  V E C T O R  
38. P U L S E  F A T I G U E  
39. W A L L   T E M P  
TABLE 8 DEVELOPMENT TEST SUMMARY 
PROPULSION SYSTEMS - OAMS, RCS, RETRO 
I I M A J O R   E N V I R O N M E N T S  I T  - T E S T  b - T E S T  
P E R F O R M E D  
N O T   R E Q U I R E D  
C O M P O N E N T S  
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was reconfigured t o  improve producibility. Also the valve mounts were 
strengthened and the valve poppet clearance was increased t o  improve contamina- 
t ion resistance.  The l i f e  of the maneuver TCA's, (the 79 and 94.5 l b  E A ' S )  
was increased by boundary layer cooling, in which fue l ,   in   addi t ion   to   tha t  
in jec ted   for  primary combustion, was sprayed along the chamber walls f o r  
cooling and subsequent secondary combustion. The .e f fec t iv i t ies  of the TCA 
performance changes a re  shown i n  Table 9 .  
TABLE 9 CHANGE HISTORY'OF TCA PERFORMANCE 
r EFFECTIVITY 
RBD 
SPACECRAFT 2, 3 
SPACECRAFT 4 
SPACECRAFT 5 
SPACECRAFT 6 8 L 
I RC! 
I 25.0 
i 23.5 
I 79 9 
I 
!CSl 
I 
4.: 
I 
i 1.3 
1 - 
25 
2.0 
OAMS 
85 
!.O 
I .6 
1 
1.2 
I 00 
AD 
- 
2.0: 
1.6 
I 
1.2 
OAMS 
25 85 ~ [ ~ 
270,' 270/ 
18/160  147/27 I 
4251578 
i _" 557175 
T 
100 1 100 
IADIAL  AFT 
'40,' 540/ 
!20/300 220/30 
I 
RCS 
2s 
300,' 
!75/26( 
I 
~ 
ISp (NOM/MIN) - SEC I 
Other early R & D experience resulted in a change from a hard, metal- 
to-metal valve seat t o  a sof t  seat design for improved contamination resistance. 
In  addition, the injector feedlines and flow passages were strengthened t o  
improve their explosion resistance, and a variable flow control  or i f ice  was 
replaced wi th  a fixed orifice to insure repeatable flow characterist ics.  
Vibration failures in the valve mount area of the 79 and 94.5 l b  TCA's 
necessitated the installation of an  external valve support bracket for early 
spacecraft and a strengthened version for later spacecraft. 
B. Propellant Tanks Development - During the  development program, the 
endurance of the  propellant tank bladders was found t o  be limited. The problem 
was greater  for  the spherical  OAMS tanks than for the cylindrical  RCS tanks, 
and more character is t ics  of the  fuel tanks than of the oxidizer tanks. A l l  
bladders were i n i t i a l l y  of two-ply construction; however, the OAMS f u e l  tank 
bladder proved marginal and was replaced by a three-ply  bladder, which was 
more satisfactory.  
During development, the  tanks were tested extensively to establish 
durabi l i ty  limits. Vibration tests, expulsion cycling tests, s losh tes ts ,  and 
acceleration tests were run and the  overal l   resul ts  proved that the   f ina l ly  
selected bladders had a greater l i f e  capability than had been expected. The 
RCS tanks were s ignif icant ly  more durable than the OAMS tanlcs. In  fact ,  three 
RCS tanks from Spacecraft 6 were reused, without refurbishin , i n  the a t t i t ude  
control system of the augmented ta rge t  docking adapter (ATDAY. 
C. B Package Development - The B package burst diaphragm original ly  
selected was a metallic gold shear disc, which proved t o  be e r ra t ic   re la t ive  
t o  rupture pressure. Spacecraft 2 was flown with the gold disc; Spacecraft 3 
did not have burst diaphragms. By Spacecraft 4 a subst i tute  burst diaphragm 
had been evolved which had a tighter and more predictable  rupture  pressure 
range. This new diaphragm was composed of a hemisphere, pressurized on i ts  
convex side, which collapsed onto a set of knives at the rupture pressure. 
D. Regulator Development - Due t o  a slight leakage from the fuel/oxidizer 
group, propellant compatibility was considered necessary i n  the pressure 
regulator. This goal was easily achieved except a t  the metal-to-metal valve 
seat, where very hard materials were needed for durabili ty,  because of the 
high unit loads required for sealing. 
The first attempt was t o  make the poppet ball of tungsten carbide with 
a cobalt binder. This solution proved unfeasible because the tungsten was 
attacked by the oxidizer. The Spacecraft 2 OAMS regulator, with a b a l l  made 
of t h i s  material, required replacement a t  Cape Kennedy because of corrosion. 
This problem was finally  resolved by using Kennamental ~601 as the poppet ball 
material. 
E. State-of-Art Advances i n  Development of RCS and OAMS - During the 
development of the RCS and O M ,  certain state-of-the-art advances were made. 
In summary form they  are : 
1. Application of ablative cooling philosophies t o  actual  pract ice  in  
2. Closed welding of complex component packages t o  prevent leakage. 
3. Manufacture of filters from 304L CRES, a weldable, propellant 
4. Creation of a composite TCA valve seat, combining the desirable 
the case of small pulsing rocket engines. 
compatible material. 
features of s o r t  s e a t s   t o  overcome contamination sens i t iv i ty  and hard seats 
f o r  endurance. 
5. Development of high temperature bonding adhesives for E A  
assemblies . 
6; Cleanliness control a t  component and system levels  t o  a degree not 
previously achieved. 
Design Approval Test Program f o r  RCS and O M .  - Components t e s t ed   i n  
the design approval test  (DAT) program were subjected to varying sequences of 
environments t o  demonstrate e i ther  of two conditions: (1) component survival 
after tes t ing,  or  (2) proper operation of the component during the test. (See 
Tables 10 and 11. ) In  some instances,  parallel  test  specimens were run, but 
to  d i f fe ren t  sequences of tes t s .  This was done, when circumstances permitted, 
t o  conserve time o r  t o  permit running of several  types of destructive tests.  
When the component was considered sufficiently durable, only one uni t  was 
tes ted  (e.g., the  C and D packages) . If the component was life-l imited,  more 
test  specimens were employed. In  the case of the propellant tanks, it was 
discovered that a l l  dynamic and functional tests contributed to the  ultimate 
fa i lure  of the bladders; hence a l l  test  series designed t o  show bladder 
integrity included each of the predicted spacecraft dynarnic environments. 
Several thrust  chambers, whose l i f e  was limited by the amount of ablative 
TABLE 10 DESIGN APPROVAL TEST PROGRAM 
PROPULSION SYSTEMS - O M S ,  RCS 
I ~ -~ ~ ITEM 
~ ~~ 
TESTS  PERFORMED 
~~ ~ 
SYSTEM 
A PACKAGE 
0 PACKAGE 
C PACKAGE 
D PACKAGE 
1.2.3.4.6.7.8.9.10 
E PACKAGE 
REGULATOR 
1.2,3,4,6.7.8.9.31 
OAMS-RCS 1, 2, 6, 7, 8. IO, 18 
OAMS-RCS 
OAMS-RCS I .  2, 6,  7, 8,  10, 31 
OAMS-RCS 
l,2,3,6,7,8,1O,11,31 
I ,  2. 7, 8, 10, 17. 18, 20, 31 
OAMS 
OAMS-RCS 
1, 2, 7. 8. IO, 11, 17,  30 OAMS-RCS 
OAMS-RCS 
OAMS-RCS 
1, 5, 7, 8. 12, 13,  14,  31, 4 OAMS-RCS 
1, 2, 5, 7, 8,  15, 16,  17, 18. 19, 31,  34 OAMS-RCS 
1.2.3.6.7.8.20.31 
1. 2,  3,  4, 5, 6, IS, 17, 18, 21.  23,  24, 25, 26,  27. 28, 31 OAMS-RCS 
OAMS-RCS 
I ,  2, 3, 4, 5, 6. IO, 14,  21,  24. 25, 26.  27. 29. 31 RCS 
I ,  2, 3,  4, 5, 6, 15, 21, 24. 25, 26. 28, 30,  31 
1, 2, 3, 4. 5, 6. IO, IS, 21. 23,  24. 25, 26,  27.  31 
1, 2, 6, 7, 8, IO, 22, 25, 31, 35 
1, 2, 3,  7, 8, 15,  22,.31,  35 
MOTOR SHU~OFF  VALVE 
PRESSURANT TANK 
THRUST CHAMBER ASSY - 85 LB' 
THRUST CHAMBER ASSY - 25 LB' 
THRUST CHAMBER ASSY - 25 LB' 
PRESSURE TEMP INDICATOR 
CARTRIDGE  VALVES 
CARTRIDGES 
1.2.3,6.7.8,10,31,32 PROPELLANTTANK 
1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.31 
THRUST CHAMBER ASSY - 100 L B *  
OAMS 
OAMS 
1 
~~ 
OAMS 
RCS 
~ 
LEGEND: 
. .- 
2. VIBRATION 
1. AMB FUNCTIONAL 
3. ACCELERATION 
4. BURST 
6. SERVICE L I F E  
5. MECH SHOCK 
7. HIGH TEMP 
8 .  LOW TEMP 
9. CARTRIDGE VALVE 
IO. COMPATIBILITY 
ACTUATION 
11. CONTAMINATION 
12. NO-FIRE CURRENT 
13. AUTO IGNITION 
14. MULTIPLE  FIRING 
15. HI-LO-TEMP A L T  
16. SAND-DUST 
17. SALT SPRAY 
18. HUMIDITY 
19. ACOUSTIC. 
20. RESPONSE 
21. THERMAL SHOCK 
23. PROP VALVE - 
22. SEA LEVEL  FIRING 31. PROOF  PRESSURE 
24.  MDC TO  FAILURE 34. BRUCETON 
25. MDC TO GUARANTEED 35. PROPELLANT 
CONTINUOUS DUTY 
32. SLOSH 
33. DROP 
L I F E  
26. MDC TO "IN S PEC" 
27. EXPLOSIVE ATM 
28. VALVE SERVICE L I F E  
29. PULSING 
30. THRUST VECTOR 
UTILIZATION 
TABLE 11 DESIGN APPROVAL TEST SUMMARY 
PROPULSION SYSTEMS - OAMS, RCS 
I I MAJOR ENVIRONMENTS 
A. C, D, E PACKAGES: PRESSURANT TANK 
B PACKAGE 
. .  . -~ .- 
~ .. . 
REGULATOR 
~~ 
~~~ . 
MOTOROPERATEOVALVE 
" . ~~ 
- ~~ . ~ ~~ ~ 
PROPELLANTTANKS 
" 
THRUST CHAMBERS 
~ . . . - .. - 
" 
CARTRIDGE: RETRO ROCKET ASSEMBLY 
~. - " 
PRESSURANT-TEMPERATURE INDICATOR 
.~ - 
-~ 
OAMS 
. " ~ ~~ 
RCS 
LEGEND: 
A =  TEST  NOT 
T = TEST  PERFORMED 
REQUIRED 
material present, were used in   the   t es t ing  so t h a t  each uni t  might keep within 
i t s  rated l i f e  f o r  a l l  test  environments. "One-shot" items of equipment, such 
as the  cartridges and cartridge valves, were t e s t ed   i n   l a rge   quan t i t i e s   t o  
acqu i r e   s t a t i s t i ca l  performance data. 
Complete systems were a l so   t e s t ed   t o  demonstrate interaction between 
components and system function at the temperature extremes. Each system was  
also  vibration  tested,   the OAMS module being separated from i t s  TCA manifolds 
f o r   t h i s  test. System flushing and drying procedures were demonstrated during 
system DAT. In the case of the OAMS both two-tank and four-tank modules were 
tested. 
DAT problems generally led to corrective action involving improved qual i ty  
control,  both in test  performance and in fabrication. They also brought about 
a reduction of test severity so tha t  updated, more reasonable test  conditions 
came t o  be employed. 
In  the propellant tanks, for example, a redesign resulted because i n i t i a l  
qual i f icat ion tes t ing showed tha t  some tanks suffered degradation of the 
flange assembly during test. The specified flange leakage rate was exceeded 
when a lower pressure situation was encountered a f t e r   t he  assembly has been 
exposed to  the  s t r ingent  environment. The original specification required 
t h a t  the tanks maintain an acceptable leak rate a t  both proof pressure and 
nominal  system pressure. However, it was apparent that such a requirement 
could not be repeatedly maintained.with the existing flange design. The prin- 
c ipa l  cause of flange leakage was a propellant compatibility test environment 
of 160°F'for two weeks; t h i s  i s  now  known t o  be an overly severe condition and 
unrepresentative of mission environment. 
The flange seal was modified by increasing Teflon thickness ir ,  the flange 
area. Modified tanks were then tested, employing a t e s t  time-temperature 
prof i le  more representative of mission environment. The t e s t  requirements were 
successfully passed by tanks incorporating the revised flange design. A l l  
tanks used on Spacecraft 6 and later spacecraft incorporate the revised flange 
design. This type of leakage has been l imi ted  to  tes t  programs. Service 
experience with tanks has been f ree  of flange leakage. 
Rel iabi l i ty  Assurance Test Program fo r  OAMS and RCS. - I n  t h i s  program 
components were subjected t o  environments which were more severe than  those 
required for qualification. (See  Table 12. ) The components were subjected t o  
overstress environments of vibration, temperature extremes, endurance, and 
contamination t o  demonstrate safe margins existed i n  performance, durabi l i ty  
and strength. The components tested survived these overstresses satisfactorily, 
although certain characteristics were revealed: 
"
A. The A package pressure transducer shifted out of specification toler-  
B. The f i l t e r s  i n  the TCA's became plugged when large amounts of contamina- 
C. The E A  sk in  temperature went over 7OO0F at So$ of i t s  rated l i f e  when 
ance under extreme temperature conditions. 
t i on  were introduced. One f i l t e r  ruptured under the pressure differential .  
inlet  pressures equal to proof pressure were imposed. 
tABLE 12 .RELIABILITY ASSURANCE TEST PROGRAM ,ENVIRONMENTS 
PACKAGE A 
PACKAGE E 
REGULATOR 
MOTOR VALVE 
TCA PROPELLANT 
VALVES 
25  L B  
100 L B  
~ ~~ .~~ 
TCA - RCS 25 L B  
~- 
TCA - OAMS 25  L B  
"- . 
VIBRATION 
T T 
T 
~ ~- 
LOW 
*EMPERATURE 
H I G H  
-I 
4: 
Z 
I- 
U 
Z 
3 
U 
2 
T 
T - TEST PERFORMED 
D. The E package and pressure regulator leakages went up t o   f i v e  times 
specification values when large amounts of contamination were introduced into 
the packages . 
E. The E package pressure switch failed to actuate at temperatures 
below -24'F. 
O M  and RCS Flight Performance. - The RCS performed without malfunction 
on all-flights except the Gemini X I 1  mission, on which the A-ring regulated 
pressure was excessive for a brief period following system arming. 
The OAMS experienced thrust  reduction in att i tude control thrust  chambers 
on the long duration missions Gemini V and Gemini V I I ,  during the extensive 
duty of Gemini V I I I ,  which was terminated early, and during the Gemini I X ,  
Gemini X I  and Gemini X I 1  missions. The cause of the thrust reduction is  being 
investigated and the results of the study w i l l  be submitted i n  McDonnell 
report F-206, Gemini TCA Anomaly Investigation. Table 13 of this report  pre- 
sents a resume of fl ight experience relative to propellant used and system 
perf  omance .
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TABLE 13 PROPULSION SYSTEM FLIGHT RESULTS 
I 7 OAMS RCS 
PROPELLAN 
EXPENDED 
U 
66.4 
~~ 
54.2 
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE PROPULSION EVENTS 
DURING MISSION PROPELLAN'  
T O T A L  
TANKED 
U 
70.4 
73.3 
PROPEL 
EXPEN 
# 
12 
'ROPELLAN 
T O T A L  
TANKED 
U 
49 
.~ 
SEPARATION. RETRD. RE-ENTRY 
.~ " 
OAMS, RCS NOMINAL 
!BALLISTIC)  
SEPARATION. OUT-OF-PLANE 
" " .. ~ 
OAMS, RCS NOMINAL 
.___~._ - 
186 366 
411 
MANEUVERING, RETRO, RE-ENTRY 
:3  ORBITS) 
SEPARATION, 4 DAYS  ATTITUDE 
CONTROL, RETRO, RE-ENTRY 
:62 ORBITS) 
jEPARATION, 8 DAYS  ATTITUDE 
CONTROL, RETRO, RE-ENTRY 
120 ORBITS) 
. -~ 
~~ 
327 72.3 68.1 OAMS, RCS NOMINAL 
280 72.2 58.7 RCS  NOMINAL ; OAMS NORMAL 
EXCEPT REDUCED THRUST 
THIRD DAY -ATTRIBUTED TO 
FROM  ATTITUDE  TCA's  AFTER 
OXIDIZER FREEZING 
OAMS, RCS NOMINAL 
RCS NOMINAL; OAMS NOMINAL 
EXCEPTREDUCED THRUST 
FROM ATTITUDE T C A ' ~  u3 a 4 
A F T E R   T H E  l2TH DAY - ATTRI -  
B U T E D T O  P L U G G I N G O F  F E E D  
L I N E   A T   T C A  
RCS NOMINAL; OAMS NOMINAL 
U N T I L   R A T E D   L I F E  OF A T T I -  
TUDE TCA's WAS EXCEEDED. 
REDUCED THRUST FROM ATTI- 
ENCED IN OVERLIFE PERIOD 
RCS NOMINAL; OAMS NOMINAL 
EXCEPT  REDUCED  THRUST 
FROM ATTITUDE TCA'r  U1 AND 
P E L L A N T  FLOW APPEARED TO 
3. RESTRICTION OF PRO- 
BE THE MOST PROBABLE CAUSt 
OAMS. RCS NOMINAL 
- .  
TUDE TCA'. 3,  7, a 8 EXPERI- 
~-  
"
RCS NOMINAL, OAMS NOMINAL 
DATION EXPERIENCED FROM 
EXCEPT FORTHRUSTDEGRA-  
SEVERAL  ATTITUDE  TCA's  . 
RESTRICTION OF PROPEL- 
T H E  MOST PROBABLE CAUSE. 
LANT  FLOW  APPEARED  TO  BE 
"" __ 
- . - "~ 
REGULATED PRESSURE IN RING 
O F   T H E  RCS INCREASED TO 415 
ING. PRESSURE DECREASED TO 
PSlA FOLLOWING SYSTEM ARM- 
NOMINAL WITH TCA USAGE AND 
REGULATOR EVENTUALLY 
ATTRIBUTED TO PARTICLE 
LOCKED-UP. THE ANOMALY WAS 
CONTAMINATION  AT  THE  SEAT 
OF THE REGULATOR.RCS PER- 
F O R M A N C E  E X C E P T F O R T H E  
OAMS NOMINAL EXCEPT FOR 
ABOVE. 
THRUST DEGRADATION EXPER. 
IENCED FROM SEVERAL TCA's. 
CAUSEOFDEGRADEDPERFORM.  
A N C E A P P E A R E D T O B E P R O .  
P E L L A N T  FLOW RESTRICTION 
" ~ 
~ 
385 
713 
428 
~. _ _ _ _ ~  
SEPARATION, CIRCULARIZE 
ZIRBIT, RENDEZVOUS  WITH  SPACE- 
:RAFT 7, RETRO, RE-ENTRY (17 
IRBITS)  
iEPARATION,  CIRCULARIZE 
)RBIT,  RENDEZVOUS TARGET 
'OR SPACECRAFT 6, 14 DAYS 
4TTITUDE CONTROL, RETRO, 
?E-ENTRY (206 ORBITS) 
_ ~ _ _ _ _  
. 
iEPARATION, CIRCULARIZE 
IRBIT, RENDEZVOUS AND 
)OCK WITH AGENA. RETRO, RE- 
i N T R Y  (7 ORBITS) EARLY 
rERMlNATlON OF MISSION 
~ " 
~ 
IEPARATION, CIRCULARIZE 
IREIT, RENDEZVOUS WITH AUG- 
AENTED  TARGET  DOCKING 
iDAPTER (ATDA),  RETRO, RE- 
i N T R Y  (46 ORBITS) 
~ . .  ~ 
;EPARATION, CIRCULARIZE 
" 
IRBIT, RENDEZVOUS AND DOCK 
l l T H  AGENA, DUAL RENDEZVOUS, 
IETRO, RE-ENTRY, (44 ORBITS) 
SEPARATION, CIRCULARIZE 
)RBIT, RENDEZVOUS AN0 DOCK 
l l T H  AGENA, MULTIPLE DOCK- 
IE -ENTRY (44 ORBITS) 
NG, RERENDEZVOUS, RETRO, 
. -  " - 
72.0 
71.9 
68.1 
68.0 
424 
320 
767 564 72.0 68.1 
46.0 762 
96 7 
967 
931 
72.1 
72.0 
__- 
72.0 
71.9 
707 
91 7 
855 
712 
-_ 
5813 
56.7 
65.1 
~ .. .. ~. 
. .  ~ .~ 
)RBIT, RENDEZVOUS AND DOCK 
EPARATION,  CIRCULARIZE 
f l T H  ACENA, MULTIPLE DOCK- 
NG, RETRO, RE-ENTRY (62 
)RBITS) 
There were no thrus te r  anomalies on Spacecraft 3, 4, 6 and 10. Therefore 
these missions are not discussed in the following paragraphs. 
A. Gemini V Experience - Gemini V data indicated that during the t h i r d  
day of the mission, OAMS a t t i t ude  TCA No. 7 ceased t o  provide normal thrust. 
On the fourth day, th rus t  from TCA No. 6 became er ra t ic .  The astronauts also 
reported that a l l  a t t i tude  TCA's seemed sluggish. The malfunction followed 
a two day period during which the heaters, used to control the temperature of 
the OAMS TCA oxidizer valves, were switched o f f   t o  conserve e l e c t r i c a l  power. 
Thermal analysis indicates that without heating, and under adverse f l i gh t  
conditions, the O M  oxidizer system can drop below the freezing point of 
nitrogen tetroxide. Performance of a l l  but one of the malfunctioning TCA's 
w a s  restored by reactivating the valve heaters. It has been concluded t h a t  
the oxidizer l ines froze and that the heaters were not adequate t o  thaw the 
last TCA, which was located in the coldest position i n  the spacecraft. 
B. Gemini V I 1  Experience - On the twelfth day of the Gemini V I 1  mission, 
OAMS att i tude control TCA's No. 3 and No. 4 yielded reduced thrust  (estimated 
a t  25% of rated thrust) during pulse mode operation. These same TCA's l o s t  
v i r tua l ly  a l l  th rus t  dur ing  the  d i rec t  mode of operation. Examination of a l l  
available data has resulted in the following conclusions: 
1. Freezing was not a fac tor  in  the  e r ra t ic  performance of the TCA's. 
The propellant supply did not freeze nor did power ever fa i l  t o  the redundant 
valve heaters (one of which w a s  under thermostatic control and the other 
continuously active). 
2. The two TCA's which f a i l ed  had had more than 80 l b  of propellant 
expended through them. This was considerably more than  the i r  ra ted  l i fe .  
3. After thorough investigation, it w a s  inferred that the TCA f a i lu re s  
were probably caused by: 
a. blockage of the propellant valve orifices or inlet filter by 
b. deformation of the  valve seat due to  heat  soakback resul t ing 
contaminants, o r  
from the heavy duty cycle. 
C. Gemini V I 1 1  Experience - After seven h r  of the Gemini V I 1 1  mission, 
O M  TCA No. 8 commenced f i r i n g  without pilot  actuation, w a s  b r i e i ly   i n t e r -  
rupted, and then recommenced f i r i n g   f o r  two min and then  for 11 min u n t i l  the 
c i r cu i t  breaker was opened. Examination revealed that t h i s  TCA's th rus t  
performance was nominal u n t i l  i ts  rated l i f e  was exceeded, after which the 
thrust degraded. It is  therefore concluded that the TCA was f i r e d  as a result 
of a short somewhere in   t he  TCA valve   e lec t r ica l   c i rcu i t .  
D. Gemini M Experience - A t  various intervals during the Gemini M 
mission, OAMS a t t i tude  cont ro l  TCA's 1 and 3 yielded reduced thrust; causing 
pitch/roll coupling and yaw/roll coupling, respectively. These anomalies 
occurred while the spacecraft attitude control was i n  pulse, direct, horizon 
scan, and ra te  command  modes of operation. Restriction of propellant flow 
appeared t o  be the most probable cause of failure. 
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E. Gemini X I  Experience, - During the Gemini X I  mission, the crew reported 
degraded performance from TCA's No. 6 and No. 8. In addition, the performance 
from TCA No. 15 was believed t o  be intermittent during the first and last 
rendezvous. The post-fl ight data review indicated several TCA's in  addi t ion 
t o  E A ' S  No. 6 and No. 8 produced degraded thrust  a t  various times during the 
mission. The data review did not confirm the reported TCA No. 15 anomaly. The 
data indicates a problem similar t o  the Gemini M experience. The degraded 
TCA performance was a t t r i b u t e d   t o  flow restriction,  possibly  result ing from 
part iculate  matter and/or precipi ta t ion of i ron  ni t ra te  from the oxidizer.. 
F. Gemini X I 1  Experience - A t  approximately 40 h r  through the mission, 
the crew reported degraded performance of OAMS thrus t  chambers Nos. 2 and 4. 
Tests performed l a t e r   i n  the mission with the thrust  chambers, and post-fl ight 
analysis of data revealed degraded performance from a l l  O M  att i tude thrusters.  
The best  appraisal  of the available facts points to propellant flow re s t r i c t ion  
as the cause of the performance loss. This res t r ic t ion  could have resulted 
from propellant contamination or the precipitation of i ron  ni t ra te  from the 
oxidizer. Al data are currently being reevaluated to  es tab l i sh  a test  program 
to invest igate  the problem. McDonnell report F-206,  Gemini TCA Anomaly 
Investigation i s  being prepared for submittal  to NASA. 
Immediately a f t e r  arming of the E A  A-ring, regulated pressure rose 
t o  a high of 415 psia  (nominal i s  295 psia).  Following thrus te r  in i t ia t ion ,  
however, the regulated pressure decreased t o  normal levels  and standard regu- 
l a t o r  performance was indicated. During post-flight testing, the regulator 
Functioned properly. The anomaly was a t t r ibu ted  t o  par t iculate  contamination 
at the regulator seat which was subsequently purged from the regulator as 
pressurant was used. 
Retrograde Rocket System 
Location. - The four retrograde rockets are located i n  the retrograde 
section of the  adapter, as shown i n  Fig. 17. Mounted on crossed aluminum 
I-beams, the  retrograde rockets are positioned symmetrically about the longi- 
tudinal axis of the spacecraft. They are exposed when the adapter equipment 
section i s  jettisoned shortly before the retrograde maneuver. The retrograde 
sect ion i tself  is jett isoned approximately 45 sec  a f te r  firing of the rocket 
motors . 
Purpose. - The retrograde rockets are used to decelerate the spacecraft 
at the start of the re-entry maneuver. As an alternate task, these motors 
increase spacecraft velocity to aid in separation from the launch vehicle 
during a high altitude, but yet suborbital, abort. During retrograde, the 
motors are  fired sequentially at f ive  and one-half sec intervals. In the abort 
situation the rockets are fired i n  salvo. 
Retrograde Rocket Description. - The four retrograde rocket motors are 
solid propellant devices, each generating a nominal t h rus t  of 2500 lb. Each 
motor assembly consists of a solid propellant grain (polysUide/auunonium 
perchlorate), a motor case, an exhaust nozzle and two pyrogen-type ign i te r  
~ ~~ 
assemblies, as i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  Fig. 20. Al four motors are identical, with 
the single exception that the ign i t e r   e l ec t r i ca l  connectors are broached 
different ly   to   prevent   incorrect   e lectr ical  hookup and therefore insure proper 
firing sequence. The ignition of these motors follows t h i s  order. An elec- 
t r ica l   s igna l ,  communicated through bridgewire, ignites a prime mix and booster 
charge which provide the heat and pressure required t o   i g n i t e  boron-potassium 
ni t ra te  pe l le t s .  These, in turn,  burn to  ign i t e  t he  pyrogen sustainer grain. 
The pyrogen exhausts into the motor cavity, igniting the main propellant 
charge, which provides thrust and impulse through the exhaust nozzle. 
Retrograde Rocket Development Program. - Thirty-three motors and 50 
pyrogen- ign i te rs  were tested during the development program. The uni t s  were 
subjected to structural, temperature, functional, and aging tests. (See 
Table 14. ) Eight motors, o r  two sets, were used i n  two altitude rocket abort 
(popgun) tes t s ,  performed to  ver i fy  the s t ructural  integri ty  of the spacecraft 
b l a s t  shield and structure under altitude abort conditions. During the first 
tes t ,  three of the four rockets ejected their  exhaust nozzles. Since loss  of 
the exhaust nozzle endangers the nozzle throat ,  without which the rocket motor 
cannot f i r e ,  a redesign which would retain the nozzle more securely was con- 
sidered necessary. Following t h i s  redesign, 18 motors were successfully 
tested, four of these i n  a repeat of the popgun t e s t .  An i gn i t e r  r e l i ab i l i t y  
t e s t   s e r i e s  was performed, i n  which the fourth unit  to be tes ted misfired. 
The remaining igni ters  were redesigned t o  provide a higher init iator output 
and then successfully tested. 
Retrograde Rocket Design Approval Test Program. - The design approval 
t e s t  program consisted of environmental, structural ,  and functional tests.  
(See Table 15.) The program was carried out w i t h  no failures.  
Flight Experience. - The retrograde rockets have functioned without 
anomaly on all Gemini flights. The motors have not  been called upon t o  perform 
t h e i r  secondary o r  abort  task. 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
mjor functions of the  environmental control system (ECS) are  to:  
A. Control the suit and cabin atmosphere. 
B. Control the temperatures of the astronaut suits and the  spacecraft 
C. Provide drinking water for the  crew and a means for  s tor ing or  
equipment . 
disposing of waste water. 
Sui t  And Cabin 
Atmosphere Control. - A simple schematic of the  su i t  and cabin atmospheric 
system i s  shown i n  Fig. 21. The primary oxygen system provides oxygen during 
I 
launch and orb i ta l   f l igh t ,  and the secondary oxygen system provides-oxygen 
during retrograde and re-entry. 
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r GRAPHITE  THROAT 
E X I T  CONE- 
CONNECTOR 
-INSULATION 
,PROPELLANT 
GRAIN 
INITIATOR AND PYROGEN IGNITOR (TYPICAL 2) 
IGNITION MIX 
INIT IATOR MIX 
BORON PELLETS 
SECTION A-A 
VIEW B-B PROPELLANT  CAVITY 
FIGURE 20 RETROGRADE ROCKET 
TABLE.14 DEVELOPMENTPROGRAM-RETROGRADEROCKETS 
ROCKET MOTOR TESTS 
~~ ~ 
~ 
T E S T  
~ 
TEMPERATURE  CYCLING 
V l B R A T f O N  - HIGH TEMPERATURE 
- NORMAL  TEMPERATURE 
- L O W T E M P E R A T U R E  
D R O P  
A C C E L E R A T I O N  
HUMIDITY 
TEMPERATURE GRADIENT 
STATIC  F IRE - SEA L E V E L  - HIGH TEMP 
- NORMAL TEMP 
- LOW TEMP 
S T A T I C  F I R E  - VACUUM - HIGH TEMP 
- LOW TEMP 
STATIC  F IRE - SEA L E V E L   ( A L T I T U D E   I G N I T I O N )  
SPACE AGING 
ACCELERATED AGING 
POP-GUN 
". ~ . ." - ~~ ~ ~~ L 
NO. OF  UNITS  TESTED 
ORIGINAL 
:ONFIGURATION 
4 
- 
2 
- 
2 
1 
2 
- 
1 
4 
1 
1 
2 
3 
- 
- 
4 
PYROGEN TESTS 
TEST 
VIBRATION - LOW TEMP 
- NORMAL  TEMP 
- HIGH  TEMP 
ACOUSTIC NOISE 
STATIC   F IR ING - SEA L E V E L  - LOW TEMP 
- N O R M A L T E M P  
- HIGH  TEMP 
STATIC  F IRING - VACUUM - LOW TEMP 
- N O R M A L  T E M P  
- HIGH  TEMP 
F I N A L  
CONFIGURATION 
4 
2 
- 
2 
4 
2 
4 
3 
6 
1 
- 
2 
2 
- 
2 
1 
4 
NO. OF UNITS TESTED 
17 
16 
17 
6 
a 
a 
6 
9 
10 
9 
T A B L E  15 DESIGN APPROVAL TEST PROGRAM 
RETROGRADEROCKET 
TEST 
TEMPERATURE CYCLING 
VIBRATION - HIGH TEMPERATURE 
-NORMAL TEMPERATURE 
- L O W T E M P E R A T U R E  
DROP 
ACCELERATION 
HUMIDITY 
TEMPERATURE GRADIENT 
VACUUM SOAK - HIGH TEMPERATURE 
- L O W T E M P E R A T U R E  
STATIC FIRE - SEA L E V E L  - HIGH TEMP 
- N O R M A L T E M P  
- LOW TEMP 
STATIC FIRE - SEA LEVEL (VACUUM IGNITION) 
- HIGH TEMP 
- LOW TEMP 
STATIC FIRE - A L T I T U D E  
TOTAL  OF 4 0  UNITS TESTED 
NO. OF UNITS 
TESTED 
18 
6 
6 
6 
10 
9 
9 
6 
8 
8 
5 
5 
8 
8 
8 
6 
Operational functions of the suit and cabin atmospheric control system 
are  as follows : 
A. The oxygen supply system consists of primary 02 (stored cryogenically 
at supercrit ical  pressure),  secondary oxygen, and egress oxygen.  (The egress 
oxygen supply has been deleted for Spacecraft 8 through 12. Ref Environmental 
Control System Design Changes, D. page 168). 
primary 02 system a t  a regulated pressure. 
B. Makeup oxygen i s  provided to  the  su i t  loop, and to  the cabin by the 
C. Cabin pressure i s  regulated via the suit  loop. 
D. The cabin i s  repressurized by opening the repressurization valve. 
E. Suit pressure is maintained by the suit  demand regulators. 
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r FIGURE 21 SUIT AND CABIN ATMOSPHERE CONTROL 
F. Suit  c i rculat ion and atmospheric control are provided by fans, suit 
heat exchanger and condensate removal, C02 and odor removal, and solid traps.  
G. Cabin moisture is p a r t i a l l y  removed by flow of water vapor through 
the cabin recirculation valve into the suit  loop, where the water vapor is 
condensed and separated by the   su i t   hea t  exchanger. 
heat exchanger, where it i s  dumped overboard as l iqu id  or  vapor. 
inlet  snorkel  and outflow vent valves are closed, and the 02 high-rate i s  
selected. 
J. After landing, the inlet snorkel, outflow vent, and recirculation 
valves are opened so that the  su i t  compressor can provide atmospheric 
circulation. 
H. Condensate collected by the sui t  heat  exchanger flows t o   t h e  launch 
1. For parachute descent, the cabin pressure relief valve is opened, the 
Suit  and Cabin Safety and Redundancy. - 
the  su i t  and cabin atmosphere control system 
A. Suit plus cabin pressurization. 
B. Sufficient secondary oxygen (in case 
Safety and redundancy features of 
are as follows: 
of f a i lu re  of primary 02 supply) 
i n  each of two b o t t l e s   f o r  one orb i t  -at normal consumption rate plus re-entry 
at high 02 consumption rate. 
su i t  c i r cu i t  leakage. 
cabin  leakage . 
C. Automatic high r a t e  02 flow in case of decompressed cabin and excessive 
D. Cabin pressure regulator preserves 02 supply i n  case of excessive 
E. 
F. 
G. 
H. 
I. 
adapter 
J. 
K. 
Combined dual cabin pressure relief valve and water seal valve. 
Redundant su i t  fans  and power supplies. 
Dual cabin pressure regulator. 
C02 sensor t o  check C02 concentration in suit  loop. 
Redundant primary 02 check valves t o  prevent loss of secondary 02 at 
separation. 
Redundant means of i n i t i a t i n g  high 02 rate automatically. 
Redundant suit  pressure regulators.  
Cooling System 
Heat Rejection Devices. - A schematic of the cooling system i s  shown i n  
Fig. 22. By active and passive cooling, the system provides temperature 
control for the crew and spacecraft equipment. Heat sinks, u t i l i zed  fo r  
temperature control during the different phases of the mission, are as follows: 
A. Prelaunch - Heat i s  re jec ted  to  the  ground cooling system via the 
B. Iaunch and Insertion - Heat i s  re jec ted  to  space via the coolant loop 
C. Orbit - Heat i s  transferred by the coolant loop to  the  rad ia tor  where 
D. Re-entry - Heat i s  radiated to  space by the re-entry module surfaces 
coolant loop and the ground cooling heat exchanger. 
by boiling water in the launch heat exchanger. 
it i s  radiated to  space. 
and i s  absorbed by the heat sink capacity of the re-entry module. 
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Cooling System Operational Functions. - Operational functions of the 
cooling system are as follows: 
A. Coolant i s  forced through the system by pumps. 
B. Heat i s  transferred from the coolant t o  the primary oxygen via  a 
cryogenic heat exchanger. 
C. Heat is  rejected from the coolant loop by e i ther   the  ground cooling 
heat exchanger, the launch heat exchanger, o r  the radiator. Outlet temperature 
of the ground cooling heat exchanger and the radiator i s  controlled to approxi- 
mately 40°F by means of a regenerative loop and a vernatherm temperature 
control  valve . 
. .- 
D. Heat i s  transferred from the  su i t  and cabin atmosphere to  the coolant  
E. Heat is transferred from the equipment to the coolant via coldplates.  
v i a  the s u i t  heat exchanger. 
Coolant inlet  temperatures  to  the bat ter ies  and fue l   ce l l s   a r e   con t ro l l ed   t o  
a range of 50°F t o  9OoF by means of a bypass coolant loop and a vernatherm 
valve . 
F. Water l ines  in  the adapter ,  RCS propellant valves, and portions of 
the O M  oxidizer system are electrically heated to prevent freezing. 
G. Passive temperature control i s  maintained by special surface coatings 
and thermal insulation. 
Cooling System Safety and Redundancy Features. - - Safety and  redundancy 
features of the cooling system are  as follows: 
A. Two independent cooling loops. 
B. Two parallel  coolant pumps, with independent power suppl ies  in  each 
coolant loop (except in Spacecraft 6). Because it i s  a battery-powered 
version, Spacecraft 6 required only one coolant pump i n  each loop f o r  both 
high and low electr ical   loads.  
C. Launch heat exchanger, capable of performing the radiator heat 
rejection function for a limited time. 
D. Coolant bypass loop to cool re-entry module equipment when cabin 
coolant flow is manually reduced. 
E. Warning lights to indicate lack of coolant  f luid in  each loop and 
l o s s  of pump flow. 
Water Management System 
Function. - The water management system provides drinking water for the 
crew during fl ight and after landing, and provides a means for disposing of 
or storing waste water. The Spacecraft 10 water system is shown schematically 
i n  Fig. 23 and i ts  operational functions are described below: 
A. Tank A has a 42 l b  capacity, i s  located in the adapter module, and 
is  ini t ia l ly  serviced wi th  nitrogen at 19.0 psia. Fuel cell product water i s  
transferred into tank A by means of a bladder, the expansion of which replaces 
the nitrogen and forces it overboard through two regulators (the second gives 
redundancy). These pressure regulators are set at 20 + 0.5 psia,  in order 
t o  prevent feedback into the tank and fue l   ce l l s .  
initially  serviced  with  potable  water and i s  pressurized  with  fuel  cell  water 
at 19.0 psia. As f u e l  c e l l  product water flows into tank B, potable water 
i s  transferred into the re-entry tank. 
module. Since the re-entry tank i s  referenced t o  cabin pressure (nominally 
5.0 psia), the adapter tanks w i l l  keep the re-entry tank filled. 
D. Water is  supplied to the drink nozzle from the cabin tank via the 
drinking water tube. Water transfer pressure i s  provided by: (1) the adapter 
water tanks, (2) su i t  compressor outlet pressure, or (3) the biomed bulb. 
Water can be drunk with o r  without cabin pressurization. 
- 
B. Tank B, also 42 lb capacity tank, located in the adapter module, i s  
C. The re-entry tank has a 16 lb  capacity and i s  located in the re-entry 
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FIGURE 23 WATER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
E. The launch heat exchanger i s  preloaded with seven l b  of water p r io r  
t o  launch and is utilized during the launch phase, i n  l ieu of the space 
radiator,  for coolant system heat dissipation. During orbi t ,  condensate water 
from the  sui t   heat  exchanger water separator i s  directed overboard through the 
launch heat exchanger. 
Water Management Safety and Red~qdancy_Features. - Safety and redundancy 
features of the water management system are as follows: 
A. Three water tanks. 
B. F'ressurization of cabin water tank by e i the r   su i t  oxygen (suit 
C. Gas relief valve prevents overpressurization of water tanks. 
D. Warning l ights  indicate  fa i led closed poppet valve on the launch 
E. Redundant means of urine dump: d i rec t ly  overboard or  through the 
compressors) or adapter water tanks. 
cooling heat exchanger. 
launch heat exchanger. 
Environmental Control System Development Test Status 
During the development of the environmental control system components, 
designs were ver i f ied by production prototype tests rather than by engineering 
model tes t s .  For example, i f  a pressure regulator w a s  t o  be produced as a 
casting, the engineering test model was also produced as a casting rather than 
by a more convenient machining process. Thus, addi t ional  tes t ing for  produc- 
i b i l i t y  was avoided, and confidence in flight worthiness was accumulated from 
developmental t e s t s  as well as from later qual i f icat ion and system r e l i a b i l i t y  
demonstration tests. 
As shown i n  Table 16, major system developmental t e s t s  of the environ- 
mental control system that have been completed include I (1) full-scale radiator 
t e s t s  under simulated orbi ta l  condi t ions to  determine pressure drop and 
radiator  heat  t ransfer  character is t ics ,  and (2) 129 h r  of manned runs using 
the boilerplate No. 2 t e s t   a r t i c l e   t o  determine the performance of the  su i t  and 
cabin atmosphere control system i n  all modes of operation. 
Environmental Control System Qualification Test Status 
Wherever possible,  qualification of the environmental control system has 
been demonstrated a t  the system l eve l  rather than at the component leve l  
because of the close interrelationship of i ts  components, especially with 
respect to thermal performance. System qualification tests are followed by 
mission r e l i a b i l i t y  demonstration t e s t s ,  and, i n  the case of Spacecraft 3A, a 
flight-type spacecraft wi th  operating systems has been subjected t o  simulated 
o rb i t a l  environments to qualify the temperature control system for  the extremes 
of flight conditions. 
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TABLE 16 ECS DEVELOPMENT STATUS 
MAJOR DEVELOPMENT  TESTS  COMPLETED 
B/P  2 SUIT AND CABIN 
ATMOSPHERE SYSTEM TESTS 
~ 
. - 
URINE DUMP 
~~ ~ 
I 
~ " 
SU.MMARY OF TEST RESULTS 
COMPLETED 20 HOURS OF PRE-LAUNCH TESTING, 96 
HOURS OF ORBITAL TESTING, AND 13 HOURS OF POST 
LANDING TESTING. VERIFIED PERFORMANCE OF 
CABIN AND SUIT ATMOSPHERE SYSTEM. INSULATED 
SIMULATED ORBITAL OPERATION VERIFIED RADIATOR 
PRESSURE DROP AND HEAT TRANSFER PERFORMANCE. 
DEVELOP DIRECT OVERBOARD DUMP AS PRIMARY 
MEANS OF URINE DISPOSAL DUMP THROUGH LAUNCH 
HEAT EXCHANGER ALSO PROVIDED FOR REDUNDANCY. 
The  environmental  control  system  qualification  test  status  is  summarized 
in  Table 17. All subassemblies  and  components  were  successfully  subjected  to 
the  complete  qualification  test  program,  which  includes  environmental,  dynamic, 
and  temperature-altitude  testing. 
In addition  to  the  qualification  test  program  summarized  in  Table 17, six  
two-day  mission  reliability  demonstration  tests  of  the  suit  and  cabin  atmo- 
sphere  system  were  completed  with  no  failures.  In  these  tests,  all  cabin  and 
adapter  mounted  suit  and  cabin  atmosphere  components  were  exposed  to  simulated 
altitude,  temperature  cycling,  and  temperature  extremes  in an altitude  chamber. 
Moisture  and C02 atmospheric  conditions  were  provided  by  crewman  simulators. 
After  each  of  these  tests,  oxygen  containers  were  sefviced  and  LiOH  canisters 
were  replaced,  but  otherwise  the  same  environmental  control  system  components 
were  used  for all six  tests. 
Three  seven-day  and six lbday mission  reliability  demonstration  tests 
have  also  been  completed.  The  first  test  also  serves  as a temperature/altitude 
long-mission  qualification  test of the  suit  and  cabin  atmosphere  and  oxygen 
supply  systems . 
Environmental  Control  System  Failure Summary 
A sumnary of  the  major  problems  that  were  encountered  and  solved  in  the 
development  of  the  environmental  control  system  is as follows: 
A. Coolant  Pump  Performance .- Some  pump  units  were  unable  to  meet  specifi- 
cation  performance.  The  problem  was  solved  by  application of more  stringent 
quality  control  procedures  in  manufacturing. 
. 
TABLE 17 ECS QUALIFICATION STATUS 
I I MAJOR  ENVIRONMENTAL 
REMARKS 
COMPLETE 
- 
COMPLETE 
COMPLETE 
COMPLETE 
COMPLETE 
~ 
*RFI, STRUCTURAL, EXPLOSION, HEAT TRANSFER, 
8 OTHER QUALIFICATION TESTS. 
P T Y O .  OF  TESTS  SUCCESSFULLY  COMPLETED. 
COMPLETELY QUALIFIED.  NO. O F  
'REQUIRED TESTS INDICATED. 
-NO.  O F  TESTS REQUIRED. 
TOTAL  TESTS  REQUIRED = 461 
TOTAL  TESTS  SUCCESSFULLY  COMPLETED = 461 
B. Coldplate Manufacturing - Difficulty was encountered in assuring tha t  
the coldplates were completely flushed after salt brazing. The problem was 
solved by changing the process to a nonflux, inert gas braze. 
C. Cryogenic Vessel Forming - Wrinkles and cracks occurred in   ea r ly  
attempts t o  form titanium half-shells for cryogenic vessels. The problem was 
solved by var ia t ions  in  the  deep d r a w  forming process. 
Environmental Control System Design Changes 
As a resu l t  of redefined mission requirements, several changes t o   t h e  
environmental control system have been required. 
A. To provide for mission durations in excess of two days, the two-day 
LiOH cartridge has been replaced by a seven-day LiOH car t r idge ,   for   ~pacecraf t .6  
and Spacecraft 8 through 32. This caused a nine l b  weight increase. 
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B. Due t o  an increase i n  OAMS requirements f o r  Spacecraft 10 through 12, 
the  RSS oxygen tank has been deleted. The ECS oxygen tank now has the dual 
requirement of supplying the environmental oxygen as w e l l  as the  reactants 
( fue l   ce l l )  oxygen supply. 
various valves, regulators, and associated connections, have been added i n   t h e  
adapter module t o  supply gaseous nitrogen f o r  EVA astronaut maneuvering. 
The composite disconnect and tank block remains t o  permit separation from the  
suit  loop in the event of abort  via the ejection seat. 
E. Due t o  the significant quantity of water recovered from the Space- 
craft 3A cabin at the conclusion of the thermal qualification test ,  some method 
of preventing or controlling condensation within the pressurized area was 
deemed necessary.  Several  approaches t o  t h i s  problem were available. One 
potential  solution was t o   i n s u l a t e  a l l  cold areas of the cabin t o  prevent the 
exposed surfaces from fa l l i ng  below the dew point temperature of the gas i n  
the cabin. Another solution was t o  cover the cabin walls wi th  a blot t ing 
material which would absorb the moisture which condenses on the walls. 
C. For Spacecraft 10 and 11, two additional secondary oxygen tanks, plus 
D. The egress oxygen supply has been deleted, for Spacecr&t 8 through E. 
Experimentation with wallpaper (an absorbent material fabricated from 
urethane foam or regenerated cellulose) disclosed that it could feasibly 
provide moisture absorption but would not effectually control temperatures. 
For the long duration mission of Gemini VII, it was therefore decided t o  modify 
t h e  ECS by install ing egress-kit  bypass hoses to   t he   su i t   ou t l e t   duc t s   t o  
eliminate heat t ransfer  between the su i t  ou t le t  and i n l e t  gas. This modifica- 
t i on  reduced water condensation i n  the l i t h ium hydroxide charge by delivering 
higher temperatures, thus extending the l i f e  of the LiOH charge and providing 
additional cooling for the crew. In addition, the carbon dioxide and odor 
absorber canister in the re-entry assembly ECS package also contained an 
insulated LiOH cartridge having greater C02 absorption capacity than the 
Spacecraft 5 cartridge, thereby avoiding t h e  possibi l i ty  of l i t h ium hydroxide 
hydration. 
These changes were insti tuted in addition to the wallpaper,  for the 
Spacecraft 7 mission only. The wallpaper was installed in Spacecraft  4 and 
up. Sheets of Amsco sponge cloth were sti tched to cotton broadcloth and 
treated t o  enhance t h e i r  f i r e  retardant capability. Approximately 7,000 square 
in. were ins ta l led  wherever prac t ica l  on cabin interior surfaces. Areas of 
installation included the  bulkheads, the sidewalls, the floor, the hatch sills, 
the hatches, the consoles, debris guards and the stowage boxes. 
Before f l ight  qual i f icat ion,  some concern was f e l t  over t h e  possible 
boiling of the absorbed water during the re-entry mode.  The astronauts 
reported t h a t  i f  any steam generation did occur (especially at the ECS doors), 
the levels  were not significant enough t o  cause the removal or redesign of the 
wallpaper. On Spacecraft 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 attempts were made t o  analyze 
wallpaper samples t o  determine their  absorption rate. The results of these 
studies were inconclusive, because a reliable quantitative indication of 
absorption was not established. However, since the additional weight of the 
installed wallpaper is negligible, and since i ts  absorbent qualities are good, 
a sound basis exists f o r  i t s  use. 
Problem Areas and Corrective Action 
Urine F i l te rs .  - Effective for the 14-day mission of .Gemini VII, two new 
u r i n e   f i l t e r s  were in s t a l l ed   i n  an e f f o r t   t o  reduce the amount of contamina- 
t i o n  at the system solenoid. The urine system functioned properly during 
flight; a vigorous inspection of the filters and the overboard dump solenoid 
valve was undertaken at the conclusion of the mission. Examination of the 
f i l t e r s  (one used f o r   t e n  and the other for four days) revealed a cer ta in  
amount of coating of the outer surfaces, naturally more pronounced on the ten 
day f i l t e r .  Microscopic analysis of the foreign material disclosed normal 
urine sediment, some amorphous material (probably calcium phosphate), some 
crystals,  some c e l l s  and ce l lu la r  debris. Also present were a number of 
f ibers.  The l a t t e r  agreed i n  width and appearance wi th  samples of glass  wool. 
In addition, a f e w  flakes of green p l a s t i c  material were found. No metal 
fragments were discovered. 
In conclusion, it was determined t h a t   t h e   f i l t e r s  had held back the 
precipitated material which normally forms i n  a urine sample as it becomes 
alkaline; certain foreign substances had also accumulated, but  their  amounts 
were negligible and t h e i r  composition was not such as t o  cause alarm. 
Disassembly of the urine solenoid valve revealed small amounts of 
contaminant in  the area of the i n l e t  port. No contaminant was v is ib le  a t  the 
outlet  port .  The foreign substances fe l l  in to  four  d is t inc t  ca tegor ies :  
A. White crystal l ine powder coating the entire inner surfaces of t h e  
B. Yellow crystal l ine powder coating the entrance port 
C. Black par t ic les  loosely bound to the inner surface of the valve, and 
D. One large yellow particle found inside the valve. 
valve 
Samples of t h i s  foreign matter were removed and subjected t o  chemical 
analysis. The analysis demonstrated t h a t  the white and yellow crystal l ine 
powders (A and B above) were products of dried urine. The black par t ic les  
were not posit ively identified,  but they are a typ ica l   a l ipha t ic  hydrocarbon, 
such as wax. The large yellow par t ic le  was ident i f ied as an epoxy. 
The deposition of the crystal l ine powders was considered t o  be normal 
f o r  a mission. The or igin of sample C was not determined. Sample D was f e l t  
t o  be a piece of epoxy tube coating which had become dislodged. The amounts 
of contaminant material discovered by t h i s  investigation prove t h a t  the new 
u r i n e   f i l t e r  was e f fec t ive   i n  reducing contamination and preventing a stoppage 
in the solenoid valve. A review of manufacturing techniques demonstrated 
that normal handling or flexing of the epoxy-coated aluminum l ines  between the 
u r i n e   f i l t e r  and the solenoid valve would not be detrimental  to the internal 
coating. 
Solids Traps. 
A. A routine investigation was conducted after the completion of the  
l b d a y  mission of Gemini V I 1  t o  determine if  the sol ids  t raps  were st i l l  
functioning and to record the amount  of filter saturation tha t  had occurred. . 
Both t raps  were removed from the spacecraft and sen t   to  the laboratory  for 
analysis . 
Inspection revealed t h a t  the residue from the left-hand duct and t r a p  
weighed 0.787 grams; that from the right-hand duct weighed 0.914 grams. The 
composition of the collected material was dust, lint, skin flakes and hair. 
The contents of the traps differed slightly, i n  tha t  there was more l i n t  and 
hair i n  the left-hand duct and t rap than in  the right-hand unit. The right- 
hand uni t  appeared t o  contain more dust or sand particles than the left.  Both 
sol ids  t raps  were found t o  be operative and not saturated. No abnormal condi- 
t ions  were observable i n  e i the r   t r aps   o r  f i l ters .  
B. The flight crew reported considerable eye i r r i t a t i o n  during the standup 
EVA on the Gemini X mission. A thorough post-flight investigation of the 
problem was made; t h i s  included a careful examination and chemical analysis 
of the contents of the solids traps.  "he constitution of the mater ia l  in  the 
t raps  was as follows: 
LH SOLTDS TRAP RH SOLIDS TRAP 
Gold Flakes Gold Flakes 
Unidentified  Plastic Hair 
Li:  0.13 ppm (parts  per  mill ion) L i :  None 
Ca :  0.148 ppm Ca:  0.23 ppm 
Na: 7 ppm Na: 4.3 ppm 
K: 2.4 ppm K: 1.0 ppm 
As a resul t  of t h i s  investigation, it was demonstrable that the 
quant i t ies  of material found i n  the  solids traps were not significant enough 
t o  be harmful t o  mission success; there was also no evidence t h a t  the sub- 
stances found i n  the  t raps  had produced the reported eye i r r i ta t ion.* 
T r a c e s  of trichloroethane were found in the charcoal charge of the 
LiOH canister on Spacecraft 10. During the Spacecraft 12 a l t i tude  runs, gas 
samples also revealed the  presence of trichloroethane. McDonnell was there- 
fore directed by the NASA to discontinue the use of a l l  chlorinated solvents 
for cleaning spacecraft and ACE components, and to  subs t i tu te  an alkaline 
compound with detergent characterist ics sl ightly stronger than hand soap. I n  
addition, the decision was made t o  employ only one suit fan during both the 
standup and the umbilical EVA, i n  order to decrease the air flow across the 
astronauts'  faces during these periods. 
C. The relative cleanliness of t he  su i t  c i r cu i t  fo r  t he  en t i r e  Gemini 
program was demonstrated by the negligible amounts of foreign material found 
collected in the solids traps during post-flight investigations. 
Drinking Water Contamination. - A post-flight investigation was made of 
the Spacecraft 9 drinking water system t o  determine the water's conformity 
with specifications "3606 and pS20531. Analysis revealed that both the 
par t ic le  count and the impurities present were higher than specification. 
Further examination disclosed that those   l ines   u t i l i z ing  aluminum Voi-shan 
flare savers (seals) exhibited corrosion damage, result ing in the deposit ion 
of par t ic les  of beta-alumina trihydrate. Lines without the Voi-shans, o r  
having nickel flare savers, gave no evidence of corrosion. 
As a resu l t  of t h i s  investigation, aluminum Voi-shans were deemed 
unacceptable f o r  use in  the  water system; replacement with nickel Voi-shans 
was recommended. 
It i s  noteworthy t h a t  t he  chemical analysis of drinking water remaining 
in the cabin water tank detected no platinum o r  sulfonates; therefore the 
poss ib i l i ty  of fuel   cel l   water  seepage was excluded. 
Cabin Pressurization. - A t  approximately 66:30 GET i n  the Gemini IXA 
mission, the cabin pressure declined from a normal 5.1 p s i a   t o  4.68 psia  at 
67:37 GET. The pressure then recovered and rose t o  5.19 psia. An intensive 
post-flight investigation was made of the pressure regulator, pressure trans- 
ducer, and the  cabin pressure relief valve. No anomalies were discovered in 
either the transducer or the  regulator. The pressure relief valve was 
subjected to cycling above the crack pressure of 5.5 t o  6.0 psia  and allowed 
to  resea t  ten  times. No abnormal leakage was encountered in  t h i s  testing. 
The valve was disassembled i n  the McDonnell failure analysis laboratory 
and examined for possible valve seat damage and contamination. This investi-  
gation revealed no  damage t o  the seats; however, a white and brownish-pink 
residue was discovered in the following areas: 
A. On the inner face of both main poppets. 
B. On the springs and diaphragms of both pilot valves. 
C. On the housing of both p i l o t  valves. 
Chemical analysis of the residue revealed tha t  it was composed of sodium 
chloride with traces of calcium sulphate. A study of  the f l ight  plan 
indicated that the valve had been open during the landing mode; the deposits 
were therefore most probably due t o  exposure t o  sea water. After t h i s  analysis 
was completed, the valves were reassembled and retested. No anomalies were 
discovered. 
Despite the most thorough investigation of a l l  hardware involved.in the 
cabin pressurization loss, no final determination of the anomaly could be 
made 
CREW STATION 
The focal  point  in  the operation of a spacecraft is the crew station. 
The primary goal of the design phase was t o  produce a simple, reliable and 
effective display and control system which would complement an  intell igent,  
well-trained astronaut i n  the performance of the mission. 
To achieve th i s  objective, simple ,and available components such as meters 
w e r e  used for display purposes in l ieu of cathode ray tubes, etc. Reliance on 
crew judgment was ref lec ted   in  a design which provided the astronauts with 
sui table   controls  and displays, and eliminated ground-based o r  automatic 
onboard  systems f r o m  important control functions. Independent operation of 
subsystems was provided t o  the crew through mode switching of both controls 
and displays.  Cri t ical  sequences, such as retrofire, were implemented with 
dual mechanical and electrical interlocks to preclude malfunctions or inad- 
vertent  actuations. 
Gemini or iginal ly  was designed t o  accommodate a 75 percentile man i n  the 
sitting position. It was then learned t h a t  some second generation astronauts, 
although six f t  o r  under, w e r e  greater than 75 pe rcen t i l e   i n   s i t t i ng  height. 
In addition, some of these individuals grew up t o  two in-when torso length was 
measured lying on t h e i r  backs, simulating a weightless condition. For t h i s  
reason it was determined that more height i n  the crew area w a s  required. 
However, since external geometry as well as seat configuration was fixed, the 
obvious solution was outruled. The egress k i t  containing oxygen was cut 1.75 
in .  by making the part a machining rather than containing bottles. In addi- 
t i on  the hatch was in te rna l ly  "bumped" i n  the region of the helmet area t o  
give the astronauts additional room above their  heads. An additional .75 in. 
was gained i n  t h i s  manner and proved t o  be a great aid f o r  ingress f r o m  EVA. 
Controls And Displays 
Spacecraft 12 control and display panel i s  shown i n  Fig. 24. The basic 
arrangement places piloting functions at  the l e f t  hand station, engineer and 
navigation duties at the r ight  and common functions a t  the center. 
Differences in panel arrangement resulted f r o m  system changes and f l i g h t  
crew experience during the program. The change from batteries t o  fuel c e l l s  
and the var ia t ion  in  experiment controls account for right hand panel differ-  
ences, whereas only minor switches w e r e  added on the lef t .  On the center 
panel a ground elapsed time clock replaced the flight plan ro l le r ,  and minor 
changes were made t o  the a t t i tude   cont ro l  and computer mode switches. 
Several lighting trade-off studies w e r e  made fo r  the Gemini crew station. 
Because of weight and parer considerations, flood lighting was selected for 
Gemini. Since red and white lights having a dimming capacity w e r e  desired, 
incandescent bulbs wi th  rheostats w e r e  selected. Additional warning and t e l e -  
panel lights w e r e  used t o  denote c r i t i ca l  func t ions  and conditions. I n  several 
cases these warning l i gh t s  remained illuminated for  prolonged periods, and w e r e  
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FIGURE 24 SPACECRAFT 12 CREW STATION DISPLAYS, CONTROLS AND FURNISHINGS (Continued) 
excessively bright and annoying, i.e., f u e l  cel l  A P  l i g h t s  and computer s t a r t  
l igh t .  These l i g h t s  were equipped with covers t o  reduce the light emitted. 
The s t a r t  comp l i g h t  was f i t ted with an adjustable Polaroid cover. 
Because of long-duration Gemini missions and increased intravehicular 
a c t i v i t y  as well as anticipated  extravehicular  activity,   switch and c i r c u i t  
breaker panel protectors were provided. A l l  bus switches and c r i t i c a l  
function switches such as pyrotechnics employed lever lock switches, recessed 
and covered push buttons, o r  slide lock push buttons. O f  the remaining 
switches and c i r c u i t  breakers, a first-design attempt of sol id  plast ic  covers  
which sprang out of the way of the panel when a push button was actuated was 
abandoned due to excessive inadvertent actuation and breakage. The configura- 
t i on  that  did f l y  on a l l  Gemini Spacecraft was a guard arrangement v i t h  a bar 
pass over each row of switches and c i r c u i t  breakers. Despite a l l  the  ac t iv i ty  
on Gemini f l i gh t s ,  very few switches or circuit breakers were inadvertently 
operated. 
Malfunction Detection Sxstem (MDD)), - The MDS design (See Fig. 25) was 
G U I D A N C E  
FIGURE 25 MALFUNCTION DETEC TI ON SYSTEM 
based on a detailed study of booster systems, Titan 11 f l i gh t   h i s to r i e s  and 
actual  and probable malfunctions. It was decided that the crew would deter-  
mine shutdown, e jec t ion  or  abor t  in  Modes I,  11, or 111, thus sufficient 
displays were provided t o  keep the crew aware of abort  o r  impending abort. 
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Placement  of  the  displays  on  the  command  pilot  panel  was  such  that  at 
lift-off  the  command  pilot  could  monitor  all  critical  parameters - the two 
ENGINE I under  pressure  lights, A'JTITCJDE overrate  indicator, ABORT light 
(ground  command),  fuel  and  oxidizer  pressure  needles,  accelerometer  and  the 
Flight  Director  Attitude  Indicator  (FDAI). A minimum  of  two  cues  are  required 
before an abort  is  initiated. 
The  first  and  second  stage  fuel  and  oxidizer  pressure  indicators  contain 
redundant  pointers  powered  from  separate  booster  electrical  sources.  Power 
failure  causes  needles  to  fail  up. A cross-hatched  area  on  the  center  of  the 
scales  indicates  minimum  allowable  tank  pressures.  The  first  stage  indicator 
contains a time  scale  to  show  the  minimum  required  pressure  at 20, 40, and 60 
sec  after  lift-off.  The  astronaut  then  is  able  to  use  both  needle  displace- 
ment  and  movement  rates  to  predict an mpending  failure  which  may  result  in an 
abort  or  which  may  require  crew  action  to  save  the  mission.  The S ndex  on
the  right  hand  gauge  indicates  minimum  allowable  second  stage  fuel  pressure  at 
staging. 
Engines 1 and 2 lights  illuminate  when  booster  thrust  chamber  pressure 
drops  below 68$, and 57$, respectively.  The  lights  thus  indicate  engine 
start,  shutdown,  and  malfunction  conditions. Normally the  Engine 2 light 
will  be  on  during  first  stage  burning  and  go  out  after  second  stage  ignition 
and  the  Engine 1 light  will  be  out  during  first  stage  burning  and  on  briefly 
at  staging. 
Attitude  rate  and  guidance  lights  indicate  whenever  these  errors  exceed 
allowable  values.  Rates  in  excess  of  the  following  will  illuminate  the ATT 
RATE light: 
Stage I Stage I1 
Pitch +2.0 to  -3.0°/sec - +1o0/sec 
Roll - +200/sec 
Yaw - +1o0/sec 
A display  of  digital  time  from  launch  provided  the  astronaut  with a time 
reference  for  correlation  of  events  during  boost. An accelerometer  was  used 
with  the  timer  for a gross  indication  of  booster  performance. 
Both  FDAI's  effectively  furnish  the  crew  with  "how-goes-it"  information 
during  launch  and  insertion.  The  coxnand  pilot  monitors  attitude  rates  for 
any  deviation  from  normal.rates  while  the  pilot  selects  computer  reference  to 
ascertain  differences  between  the  launch  vehicle  and  onboard  guidance  signals. 
Ianding  Systems. - The  landing  system  controls  and  associated  instruments 
(See  Fig. 26) have  not  changed  throughout  the  manned  portion  of  the  Gemini 
program.  Initiation  of  all  sequences is entirely  manual. 
FIGURE 26 LANDING INSTRUMENT SYSTEM 
Redundant a l t i tude indicat ions are provided in   t he  form of an a i r c r a f t  
type barometric altimeter and lights operated by pressure sensing switches. 
The al t imeter  i s  a three-pointer type wi th  a zero t o  100,000-ft rawe. 
Although some astronauts would have preferred a counter-pointer type, t h i s  was 
rejected due to   l a rger   case  s i z e  requirements and decreased high a l t i t ude  
sensi t ivi ty .  Amber warning l i gh t s  provided indicator back-up a t  40,000 and 
10,000 f t .  
After re-entry, drogue and main chute deployments are i n i t i a t ed  a t  
50,000 and 10,000 f t ,  respectively.  In addition to using alt imeter and l ights ,  
the asuonauts could estimate a l t i t ude  by aerodynamic s tabi l i ty  character-  
i s t i c s ,  the computer program, and elapsed time from re t rof i re .  
A rate of descent indicator,  uti l izing standard aircraft  mechanical 
barometric indicator principles was included also. Although the condition of 
the main and drogue chutes was ascertained visually, th i s  instrument allowed 
greater confidence i n  chute performance and provided better anticipation of 
events such as water impact. 
A lever lock switch, used to arm the landing sequence functions, was 
in i t i a t ed  by push-button switches protected with covers t o  prevent inadvertent 
operation. The first button deployed the drogue  chute. This pulled out and 
the pilot  chute which, in turn,  pulled the R & R can from the spacecraft. The 
second button deployed the main chute. Once the pi lot  es tabl ished tha t  the 
main chute had deployed, he pressed the t h i r d  button t o   i n v e r t  the spacecraft 
i n to  the landing att i tude.  After touchdown the main chute was cut  free by the 
last button on the landing sequence panel. If the drogue chute failed t o  
deploy, an emergency switch t o  deploy it was provided on the command p i l o t ' s  
panel, The emergency switch cut the drogue chute free; the pilot  chute was 
fired by its own mortar. 
Guidance System. - Rendezvous and docking missions along with experiment 
pointing requirements demanded a more sophisticated guidance system on the 
Gemini than on the Mercury program. Controls and displays were arranged so 
t h a t  the command pi lot  pr imari ly  would control the spacecrsft, while the 
p i l o t  would fhnction as systems monitor. The computer was designed fo r  
operation by the p i l o t  with an incremental velocity indicator (IVI) on the 
command p i lo t ' s   pane l   t o  show computer commanded t rans la t ions   in  three axes. 
The guidance system controls (platform, computer, a t t i tude  cont ro l  mode 
selector)  were located on the center  panel  accessible  to either p i l o t  though 
they ordinarily were used by the command p i lo t .  Wfth the  cent ra l  a t t i tude  
cont ro l   s t ick  and dual maneuver controllers,  guidance could be controlled by 
either p i lo t .  Each p i l o t  had selectable modes of display and reference inputs 
fo r  his  flight director  indicator  (F'DI) as shown i n  Fig. 27. 
A. Launch - Redundancy was the primed consideration in the design 
philosophy of launch displays. A t  l i f t -of f  the command p i l o t ' s  FDI needles 
indicated booster guidance information while as a back-up the p i l o t  monitored 
the Gemini computer guidance signals. In the event of excessive errors in.the 
booster guidance system the command pilot selected the spacecraft platform/ 
computer guidance system t o  control booster guidance. The mode selector  on the 
computer panel was placed i n  ASCENT and the platform in FREE mode. A l l  launch 
oriented controls and displays were evaluated for   posi t ion and operabili ty by 
the crew under the maximum g loads and vibration which might be encountered 
on launch. 
€3. Rendezvous - Development of guidance controls and displays was based 
on a requirement t o  rendezvous, independent of ground inputs  ut i l iz ing radar, 
computer, and - for  ver i f ica t ion  and back-up - manual computation. Computer 
controls w e r e  located i n  f ront  of the pilot enabling him t o  make inputs into 
the  computer and extract readouts f r o m  it while the commanded AV fo r  o rb i t a l  
or planar corrections were displayed on the N I  f o r  the command p i lo t .  The 
displays allowed the pilot the option of monitoring FDI outputs that differed 
f r o m  those viewed by the command p i lo t ;  e.g., while the command p i l o t  moni- 
tored computed rendezvous steering information, the pilot could monitor actual 
ta rge t  aximuth and elevation angles from the radar. 
The radar system, acting in conjunction wi th  a cooperative transponder 
i n  the target, furnished range, range rate, azimuth and elevat ion to  the 
computer i n   d i g i t a l  form and t o  panel displays in analog form. Target azimuth 
and elevation signals were displayed on the fl ight director indicator needles 
provided t h a t  the pi lot  selected RDR (Radar) on h i s  f l i gh t   d i r ec to r  reference 
switch. Range and range rate were displayed on a dial on the command p i l o t ' s  
panel (See Fig. 28). Since range and range rate were c r i t i c a l  as closer  
ranges, a special  range sweep c i r c u i t  was used i n  the radar t o  expand the 
sweep at closer  ranges. The near range (zero  to  3000 f t )  was nine times more 
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FIGURE 28 RADAR AND RATE INDICATOR 
sensitive than the middle range (3000 ft t o  30,000 f t  ) and 90 times more 
sensitive than the far range (30,000 f t  t o  300,000 f t ) .  The needle jumped as 
it passed from one range to  the other .  With the exception of the vernier 
zero +5 f p s  scale in the center which was benef ic ia l  in  docking, the meter 
face was inadequate for the following reasons: 
1. The range rate meter index point appeared to   po in t   t o  the range 
2. The point of the range index pointed t o  the  range rate  scale-  
3. The broad portion of the pointers covered the numerals t o  be read, 
4. 250,000 f t  was an impractical figure for pilots accustomed t o  miles 
scale. 
making extrapolation necessary on a nonlinear scale. 
at far ranges. Ranges i n  excess of 6000 ft should be calibrated in miles.  
Three and four above introduced a time-consuming factor   for   extra-  
polation and interpretat ion while a simpler dial could be "scan read" by the 
command pilot  during rendezvous when time i s  crit ical .  Operational controls 
of the radar have been simplified t o  one OFF-STBY-ON toggle switch and a 
l igh t  t o  ind ica t e  lock-on. 
Optical rendezvous could be accomplished, even with a radar fai lure ,  
as on Gemini XII, by using the optical  sight and back-up charts. The sight 
r e t i c l e  mounting lugs w e r e  placed i n  the l e f t  hand window and aligned and 
inspected to  within +0.1 degree of the spacecraft longitudinal axis. The 
sight itself was guaranteed to  wi th in  +0.1 degree of i t s  mounting points. A l l  
experiments, including radar, were ali&ed to  wi th in  +0.1 degree. In other 
words boresighting the spacecraft guaranteed +0.3 degree accuracy wi th  any 
experiment. Flight experience shared that thzse accuracies w e r e  well within 
the  guaranteed - +O.3 degree  and i n  most cases  within - +0.1 degree. 
C. Re-entry - Control provisions were provided f o r  a man-in-the-loop 
re-entry control system as well as an automatic mode. Spacecraft 3 through 
10 re-entries were controlled manually by the command pi lot   center ing the FDI 
needles t o  maintain the proper  at t i tude while the pi lot   extracted the 
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predicted touchdown earth coordinates from the computer. Spacecraft 11, and 
12  ut i l ized  the RE-ENT mode of computer. 
Power Management Section. - The e l e c t r i c a l  system power management con- 
. t r o l s  and displays w e r e  subjected to more changes and modifications than any 
other system on the spacecraft. Continuity was not achieved u n t i l  Space- 
c r a f t  10, 11, and 12, f o r  which power management controls and displays, w e r e  
the same. Changes were dictated by introduction of f u e l  c e l l s  on Spacecraft 5 
and by development work involving the f u e l   c e l l  and i ts  associated reactant 
supply system (RSS). 
Table 18lists every switch associated with the   e l ec t r i ca l  power system 
monitoring and control. This figure shows the increasing need for monitoring 
more parameters and controll ing more functions by the crew t o  preclude loss 
of a mission due t o   e l e c t r i c a l  power failure. The number of controls and 
displays of necessity w e r e  increased as . the fuel  cel ls  were introduced, since 
some batteries were retained for redundancy. 
The crew of Spacecraft 5 demonstrated what could be accomplished when 
provided with adequate controls to  cor rec t  fue l  cell/RSS malfunctions. The 
s ix   ver t ica l   sca le  ammeter readouts for the six fuel ce l l   s tacks  provided the 
best method for constantly monitoring the overall conditions of the   ce l l s  and 
electr ical  loads.  This enables the crew t o  observe deviations more rapidly 
rather  than wait f o r  a preset time t o   r o t a t e  a knob and check for  deviations. 
'Communications Section. - The voice control center (VCC), located on 
the upper center console, contained the se lec t  and volume switches for voice 
communication on UHF, ED', and intercom. Beacon, telemetering and antenna 
control switches were located immediately to  the  right of the VCC. Switch 
type circuit breakers for the communication system were located in the top 
row of the   l e f t  hand circuit breaker panel and in   the   l e f t  af t  corner of the 
overhead circuit breaker panel. 
Additional console space could be  made available by reducing VCC s ize  
and by incorporating the functions of the audio mode switch into the UHF and 
HF select switches, and dual volume control switches into a single set .  (See 
Fig. 29.) 
The audio mode switches on the VCC w e r e  positioned by the crew to   s e l ec t  UHF, INT (intercom), HF', and HF-DF. The switches w e r e  independent so t ha t  
while one crew member was transmitting and receiving on UHF, the  other crew 
member could transmit and receive on HF and also receive on UHF'. Selection 
of the HF-DF posit ion on e i the r  switch i n i t i a t e d  a lo00 cps tone which was 
audible   to  both crew members regardless of the posit ion of the other switch. 
The INT posit ion was selected  to  reduce the noise level in the respective 
headset. The RCD (record) position on this  switch was used for the voice tape 
recorder on Spacecraft 3 and 4. Beginning with Spacecraft; 5 it was removed 
and the function was incorporated into a toggle switch located in the lower 
r ight  hand corner of the VCC. 
182 
I UORY 
SILEHCE RECORD 
PRESENT  CONFIGURATION 
I on I con1 I CONT 
I I 
I TI4 CMtTROL 
lic&l w& 
RESET ADPT 
PROP@SED  CONFIGURATION 
UHF " UHF - r- 1 
OFF 
no. I @ HO. 2 - 
u n F I [ ~ ~  L CALI8 STBY HF TU COWTt 
NO. I 
r 
P T T  OFF 
P T T  
KEYIHG RECORD 
ALTERNATE PROPOSED 
CONFIGURATION 
FIGURE 29 VOICE CONTROL CENTER AND BEACON, TM AND 
ANTENNA  CONTROL SWITCHES 
The volume control switches were located  direct ly  below the audio mode 
switches. Each crew m e m b e r  had individual wheel controls for UHF, INT, and HF. These switches operated quite satisfactorily and they,required less 
panel space than rotary switches, which would have had t o  be large enough t o  
be manipulated with a pressurized glove. However, due t o  limited panel space, 
one of the two sets of controls could be eliminated. On Spacecraft 7, 
removable plastic  covers w e r e  provided t o  prevent moisture from ge t t , iw   i n to  
the controls. It is suggested that f+u&re applications of this type- control 
be sealed against moisture. 
The UHF and HF ,iquelch and select  switches  located  in the center of the 
VCC f'unctioned sa t i s f ac to r i ly  throughout the program. Prior to Spacecraft  3, 
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an €IF' transmitter-receiver (T/R) was p-ed for  installation  in  the  adapter 
section  in  addition to the one in  the &-entry section.  However,  due  to  the 
poor HF transmission  qualities,  the T/h was  replaced by another HF whip 
antenna  in  the  adapter.  The HF select.switch  remained  as  three-position 
switch  with  two  unused  positions. 
The  audio  mode  switch  functions  could be relocated  to  the UHF and HF 
select  switches  as  follows: 
AUDIO MODE 
FUNCTION UBF SEIECT SWITCH HF SELECT SWITCH 
A. UHF to No. 1 or No. 2 
B. INT (for CP) to  position now used 
for OFF 
C .  INT (for P) to  center  position now 
used  for OFF 
D .  HF to RNTY 
E. HF-DF to  position  formerly 
designated  for ADFT 
Incorporation of the  above  changes  would  make  additional  panel  space 
available  for  other  controls  and/or  displays. 
The  silence  switch  was  incorporated on the  lower  left  hand  corner of 
the VCC beginning  with  Spacecraft 5.  In NORMAL position  there  was no change 
to  the  communications  capabilities.  In  either  the No. 1 or No. 2 position 
all UHF, €IF, and INT receiving  capability  was  removed  from  the  respective 
headset.  This  addition  enabled  one  crew  member  to  sleep  or r s t without 
any  radio  interference.  However,  beginning  with  Spacecraft 6 the  flight 
plan  called  for  simultaneous  crew  rest  periods  which  limited  the  use  of  this 
switch, making its  usefulness  questionable. 
The  keying  switch,  located  in  the  lower  center part of the VCC, had 
three  positions: VOX, FlT, and CONT RTT-PTT. In the VOX position  either 
crew  member  communicated  with  ground  stations  as  well  as  each  other  without 
pressing  the  switches on the  attitude  hand  controller. In the PTT position, 
the  switches on the  attitude  hand  controller  or  pressure  suit  electrical 
umbilical  were  actuated (1) for  communication  with  ground  stations  when  the 
respective  audio  mode  switch  was  in UHF or HF position,  and (2) for  conver- 
sation  between  crew  members  when  the  respective  audio  mode  switch  was  in  INT 
position. In the CONT INT-PTT position  the  crew  members  conversed  without 
actuating  any  switches.  However  the  switches  on  the  attitude  hand  controller 
or  suit  electrical  umbilical  switch  were  pressed  for  communication  with 
ground  stations.  This  last  position  was  the  only  one  connected  to  the  voice 
tape  recorder.  The VOX position,  though  rarely  used on flights,  could  be 
utilized  during an emergency  that  would  preclude  the  use of the  switches on 
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the  a t t i t u d e  hand controller.  The PTT posit ion had l i t t l e  u t i l i za t ion  and 3 ta  
importake i n  an emergency s i tua t ion  is nebulous. The CONT IIW-F"J! posit ion 
was used most because it afforded the convenience desired most by the crew 
m e m b e r s .  Depending on the degree of importance plac'ed on the  features  of the 
VOX posit ion,  the keying switch could be eliminated from the VCC and features 
of the CONT INT-FTT posStion could be incorporated  into the VCC without the 
Switch 
The record swstch located  in   the lower right hand corner of the VCC i s  
f o r  the voice tape recorder. As mentioned previously, this switch was added 
prior   to   Spacecraf t  5 ,  giving the c r e w  greater   control   capabi l i ty  with i ts  
MOMENTARY and CONTINUOUS positions. To operate the recorder, the record 
switch was placed i n  either the COm o r  MOM posit ion,   the keying switch i n  
CONT INT-FTI position, and the audio mode switch i n   t h e  UHF, HF, o r  HF"DF 
position. 
Beacon Control Switches - These switches w e r e  located immediately t o  the 
right of the  VCC . The RJ3SC (rescue) switch was labeled ON-OFF W/O LT. I n  
the ON posit ion the UHF rescue beacon and the flashing recovery light were 
operative, but in the W/O LT position only the UHF rescue beacon was operative 
provided the Vm bus was operative. To avoid possible transmitter damage, the 
switch was not actuated from the O F F  pos i t ion   un t i l  the rescue antenna had 
been extended at main chute single point release. 
Spacecraft 3 had one S-band beacon located in the equipment adapter 
section and one C-band beacon located in the re-entry section. Beginning 
with Spacecraft 4 the S-band beacon was replaced with a C-band beacon. The 
C-ADPT and C-RNTY switches w e r e  two-position switches labeled CONT and CMD. 
In CON" posit ion the beacon was powered continuously, but t h i s  posit ion did 
not disable DCS command "on" capability. The CMD position placed the beacon 
i n  a standby mode  u n t i l  a ground DCS command was sent   to   act ivate  the beacon. 
The C-band helix antenna (re-entry) phase shifter was powered by C-RNTY switch 
provided that the  ANT SEL switch was i n  the RNTY position. Only one beacon 
was on a t  any given time, since both beacon character is t ics  were the same. 
The configuration and operation of these switches w e r e  sa t isfactory 
throughout the program. 
Telemetry Control Switches - These switches were located directly below 
the beacon control switches. The location and arrangement of these switches 
did not change throughout the program. 
The CALIB switch has three positions: No. 1, OFF, and Bo. 2. Position 
No. 1 ini t ia ted cal ibrat ion of  low calibrate point (26 fu l l  s ca l e  signal) 
of ECS 02, M: 02, and M= H2 quantity and pressure gauges, and a one-point 
calibration of 20 other parameters. Position No. 2 in i t ia ted  ca l ibra t ion  of 
high calibrate point ( 8 6  f u l l  s c a l e  signal) f o r  the same items as No. 1. 
The STBY switch. had three positions: R/T, OFF, and D/T. In  R/T ( rea l  
time) posit ion the standby T/M transmitter was powered f o r  R/T transmission 
and R/T TIM data was transferred from the FCM Programmer t o  the standby 
T/M transmitter. In  the OFF posit ion there was no power t o  the standby 
transmitter.  In the D/T (delayed time) position the standby T/M transmitter 
was powered f o r  D/T transmission. This position also enabled tape playback 
control through "E PLYBK switch i n  CONT and DCS when TAPE PLYBK switch was 
i n  CMD. 
The T/M switch had three positions: 
A. When i n  R/T and ACQ position, the switch powered R/T T/M transmitter 
continuously (the R/T T/M transmitter was always connected t o  the quadri- 
plexer),  activated the acquisit ion aid beacon and connected the beacon t o  
the diplexer. 
DIT T/M transmitters on, disconnect the acquisition aid beacon from the 
diplexer and connect D/T T/M transmitter to the diplexer.  It also act ivated 
the acquisit ion aid beacon when the D/T T/M transmitter was off  and connected 
the  acquisit ion aid beacon t o  the diplexer. 
transmitters continuously and connected the latter t o  the diplexer. The T/M 
switch also enabled tape playback control through the TAPE PLYBK switch i n  
CONT and DCS when TAPE PLYBK switch was i n  CMD. 
B. In  the CMD position, the T/M switch enabled DCS t o  command R/T and 
C. In  the R/T D/T position, the switch powered the R/T T/M and D/T T/M 
On Spacecraft 6 and up the TAPE PLYBK switch was located directly under 
the T/M CALIB switch. On Spacecraft 3 through 5 it was located in the  same 
group with the ANT SEL and HF ANT, but the  order  of  position varied wi th  each 
spacecraft. In the CONT posit ion the  FCM T/M recorder played back continu- 
ously through the T/M control T/hl switch. In the CMD posit ion the recorder 
played back (dumped) when  commanded on by DCS. On Spacecraft 6 and up the 
REXZT posit ion was used t o  r e s e t  DCS relays 1 through 8. Calibration 
(Channel 9) and abort  (Channel 10) were not reset. Spacecraft 3, 4, and 5 
did not have t h i s  reset capabili ty.  
The ANT SEL (antenna se l ec t )  switch w a s  a two-position switch located 
d i rec t ly  below the T/M control switches. In the RNTY position the re-entry 
C-band beacon phase shifter was powered (when C-band beacon i s  on), and the 
UHF stub antenna (re-entry R & R section) was connected t o  the quadriplexer 
through the descent antenna coax switch. In the ADFT posit ion the UHF whip 
antenna (retroadapter) was connected t o  the quadriplexer. 
The three-position HF ANT select switch was located on the upper center 
console with the TAPE PLYBK and ANT SEL switches. I n  the EXT posit ion the 
re-entry HF whip antenna was extended through the LANDIXG switch i n  ARM 
position. The adapter HF whip antenna extended through the LANDING switch 
(SAFE), and the HI? T/R connected to  the  extended antenna. In the OFF posit ion 
power was removed from the antenna motors. I n  the FtET posit ion either 
extended HF whip antenna was retracted.  During docking or during Agena burns 
while docked, the HI? whip antenna should be retracted to prevent possible 
antenna breakage. 
Attitude Display. - A simulation program was established to determine 
the best approach t o  an attitude reference display duplicated on each side of 
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the cockpit. The display most acceptable to pilot/astronauts was essent ia l ly  
the same type att i tude ball found on contemporary f igh te r   a i r c ra f t  with some 
modification. Each display incorporated a three-axis attitude reference ball 
having 360 degrees of rotation about each axis. The att i tude reference balls 
were slaved to   the  posi t ion of the iner t ia l   p la t form gimbals t o  provide a 
continuous al l -a t t i tude reference of  rol l ,  p i tch and y a w .  A needle at the 
top of the indicator provides roll  rate indicat ion in  one degree/sec incre- 
ments to  ful l .scale  needle  def lect ion of f ive degrees. The pitch reference 
scale marking was changed from five degree increments t o  one degree increments 
effect ive on Spacecraft 6 .  Pitch readouts became c r i t i c a l  as inputs w e r e  
needed f o r   p i l o t  manual computation in   ce r t a in  rendezvous malf'unction modes 
with one-half degree o r  better pitch  reference. 
The a t t i t ude  ball was selected  for  Gemini because it provided a simpli- 
fied method of using gimbal position information f r o m  the stable platform as 
an all-att i tude display. The sphere through mutual interaction of the axes 
provides an unambiguous, a l l -a t t i tude display which is  a tremendous improve- 
ment over the separate axis  Mercury-type display. 
An example of the lack of mutual interaction in a Mercury-type display 
was shown  by the following maneuver: Yaw t o  180 degrees, then pitch t o  
180 degrees. This resu l ted  in  a r o l l  of 180 degrees with a y a w  and a pitch. 
Since the Mercury display elements were single plane the interaction did not 
occur. However, in  ro ta t ing  a sphere 180 degrees i n  y a w ,  and 180 degrees i n  
pi tch as i n  the Gemini display, it provided i t s  own interact ion and displayed 
the  e f fec t  as 180 degrees roll.  
I n  event of a partial o r  complete platform failure, considerable simula- 
t i on  was accomplished using a star background and r e t i c l e   fo r   a t t i t ude  
reference. Based on the simulations, it was considered feasible t o  rendezvous 
despite a platform failure, though it was more d i f f i c u l t  and the probabili ty 
of e r ro r  was increased. 
"he i n e r t i a l  guidance system (IGS) selected for the Gemini was a four- 
gimbal system u t i l i z ing  an i nne r   ro l l  gimbal wi th  +l5 degrees freedom, i n  
addi t ion   to  the 360 degrees   outer   rol l  gimbal t o  prevent gimbal lock at  the 
zero degree y a w ,  zero degree pitch, 90 degree r o l l  attitude. The stable 
element contained the gyros, accelerometer, servo loops and alignment prism. 
The system was designed so that the spacecraft could be a l igned   in   f l igh t  by 
aligning  the blunt end forward o r  small end forward with the horizon scanner 
and caging the platform. Guidance System, page 179 describes operational 
controls of the IGS system. No'major problems w e r e  encountered with the IGS/ 
at t i tude  display combination which proved accurate and reliable i n   o r b i t a l  
f l igh t .  
Flight Control Console. - The flight control console included $he manual 
attitude control ler  and the control m o d e  select switch. Studies on the manual 
controller included location of the controllers, loads'versus displacement of 
the controller,  and determination of optimum movement about the axes. 
In i t i a l ly ,  rudder pedals w e r e  envisaged; however, weight and space 
limitations  forced abandonment of pedals i n  favor of placing a th i rd  axis on 
the manual controller.  Either crew member could operate the controller while 
in  the  restrained  posit ion  through wrist a r t i cu la t ion  and palm pivot motion 
only, t o  preclude body movements from being transmitted to the controller. 
The handle was spring loaded t o  provide an increasing resistance as the 
handle was moved  away from neutral. Controller force/displacement originally 
had a step function designed i n  a l l  three axes, but was later revised  to  a 
smooth curve as shown i n  Fig. 30 f o r  a l l  three axes. Redundant switches w e r e  
incorporated for selectively energizing solenoid valves in the a t t i t ude  con- 
t r o l  system. Total  t ravel  of  the hand control ler  was 10 + 1 degrees from 
neut ra l  in  p i tch  and y a w  axes and 9 + 1 degrees i n  the r o i l  axis. Rotary 
movement of the handle about a transverse axis located a t  the palm pivot 
point effected a corresponding spacec-raft motion about the pitch axis. Rotary 
displacement i n  a clockwise or counterclockwise direction in a transverse 
plan'e with respect t o  an adjustable canted axis below the   p i lo t ' s  wrist 
effected a similar movement about the spacecraf t  rol l  axis. Clockwise o r  
counterclockwise rotation of the controller about the longitudinal axis of the 
handle effected a corresponding movement about the yaw axis.  
Due t o  extended operation in this mode, the resis tant  s t ick forces  
tended t o  cause wrist fatigue. Consequently, the cont ro l  s t ick  was modified 
t o  assimilate a T a t  the top. This enabled the p i lo t  t o  g ra sp  the top of the 
s t i c k  palm down i f  desired f o r  more ease of y a w  control. A guard was b u i l t  
up on the top to prevent depressing the communications transmit buttons while 
grasping the st ick in th i s  manner. 
Evaluation of the many attitude controller designs included operation of 
the s t i c k  with a bare hand, a soft glove or a pressurized glove, as well as 
consideration of the man pressurized or unpressurized, in zero g o r  under 
heavy re-entry g loads. 
The a t t i tude  cont ro l le r  (See Fig. 31) worked i n  conjunction with a rotary 
mode se lec tor  s l igh t ly  forward and l e f t  of the s t ick.  This was needed t o  
allow the pilot  minimal three-axis response for fine maneuvering such as 
docking (pulse) or  larger  orders  of magnitude i n  response f o r  gross correce 
t ions (rate command or  d i rec t ) .  
The modes made available t o  the p i l o t  w e r e :  
A. HOR SCAN - The horizon sensors provided a reference in pitch and r o l l  
to automatically control a limit cycle mode +5 degrees in these axes. The 
y a w  ax is  was maintained by the pilot   using  tge  pulse mode which was maintained 
on a l l  axes i n  t h i s  mode. 
cont ro l le r   pos i t ions   to  produce a t t i t ude  rates proport ional   to   control ler  
deflection. (Operationally, t h i s  mode was ef fec t ive  in  cor rec t ing  the  fa i r ly  
high cross-coupling rates developed when the maneuver control ler  was used 
to   t r ans l a t e .  ) 
the  a t t i tude  cont ro l le r  was deflected approximately 25$ of full travel .  (me 
B. RATE CMD - Pitch, roll and y a w  rate gyro outputs were compared wi th  
C. DIRFCT - Provided direct  control  to  open thrus t  chamber solenoids when 
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r- 
utmost discretion was used i n  th i s  mode, as it tended t o  waste fuel.  ) 
D . FULSE - For  each  deflection  of  the  controller away from the center 
position, a single short duration (20 msec) pulse was appl ied   to  the appropri- 
a t e  a i s .  
E. RATE CMD, RE-ENT - Simi lar   to  rate command with a wider neutral band 
and gain crossfeed from roll t o  yaw. (Designed f o r  use i n  manual re-entry.) 
F. RE-ENT - Pitch and y a w  axes i n  rate damping control mode, with roll 
axis slaved t o  bank-angle command from the computer. 
G. PUT - ACME accepted attitude information from the platform and 
provided outputs t o  the thrusters to maintain spacecraft attitude automati- 
cally  within  pitch,  y a w  and roll deadbands. 
before the first manned f l ight .  (On Spacecraft 5 and up, t h i s  s e l ec to r  
posit ion was used f o r  the PLATFYIRM mode. ) 
H. PARA - A mode designed f o r  use with a paraglider which was eliminated 
Environmental Control Section (ECS). - The control and displays for  the 
environmental control system are shown i n  Fig. 32. Several significant 
changes in   t he  ECS (See ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM, page 157 ) are ref lected 
on the panel. The overhead manually-operated ECS handles w e r e  the same on 
a l l  spacecraft, A redundant valve was added t o  back up the vent valve on 
Spacecraft 7 and up. On Spacecraft 7 it was merely a cap tha t  was pulled off 
the valve opening with a lanyard, but on Spacecraft 8 and up it was a spring- 
loaded permanent i n s t a l l a t ion  that could be recycled for EVA. The e l e c t r i c a l  
switch to   ac t iva t e  02 high rate was located on the sequence panel on Space- 
c r a f t  3 and 4, but was detennined by test  not t o  be a sequential requirement. 
When the function was removed from the sequential panel and placed on the 
lower posit ion of the cabin fan switch on Spacecraft 5 and up, the associated 
light i n  the sequence panel was placed on the annunciator panel. The manual 
02 high rate pu l l  ring located on the center pedestal between the  seats  did 
not change throughout the Gemini series.  The suit  fan switch posit ions 
changed f r o m  No. 1 and No. 2 t o  No. 1 and No. 1 and No. 2 ( t o  run both fans 
simultaneously) on Spacecraft 4 and up in   o rder   to   ge t   g rea te r   c i rcu la t ion   in  
the la t ter  posi t ion.  The cabin fan was removed in Spacecraft 8 and up and 
other functions placed on i t s  switch position. The remainder of the ECS 
switches and warning l ights on the upper center panel remained the same i n  a l l  
spacecraft although the functions varied slightly. Spacecraft 6 had one 
coolant pump i n  each loop in   o rde r   t o  save weight since it was a one-day 
mission and of the battery configuration. 
Pump B i n  each loop a l so  was configured t o  a lower flow rate t o  conserve 
power on Spacecraft 5 and up for periods of low ac t iv i ty  and parer down. A l l  
the gauges associated with the ECS remained the same on a l l  spacecraft except 
that a rotary  selector  was added t o  read the cry0 gauge when f u e l   c e l l s  w e r e  
added t o  Spacecraft 5 and up so that fuel c e l l  02 and H2 could be read i n  
addi t ion  to  ECS 02. A crossfeed switch was added t o  Spacecraft 7, 8 and 9 i n  
order to supply ECS 02 t o  the fuel c e l l s  and vice versa. This act ion w a s  
taken as a r e su l t  of the M: 02 cry0 heater fa i lure  on Spacecraft 5.  Space- 
c r a f t  10 and up had only one 02 supply f o r  both ECS and fuel ce l l s .  A tube 
cu t t e r  was added t o  the H2 cry0 vacuum bot t le  on Spacecraft 7 and up t o  
improve the thermal charecter is t ics .  This cu t t e r  was activated by the cross- 
feed switch with the experiments bus armed but was labeled separately on 
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Spacecraft 10 and  up.  The  manual  heater  in  the 02 bottle  was  originally a
momentary  switch  but  was  changed  to a fixed  position  and  resulted  in  adding 
a light  ECS RTR to  the  annunciator  panel.  The  temperature  selector  on  the 
center  console  served  the  same  function  throughout  the  program  but,  beginning 
with  Spacecraft 8 it  was  marked  "minimum"  and  "maximum"  because  the  flow  was 
controlled  over  such a short  valve  travel.  The  center  pedestal  items  did  not 
change  except  for  the  addition  of a positive  lock  to  the  repressurization 
valve.  The  repressurization  oxygen  was  ducted  through  the  console  to a quick 
disconnect so it  could be used  with an EVA  umbilical. 
Propellant  Quantity  Indication. - As  originally  conceived,  the  measure- 
ment  of OAMS propellsnt  quantity was based  on  display  of  temperature  and 
pressure of the  helium OAMS fuel  pressurant  from  which  the  crew  would  inter- 
polate  quantity  by  utilizing a graph  curve.  To  avoid  this  inconvenience  and 
provide a constant  quantity  readout,  an  instrument  and  associated  circuitry 
were  designed  which  would  integrate  the  temperature  and  pressure  parameters 
and  present a zero  to lo@ OAMS quantity  indication. 
A pressure  transducer  furnished an input  to  one  side  of a bridge  while a 
sensitive  platinum  element  provided a temperature  variable  input  to  the  other 
side,  resulting  in  an  integrated  signal  to  an  indicator  (See  Fig. 33) with 
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FIGURE 33 OAMS PROPELLANT QUANTITY INDICATOR 
internal  variable  resistance  to  compensate  for  fuel  loadings  which vary  
between  spacecraft.  Uneven  fuel/oxidizer  burning  ratios  principally  accounted 
for  the -+lo$ accuracy  of  the  present  gauge. 
Agena  Status  Display  Panel. - When  docking  was  established  as a mi sion 
requirement,  McDonnell  assumed  the  design  responsibility  for a status  display 
panel  for  the  Agena  target  docking  adapter  (TDA). 
Due t o  space limiations i n  the Gemini cockpit, the panel was designed fo r  
i n s t a l l a t ion  on the Agena so as t o  be v is ib le  and f’unctional to   as t ronauts  i n  
the Gemini cockpit. 
No new design problems w e r e  involved because the instruments were t o  be 
subjected to  almost the same environment when the hatches w e r e  opened and the  
cockpit  depressurized  for EVA. 
This type of installation shown i n  Fig. 34 probably was the first 
FIGURE 34 AGENA STATUS DISPLAY PANEL 
u t i l i z e d   i n   t h i s  manner and proved highly beneficial because of savings in 
Gemini cockpit instrument panel space, spacecraft weight and related electri- 
c a l  wiring. 
Qualification tests proved uneventful with a l l  display  indications and 
l ights passing the predicted testing requirements. 
The ASC panel was mounted atop the forward end of the TDA so that it was 
visible to the astronauts during the docking sequence and during subsequent 
maneuvers i n  the docked configuration. The display consisted of nine l ights 
and three analog dials that provided the following data: 
A. TDA docking system ready f o r  docking. 
B . TDA rigidized. 
C.  Agena Target Vehicle (ATV) e lec t r i ca l  power system operating properly. 
D. Amount of PPS burn time remaining. 
E. PPS safety s ta tus  (main red).  
F. PPS pressure status. 
G. Status of PPS and SPS th rus t  allow - thrust  s top  c i rcu i t .  
H. SPS gas  pressure status. 
I. Amount of SPS burn time remaining. 
J. Vehicle under control of Agena a t t i t ude  system. 
K. Amount of att i tude control gas remaining. 
With the exception of the main red, the a t t i tude  cont ro l  system (ACS) 
gas pressure display (ATT gas dial)  and the propulsion system clocks, the ASD 
panel was deenergized until activated by ground or spacecraft connaand. The 
ACS gas pressure display and the AP portion of the main red light were always 
energized and the propulsion system clocks were energized whenever the appli- 
cable engine fired. 
Two levels of illumination, bright and dim, were ava i l ab le   t o  a l l  
displays  except the main red which was either o f f   o r  on bright. 
Dock (green l i gh t )  - When illuminated, the docking cone was unrigidized, 
the latches were reset and the TDA was i n  the proper condition to   receive  the 
nose section of the spacecraft. 
Rigid (amber l i g h t )  - When illuminated, the docking cone was rigidized 
and ready t o  allow post-docking maneuvers. 
Pwr (green light) - When illuminated, the 28 vol t s  DC unregulated 
28 vol t s  DC regulated, -28 vol t s  DC regulated, 115 volts,  400 cps, single- 
phase and 115 volts,  400 cps three-phase parameters were operating within 
tolerances. 
Main (red light) - When illuminated, indicated the following: 
A. When the ASD was activated: 
1. When the main engine was firing, the turbine exceeded 27,000 RPM, 
the hydraulic pressure was below 1500 + 20 psia o r  the different ia l   pressure 
between the fue l  and oxidizer tanks was below 3 + 2 psid, fuel above oxidizer. 
between the  fuel  and  oxidizer tanks was below 3 - + 2 psid, fuel above oxidizer. 
2. When the main engine was not fir ing,  the differential  pressure 
- 
B. When the ASD was deactivated: the differential pressure between the 
fuel and oxidizer  tanks was below 3 - + 2 psid, fue l  above oxidizer. 
Main (green l i g h t )  - When illuminated, the main fuel  tank was above 
15 + 2 psia, the main oxidizer tank above 15 + 2 psia, the hydraulic system 
pressure above 50 - + 5 psia,  and the PPS safely commanded t o  f ire.  
Amed (amber l i g h t )  - When illuminated, the engine control circuits 
were closed and either the main o r  secondary engines were commanded t o  fire. 
Sec H i  (green l i gh t )  - When illuminated, more than 1110 + 20 psia expul- 
sion gas pressure existed in both nitrogen spheres for a 50 s& uni t  I1 (200 
l b  SPS th rus t  chamber) f i r i n g  and more than 170 5 5 psia regulated pressure 
existed i n  both  propellant tank gas manifolds. 
Sec Lo (green light) - When illuminated, more than 360 + 20 psia expul- 
sion g a s  pressure existed in both nitrogen spheres f o r  a 150-sec uni t  I (16 l b  
SPS th rus t  chamber) f i r i n g  and more than 170 2 5 psia regulated pressure 
ex i s t ed   i n  both propellant tank gas manifolds. 
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ATT (green  light) - When  illuminated,  the  Agena  attitude  control  system 
was  active. 
Main  time  (clock  display)  indicated  by  minute  and  second  hands  the  time 
remaining  for  main  engine  burn.  The  regulated 28 VDC was  applied  to  the  main 
time  display  unit  when  the  start  signal  was  applied  to  the  main  engine. This 
caused  the  display  unit  to  decrease  the  time  remaining  indication  at a rate 
of  one  sec/sec  burn  time. 
Sec  Time  (clock  display)  indicated  by  minute  and  second  hands  the  time 
remaining  for 200 lb SPS burn.  The  regulated 28 VDC  was  applied  on  separate 
wires  for  high  and  low  thrusters  of  the SPS. This  caused  the  display  unit 
to  decrease  the  time  remaining  indication  at a rate  of  one  sec/sec  burn  time 
for  the  high  consumption  and a rate  of  one-twelfth (1/12) sec/sec  burn  time 
for  the low consumption  rates. 
A n t  Gas  (synchro  display)  indicated  the  percentage  of  total  pressure 
remaining  in  the  Agena  attitude  control  system  gas  spheres. 
Spacecraft 8 produced  two  minor  problems,  the  first  being  the  difficulty 
in  distinguishing  the  docking  light  illumination  from  the  rigid  light  because 
of their  close  proximity  and  similar  color  (green).  The  second  became  evident 
during  the  daylight  pass.  At 50 to 75 ft  (the  station  keeping  range)  it 
became  impossible  to  read  either  lights  or  gauges  due  to  the  sunlight  reflect- 
ing  off  the  lenses.  The  acquisition  of a film,  probably  Agena  propellant 
mist,  on  the  entire  Agena  status  display  panel  is  believed  to  have  contributed 
to  this  condition.  The  problem  was  overcome  by  sighting  the  lights  through 
the  telescopic  portion  of  the  sextant. 
Stowage 
Allotting  space  and  providing  the  means  to  secure  stowage  items  on  each 
spacecraft  presented  problems on most  missions. 
Manned  missions  called  for known quantities  of  food,  and  rendered  known 
quantities  of  waste.  Cameras,  film,  camera  accessories,  and  various  hard  and 
software  were  required  for  experiments.  Logbooks  and  data  cards  were  used 
for  recording  events  during  the  missions.  "Zero  g"  conditions  necessitated 
stowing  each  item.  Other  factors  affecting  stowage  included  the  duration  of 
each  mission,  the  size  and  nature  of  the  item  to  be  stowed,  and  its  immediacy 
and  frequency  of  use. 
Due  to  the  relatively  short  duration  of  the  Spacecraft 3 mission and 
the  small  amount  of  equipment  necessary,  stowage  was  not a problem.  Space- 
craft 3 did  not  have  all  the  fixed  stowage  containers  of  later  spacecraft. 
Consequently,  the  right  hand  aft  box  and  the  modified  whirlpool  center  food 
box  contained  excess  space.  But  on  subsequent  spacecraft,  except  Spacecraft 6, 
all  available  stowage  space  was  utilized. 
A l l  items had t o  be secured t o  prevent them from floating. The method 
of securing "loose items," i.e., not bolted to the spacecraft  or removed from 
a fixed container, was t o  apply Velcro hook about the spacecraft walls, 
instrument panels, hatches and seats, and Velcro pile t o  the item t o  be 
secured. A f t e r  each flight, the next crew usually requested that additional 
Velcro hook be appl ied  to  the in t e r io r  of each spacecraft through Spacecraft 8 
when nearly a l l  the usable space was occupied. 
Beginning with Spacecraft 4, the aft  and center stowage area was 
redesigned t o  the following configuration: 
A. A center stowage rack f i t ted with one t o  three Fiberglas containers. 
B. Left and r igh t  aft  food boxes. 
On Spacecraft 4 and 5 ,  the center stowage rack was configured with three 
Fiberglas containers which housed cameras and camera accessories. A mounting 
adapter f o r  the 200 mm lens was stowed on the center stowage rack door. 
However, the center stowage containers on Spacecraft 4 did not have adequate 
space f o r  stowing a l l  of the camera accessories. Based on the probable low 
use rate, three lenses were stowed in  the  r igh t  hand af t  box i n  pouches. 
Since the film magazines could withstand more shock and vibration than the 
accessories, they were stowed i n  the  side food boxes due t o  the lack of space 
i n  the center containers and the need for   accessibi l i ty .  
Commencing on Gemini VI a special centerline rack was ins t a l l ed   t o   ca r ry  
the extravehicular l i f e  support system (ELSS) and a Fiberglas camera case. 
Although the ELSS was not carried on Spacecraft 6 and 7, t h i s  rack was carried 
t o  maintain a standardized stowage configuration throughout the  program. The 
ELSS was placed into the rack on a guide rail and structurally supported by 
two pins on the rear of the rack and two pins  in  the door of the rack t h a t  
mated with corresponding holes i n  the EMS. On several flights considerable 
d i f f i cu l ty  was encountered in closing the door on the stowage rack. This 
problem was resolved by removing part of the structure in the rack (making it 
more f lex ib le )  so it could more eas i ly  be placed i n  a mating posit ion with i t s  
door. A theory t h a t  the structure shifted as the spacecraft was pressurized 
prompted t h i s  action. 
The Fiberglas container arrangement on Spacecraft 6 and 7 was changed 
t o  two containers, upper and lower, which allowed more stowage space. Except 
f o r  pen l ights on Spacecraft 6 ,  cameras and camera accessories were stowed i n  
these containers. The primary stowage objective was to  loca t e  a l l  equipment 
needed fo r  a given photographic experiment o r  documentation i n  one container. 
On Spacecraft 7, cameras and camera accessories were placed i n  the lower 
container and the extra   f i lm magazines w e r e  stowed i n  the right hand pedestal 
auxi l iary food container. The upper container was used pa r t i a l ly  fo r  items 
tha t  w e r e  usually stowed i n   t h e  sidewall containers on other spacecraft. 
These included tape car t r idges,  sui t  repair k i t ,  urine collection system 
components, p l a s t i c  z ipper  bags, t issue dispenser,  vision testing and dewpoint 
hygrometer components, interference filters, and medical accessory kit. 
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The upper part of the center stowage area on Spacecraft 8 through 12 was 
used for the extravehicular l i f e  support system (ELSS)' package. The lower 
portion contained a Fiberglas box with foam molded t o  accept cameras, f i lm 
magazines, and camera accessories. On each of these spacecraft there was not 
suff ic ient  room i n   t h i s  box to   conta in  a l l  the equipment, and overflow items 
such as lenses and film magazines sometimes w e r e  stowed i n  pouches in   t he  
a f t  and side food boxes. 
In   addi t ion   to   cen ter  stowage overflow of cameras and accessories; the 
l e f t  and r igh t  af t  boxes were u t i l i zed   fo r  stowing food, extravehicular 
ac t iv i ty  (EVA) equipment, urine bags, defecation devices, and other items not 
requiring frequent use. Each item, with the exception of the food packs, was 
in  an individual  pouch. Some items such as cameras with lenses were i n  
padded pouches. Typical stowage i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  Fig. 35. 
On Spacecraft 4 and 5 ,  the l e f t  a f t  box was used f o r  food, but the r igh t  
aft  box was used t o  stow "infrequent use" items such as camera lenses, 
umbilical hose, defecation bags, s u i t  repair k i t ,  and Zodiacal l i gh t  camera. 
On Spacecraft 4, the s i z e  and shape of the in-fl ight exerciser,  blood pressure 
adapter, urine receiver and hose, and umbilical guide was responsible for 
these items being stowed i n  the r ight  aft  box. 
The l e f t  aft  box on Spacecraft 6 was used f o r  food, personal effects 
items such as tissue dispenser, bio-med f i t t i n g  wrench, waste containers, 
roll-on cuff receiver, and defecation devices, and f o r  items of a general 
nature such as lightweight headsets, humidity sensor, voice tape recorder 
cartridges, 16 mm film magazines, and a col lect ion bag assembly. The r igh t  
aft box contained auxiliary water bags f o r  use in  obtaining a drink during 
prelaunch count down. 
Both of the aft  boxes on Spacecraft 7 were used mainly f o r  food. 
Personal hygiene towels also were stowed i n  each of the aft  boxes. 
Beginning with Spacecraft 8, mission requirements became more uniform 
wi th  respect to duration, EVA, and photography. On Spacecraft 9, 11 and 12, 
t h e  l e f t  aft box was ut i l ized pr imari ly  for  EVA equipment. On Spacecraft 10, 
the EVA equipment was divided between the two aft boxes. The r igh t  aft  box 
contained items which could not be stowed elsewhere o r  which had a low l eve l  
of use. The right aft box on Spacecraft 11 and 12 was used pr incipal ly  for  
food, blood pressure bulb, waste container, defecation devices, and camera 
equipment that could not be stowed i n  the center stowage container due t o  
lack of space. 
The l e f t  and right sidewall boxes were ut i l ized pr imari ly  for  items 
intended t o  be easily accessible,  or of a small volume. Typical of such items 
were personal hygiene towels, waste containers, pen l ights,  defecation 
devices, voice tape recorder cartridges, the spot meter exposure dial, and 
lightweight headsets. On most spacecraft two man-meals w e r e  stowed i n  each 
sidewall box t o  eliminate the need f o r  unstowing of the aft boxes o r  the 
hatch food pouches until after the  first sleep period. The "small volume" 
hard items such as hose nozzle interconnectors and 16 mm and 70 mm film 
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magazines w e r e  placed i n  the sidewall boxes rather than the pedestal, footwell, 
o r  c i rcu i t  b reaker  panel f a i r ing  pouches, due t o  launch conditions. On some 
spacecraf t  the ci rcui t  breaker and light module assemblies, plastic.'iippe!r 
bags, u t i l i t y   e l ec t r i ca l   co rds ,  and velcro hook s t r i p s  and velcro piie strips 
w e r e  stared only i n  t h i s  location because of crew preference that they be 
equally  accessible  in the pedestal pouches o r   t h e   u t i l i t y  pouch under the 
r ight  hand instrument panel. 
The sidewall extension boxes were incorporated beginning with Space- 
c ra f t  4. They were located directly aft of the sidewall boxes. Accessibil i ty 
t o  these boxes was limited due t o  proximity of the ejection seat. On Space- 
c r a f t  4, they were used f o r  stowing a lightweight headset and defecation 
devices. On Spacecraft 6, the boxes contained one hose nozzle interconnector 
each and on Spacecraft 7, seven defecation devices each. On Spacecraft 5 
through 12, the crew preference kits were stowed i n  these boxes. 
Underneath each sidewall box a long, n a r r o w ,  auxi l iary stowage pouch 
was a f f ixed  to  the sidewall beginning with Spacecraft 5.  These pouches were 
used general ly   to  star the blood pressure bulb and one of the urine hose 
and f i l t e r  assemblies. On  some spacecraft they contained small items such as 
hose nozzle interconnectors. Beginning with Spacecraft 8, a pair of debris 
cu t te rs  were stowed i n  the r igh t  hand sidewall pouch. 
There were s i x  "hard-mounted" items about the spacecraft. The in- f l igh t  
medical kit was mounted between the le f t  hand seat and sidewall on Space- 
craft 3 through 7 and between the right hand seat and the  sidewall on Space- 
c r a f t  8 and up. The voice tape recorder was mounted permanently between the 
r igh t  hand seat and the sidewall on Spacecraft 3 through 7. Beginning with 
Spacecraft 8, the recorder was interchanged wi th  the in-f l ight  medical k i t  
and at the same time the mounting was changed t o  allow the recorder t o  be 
removed from i t s  bracket and be stowed on the l e f t  hand c i r c u i t  breaker 
panel fairing pouch cover during orbit. It was made portable primarily for 
EVA purposes. The 16 mm camera bracket that mounts on the outboard corner of 
the window frame was stowed i n  a hols ter  mounted on the  le f t  sidewall aft and 
s l igh t ly  lower than the sidewall box. A similar hols te r  for  the right window 
bracket was mounted on the right sidewall directly opposite the mounting on 
t h e  l e f t  side. 
The swizz le  s t i c k  was located on the right side of the overhead c i r cu i t  
breaker panel switch guard. E i t h e r  crew member could use t h i s  device t o  
actuate switches i n  the other cockpit. An opt ica l  s igh t  was stowed under 
the left  instrument panel on each spacecraft. 
A pouch approximately 4 x 6 x 1.5 in .  deep was located directly below 
the l e f t  and r igh t  c i r cu i t  breaker panels. It was constructed so as t o  fair 
in with the panels. These pouches were used primarily for small, lightweight 
items such as the urine collection device (UCD) clamps Velcro s t r ips ,  small 
rolls of tape, and a urine system component. 
Each spacecraft had dry stowage bags mounted on the footwell sidewalls 
with Velcro. These bags w e r e  used f o r  stowing charts, sun shades, reflective 
shades, and f l i g h t  data books. On Spacecraft 3 through 9, a plotboard pouch 
was ins ta l led  on the inboard sidewall of the left  footwell. This pouch con- 
tained charts and f l i g h t  data books i n  addi t ion to  the plotboard. On Space- 
c r a f t  4, the vent i la t ion control  module (VCM) was stowed i n  the right footwell. 
The VCM was the forerunner of the ELSS. 
On Spacecraft 73 an  auxi l iary food pouch was stowed i n  the right foot- 
well. On Spacecraft 8 and 11, a TV monitor was mounted on the inboard 
sidewall of the right footwell  for launch and re-entry. For the rest of the 
flight the TV monitor was stowed i n  a specially  cut mounting on top of the  
inboard side of the l e f t  e ject ion seat. On Spacecraft 10 and 11, a 50 ft  
umbilical was stowed i n  the forward portion of the l e f t  footwell. The debris 
guard under the le f t  instrument panel was modified t o  make more room f o r  the 
umbilical. This was done t o  provide more clearance f r o m  the eject ion 
envelope. 
An o r b i t a l   u t i l i t y  pouch was ins ta l led  under the right instrument panel 
on Spacecraft 4 through 12. On Spacecraft 4 through 6 ,  this pouch was small 
and held only a f e w  items. On Spacecraft 4, it was primarily for the hatch 
closing device. On Spacecraft 7, it was enlarged t o  provide additional 
stowage space. Spacecraft 8 through 12 retained the Spacecraft 7 configura- 
t ion.  
Due t o  the requirement for  addi t ional  stowage space f o r  experiment and 
photographic equipment on Spacecraft 9 through 12, food pouches were ins ta l led  
on each hatch. Similar pouches were ins ta l led  on Spacecraft 7 due t o  the 
increased need f o r  food on the 14-day mission. I n i t i a l l y  the pouches were not 
r igid enough on Spacecraft 9 t o  hold the food in place before the hatch was 
closed. Before the launch of Spacecraft 9, e l a s t i c  straps were sewed onto 
the pouches t o  provide the required rigidity. As a precaution the crew 
planned t o  ea t  at least two meals each from the right hatch pouch t o  avoid 
any d i f f icu l ty   in   c los ing   the   ha tch   a f te r  the first EVA exercise. 
Incorporated  in the  water management panel was a water drink gun on t h e  
early spacecraft. On Spacecraft 8 and up, a water metering device was used 
which would measure i n  half-ounce increments and provisions were made f o r  
stowing an additional urine hose and f i l t e r  assembly. 
The l e f t  and right hatch torque boxes were u t i l i zed   t o   i n s t a l l   va r ious  
experiments in hard-shell containers. The design requirements f o r  these 
containers included adequate clearance with the eject ion seat, noninterference 
with the crew's helmets, and a b i l i t y   t o  withstand hatch opening shock loads 
of up t o  40 g's.  The list of experiments stowed on the hatch torque boxes 
i s  shown below: 
s/c LEFT HATCH 'JXRQUE BOX RIGPI '  HATCH lDRQUE BOX 
3 Sea Urchin Egg Unit Blood Chromosome Unit 
4 Dose Rate Indicator - Type 5 Dose Rate Indicator - Type 1 
(Removable ) (Fixed) 
I 
slc 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
LEFT HATCH TORQUE BOX 
Vision  Tester 
Dose  Rate  Indicator - Type 1 
Dosimeter,  Passive 
Vision  Tester 
Frog  Egg  Container 
50 mm Lens and  Filter (S-11) 
Star  Occultation  Photometer 
Blood  Irradiation  Device 
Spectrometer  Sensor 
RIGET HATCH rORQUE BOX 
Photometer 
Dose  Rate  Indicator 
Photometer 
Frog  Egg  Container 
Sextant 
Sextant 
Sextant 
Frog  Eggs  Experiment 
Personal  Equipment  And  Survival  Equipment 
All of the  personal  and  survival  equipment  was  government  furnished. 
Personal  equipment  largely  consisted  of  the  space  suit  and  associated  equip- 
ment.  Fig. 36 illustrates  the  Gemini  pressure  suit.  The  following  suits 
were flown: 
SPACECRAFT SUIT -
3 G3C 
4 G4C 
5 G3C 
6 G3C 
7 G!X 
8 and  up  G4C 
Personal  equipment  consisted of: 
QTY. PAFtT NUMBER 
2 sets ACS-1505 
2 CF55019-16 
2 CF55033 
2 CF55044-1 
4 CF55050-1 
4 CF55051-2 
2 CF55052-5 
2 Pr CF55081-1 
2 CSD20537-iL 
2 CSD20537-1R 
2 sets  CF55047-5 
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NOMENCLATURE 
Wrist  Dam 
Flight  Booklet 
Chronograph  Wrist  Watch 
Flight  Data  Cards 
Marking  Pen 
Mechanical  Pencil 
Watch  Band 
Sunglasses 
Life  Vest  Assembly 
Life  Vest  Assembly 
Leg  strap 
FIGURE 36 GEMINI PRESSURE SUIT 
QTY. 
2 
1 
0 
2 
1 
2 
4 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
PART " B E R  
CSD20542 
a35998-1 
m35999-1 
EC 30045 
EC30047-1 
G4C 
M S C  -ECG-SIG-GF-S1 
MSC-HAR-SYS-GF"G2-1 
MSC -!LE"PRB-GF-Sl 
MSC"TEM-SIG-GF-S~ 
MSC-ZPN-SIG-GF-S1 
9557-3-112-3 
IRI-GBE-A 
IRI-GBE-s 
NOMENCLArn 
Surgical  Scissors 
Radiation  Pocket  Dosimeter 
Passive  Radiation  Packet 
Space  Suit  Knife 
Visor Cover 
Space  Suit  Assembly 
ECG Signal Conditioner 
Bio-Med  and  Communication  Harness 
Oral Temperature Probe 
O r a l  Temperature  Signal  Conditioner 
Impedance  Pneumograph  Signal 
Launch Day Urine Bqg 
Auxiliary, EIG Electrode  Harness 
Sternal,  ECG  Electrode  Harness 
205 
The following equipment i s  i n  the survival  ki t :  
QTy. PART NUMBER 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
4 
2 
CSD20539 
CSD205034 
CSD20543 
~ ~ ~ 2 0 5 3 6 - 1  
~ ~ ~ 2 0 5 4 8  
cm20505 
cs~20538 
cs~20511 
~ ~ ~ 2 0 5 2 6  
2588218 
CSD20534 
CSD20513 
CSD20504 
NOMENCIA= 
Survival Pack (Less Container) 
Life Raft 
Sea Anchor 
Sunbonnet 
C02 Cyliner and Valve 
H$ Container 
Combination Lite Assembly 
Desalter K i t  
Medical Kit 
Machete and Sheath 
Sunglasses 
Sea Dye Marker 
Radio-Beacon 
"he survival kit i s  pictured on Fig. 37 and 38. 
.PARACHUTE 
SUR 
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FIGURE 38 CREW SEATING AND RESTRAINT DETAtLS 
ESCAPE, LANDING AND ReCOvERY SYSTEMS 
Escape  System 
The  ejection  seat  system,  designed  as  the  primary  escape  system  for  crew 
safety,  consists  of  ejection  seats,  seat  rocket/catapult,  hatch  actuating 
system,  personnel  parachute  system,  and  survival  equipment.  Maximum  design 
operating  parameters  are  at  altitudes  up  to 70,000 ft,  speeds  up  to  Mach 2.86 
and  dynamic  pressures up-to 820 psf.  The  ejection  system  also  has  the 
capability  of  being  utilized  at  zero  altitude - zero  velocity  thus,  the  system 
will  allow  the  astronauts  to  escape  from  the  spacecraft  while  on  the  launch 
pad,  during  launch  or  after  re-entry.  However,  the  operational  use  of  the 
seat  was  restricted  to  altitudes  below 15,000 ft  by  decree,  although  the 
design  and  qualification  tests  were  as  stated.  The  reasons  for  this  restrict- 
tion  are  as  follows: 
A. Titan I1 booster  flights N-7 and N-20, where  breakup  occurred  disclosed 
no  hazards  that  would  have  been  significant  to  the  spacecraft  during  "ride 
it  out"  abort.  This,  coupled  with  additional  analysis  indicated a high  degree 
of  confidence  in  crew  safety  could be obtained  by  remaining in the  spacecraft 
during a booster  malfunction  and  then  using a Mode I1 (retro-rocket  salvo) 
abort  to  escape  from  the  booster. 
random  nature  of  possible  ejection  conditions  such  as  attitudes,  oxygen  hose 
flapping,  astronaut  sizes  and  pressure  suit  modifications  did  not  instill 
confidence  in  high  altitude  or  high  dynamic  pressure  ejections. 
C. Water  recovery  after  an  ejection  posed  as  additional  safety  hazard 
which  would be compounded  if  an  injury  were  sustained  during  the  ejection. 
D. Use  of  the  ejection  seat  made  an  abort  decision  more  time  critical 
since a late  ejection  could  result  in  recontact  with  the  booster  or  fireball. 
Thus;  ejection  had  to  occur  before  significant  booster  attitude  excursions 
occurred.  This  was  nominally  about 5 degrees  while  booster  breakup  angles 
were  much  greater  and  therefore  the  decision  to  eject  was  time  critical  based 
on  ejection  seat  rather  than  booster  restrictions. 
B. Although  high  speed  ejection  seat  sled  tests  were  satisfactory,  the 
Optimum  trajectory  and  stability  of  the  seat  during  its  powered  flight 
is  maintained  through  position  control  of  the  seat-man  combination  center-of- 
gravity.  After  the  powered  phase  of  the  flight  the  man  is  separated  from  the 
seat  and  descends  under a stabilizing  device  called a ballute,  until a 
desirable  parachute  opening  altitude  is  reached.  After  parachute  opening, 
the  backboard  assembly  and  egress  kit  are  jettisoned,  leaving  the man to
descend  under  his  parachute  with  his  survival  gear  secured  to a lanyard  below 
him. 
The  ejection  seat  system  as  it  is  currently  designed  has a .995 reliabil- 
ity  factor  of  successful  operation. 
The  basic'  location  and arrangement/configuration of  the  ejection  system 
are  shown  in  Fig. 39. The  crew  members  are  seated  side  by  side,  faced  toward 
the  small  end  of  the  re-entry  module.  Each  seat  is  canted 12 degr es  outboard 
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FIGURE 39 EJECTION SEAT SYSTEM AND DEVICES 
and 8 degrees 20 min forward to   assure   separat ion and provide required 
e leva t ion   in  the event ejection off the pad is  necessitated. 
Ejection Seat. - The eject ion seat  as shown i n  Fig. 40 is  basically a 
sheet metal s t ruc ture  bui l t  on a torque box frame principle. The seat i s  
mounted i n  the spacecraft on T-type rails at tached to  the large pressure 
bulkhead and held i n  posit ion by a single  bolt  a t  the top of the seat back 
where it a t t aches  to  the rocket catapult. The seat structure includes a 
seat back, seat pan, side panel, am rests, padded headrest, stirrups, 
stowable am res t r a in t s  and seat slider blocks. Attached t o  the seat strucd 
tu re  i s  the equipnent required t o  separate the man from his  seat. This  
includes the e ject ion control  mechanism, seat-man separator thruster, seat-man 
PARACHUTE RISER AND 
BALLUTE RISER STORAGE 
CPARACHUTE RISER 
SURVIVAL KIT 
SLING  ASSEMBLY 
CONTOUR BOARD BACKBOARD 
ARM RESTRAINT 
PELVIC  BLOCK 
CONTRO 
HARNESS RELEASE 
BALLISTIC HOSE T O  
SEAT  MAN  SEPARATOR SEAT-MAN SEPARATOR 
REEL 
L 
FIGURE 40 EJECTION SEAT ASSEMBLY 
separator  strap with personalized contoured pelvic block attached, harness 
release actuator,  lap belt releases, and upper and lower backboard releases 
and their  associated linkage. Attached to the l e f t  seat side panel i s  the 
i n e r t i a  reel control handle, which allows the man t o   s e l ec t  either a manual 
lock or automatic lock position. The manual position prevents the astronaut 's  
shoulders from moving forward by mechanically preventing extension of the 
shoulder straps. The automatic lock position allows the astronaut ,  to  move 
forward slowly but w i l l  lock with a fast movement of 2 g's.  If locking occurs 
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in  the  automatic  position,  the  astronaut  releases  himself  by  cycling  the 
control  handle  to  manual  and  back  to  automatic  lock. On the  right  hand  seat 
side  panel, a ditching  handle  releases  the  man  with  his  backboard  assembly 
and  the  egress  kit  from  the  seat  structure.  This  provision  permits an over- 
the-side  bailout. 
Backboard  Assembly. - The  backboard  assembly  mounts on the  eJection  seat 
structure  through  the upperand lower  backboard'releases.  Mounted  to  the 
backboard  assembly  are  survival  items  such  as  the  survival  kits,  personnel 
parachute  system,  and  the  ballute  system (a high  altitude,  high  velocity . 
stabilization  device). 
Mounted  to  the  backboard  is an inertia  reel  with  restraint  straps  that 
pass over  the  top  of  the  backboard  and  are  attached  to  the  parachute  risers 
at  the  parachute  quick  disconnect  fittings. A personalized  cushion  contoured 
for  safety  and  comfort,  is  mounted  to  the  front  of  the  backboard.  Also 
mounted on the  backboard  are  the  pyrotechnic  devices  that  initiate  system 
operation.  These  devices  include  the  drogue  mortar  and  its  associated  equip- 
ment  jettison  system  and  the  ballute  deploy  and  release  system. 
Egress  Kit. - The  egress  kit  assembly  rests on the  seat  structure  and 
is  restrained  to  the  seat  structure  and  backboard  assembly  by  the  lap  belt 
system.  The  egress  kit  contains  the  emergency  bailout  oxygen  system.  For 
Spacecraft 8 and  up,  the  egress  kit  height  is  lowered  by  removing  the  bailout 
oxygen  system  to  allow  more  room  in  the  seats.  Removal of the bailout  oxygen 
system  lowersthe  rated  ejection  altitude  to 15,000 ft.  For  pilot  comfort, 
a contoured  cushion  is  mounted on top  of  the  egress  kit.  Located  at  the  front 
of  the  egress  kit  is a single  point  release  handle  which,  when  activated, 
releases  the  egress  kit  from  the  seat  structure  and  backboard  assembly.  This 
manner  is  convenient  for a low altitude  over-the-side  bailout.  The  ejection 
control  handle (D ring)  is  normally  stowed  under a sliding  door  at  the  front 
of  the  egress  kit  to  prevent  inadvertent  ejection.  However,  during  launch 
and  re-entry,  it  is  in  operational  position.  At  the  rear  of  the  egress  kit 
is a pytotechnic-activated  quick  disconnect  system.  The  supply  and  return 
oxygen  hoses  from  the  suit  as  well  as  the  communications  wire  bundle  are 
attached  to  this  disconnect.  Because  the  egress  kit  was  lowered  for  Space- 
craft 8 and  up  (see  below),  the  single  point  release  handle  was  removed  and 
the D ring  was  stored  on  the  seat-man  separator  thruster. 
After  the  flight  of  Spacecraft 3, he  astronauts  reported  that  the  egress 
kit  knee  supports  provided  were  uncomfortable  and  actually  hampered  their 
leg  movements  when  they  tried  to  shift  their  position. In addition,  it  was 
felt  that  the  excessive  height  of  these  supports  might  render  egress  during 
EVA  more  difficult. As a result,  the  thickness  of  the  egress  kit  cushion  was 
trimed (deleting  the  knee  supports)  for  Spacecraft 4 through 7; this  served 
to  lower  the  astronauts  in  their  seats  and  provided a m re  comfortable 
attitude.  However,  the old (52-82911) structure  was  still  employkid  and  the 
single-point  release  system  was  still  incorporated. 
For  Spacecraft 8 and  up,  the  trimming  was  carried  further,  resulting 
in a thinner  egress  cushion  in  the  forward  position. A new  egress  kit 
structure  was  employed,  and a ew  ejection  control  mechanism  was  incorporated. 
The  single-point  release  system  was  eliminated. In  addition,  the  ejection 
control  handle  storage  container  which  went  between  the  legs  was  deleted. 
Lap  Belt  Assembly. - The  lap  belt  assembly  is a webbing  arrangement 
designed  to  hold  the  egress  kit  into  the  seat and the  astronaut  into  the 
ejection  seat  system.  After  ejection  and  subsequent  seat-man  separation  it 
secures  the  bottom  of  the  backboard  and  the  egress  kit  to  the  astronaut.  The 
lap  belt  assembly  includes a manual  disconnect  and a pyrotechnic  disconnect. 
The  lap  belt  disconnect  was  modified  for  Spacecraft 11 and 12 by  adding  belt 
guides  to  the  disconnect.  The  guides  prevent  belt  jamming  in  the  disconnect 
during  adjustment  by  the  astronaut. 
Hatch  Actuating  System. - The  hatch  actuating  system,  when  initiated  by 
either  pilot,  activates  the  firing  mechanisms  of  both  hatch  actuators.  This 
system  consists  of  two  manual  firing  mechanisms  cross-connected  by  two  rigid 
mild  detonating  fuse  (MDF)  crossovers  and  two  pyrotechnically  actuated  hatch 
actuators  redundantly  interconnected  by  four  rigid  and  four  flexible MDF 
lines . 
An MDF  interconnect  is a single  strand  of  high  explosive (2 gr/ft  of 
RDX) encased  in a lead  sheathing  and  installed  in  flexible  or  rigid  steel 
tubing. A small booster  charge  is  incorporated  at  each  end  of  the  explosive 
strand.  Attachment  fittings  are  incorporated on each  end  of  the  tubing. 
The  pyrotechnic  hatch  actuator  unlocks,  opens,  and  mechanically  retains 
the  egress  hatch  in  the  open  position.  This  assembly  also  furnishes  gas 
pressure  to  initiate  the  firing  mechanisms  of  the  seat  ejector-rocket 
catapult  after  opening  the  hatch. A lanyard,  attached  to  the  locking 
mechanism  of  the  actuator,  permits  the  hatch  to  be  unlocked  manually. 
Escape  System  Operation  (Fig. 41). - The  ejection  sequence  is  initiated 
when  either  crew  member  pulls  the D ring.  The D ring  then  activates a
detonator  in  the  manual  firing  mechanism  which  induces  propagation  in  the 
MDF interconnects.  These MDF lines  redundantly  provide  the  initiation  pulse 
to  the  dual  cartridges  in  each  hatch  actuator  breech.  The  large  volume of 
high  pressure  gas  developed  in  the  breech  is  ported  into  the  actuator.  The 
gas  pressure  extends  the  latch  piston,  which  unlocks  the  egress  hatch  through 
a bellcrank/push  rod  mechanism.  The  gas  pressure  then  acts  on  the  piston/ 
stretcher  assembly,  moving  it  through  the  length  of  the  cylinder.  At  approxi- 
mately 0.6 in.  prior to the  stretcher  assembly  reaching full extension,  gas 
pressure  is  exhausted  into a ballistic  hose.  The  ballistic  hose  then  delivers 
the  gas  pressure  to  the  firing  mechanism  of  the  seat  ejector-rocket  catapult. 
As  the  stretcher  assembly  reaches  the  fully  extended  position,  the  lock  pin 
of  the  locking  mechanism  engages  the  piston  of  the  stretcher  assembly,  and 
holds  the  hatch  open.  The  catapult  firing  mechanism  ignites a r lay  and  main 
charge  in  the  catapult.  The  resulting  gas  pressure  propels  the  rocket  motor 
through  the  length  of  the  catapult  housing.  After  approximately 31 in. of 
stroke  of  the  catapult,  the  gas  initiates  dual  igniter  charges  in  the 
sustainer  motor  which  provides  additional  thrust  through  the  cg  of  the  ejec- 
tion  seat.  The  ejection  seat  moves  up  the  rails  actuating  four  lanyards 
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SYSTEM ACTIVATION - 0.0 SECONDS 
SEQUENCE -1- 
BALLUTEACTUATOR 
ARMING PINS 
BACKBOARD 
RELEASE7 7 
(FROM  SEAT) 
SEPARATOR 
SEAT/MAN 
SEAT/MAN THRUSTER FIRES - 1.524 SEC. HARNESS RELEASE FIRES - 1.474 SEC. 
SEAT/MAN  SEPARATED - 
LANYARDS PULLED - 
HATCHES OPEN - 0.250 SECONDS 
SEQUENCE -2- 
EALLUTE I S  DEPLOYED 5.00 SEC. 
AFTER SEPARATION 
BALLUTE IS  RELEASED A T  7500 FT. 
FIGURE 41 EJECTION SEAT SEQUENCE OF OPERATI-ON 
I 
SEAT - MAN SEPARATED I 
FROM SPACECRAFT 
FDROGUE MORTAR SLUG 
PILOT CHUTE 
SUSPENSION LINES 
LANYARD 
AT  ALTITUDE  OF 5700 FT. OR LESS. 
DROGUE MORTAR IS ACTUATED 
2.30 SEC. TIME DELAY  AFTER 
ACTIVATION FOR FIRING. 
SEAT 
EJECTOR 
ROCKET/ 
CATAPULT- \ 
r EGRESS KIT 
ROCKET CATAPULT FIRES - 0.333 SEC. 
LANYARDS PULLED - 0.394 SEC. 
SEQUENCE -3- 
FIGURE 41 EJECTION SEAT SEQUENCE OF OPERATION (Continued) 
at tached to  the spacecraft structure. Three of the lanyards a lso  are attached 
t o  the egress k i t ,  and accomplish the following functions: 
A. Remove lock pin from composite disconnect allowing separation of 
B. Trip pressure regulator valve, initiating oxygen flow from egress 
spacecraft oxygen hoses and w i r e  bundle f r o m  the seat. 
k i t  t o  astronaut. 
. C. Ini t ia te  control check valve t o  provide pressure in suit .  
Effective Spacecraft 8 and UP, the lanyards t o  the oxygen regulator and the 
control check valve are removed as the bailout oxygen i s  removed. 
The fourth lanyard is a t t ached   t o   t he   f i r i ng  mechanism of the harness 
release actuator, which fires a percussion cartridge to release the backboard 
and egress k i t  from the seat structure after a 1.08 sec pyro time delay. The 
gas pressure of the harness release actuator cartridge i s  then vented through 
a f lex ib le  hose t o  i n i t i a t e  the seat-man separator thruster cartridge. The 
seat-man separator thruster pushes against a Y strap, fixed a t  a l l  three 
points, and forcibly separates the astronaut with h i s  backboard and egress 
k i t  from the edection seat. During seat-man separation, lanyards f o r  the 
bal lute  deploy and release mechanism i n i t i a t e  a time delay deploy cartridge 
and ann a barostat-controlled  f ir ing mechanism for   the release function. 
Below 7500 f t  the barostat fires the ballute release cartridge. For off-the- 
pad ejection, the release function occurs prior to the ballute deploy, thereby 
freeing the ballute i f  the deployment function should inadvertently occur. 
Also, at seat-man separation, a lanyard at tached to  the seat structure fires 
the parachute drogue mortar, o r  i f  separation occurs above 5700 f t ,  unlocks 
the  f i r ing  p in  to  be released by a barostat when the 5700 f t  a l t i t ude  is  
reached. The drogue mortar deploys the personnel parachute and also supplies 
p re s su re   t o   i n i t i a t e  a time delay cartridge propagating MDF which accomplishes 
the following: 
A .  Disconnects the suit hoses and wiring (Jetelox) from the egress k i t .  
B. Releases the lap b e l t  which allows the egress kit t o  fa i l  away. 
C. Cuts the i n e r t i a  reel straps which releases the backboard t o  fall 
away. 
As the  backboard and egress k i t  fal l  away, a mooring lanyard attached t o  the 
astronaut becomes t au t  and extracts  the l i f e  raft and rucksacks (containing 
survival items) from their  packs on the backboard. The astronaut descends 
with the survival kit items a t tached   to  him. 
Escape System Development and Qualifications Tests. - Ejection seat 
system development te ' s ts  and qua l i f i ca t ion   t e s t s ' a r e  shown on Tables  19, 20 
and. 21, respectively. Firings of ejection seat of pyrotechnic components and 
devices are  tabulated in Table 22. Before each f l ight ,  ver i f icat ion firings 
were made of uni t s  from the same l o t s  as those instal led in  the spacecraft. 
Failure Summary. - The fa i lure  summary i s  shown i n  Table 23. 
TABLE 19 EJECTION SEAT DEVELOPMENT TEST 
TEST 
IOMPLETED 
4 
11 
14 
3 
2 
3 
1 
1 
2 
5 
5 
2 
14 
TYPE  OF  TEST 
10% SEAT-MAN  COMBINATION 
20% SEAT-MAN  COMBINATION 
SIMULATED EJECTION (SLED 
TEST) 
SIMULATED  OFF-THE-PAD 
EJECTION  (SOPE) 
LOW ALT.  DUMMY DROP 
ROCKET/CATAPULT  (RPI)  
THROUGH CANOPY (NAA) 
ROCKET/CATAPULT  (AEDC) 
ROCKET/CATAPULT - SEAT 
SEAT DROP TEST 
ROCKET/CATAPULT 
SEAT - EGRESS KIT  SEPARATION 
ROCKET  CATAPULT 
L O W A L T D U M M Y  DROP 
SEAT - MAN  SEPARATION 
POLYSONIC WIND TUNNEL TESTS TO OBTAIN THE 
AERODYNAMIC CHARACTERISTICS USING SCALE MODELS 
SEAT EJECTION SYSTEM FROM BOILERPLATE UNDER 
LAUNCH AND RE-ENTRY AIR LOAD CONDITIONS 
SEAT EJECTION SYSTEM FROM TOWER FOR EJECTION 
FROM  LAUNCHING  PAD 
PERSONNEL PARACHUTE 
SEAT-MAN TRAJECTORY 
SEAT EJECTION THRU THE CANOPY OF NAA PARAGLIDER 
CAPSULE 
ALTITUDE  FIRING  CHARACTERISTICS  AT 70k 
VERIFY POCKET BUMPER FITTING OF EJECTION SEAT 
TO PROVE OUT 3-POINT RELEASE SYSTEM 
VERIFY EJECTION SEAT FLAME BUCKET 
DYNAMIC SEPARATIONS OK EGRESS O2 DISCONNECTS AND 
VALVE  INIT IATION 
THRUST  ANGLE  VERIFICATION 
VERIFY PERSONNEL PARACHUTE 
VERIFY HARDWARE BEFORE SLED AND SOPE TESTS 
PYROTECHNIC COMPONENTS AND DEVICES - NUMEROUS  DEVELOPMENT  TESTS  WERE  CONDUCTED.  THESE 
TESTS WERE AT  THE  COMPONENT  LEVEL,  SYSTEM LEVEL  AND  BREADBOARD  TYPE  TESTS  TO  OBTAIN  THE 
CORRECT OPERATING TIME, PRESSURE AND MECHANICAL FUNCTION OF EACH DEVICE. 
Mission  Anomalies, - No mission  anomalies  occurred  with  the  escape 
system. 
Mission  Evaluation. - F'yrotechnic  components of Spacecraft 2 were  removed 
and  post-flight  fired.  Pyrotechnic  components of  Spacecraft 10 (except  hatch 
actuator  and  rocket  catapult)  were  post-flight  fired  in  the seat. No anomalies 
were  encountered. 
In-flight  safety  pins  for  the  drogue  mortar  were  repositioned  for 
easier  insertion. 
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TABLE 20 WIND TUNNEL TESTS 
~~ 
B A L L U T E  
FULL SCALE SERIES I 
FULL  SCALE  SERIES I 
FULL  SCALE  SERIES II 
5'0 ':EL- ~~ -1 FULL  SCALE  SERIES  I l l  
FULL  SCALE 
EJECTION SEAT 
DROGUE 
BAROSWITCH 
- ~ ~~~~ 
20% MODEL  SERIES I 
20% MODEL SERIES II 
20% MODEL SERIES Ill 
10% MODEL SERIES I 
MCDONNELL LOW SPEED WIND TUNNEL 
AEDC 16' x 16' TUNNEL 
AEDC 16' x 16' TUNNEL 
AEDC 16' x 16' TUNNEL 
LANGLEY  SPIN  TUNNEL 
MCDONNELL LOW SPEED WIND TUNNEL 
~~ ~ 
MCDONNELL POLYSONIC WIND TUNNEL 
MCDONNELL POLYSONIC WIND TUNNEL 
MCDONNELL POLYSONIC WIND TUNNEL 
MCDONNELL POLYSONIC WIND TUNNEL 
. 
16 RUNS 
11  RUNS 
8 RUNS 
8 RUNS 
48 RUNS 
7 RUNS 
115 RUNS 
51 RUNS 
65 RUNS 
149 RUNS 
Landing And Recovery System 
A three-parachute system is  series s tab i l izes  and retards the re-entry 
vehicle velocity. During the final stage of descent, the main parachute 
suspension i s  shifted from a single-point to a two-point system in   o rde r   t o  
achieve a more favorable  a t t i tude for  a water landing. The landing system 
consists of three parachutes (drogue, pilot, and main parachute), two motars, 
reefing cutters, pyrotechnic cutters and separation assembly, disconnects, 
r i se rs ,  and attaching hardware. The system is located primarily in the 
rendezvous and recovery (R & R )  module as shown  on Fig. 42. Only Spacecraft 2 
u t i l i zed  a two-parachute system (p i lo t  and main). The recovery system con- 
sists of a hois t  loop, flashing recovery light, pyrotechnic cutter, dye marker, 
and f lo ta t ion  material. 
Parachutes. - A high a l t i t ude  drogue parachute stabilizes the re-entry 
vehicle. The drogue parachute assembly consists of an 8.3 f t  Do, 20 degrees 
conical ribbon chute with twelve 750-lb tensile strength suspension lines. 
A pyrotechnic-actuated mortar deploys the chute. Two 16-sec pyrotechnic time 
delay reef ing l ine cut ters  disreef the chute after deployment. A three-legged 
riser assembly attaches the parachute assembly t o  the R & R module. Three 
electr ical ly   ini t ia ted  pyrotechnic   cable   cut ter   gui l lot ines ,  each u t i l i z ing  
dual car t r idges  for  redundancy, sever the chute risers from the R & R module. 
Attached t o  one of the drogue r i s e r   l egs  i s  an apex l ine  which extracts   the 
pilot parachute from its own mortar. A p i l o t  parachute, used i n  tandem with 
the drogue chute, decelerates the re-entry vehicle, removes the R & R module, 
and deploys the main parachute. The pilot parachute assembly consists of an 
18.3 ft DO ringsail chute with sixteen 5W-lb tensile strength suspension 
TABLE 21 EJECTION SEAT QUALIFICATION TEST 
t- C O M P L E T E D  
I 3  
I 3  
1 
1 
1 
4 LOW A L T  
2o 16 H I G H   A L T  
12 LOW A L T  
6 H I G H   A L T  
I l 2  
T Y P E   O F   T E S T  
~ 
S IMULATED EJECTION 
(SLED TEST) 
S IMULATED  OFF-THE-PAD 
EJECTION  (SOPE) 
STATIC EJECTION 
15k EJECTION 
40k EJECTION 
DUMMY DROP 
L I V E  D R O P  
STATIC TEST 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
SEAT PYRO FIRING 
DUMMY DROP FROM 
TOWER 
- ~~ - .  
REMARKS 
SEAT EJECTION SYSTEM FROM BOILERPLATE TO 
QUALIFY IT  UNDER LAUNCH AND RE-ENTRY 
CONDITIONS 
SEAT EJECTION SYSTEM FROM TOWER TO QUALIFY I T  
FOR EJECTION FROM THE LAUNCHING PAD 
SEAT EJECTION FROM F-106 AIRCRAFT TO DEMON- 
S T R A T E  E J E C T I O N  C A P A B I L I T Y  A T  Z E R O  V E L O C I T Y  A N D  
ZERO ALTITUDE AND MACH 1.72 AND 40k A L T I T U D E  
TO QUALIFY ALL ESCAPE SYSTEM COMPONENTS AT- 
TACHED  TO  THE  ASTRONAUT  AFTER  SEAT  SEPARATION 
TO QUALIFY EJECTION SEAT FOR STRUCTURAL IN-  
TEGRITY 
TO QUALIFY SEAT ASSEMBLY FOR HIGH AND LOW TEMP, 
TEMPIALT ,  HUMIDITY,  O2 ATMOSPHERE AND PRESSURE 
TO QUALIFY PERSONNEL PARACHUTE AFTER EXPOSURE 
TO VARIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 
TO QUALIFY BALLUTE AFTER EXPOSURE TO VARIOUS 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 
TO QUALIFY SURVIVAL KITS AFTER EXPOSURE TO 
VARIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 
TO DEMONSTRATE FUNCTIONING OF PYRO SECOND 
SOURCE  VENDOR 
TO QUALIFY PERSONNEL HARNESS INTEGRITY 
l ines .  A two-legged riser assembly attaches the parachute t o  the R & R module. 
Two pyrotechnic reefing cutters disreef the pi lot  chute  s ix  sec af ter  deploy- 
ment. The pilot  chute can be pyrotechnically deployed by i t s  mortar i n  the 
event the drogue parachute does not deploy o r  deploys improperly. An e l e c t r i -  
cally init iated pyrotechnic apex l i n e  gui l lot ine,  with dual car t r idges for  
redundancy, is provided to  sever  the apex l i n e   t o  free the pilot  chute from 
the drogue chute i n  the event of a drogue chute malfunction. The design of 
the guillotine allows the apex l i n e   t o   p u l l  free when the pi lot  chute  i s  
deployed by the drogue chute. 
The main parachute assembly consists of an 84.2 f t  Do ringsail chute with 
seventy-two  550-lb t ens i l e  strength suspension lines. Three pyrotechnic 
reefing cutters disreef the main chute 10 sec after deployment. The main 
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TABLE 22 ESCAPE SYSTEM PYROTECHNIC COMPON-ENT FIRINGS 
COMPONENT 
~~ ~ ~ 
~ ~~ 
(HRA) 
HARNESS RELEASE ACTUATOR 
FIRING MECH (HRA) 
CARTRIDGE (HRA) 
(1.08 SEC TIME DELAY) 
SEAT-MAN SEPARATOR 
THRUSTER (SMS) 
FIRING  MECH (SMS) 
CARTRIDGE (SMS) 
ROCKETCATAPULT 
HATCH  ACTUATOR 
BREECH-HATCH ACT 
BALLUTE ANEROID 
BALLUTE  REL CARTRIDGE 
BALLUTE DEPLOY CARTRIDGE 
DEPLOYCUTTER 
BALLUTE GUILLOTINE 
DROGUEMORTAR BACKBOARD 
JETTISON SYSTEM 
MAIN CARTRIDGE 
INITIATOR CARTRIDGE 
TIME DELAY CARTRIDGE 
FLEX MDF INTER 
RIGID MDF INTER 
RESTRAINT STRAP CUTTER 
LAP  BELT DISC 
JETELOX PIN DISC 
MDF MANIFOLD 
MDF FIRING MECH 
MANUAL FIRING MECH 
DROGUE MORTAR 
HATCH MDF INITIATION 
SYSTEM 
CROSSOVER 
RIGID MDF INTER 
FLEX MOF INTER 
MANUAL INITIATOR 
CARTRIDGE (HRA) 
CARTRIDGE (SMS) 
MAIN CARTRIDGE 
{BACKBOARD  JETT) 
INITIATOR CARTRIDGE 
(BACKBOARD JETT) 
TIME  DELAY  CARTRIDGE 
(BACKBOARD JETT) 
(BACKBOARD  JETT) 
FLEX MDF INTER 
CROSSOVER 
(HATCH MOF) 
(WATCH Y D f )  
RIGID INTER 
((BALLUTE) 
RELEASE CART 
OEPLOYCART 
(BALLUTE) 
" " 
I 
p- CTI 
OA/WAC 37 
CTI 21 
CTI  
NATIONAL 
89 RPI 
21 
26 
WATERLIFT 
MCDONNELL 31 
MCDONNELL/ I S  
OA 
CTI 24 
CTI 24 
OA/WAC 17 
CTI 24 
OA/WAC 
CTI 
17 
24 
CTI 
MCDONNELL/ 
19 O A  
I5 O A  
6 OA 
7 OA 
7 OA 
12 OA 
24 O A  
IO CTI 
21 CTI 
21 CTI 
21 
OA 
CTI 
CTl  
' O A  
I8 * O A  
34 * 0 A  
40 'OA 
88 O A  
50 
'OA 18 
* 0 A  18 
'OA 30 
'OA so 
* 0 A  100 
* 0 A  27 
*OA 27 
RELIABILITY 
ASSURANCE 
TEST 
IO 
8 
IO 
8 
8 
19 
8 
25 
8 
8 
34 
IO 
IO 
19 
45 
23 
24 
20 
3 
2 
*SIMILAR UHlTS  THAT WERE UTILIZE0  IN TEST AHD ON EARLY SPACECRAFT, BUT WERE NOT  AVAILABLE 
FORSPACECRAFTSANDUP. 
NOTE, OA'WAC - TESTS AT WEBER AIRCRAFT CORP. 
CTI - TESTS AT  CENTRAL TECHNOLOGY INC. 
TABLE 23 ESCAPE SYSTEM FAILURE SUMMARY 
TEST 
SLED #a 
SOPE #12 
DUMMY DROP 
TEST #1 & 2 
L I V E  DROP 
TEST #2 
DUMMY DROP 
QUAL TEST 
QUAL TEST 
~ 
Q U A L  & F I E L D  
TEST 
F A I L U R E  
L H  S IDE PANEL OF EJECTION SEAT HAD 
S T R U C T U R A L   F A I L U R E   D U E   T O  
LATERAL LOADING CONDITION.  
HATCH  ACTUATOR  SUPPLIED  PRESSURE 
T O   R O C K E T C A T A P U L T P R E M A T U R E L Y  
CAUSING EJECTION OF SEAT PRIOR TO 
COMPLETE OPENING OF HATCH.  SEAT 
A N D  DUMMY IMPACTED  AGAINST  HATCH 
DURING ATTEMPTED EJECTION. 
SUIT OXYGEN HOSES AND ELECTRICAL 
WIRE  BUNDLE  ( JETELOX)   FA ILED  TO 
DISCONNECT, WHICH PREVENTED 
JETTISON OF EGRESS KIT. 
BACKBOARD AND EGRESS K I T  F A I L E D  
TO JETTISON AFTER PERSONNEL PAR- 
ACHUTE  DEPLOY ED, AS RESTRAINT 
S T R A P  F L E X I B L E  L I N E A R - S H A P E D  
CHARGED  (FLSC)   CUTTER  DID  NOT  CUT 
STRAP. 
ANEROID MECHANISM JAMMED OR "HANG 
T I O N  A T  T H E  P R O P E R  P R E C A L I B R A T E D  
ALT ITUDE.  
F IRED"  AND FAILED TO F IRE OR FUNC- 
ANEROID  MECHANISM  FAILED  AFTER 
EXPOSURE TO A HUMIDITY ENVIRON- 
MENT  PER  MIL-E-5272  PARA 4.4.1. 
J E T E L O X   L I N E S   F A I L E D   T O   F I R E   D U R -  
ING QUAL TESTING. 
PERCUSSION CARTRIDGES FAILED DUE 
TO  THE  LACK OF SOLID SUPPORT FOR 
THE PRIMER. 
CORREC.TIVE ACTION 
STRUCTURAL  ATTACHMENT OF SIDE 
PANELS  TO  SEAT  PANEL  MODIF IED.  
STRAIN LATERAL FOOT MOVEMENT.  
H A T C H  A C T U A T O R  B R E E C H  E N D C A P  
MODIF IED TO EL IMINATE PREMATURE 
FOOT STIRRUPS MODIFIED TO RE- 
PRESSURE DUMP TO ROCKET CATA- 
PULT BY INCORPORATING REDUNDANT 
SEALS  AND  INCLUDING  A  VENT  AREA 
TO INSURE NO PREMATURE PRESSURE 
BUILD-UP. 
HOSE FITTINGS IN DISCONNECT MODI- 
F IED TO PREVENT BINDING.  SEPARA-  
TION COMPRESSION SPRINGS STRENGTH 
ENED. 
QUALITY CONTROL PROBLEM. DOWEL 
PINS MISSING FROM FLSC ASSEMBLY. 
INSPECTION CHECK POINT WAS ADDED 
DURING INSTALLATION OF RESTRAINT 
STRAP IN CUTTER.  
~ _ _ _ ,  ~ ~ 
MCDONNELL REDESIGNED AND RE- 
WORKED THE ANEROID MECHANISM TO 
EL IMINATE THE HANG UP.  
EXAMINATION, ANALYSIS, AND RE- 
P E A T E D   T E S T  OF THESE ASSEMBLIES. 
LISTIC.   SPACECRAFT 3 & 4 UNITS WERE 
IN  TOLERANCE.  A  14-DAY HUMIDITY 
TEST WAS CONDUCTED  ON  THE  UNITS 
FROM SPACECRAFT 4 AND THE UNITS 
WERE IN TOLERANCE.  
HYDROSTATIC PRESSURE CHECK OF 
L INES WAS D E L E T E D  SO T H A T   N O  
WATER WOULD BE L E F T  IN THE LINES. 
LINES ARE NOW CHECKED WITH DRY 
NITROGEN. 
THE ORIGINAL TESTS WERE NOT REA- 
POST FLIGHT FIRED AND WERE WITH- 
.~ ~ - 
___ ~ - .  . 
BOTH DESIGN AND PRODUCTION DE- 
FICIENCIES EXISTED. THE PERCUSSION 
CARTRIDGES WERE REDESIGNED TO 
HAVE SOLID SUPPORT FOR THE PRI -  
MERS A T  SECOND SOURCE VENDOR AND 
THE NEW CARTRIDGES WERE QUAL 
T E S T E D   A N D   U T I L I Z E D   S P A C E C R A F T  
5 AND UP. 
~ ~~ ~~ 
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H O I S T   L O O P  6 F L A S H I N G  
R E C O V E R Y   L I G H T  
F L A S H I N G   L I G H T  
P A R A C H U T E  R I S E R  M A I N  
P Y R O T E C H N I C  S W I T C H  " A "  
O T P A R A C H U T E  
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chute canopy can withstand a dynamic pressure of 120 psf. However,  by 
reefing the main chute, a maximum of 16,000 l b  i s  experienced at deployment. 
The disreefed main parachute allows a m a x i m u m  average rate of descent of 
31.6 m s  f o r  a module weight of 4.400 lb .  
R & R Re-entry Separation Assembly. - A mild detonating fuse (MDF) ring 
assembly separates the rendezvous and recovery module f r o m  the re-entry 
vehicle. This separation assembly primarily consists of MDF, MDF housing/ 
mating ring, two detonators, two detonator housings, two booster charges, and 
frangible bolts. Two strands of high explosive ( 5  gr/f t  of  RDX) encased i n  
lead sheathing are i n s t a l l e d   i n  parallel grooves i n  the housing ring, which 
faces the re-entry vehicle. The grooves converge a t  the booster charges which 
are installed approximately 180 degrees. The MDF housing is  fastened to  the 
R & R module which i s  at tached  to  the RCS of the re-entry vehicle by 24 
frangible bolts. The detonator housings are i n s t a l l e d  i n  the RCS so that the 
detonators are indexed d i rec t ly  under the  booster charges when the sections 
are mated. The detonators have redundant e l ec t r i ca l  c i r cu i t ry  to  in su re  
act ivat ion of the booster charges. Each booster charge strengthens the 
detonation wave and transmits it t o  the dual strands of MDF.  When in i t ia ted ,  
the MDF exerts  a force against the RCS and the R & R section mating surface. 
This  force breaks a l l  the frangible bolts and allows the p i l o t  chute t o   p u l l  
the R & R module f ree  of the re-entry vehicle, thereby deploying the main 
parachute from i ts  container  in the R & R module. 
Main Parachute Disconnects. - The main parachute disconnects include 
the single point disconnect assembly, and the forward and aft bridle dis- 
connect assemblies. The disconnect assemblies are identical  in design and 
function. The assembly consists of a breech assembly, arm, and two e l ec t r i -  
ca l ly  f i red gas pressure cartridges. The arm with the parachute strap 
attached is held in  posi t ion against  the breech by a piston. The cartridges 
produce gas pressure in the breech which exerts  a force on the piston, 
propelling it a l l  the way in to  the am and in to  a lead slug. This action 
prevents the piston from hindering arm operation. 'The pu l l  of the parachute 
causes the arm t o  cam open after release, thus releasing the attached riser 
or   br idle .  
Landing System Pyrotechnics. - Additional pyrotechnic devices associated 
with the landing system consist of: 
A. W i r e  bundle gui l lot ines  ut i l ized to  sever  the two e lec t r i ca l  w i r e  
bundles routed f r o m  the -re-entry vehicle to R & R module. For redundancy, two 
cu t te rs  are provided f o r  each w i r e  bundle, one on each side of the  separation 
plane. 
by guillotine  action. 
B. A pyroswitch t o  deadface the electrical circuitry before severance 
S ta t ic  System. - The s ta t ic  pressure system operates the rate of descent 
indicator, altimeter, and the two barometric pressure switches which provide 
for  illumination  of the 10.6 K and 40 K warning indicators. 
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Recovery Aids. - Flotation of the re-entry vehicle i s  achieved by 
displacing water with the cabin vessel and the equipment i n  the floodable bays. 
The f lotat ion character is t ics  are a function of the cg location. To improve 
the f lotat ion at t i tude,  addi t ional  f lotat ion material (Styrofoam) was 
ins ta l led  under the equipment in   t he  side bays and inside the RCS. 
A sea dye marker i s  u t i l i zed  as a visual rescue aid. The dye is  packaged 
i n  a Fiberglas-reinforced plastic laminate container which releases the dye 
through openings covered with water soluble film. The container i s  mounted 
below the f lo ta t ion   l ine  on the forward end of the RCS and is exposed when 
the R & R module i s  jettisoned. A cab le  cu t te r  u t i l i z ing  two e l ec t r i ca l ly  
f i r e d  gas pressure cartridges, each with a separate circuit ,  severs a holding 
cable  a f te r  main parachute jettison. This allows the spring-loaded hoist 
loop and f lashing recovery l ight  to  je t t ison their  protective doors. The 
hois t  loop, which i s  located near the heat shield and between the hatches, 
provides a hoisting attachment point for l if t ing devices used for recovering 
the re-entry vehicle. The flashing recovery light i s  located forward of the ’ 
hoist loop and provides a visual rescue aid. The flashing l ight,  which 
u t i l i z e s  i t s  own battery power independent of the spacecraft power supply, 
i s  energized by the positioning of the RESC beacon control switch. 
Landing System Operation (Fig. 43). - Operation of the landing system 
i s  as follows: 
When the altimeter indicates 50,OOO f t J  the HI-ALT drogue switch is 
activated manually by the astronaut. The drogue switch energized two single- 
circuit  pyrotechnic cartridges in the drogue mortar. The drogue mortar 
deploys the drogue chute reefed t o  4% of the parachute diameter in   o rde r   t o  
reduce the opening shock load. Sixteen sec after deployment, two lanyard- 
init iated pyrotechnic reefing cutters disreef the chute. A barostat ical ly  
operated instrument panel light is illuminated a t  40,000 f t  t o  signal that 
the drogue chute should have been deployed. A t  10,600 f t  another barostati-  
cally operated l ight signals the astronaut  to  actuate  the PAR4 switch, which 
i n i t i a t e s  the main parachute deployment sequence. 
The PARA switch energizes six 80 msec pyrotechnic time delay cartridges, 
which are i n s t a l l ed   i n  the three high a l t i t ude  drogue cable guillotines. 
After the drogue r i s e r s  have been cut, the dorgue parachute pulls away from 
the re-entry vehicle extracting the pilot parachute f r o m  the pilot mortar tube 
with the apex line. When deployed, the pilot  chute is reefed to  11.5% i n  
o rde r  t o  limit the opening shock load t o  3000 l b .  The PARA switch a l so  
energizes a 2.5 sec time delay relay to  the separation sequence t o  allow 
suff ic ient  time f o r  the pSlot chute t o  be deployed. The 2.5 sec time delay 
relay then energizes the car t r idge  in  a pyroswitch t o  deadface the e l e c t r i c a l  
w i r e  bundles t o  the R & R module. The four  car t r idges instal led in  the wire 
bundle gui l lo t ines  a l so  are energized. These gui l lot ine car t r idges have a 
120 msec pyrotechnic time delay to assure deadfacing of the w i r e s  before 
severing. The two MDF ring detonators are energized at  the same time t o  f i re  
the MDF ring which separates the R & R module from the re-entry vehicle. The 
MDF detonators have a 160 msec pyrotechnic time de lay   to  assure that the w i r e  
bundles have been cut before the MDF r ing fires. The w i r e s  t o  t he  r e -en t ry  
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umbilical   also are deadfaced a t  th i s  time by energizing another pyroswitch 
cartridge. 
As the landing vehicle falls away f r o m  the R & R mduik, the -in para- 
chute is deployed in a reefed condition (10. 546). six sec after deployment 
of the pilot parachute, two lanyard-initiated pyrotechnic reefing cutters 
disreef the p i l a t  chute. The main parachute is  disreefed by three lanyard- 
init iated pyrotechnic reefing cutters ten sec after deployment. The two 
decelerations provided by the main parachute divide the retarding shock load. 
The astronaut visually monitors a l l  parachute deployments and after the main 
chute disreefs and i s  f 'ully inflated, he actuates the IDG ATT switch. The 
LDG ATT switch energizes two pyrotechnic cartridges in the single point 
release (main disconnect) t o  change the single point suspension system t o  a 
two-point suspension system. Upon landing, the main parachute i s  jett isoned 
by act ivat ing the PARA JETT switch. The PARA JETT switch energizes the 
forward and aft bridle disconnects releasing the main parachute. The PARA 
JETT switch also energizes the two single pyrotechnic cartridges in the cable 
cutter allowing the hoist loop and flashing l i g h t   t o  be erected. 
Emergency Operation of Landing System (Fig. 44). - In the event the 
drogue parachute does not deploy o r  deploys improperly, the drogue emerg. 
10.6 K switch is  actuated. This switch fires the three drogue cable guillo- 
t ines ,  the apex l ine  gui l lo t ine ,  and the pilot parachute mortar, and i n i t i a t e s  
the 2.5 sec time de lay  to  the separation sequence. After the pilot mortar 
deploys the pilot parachute in a reefed condition, the remaining emergency 
sequence i s  the same as tha t  f o r  a normal landing. 
Landing System Development and Qualification Tests.  - The landing system 
development and qual i f icat ion tests are shown  on Table 24. The  number of 
actual  firings of the pyrotechnic components, and devices  ut i l ized in  the 
landing system i s  shown  on Table  25. In  addi t ion,  ver i f icat ion f i r ings of  
un i t s  from the same l o t s  as those installed in the spacecraft  were made before 
each f l igh t .  
Failure Summary. - The fa i lure  summary i s  shown on Table 26. 
Mission Anomalies. - The landing system had the following anomalies on 
Spacecraft 2: 
A. Problem - One wire bundle gui l lot ine on the RCS failed t o  completely 
cut a wire bundle a t  t h e  R & R separation plane. "he redundant gui l lot ine 
ins ta l led  on the R & R section did sever the wire bundle which allowed the 
separation of the R & R re-entry sections. 
Investigation/Conclusion - The wire bundle in question was instal led 
i n  an abnormal position. It was pulled up t ight ly  against  the cut ter  blade 
which requires additional energy of the cartridge. The cartridge was 
developed t o   c u t  the w i r e  bundle when it was held against  the anvi l  and did 
not have suff ic ient  margin of energy t o  handle the abnormal, instal la t ion.  
The fa i lure  was duplicated in the f a i lu re  lab.  
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TABLE 24 DEVELOPMENT AND QUALIFICATION TESTS 
LANDING SYSTEM DROP TEST 
TEST 
D E V E L O P M E N T  
T Y P E   O F   T E S T  
QUALIF ICATION 
TEST 
T Y P E   O F   T E S T  
TEST I COMPL.ETED 
DROGUE  LANDING MA1 N P I L O T  
P A R A C H U T E  SYSTEM P A R A C H U T E   P A R A C H U T E  
14 14 30 18 
PTV  (BOMB)  
FROM  AIRCRAFT 20k A I R C R A F T  10k A IRCRAFT 10k A I R C R A F T  42k 
CRAFT DROP TEST DROP TEST FROM DROP TEST FROM DROP TEST FROM 
B O I L E R P L A T E   S P A C E -  PTV  (BOMB)  PTV  (BOMB) 
8 13 13  13 
3 - WITHOUT DROGUE 
S P A C E C R A F T 2  
CONFIGURATION 
2 - EMERGENCY MODE 
BOILERPLATE SPACECRAFT WITH PRODUCTION 
RCS 8, RBR SECTION. DROP TEST FROM AIRCRAFT 
2 A T  17k - EMERGENCY MODE 
3 A T  20k - S P A C E C R A F T  2 CONFIGURATION 
8 A T  33k - NORMAL LANDING MODE 
TYPE  OF  TEST  REMARKS 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
STATIC   TEST 
TO QUALIFY BAROSWITCHES FOR ADDLTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS 
NOT QUALIFIED BY PROJECT MERCURY. BAROSWITCHES IN 
GENERAL WERE QUALIFIED BY SIMILARITY TO PROJECT 
MERCURYHARDWARE. 
TO QUALIFY THE INVERSION BRIDLE FOR STRUCTURAL 
I N T E G R I T Y   A F T E R  24 DAYS OF EXPOSURE TO 160°F. 
Action Taken - Effective Spacecraft 3 and up, the length of the w i r e  
bundle was adjusted to allow the blueprint  instal la t ion of the  wire bundle 
solid against  the anvil .  A CTI cartridge with higher energy output was used 
i n   l i e u  of the OA cartridge. 
B. Problem - The flashing recovery light did not deploy. 
Investigation/Conclusion - A review of engineering drawings and 
spacecraft revealed t h a t  a tolerance buildup could exist and r e su l t   i n  binding 
the door on structure thus preventing the  door from opening. 
Action - Effective Spacecraft 3 and up, the door f i t t i n g  was shortened 
t o  preclude any tolerance buildup interference and inspection requirements 
were added to   assure   sat isfactory  operat ion  of  the door after ins ta l la t ion  
and pr ior   to   f inal   r igging  of  door restraining cable. 
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TABLE 25 LANDING SYSTEM COMPONENT FIRINGS 
- 
COMPONENT 
- 
CARTRIDGE 
A P E X C U T T E R  
H I G H   A L T I T U D E  
DROGUE  CABLE 
G U I L L O T I N E   ( H A D )  
CARTRIDGE  (HAD) 
CARTRIDGE* 
DROGUEMORTAR 
CARTRIDGE* 
P ILOT  MORTAR 
CARTRIDGE* 
MAIN DISCONNECT 
CARTRIDGE* 
BRIDLE DISCONNECT 
BRIDLE DISCONNECT 
ASSEMBLY 
CARTRIDGE 
BRIDLE DISCONNECT 
DROGUEMORTAR 
ASSEMBLY 
CARTRIDGE 
DROGUE MORTAR 
PILOT MORTAR 
ASSEMBLY 
CARTRIDGE 
PILOT  MORTAR 
RBR SEPARATION 
MDF RING ASSY 
APEX GUILLOTINE 
REEFING CUTTER 
P I L O T   C H U T E  
(6 SEC TD) 
REEFING  CUTTER 
MAIN CHUTE 
(10 SEC  TD) 
REEFING  CUTTER 
DROGUE  CHUTE 
(16 SEC TD) 
REEFING  CUTTER*  
DROGUE  CHUTE 
(16 SEC  TD)  (BACKUP) 
MAIN DISCONNECT 
ASSEMBLY 
CARTRIDGE 
MAIN DISCONNECT 
~ 
VENDOR 
~~ 
C T I  
M C D O N N E L L /  
OA 
C T I  
ORDCO 
C T I  
SDI 
SDI 
N -V  
@ C T I  
C T I  
@ C T I  
C T I  
N  -V 
N-V 
@ C T I  
ORDCO 
OA 
MCDONNELL 
OA 
OA 
OA 
NOP 
5 0 s  
N  -V 
@ C T I  
C T I  
~ 
DROP 
TEST 
4 
30 
6 0  
18 
- 
- 
- 
54 - 
- 
33 - 
- 
27 - 
8 
27 
2 
32 
106 
- 
16 
27 - 
- 
SPECIAL  
TEST @ 
VENDOR. 
20 
7 
45 
- 
5 
- 
- 
- 
5 
21 
- 
21 
21 
- 
4 
- 
5 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
5 
5 
K D O N N E L L  
TEST 
18 
22 
38 - 
- 
- 
- 
2 - 
- 
1 
21 
32 
2 - 
- 
19 
10 
- 
- 
62 
- 
1 - 
- 
Q U A L  
TEST 
61 
23 
61 
368 
- 
353 
7a 
21 
21 
42 
- 
21 
24 
72 
368 
- 
40 
23 
63 
53 
32 
103 
71 
21 
42 
R A T  
32 
36 
36 
28 
- 
19 
19 
19 
19 
19 
28 
25 
25 
- 
- 
- 
18 
32 
12 
12 
10 
19 
19 
19 
19 
*S IMILAR  TO  UNITS  UT IL IZED O N  SPACECRAFT 3 AND UP. 
T A B L E  26 FAILURE SUMMARY 
PROBLEM 
PRIME  VENDOR  HAD  D IFF ICULTIES 
WITH MANUFACTURING AND QUAL 
TESTING OF DETONATORS, GAS 
GENERATING CARTRIDGES, SOME 
GUILLOTINES AND PYROSWITCHES. 
MORTAR BREECH BLOCK FAILED 
D U R I N G   E N V l R O N h E   N T A L   Q U A L  
TESTING, WITH ORDCO CARTRIDGES. 
~ 
CORRECTIVE  ACTION 
S P A C E C R A F T  2 UT IL IZED  THE  PRIME  VENDORS  CARTRIDGES 
BREVIATED  QUAL  TESTS  WERE  CONDUCTED  ON  THESE  UNITS 
WHICH CONSISTED OF HI-TEMP/ALT, HUMIDITY, VIBRATION, 
AUTOIGNITION, PROOF AND BURST PRESSURE, 40-FT DROP, 
C E P T A N C E  T E S T E D  AS FOLLOWS: BRIDGE WIRE RESISTANCE, 
LEAKAGE, VIBRATION, 2OO0F TEMP, SOAK 1/2 HR, RESISTANCE 
8, DIELECTRIC.  
AND  DETONATORS  WITH  DUAL  BRIDGE  WIRE  CIRCUITS.  AB- 
1 AMP NO-FIRE AND 1 WATT NO-FIRE. THE UNITS WERE AC- 
SPACECRAFT 3 - MCDONNELL ASSUMED THE DESIGN AND 
MANUFACTURING RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GUILLOTINES AND 
PYROSWITCHES WHICH WERE NOT AVAILABLE. MCDONNELL 
PROCURED  SECOND  SOURCE  VENDORS  FOR  DETONATORS  AND 
CARTRIDGES. THE DETONATOR AND CARTRIDGES WITH THEIR 
ASSOCIATED DEVICES WERE QUALIFIED BY THE SECOND 
SOURCE VENDORS AS REQUIRED. DISCONNECT CARTRIDGES - 
SPECIAL   DEVICES INC. MORTAR CARTRIDGES - ORDCO 
DETONATOR  AND  CARTRIDGES  UTIL IZED  FOR  GUILLOTINES,  
PYROSWITCHES AND TUBE CUTTER - CTI.  
SPACECRAFT 4 AND  UP - CTI CARTRIDGES AND DETONATORS 
WERE UTIL IZED ENTIRELY WITH THE LANDING SYSTEM EX-  
CEPT FOR THE PILOT MORTAR (ORDCO).  
P ILOT MORTAR BREECH MATERIAL  WAS CHANGED FROM 
ALUMINUM TO STEEL. UNITS WERE RETESTED WITHOUT ANY 
FAILURES. DROGUE MORTAR BREECH WAS T E S T E D   A T   C T I  
WITH THEIR CARTRIDGES REPEATEDLY WITHOUT ANY 
ANOMALIES. 
S P A C E C R A F T  4 AND UP CONFIGURATION - CTI CARTRIDGES 
I N  T H E  D R O G U E M O R T A R W I T H  A N  A L U M I N U M B R E E C H A N D  
P ILOT  MORTAR WITH STEEL BREECH AND ORDCO CARTRIDGES. 
Mission  Evaluation. - The  landing  and  recovery  systems  functioned 
successfully  on all missions. 
PYROTECHNICS 
Pyrotechnic  devices as shown  on Fig. 45 perform  many of the  spacecraft 
sequential  operations.  They  provide  the  modes  to  function  or  diable  systems 
and  separate or jettison  various  sections  or  assemblies.  The  pyrotechnic 
system  consists of a  wide  range of explosive  devices,  their  actuation  system, 
and  related  equipment.  The  systems  utilize  both low explosives  which  burn  and 
generate gas pressure, and high explosives which detonate and generate a 
shock front. Hot gas pressure f r o m  the slowly decomposing low explosives i s  
used to  ac tua te  a device or propel a projectile. Pyrotechnic devices are 
described in subsequent paragraphs except for the pyrotechnics uti l ized for 
the escape system, recovery system, and the retro-rockets, which are discussed 
i n  their  appropriate sections. 
The pyrotechnic devices in  the spacecraf t  are ins ta l led  so tha t  the 
explosions are confined within the device or are shielded t o  preclude damage 
to the spacecraf t .  
A r e l i a b i l i t y  program was conducted throughout the design, development, 
fabrication, and qual i f icat ion of the pyrotechnic system. Testing by 
McDonnell and i t s  vendors insured a system r e l i a b i l i t y  of .995. Before each 
f l i g h t  a uni t  from the same manufacturing l o t  as the pyrotechnic device 
ins ta l led  on the spacecraft was test f i red for  ver i f icat ion.  
Pyrotechnic Components 
Pyrotechnic items, such as cartridges, detonators, flexible linear-shaped 
charges (FLSC), gui l lot ines ,  and pyroswitches were used extensively throughout 
the spacecraft. Their description and operation are outlined below. Later 
sections describe their  use in various systems. 
Cartridges and Detonators. - The e lec t r ica l ly  in i t ia ted  car t r idges  and 
,detonators have the same basic design. They consist  of a body, bridgewire, 
c i rcui t ,  igni t ion mix, and an output charge. In some instances, a pyro- 
technic time delay column was used t o  provide a delay between ignition mix 
and output charge ignition. The car t r idges  u t i l i ze  low explosives t o  produce 
a specific gas pressure output to operate the  device i n  which they are 
installed.  The detonators utilize high explosives which transmit a shock 
wave t o  t h e  assembly i n  which they are attached. Cartridges and detonators 
are provided w i t h  one o r  two e l ec t r i ca l  bridgewire circuits. The second 
c i r cu i t  i s  redundant. Each bridgewire c i r cu i t  i s  independent of the cartridge 
or  detonator body. 
The body of the cartridge or detonator provides for the ins ta l la t ion  of 
the explosive train. The bodies are threaded on one end for  ins ta l la t ion  in to  
the device. An electr ical  receptacle  i s  machined on the other end fo r  
connection t o  the spacecraft w i r e  bundle. 
Each f i r ing circui t ,  consis t ing of two electrical  pins with a bridgewire 
attached between them, is  in s t a l l ed  in  the body. The electr ical  pins  are 
insulated from the body by a ceramic material. 
The heat-sensitive mix, which encases the bridgewire, igni tes  when 
e l e c t r i c i t y  passes 'through the bridgewire. This in  tu rn  in i t i a t e s  t he  next 
explosive element i n  t h e  t r a i n  of explosives. The number and type of 
explosive elements i n  t h e  t r a i n  from the ignit ion mix t o  the final output 
charge vary with requirements. Cartridges are designed with an energy output 
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of 1.5 times the energy required t o  operate the device. Detonators have an 
energy output of 1.3  times that necessary t o   i n i t i a t e  the next inline 
explosive element and w i l l  produce sufficient energy to propagate across a 
gap 1.5 times the nominal design gap between the detonator and the next 
inline explosive element. 
The design of the,cartridges and detonators also includes the following: 
A. The cartridges and detonators without pyrotechnic time delays begin 
to function within 0.004 sec after 15 VDC is applied to the bridgewire 
c i rcu i t .  
B. Bridgewire c i rcui t   res is tance i s  1.0 - + 0.2 ohm. 
C. The cartridges and detonators have a d i e l ec t r i c  strength capable of 
withstanding: 
1. Five hundred vol ts  (RMS) for  one min a t  sea level between a l l  
2. Two hundred f i f t y   v o l t s   f o r  20 min a t  alt i tude conditions.  
pins t ied together and the case. 
D . No-Fire  Requirements. 
1. The uni ts  w i l l  not  f i re  inadvertent ly  due to  t ransient  currents  
2. The uni ts  w i l l  not f i r e  when one ampere o r  one watt i s  applied 
o r   s t a t i c  charges. 
simultaneously t o   e i t h e r   o r  both c i r cu i t s   fo r   f i ve  min. 
E. All-Fire Requirements - The units w i l l  f i re  with 40 msec when four 
amperes i s  applied to   t he   c i r cu i t .  
Flexible Linear-Shaped Charge. - The flexible linear-shaped charge 
(FLSC] i s  a V-shaped, flexible lead sheathing containing a high explosive 
RDX core. FLSC i s  used i n  the  separation assemblies t o  sever various 
materials. The FLSC is  in s t a l l ed  in  a molded back blast shield wi th  t h e  open 
portion of the V-shaped sheathing placed toward the material t o  be severed. 
The FLSC explosive core, set off by the detonator, collapses the sheathing 
in  the  V-groove. This produces a cut t ing je t  composed of explosive products 
and minute metal par t ic les  which cut the ta rge t  material. The FLSC i s  
designed with a minimum cu t t ing   ab i l i t y  of 20$ greater  than  required. 
Guillotines. - Guillotines are designed i n  two basic configurations, one 
t o  cu t  e lec t r ica l  w i r e  bUrIdleS, the other to cut stainless steel  cables.  
A. Wire Bundle Guillotines - W i r e  bundle gui l lot ines  are  provided i n  
two sizes t o  c u t  bundles up t o  1-1/4 and 2-1/2 in .  in  diameter. The guillo- 
t ines consist  of a body, end cap or anvil, piston/cutter blade, shear pin, 
and an electrical-fired gas-pressure cartridge. The  body houses the piston/ 
cu t t e r  blade held i n  a retracted  posi t ion by a shear pin and provides fo r  
ins ta l la t ion  of  the cartridge and attachment of the anvil. The anvi l  is 
removable t o   f a c i l i t a t e   i n s t a l l a t i o n   o f ' e i t h e r  the gu i l lo t ine   o r  the w i r e  
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bundle or cable. Lugs, for  a t taching the gui l lot ine to  the spacecraf t  s t ruc-  
ture,  are an integral  part of the guillotine body. The pressure produced by 
f i r ing  the  car t r idge  exer t s  a force on the piston/cutter blade. When suf f ic i -  
ent force i s  applied, the piston/cutter blade first severs t h e  shear pin, and 
then the wire bundle w i t h  a high velocity stroke. The stroke of the piston/ 
cu t t e r  blade i s  stopped by the anvil .  The wire bundle i s  then free of the 
gui l lot ine body. Two guil lot ines  are used per w i r e  bundle, one  on ei ther  s ide 
of the separation plane. 
B. Cable-Cutting Guillotines - Cable-cutting guillotines are provided 
in  th ree  sizes to  sever  cables up t o  1/8, 1/4, and 9/32 in.  diameters. The- 
guil lotine consists of a body, piston/cutter blade, shear pin, anvil end cap, 
and two e l ec t r i ca l ly  fired gas-pressure cartridges. The body provides for 
the   ins ta l la t ion  of the two cartridges and incorporates a port  between the 
cartridge areas t o  the piston/cutter area. The body has an integral  barrel 
section which houses the piston/cutter blade retained in the retracted 
posit ion by a shear pin and provides f o r  the attachment of the end cap. The 
barrel  section i s  s lo t ted  for  ins ta l la t ion  and positioning of the cable normal 
to  the  pos i t ion /cu t te r  blade. The anvi l  is  retained in the barrel under the 
cable by the end cap. The anvi l  and end cap are removable t o  permit guillo- 
t ine cable  instal la t ion.  Lugs, for attaching the  gui l lot ine to  the spacecraf t  
structure,  are an integral  part of the body. 
Pyroswitches. - Pyrotechnic switches are used t o  open e l ec t r i ca l  c i r cu i t s  
in various wire bundles before the bundles are severed. They are provided i n  
two s i zes ,  one with 41 electr ical  contacts ,  and the other with 55 pyroswitches 
consist  of a body, piston, shear pin, spring lock, and electr ical ly-f i red 
gas-pressure cartridge. A dual-bridgewire cartridge wi th  separate  e lectr ical  
circuits provides redundancy. The body houses the cartridge and the piston. 
Incorporated in opposite ends of the switch body are  two e l ec t r i ca l  recep- 
tac les  which contain hollow spring leaf contacts. These contacts are con- 
nected axially in the switch-closed position by pins mounted in   the  pis ton.  
The piston is  held in place by a shear pin. The pressure produced by f i r ing  
the cartridge i s  ported through the switch body t o  a flange on one side of 
the piston. When sufficient gas pressure i s  generated, the piston severs the 
shear pin and moves ax ia l ly  in  the  body. A s  the piston moves, the connector 
pins mounted i n  the pis ton are  disengaged from the hollow contacts a t  one end 
and driven farther into the hollow contacts a t  the other end. The spring 
lock moves into place behind the pis ton to  lock it, and residual gas pressure 
provides a redundant means for preventing piston rebound. The piston thus is 
maintained i n  the SWITCH OPEN position. 
Separation Assemblies 
2 13  Separation Assembly. - The launch vehicle i s  separated from the 
spacecraf't/adapter equipment section by cutting the structure skin wi th  
redundant dual strands of F'LSC. The separation assembly consists of two 
strands of FLSC, three detonator blocks each containing a crossover and two 
boosters, and three detonators (two single-bridgewire and one dual-bridgewire), 
each with a pyrotechnic time delay of 240 msec. The FLSC is in i t i a t ed  when 
the  redundant detonators receive the proper  e lectr ical  signal from the SEP 
SpclT switch. The detonators transmit a shock wave to the crossover charge 
in  the detonator  block, which i n  turn i n i t i a t e s  the boosters. The boosters 
propagate the wave t o  t h e  FISC i n  both directions simultaneously. The FISC 
detonates and functions redundantly t o  sever the adapter skin at the parting 
l ine ( located at s ta t ion  2 13). The FLSC is ins ta l led  around the inner 
per5phery of the adapter  skin with the  detonator  blocks as an in tegra l  part 
of the assembly. The in tegra l  b l a s t  shield protects the structure and 
equipment f r o m  shrapnel. Proper detonation of one strand of FLSC w i l l  achieve 
separation. 
The e l e c t r i c a l   c i r c u i t r y  t o  the launch vehicle is deadfaced by the 
activation of pyroswitch G (located in the re-entry vehicle).  The e l e c t r i c a l  
wire bundle t o  the launch vehicle i s  severed by w i r e  bundle gui l lot ines  
located on either side of the separation plane. The pyroswitch, two guillo- 
t ines ,  and FLSC assembly are energized by the act ivat ion of the SEP SPCFT 
switch. 
The sequence i s  as follows: 
A. Initiated simultaneously are three detonators with 240 msec pyro- 
technic time delay, two wire bundle gui l lot ine car t r idges with 120 msec 
pyrotechnic time delay and a relay with 50-70 msec e l e c t r i c a l  time delay. 
the c i rcu i t s ,  removing the power f r o m  the cartridges and detonators. 
t i n e s   t o   c u t  the deadfaced wire bundle. 
cut the s t ructure  for  complete separation. 
B. The 50-70 msec r e l ay  in i t i a t e s  the pyroswitch cartridge t o  deadface 
C. The cartridges f i re  a f t e r  the 120 msec delay, activating the guillo- 
D. The detonators  f i re  after the 240 msec delay,  ini t ia t ing the FLSC, t o  
Z 69 Separation Assembly. - The equipment adapter section i s  separated 
from the spacecraft  retro section by an FLSC assembly. The FLSC assembly 
consists of two main units: A separation assembly of FLSC which is similar 
i n  design and operation t o   t h e  Z 13  assembly and a FLSC tubing  cutter 
assembly. 
A. FLSC Separation Assembly - The FLSC of the separation assembly i s  
instal led around the  outer periphery of the adapter skin and insu la ted   to  
protect it from launch heating. The adapter skin i s  s l o t t e d  i n  three places 
under the FLSC t o  provide fo r  the installation of three detonator blocks on 
the  inside of the skin. One of the detonator blocks provides for installation 
of both a detonator and an explosive interconnect (MDF). The other two 
contain detonators only. The three detonators  ut i l ized for  t h i s  separation 
have no pyrotechnic time delay. A sheet metal b l a s t  deflector,  which i s  
part of the adapter structure, protects the structure and equipment from 
shrapnel. The i n i t i a t i o n  and function of the separation assembly is  the 
same as Z 13. 
B. FLSC Tube Cutter Assembly - The FLSC tube cutter i s  mounted t o  the 
inside of the retrograde section of the adapter forward of the parting l ine 
( Z  69). Th i s  tube cutter severs 12 aluminum tubes and one nylon tube f r o m  
the equipment section. The cu t t e r  assembly consists of a housing, molded 
back-up retainers,  two strands of FLSC with boosters attached, explosive 
interconnect, and a dual bridgewire detonator. The FLSC is installed on 
opposite sides of the  tubes i n . t h e  back-up retainers  of the  housing and 
staggered t o  provide redundant cuts. The detonator i s  in s t a l l ed  in  the 
housing with i t s  outputzend adjacent t o  the booster charge of one strand of 
FLSC. The explosive interconnect i s  ins ta l led  with one end i n  t h e  gube cu t t e r  
housing and the other end i n  a detonator block of the separation-assembly. 
The explosive interconnect is a single strand of high explosive (€DX). encased 
i n  a lead sheathing and covered by a flexible vinyl tube.  Attachment f i t t i n g s  
are incorporated on each end of the interconnect for installation. A small 
booster chqrge is  incorporated at  each end of the explosive strand, which is 
instal led  adjacent   to  the booster charge of the strand of FLSC and the booster 
charge of one F’LSC sect ion in  the tube cutter. The explosive interconnect 
transmits detonation from the separation assembly t o  one strand of FLSC i n  
the tube cutter. The detonator in the tube cutter and the detonators in the 
separation assembly are i n i t i a t e d  simultaneously. Proper detonation of one 
strand of FISC i n  both the separation assembly and tube cu t te r  assembly, w i l l  
achieve separation. 
C.  E lec t r ica l  W i r e  Bundle Guillotine - The e l e c t r i c a l   c i r c u i t r y   t o  the 
equipment section i s  deadfaced by the activation of pyroswitches B, C,  C, E, 
F, and J. The three separate  e lectr ical  w i r e  bundles t o  the equipment section 
are severed by wire bundle gui l lot ines  C,  D, and E located on both sides of 
the separation plane. 
D. OAMS Line Cutter - Two stainless steel, Teflon-lined tubes containing 
the hypergolic propellants used in the OAMS a re  sealed and severed by the 
tubing cutter/sealer located on both sides of the  Z 69 separation plane. The 
tubing cutter/sealer assembly consists of a body, anvi l ,  e lec t r ica l ly  fired 
gas pressure cartridge, four shear pins, and cu t t e r  assembly. The cu t t e r  
assembly consists of a piston, crimper, and blade. The crimper and blade a re  
a t tached to  the pis ton by  two shear pins (sequencing pins). The  body houses 
the cu t t e r  assembly retained in  a retracted posit ion by two shear pins (lock 
pins),  and provided fo r   i n s t a l l a t ion  of the cartridge and attachment of the 
anvil .  The gas pressure produced by firing the cartridge exerts a force on 
the piston of the cu t t e r  assembly. When sufficient force i s  applied, the 
two lock pins are severed and the cu t t e r  assembly actuates with a high 
velocity. The blade and crimper, which extend past the end of the piston, 
contact the two tubes first. The crimper f l a t t ens  the  tubing against a 
raised portion of the anv i l  and comes t o  a halt, shearing the two sequencing 
pins that hold the crimper and blade. The piston and blade continue t o  travel, 
allowing the blade to  sever  the tubing. Proper f’unctioning of one tubing 
cut ter /sealer  w i l l  achieve separation. 
E. Sequencing - Three switches achieve separation of the adapter equip- 
ment section from the spacecraft retro section. 
Sequencing is  as follows: 
1. SEP OAMS Line Switch 
a. Initiates simultaneously two tubing cutter/sealer cartridges 
(instantaneous type), three w i r e  bundle gui l lo t ine  (C -Dl -E ' ) cartridges 
(with 120 msec pyrotechnic time delay) installed below the separation plane, 
and energizes a 50-70 msec e l e c t r i c a l  time delay relay. 
cartridges to deadface the c i r c u i t s  and remove e l e c t r i c a l  power from the 
cartridges and detonators. 
actuating the gu i l lo t ines   t o   cu t   t he  deadface wire bundles. 
b. The 50-70 msec r e l a y   i n i t i a t e s  the pyroswitch (B-C-D-E-F-J) 
c. The gui l lot ine car t r idges f i re  a f t e r  the 120 msec delay, 
2. SEP ELECT Switch - Energizes a 50-70 msec e l e c t r i c a l  time delay 
relay which init iates simultaneously three w i r e  bundle gui l lot ine (C-D-E) 
cartridges (instantaneous type) installed above the separation plane t o  
actuate the guillotines and cut the w i r e  bundles. 
3. SEP ADAET Switch - Energizes a 70-90 msec e l e c t r i c a l  time delay 
relay which initiates simultaneously three detonators of the FLSC separation 
assembly and the detonator of the FLSC tube cutter.  
Z 100 Separation Assembly. - The retrograde section separates from the 
re-entry vehicle when three titanium straps and various tubes and wire bundles 
are cut  by redundant dual strands of FLSC. The separation assembly consists 
of three cutter assemblies, three detonator housing, three dual bridgewire 
detonators (160 msec pyrotechnic time delay) six explosive interconnects, and 
three iner t  unions. Each cu t t e r  assembly severs one t i tanium strap,  electrical  
wires varying in  s i ze  from No. 20 to coaxial  cable,  .35 diameter, and up t o  
s i x  1/4 in. diameter tubes. The cu t t e r  assembly consists of two parallel 
machined bars. Two RDX FLSC cords, with their apexes 1/2 in .  apart, are 
embedded i n  each bar. One end of each FLSC s t r i p  i s  bent 45 degrees away 
from the bar. When joined together with an 0.4 in. gap between bars, the 
FLSC st r ips  face each other and the bend ends converge a t  the booster. Proper 
gap i s  maintained by spacers and bolts. The detonator housing i s  ins ta l led  
on one end of  the  cutter assembly and contains a parallel booster assembly 
and an interconnect booster. The detonator housing also provides for the 
in s t a l l a t ion  O f  a detonator and t w o  explosive interconnects with their   output 
ends adjacent t o  the interconnect booster. The interconnect booster i s  a 
column of RDX explosive  in a holder with two output ports which mate with the 
converged strands of FLg. The parallel booster assembly consists of a main 
column, crossover column, and two dual output columns installed i n  a charge 
holder. The main booster column i s  installed with one end adjacent  to  the 
interconnect booster and the other end sitting on the crossover column.  The 
output boosters have chevron-shaped output cans on both ends of each booster. 
The two output columns a re  parallel planes, adjacent t o  each end of the cross- 
over column. Each end of the output column is  mated wi th  the open V-groove 
of the FLSC. 
The cut te rs  are located i n  three places around the par t ing l ine (Z 100) 
and are linked by explosive interconnects. Two explosive interconnects joined 
by a union are ins ta l led  between each cut ter .  Two explosive interconnects 
are ins t a l l ed   i n  each detonator housing with their  booster charges adjacent 
t o  the booster column of the housing. A detonator i s  in s t a l l ed  in  each 
housing with i t s  output end adjacent   to  the booster column of the housing 
and t o  the boosters of the interconnects. The t i tanium strap,  e lectr ical  
wires, and tubes t o  be severed are ins ta l led  between the two bars of the 
cut ter .  The FLSC i s  in i t i a t ed  when the redundant detonators receive the 
proper electrical  signal f r o m  the JETT RETFtO switch. The detonator transmits 
a shock wave t o  the interconnect booster, which relays propagation t o   t h e  
FTSC i n   t h e   c u t t e r  a t  the point where they converge and simultaneously 
propagates the main booster of the parallel booster assembly. The main 
column charge relays propagation redundantly t o  the four strands of FLSC 
through the crossover and two output charges. The detonator also simulta- 
neously propagates the two explosive interconnects. 
The interconnects transmit the detonation wave t o  a l l  three cu t t e r  
assemblies. This i s  to assure detonation of three cut ters ,  i n  the event one 
o r  two detonators should not function. Proper detonation of one s e t  of two 
opposing s t r i p s  of FISC i n  each cu t t e r  i s  sufficient to achieve separation. 
The e l ec t r i ca l   c i r cu i t ry   t o  the retrograde section is  deadfaced by pyroswitch 
H. Th i s  pyroswitch u t i l i ze s  an  80 msec pyrotechnic time delay cartridge. The 
pyroswitch and separation assembly are energized by the JEW R E n O  switch. 
The sequence is  as follows: 
A. Initiated simultaneously are three detonators with 160 msec pyro- 
technic time delay and the pyroswitch cartridge with 80 msec pyrotechnic time 
de lay. 
c i r cu i t  and a l so  removes the e l ec t r i ca l  power from the cartridges and 
detonators. 
cut the straps, tubes and deadfaced wires. 
B. The pyroswitch ca r t r idge   f i r e s   a f t e r   t he  80 msec delay t o  deadface the 
C.  The detonators f ire a f t e r  the 160 msec delay,  ini t ia t ing the FLSC, t o  
Fairing  Release 
The horizon scanner is  uncovered by a pyrotechnic ejector which je t t i sons  
the horizon scanner fairing. The radar, parachute canisters, and  nose 
antennas are uncovered by a pyrotechnic ejector which je t t i sons  the hose 
fairing. Spacecraft 2, 3, and 4 u t i l i zed  a cable  cut ter  to  sever  a holding 
cable that releases the nose fairing for spring-driven jett ison. The nose 
fa i r ing  and horizon scanner fairing are jett isoned by the JEW FAIRING switch. 
Horizon Scanner Fairing Release. - The horizon scanner fairing release 
assembly secures the fairing to the spacecraft  and, when in i t ia ted ,  j e t t i sons  
it. The assembly consists of an actuator housing, actuator rod, main piston, 
release piston, eight locking pins, and two e l ec t r i ca l ly  f ired gas pressure 
cartridges. The actuator rod forms a pos i t i ve  t i e  between the actuator and 
the  scanner fairing. The actuator  rod is locked to  the  main piston by four 
locking pins. The main piston i s  locked i n  the base of the housing by four 
locking pins that are held in  p lace  by the release piston. The release piston 
i s  spring-loaded i n  the locked position. The housing provides fo r  i n s t a l l a -  
t ion  of the pistons, actuator rod, and two cartridges and f o r  mounting of the 
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assembly.  The  gas  pressure  produced  by  firing  the  cartridges  is  ported 
through  the  housing  to  the  base of the  piston.  The  gas  pressure  moves  the 
release  piston  forward,  enabling  the four locking  pins to c m  inboard  and  thus 
release  the  main  piston.  The g a s  pressure  causes  the  main  piston,  with 
attached  actuator  rod,  to  move  through  the  length  of  the  housing. A shoulder 
stops  the  piston  at  the  end of the  housing.  The  four  locking  pins,  securing 
the  actuator rod to  the  piston,  cam  outboard  into a recess  and  release  the 
actuator  rod.  The  actuator  rod  is  jettisoned  with  the  scanner  fairing 
attached.  Proper  function  of  one  cartridge  is  sufficient  to  Jettison  the 
fairing. 
Nose  Fairing  Release. - The  nose  fairing  ejector,  which  secures  the 
rendezvous  and  recovery  section  nose  fairing  to  the  spacecraft,  is  initiated 
to  jettison  the  fairing.  The  assembly  consists  of a breech,  ballistic  hose, 
actuator  assembly,  bellcrank  mechanism,  and a dual-bridgewire  electrically 
fired  gas  pressure  cartridge.  The  nose  fairing  is  attached  to  the  bellcrank 
mechanism.  The  actuator rod forms a positive  tie  between  the  actuator  body 
and  the  crank  mechanism.  It  is  locked  to a piston  in  the  actuator  by  two 
locking  pins  and  held  in  place  in  the  actuator  body  by a shear  pin.  The 
actuator  assembly  is  connected  to  the  breech  by  the  ballistic  hose.  The 
breech  provides  for  installation  of  the  cartridge  and  is  positioned  approxi- 
mately  nine  in.  from  the  actuator.  The  actuator  is  installed  on  the  antenna 
support/actuator  fitting  of  the  rendezvous  and  recovery  (R & R)  section  and 
is  located  on  the X axis,  five  in.  up  from Y zero.  The  gas  pressure  produced 
by  firing  the  cartridge  in  the  breech  is  transferred  through  the  ballistic 
hose  to  exert a force on the  piston  in  the  actuator.  The  piston  with  rod 
attached  severs  the  restraining  shear  pin.  The  gas  pressure  causes  the 
piston,  with  attached  rod,  to  move  through  the  length  of  the  actuator  housing. 
As the  piston  reaches  the  end  of  the  housing,  the  two  locking  pins  securing 
the  rod  to  the  piston  cam  outboard  into a recess  and  release  the  actuator  rod. 
The  actuator  rod  then  is  jettisoned  with  the  nose  fairing. A hinge  on  the 
nose  fairing,  located  on  the  outer  moldline,  releases  and  directs  the  path 
of the  fairing  away  from  the  spacecraft.  The  bellcrank  mechanism  provides 
for  angular  jettison f the  fairing  using  the  axial  movement  of  the  ejector 
shaft. 
Horizon  Scanner  Release 
The  horizon  scanners  are  jettisoned  from  the  spacecraft  by  the JETT RETRO 
switch.  The  horizon  scanner  release  assembly  secures  the  scanners  to  the 
spacecraft  and  jettisons  them  when  actuated.  The  assembly  consists  of  an 
actuator  housing,  actuator  rod,  locking  mechanism,  cartridge  housing,  and  two 
electrically  fired  gas  pressure  cartridges  with  an 80msec  pyrotechnic  time 
delay.  The  actuator  rod  is  secured  in  the  actuator  housing  by  the  locking 
mechanism.  This  mechanism  consists  of a tang  lock, tang lock  retainer,  and 
a shear  pin. 
The  actuator 
housing  with 
g a s  pressure 
actuator rod 
The  tang  lock  is  secured  to  the  base-of  the  actuator  housing. 
housing  is  attached  to  the  spacecraft  structure.  The  cartridge 
both  cartridges  installed  is  attached  to  the  actuator  rod.  The 
produced  by  firing  the  cartridges  is  ported  through  the  hollow 
to  the  base  of  the  actuator  housing.  Slots  in  the  tang  lock 
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allow  the  gas  pressure  to  exert a fo ce  against  the  base of the  tang  lock 
retainer.  The tang lock  retainer  then  severs  its  shear  pin  and  moves  axially 
in  the  housing,  exposing  the  tines of the tang lock.  The  tines  cam  open, 
releasing  the  actuator  rod  and  allowing  the  gas  pressure  to  jettison  the 
actuator  rod  with  horizon  scanners  attached.  Proper  functioning of o e
cartridge  is  sufficient  to  jettison  the  horizon  scanners. 
Fresh  Air  Door  Actuator 
A fresh  air  door  actuator  ejects  the  door  when  initiated  by  the HI ALT
DRO(UE switch.  The  fresh  air  door  actuator  is  located  in  the  unpressurized 
area  forward  of  the  egress  hatches,  to  the  left  of  the  spacecraft  centerline 
and  below  the  outer  moldline.  The  actuator  consists  of  breech,  plunger, 
screw  '(shear  pin),  and  two  electrically  fired  gas  pressure  cartridges.  The 
plunger  forms a positive  tie  between  the  fresh  air  door  and  the  breech,  and 
is  retained  in  the  breech  by  the  screw  which  acts  as  shear  pin.  The  breech 
provides  for  installation  of  the  two  cartridges  and  attachment o t e  space- 
craft  structure.  The  gas  pressure  produced  by  firing  the  cartridges  exerts 
a force  on  the  plunger,  which  severs  the  screw.  The  plunger  and  fresh  air 
door  then  are  jettisoned  free  of  the  spacecraft. 
Docking  System  Pyrotechnic  Devices 
The  pyrotechnic  devices  utilized  for  the  docking  mission  of  the  space- 
craft  are  located  in  the R & R section  of  the  spacecraft  as  shown  on  Fig. 45
and  consist  of  the  following: 
A .  A pyrotechnically-actuated  docking  bar  assembly  extends  and  locks  the 
indexing  bar  prior  to  the  docking  maneuver  and  jettisons  the  indexing  bar 
after  rendezvous  operations  are  completed.  The  indexing  bar  aids  both 
visually  and  mechanically  in  the  docking  maneuver. 
latch  hooks  on  the  docking  cone  of  the  target  docking  adapter  (TDA).  The 
latch  receptacles  normally  are  jettisoned  during  the  retrograde  sequence  or 
they  can  be  released  from  the  spacecraft  to  provide an emergency  demate 
capability  in  the  event  of a malfunction  of  the  normal TDA release  system. 
covers  for  re-entry  heat  protection. 
B. Three  pyrotechnically  released  latch  receptacles  mate  with  the  mooring 
C. Three  pyrotechnically  actuated  cable  cutters  release  the  three  latch 
Docki  Bar. - The  docking  bar  has  been  designed  and  developed  with  two 
cycles -+=- extension  and  Jettison).  The  indexing  bar  is  retained  in  the 
retracted  position  until  cycled.  The  extension  cycle  moves  the  indexing bar 
13.82 in.  from  the  retracted  position  to  the  fully  extended  position  and  locks 
the  indexing  bar  until  jettison  is  required.  The  indexing bar, when  in  the 
extended  position,  can  withstand  1500 lb  ultimate  load  applied  normally  to 
the  outer  end  of.the  bar.  The  jettison  cycle  jettisons  the  indexing bar 
without  recontact  with  the  spacecraft. 
The docking bar  assembly consists of cylinder/housing, pistons, indexing 
bar, manifold assembly, one extension cartridge, and two jett ison cartridges.  
The cylinder/housing is  mounted to the spacecraft  structure along the  X axis. 
The manifold assembly, which is  attached t o  the top of the cylinder housing 
and a t t aches  to  the spacecraft structure, contains a spring-loaded locking 
pin mechanism and two breeches. The extension cartridge i s  installed in  the  
breech on the l e f t  side of the manifold and the two je t t ison car t r idges are 
ins ta l led  i n  the breech on the right. The indexing bar, with a hollow base, 
i s  secured in  the outer  pis ton by a, shear pin. A dril led o r i f i ce  in  the  upper 
portion of the outer piston mates with an o r i f i ce   i n   t he  hollow base of the 
indexing bar. An inner piston is  ins ta l led  under the indexing bar, inside the 
outer piston. A hollow extension on the inner piston protrudes through the 
outer piston base. The indexing bar assembly i s  retained in  the retracted 
posit ion inside the housing by a retaining pin (shear p in)  through one side 
of the manifold. 
The indexing ba r  i s  extended by the gas pressure generated when the dual- 
bridgewire extension cartridge i s  in i t i a t ed  by the INDEX EXTENT switch. The 
gas pressure i s  ported into the cylinder/housing and enters the orifice in the 
base of the indexing bar .  The gas pressure then i s  ported through the hollow 
inner piston extension and exerts a force on the bottom of the outer piston. 
When sufficient force i s  appl ied to  the  base of the outer piston, causing it 
t o  move, the retaining pin in the manifold/indexing ba r  i s  severed. The gas 
pressure causes the  piston, wi th  attached indexing bar, t o  move through the  
length of the cylinder housing. The engagement of the locking pin in the 
manifold with a recess in the outer piston stops the t r ave l  and secures the 
outer  piston with the attached indexing b a r  i n  the f’ully extended position. 
The docking bar i s  jett isoned by the gas pressure generated when the two 
je t t ison car t r idges are  i n i t i a t ed  by the JETT RETRO switch. The gas pressure 
generated by firing the je t t ison car t r idges i s  ported into the cylinder/ 
housing and en ters   an   o r i f ice   in  the lower portion of the outer piston into a 
cavity between the inner and outer pistons. The thrusting action of the inner 
piston causes the indexing ba r  to  sever  the shear pin (indexing bar/outer 
piston) and j e t t i son  both the inner piston and the  indexing bar .  I n i t i a t ion  
of one je t t ison car t r idge is su f f i c i en t  t o  complete the jettison cycle. The 
je t t ison car t r idges have a 2.0 sec pyro delay to assure t h a t  during an abort 
mode the extension cartridge w i l l  f i r e  first t o  extend the bar before the 
je t t ison cycle  is init iated.  
Emergency Docking Release System. - The emergency docking release system 
consists of three pyrotechnically released docking latch receptacles, which 
release the spacecraft  from the  docking vehicle i f  the normal release system 
fails. Each release assembly consists of a body, latch receptacle, piston/stud 
assembly, shear pin, closure end cap,  and two gas pressure cartridges. The 
body houses the piston/stud assembly and provides fo r  the ins ta l la t ion  of the 
two cartridges and attachment of the end cap. Flanges for  a t taching the body 
to the spacecraft  structure are an integral  par t  of  the body. The piston/stud 
assembly is  ins ta l led  with the stud protruding through the body.  The end cap 
seals the area above the piston and provides a mechanical stop. The la tch 
receptacle i s  secured t o  the structure by a holding shear pin through the 
protruding piston stud. The la tch i s  preloaded on assembly by torquing the 
s tud in  the pis ton.  The design of the latch, stud, and shear pin arrangement 
allows the unit  to withstand a 5770 l b  ultimate docking load on the  la tch 
without failure. The gas pressure produced by f i r ing  the  two cartridges i s  
ported to.the underside of the piston. The pressure displaces the piston, 
separating the shear pin from the latch receptacle and moving the piston stud 
in to  the body t o  c l e a r  the latch receptacle. The latch receptacle being 
held by the docking vehicle latch i s  then parted f r o m  the release body, 
allowing the spacecraft freedom t o  move out of the docked condition. 
The EMERG REL switch simultaneously in i t ia tes   the   dua l   car t r idges   in  
each device. The JETT RETRO switch also w i l l  i n i t i a t e  the release system i f  
not fired previously. Function of one car t r idge  in  a device provides latch 
release. Function of two of the three releases w i l l  achieve separation. 
Latch Cover Cable Cutter System. - One latch cover is located a t  each 
emergency docking release t o  cover the opening created when the emergency 
docking release la tch i s  released and t o  prevent excess t h e m 1  energy from 
entering the spacecraft. Each system consists of a spring-loaded latch cover, 
a restraining cable and a dual cartridge guillotine.  Firing either or both 
cartridges actuates the guillotine that severs the restraining cable.  The 
spring-loaded cover then slides forward t o  cover the docking latch cavity. 
A l l  cartridges are in i t i a t ed  simultaneously by the JETT RETRO switch. The 
cartridges contain a 1.0 sec pyrotechnic time delay to   i n su re  emergency 
release p r io r   t o   l a t ch  cover release. 
Fyrotechnic Valves 
.Pyrotechnic valves in   t he   o rb i t   a t t i t ude  and maneuvering system ( O M )  
and re-entry control system (RCS) are  one-time actuating devices which control 
f l u id  flow. Types of valves utilized are e i the r  normally open o r  normally 
closed. A package valves are nonnally open, C and D package valves are 
normally closed, and E package valves include one of each type. 
The pyrotechnic valve consists of a valve body, nipple, ram, and a dual- 
bridgewire e l ec t r i ca l ly  f i r ed  high explosive cartridge/detonator. When the 
proper  e lectr ical  s ignal  ini t ia tes  the car t r idge/detonator ,  the resul t ing g a s  
pressure and shock wave actuates the ram and e i the r  opens or   c loses   the  f luid 
l i ne  depending on the type of valve. 
Fuel Cell Hydrogen Tank Vent Actuator 
The f u e l   c e l l  hydrogen tank vent actuator opens the hydrogen tank pinch- 
off tube, allowing g a s  molecules in the void between the inner and outer tank 
walls t o  escape when the  spacecraft is in  orb i t .  This increases system 
efficiency by reducing heat transfer. The actuator assembly consists of a 
body, piston/cutter blade, shear pin, breech b a l l i s t i c  hose, and a dual- 
bridgewire e lectr ical ly  f i red gas  pressure car t r idge.  The body houses the 
piston/cutter blade retained by a shear pin and provides f o r  attachment of a 
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blade guard. The  actuator  body  assembly  is  bonded  and  strapped  in  place o
the  fuel  cell  hydrogen  tank  and  connected  to  the  breech  by a ballistic  hose. 
The  breech  provides  for  installation of the  carbridge  and  is  positioned 
approximately  nine  in.  from  the  actuator  to  protect  the  cartridge  from  the 
extreme  cold of the He tank.  The  gas  pressure  produced by firing  the  cart- 
ridge  is  transferred  through  the  ballistic  hose,  causing  the  piston/cutter 
blade  to  sever  the  shear  pin  and  to  move  foruard  with a high velocity  to 
split open the  vent  tube. As the  piston/cutter  blade  reaches  the  end of the 
body, a shoulder  stops  the  piston  travel.  The  blade guard attached  to  the 
actuator  body  provides a trap  for  fragments. 
Pyrotechnic  Devices  For  Experiments 
The  experiments  utilizing  pyrotechnic  devices  (cable-cutting  guillotines) 
to  sever  restraining  cables  and  allow  the  release  of  spring-loaded  doors  or 
equipment  include D-4, -7, -10, -12, -15, -16, M S C - 1 ,  -2, -3, -6, and S - 9 .  A 
large  wire  bundle  guillotine  with a dual-bridgewire  cartridge  was  used  to 
sever a holding  bolt  on  the  extravehicular  support  package  and  holding  bolt 
and  two  tubes  on  the  astronaut  maneuvering  unit. 
The  rendezvous  evaluation  pod  was  jettisoned  from  the  adapter  of  Space- 
craft 5 by a pyrotechnic  ejector  employing  two  electrically  fired  gas  pressure 
cartridges.  This  ejector  was  similar  to  the  horizon  scanner  release  assembly 
in  design  and  operation,  except  for  output  charge  of  the  cartridge. 
Pyrotechnic  Development  And  Qualification  Tests 
Numerous  breadboard  development  tests  were  conducted  on  each  pyrotechnic 
device  at  component  and  system  levels  to  obtain  the  correct  operating  time, 
pressure,  and  mechanical  function. 
Qualification  tests  of  devices  shown  on  Table 27 were  made  while  under 
the  environmental  condition,  or  after  exposure  to  the  condition. 
Z 13 Separation  Assembly  Tests. - The Z 13 separation  assembly  was 
environmentally  tested  utilizing  test  sections  or  strips.  The  test  units 
consisted  of a section  of  simulated  spacecraft  structure  approximately 24 in. 
long with a section  of F’LX assembly  attached  as  in  the  production  assembly. 
One  single  and  one  dual-bridgewire  detonator  were  installed  on  each  section. 
The  units  were  fired  by  applying  four  amps  or 30 VDC to  one  or  both  detonators 
according  to  the  test  schedule.  The  nine  vendor  system  or  performance  tests 
were full scale  separation  assemblies  mounted on boiler  plate  structure. 
These  units  were  fired  with 60 linear  in.  of  the  shaped  charge  at 2880~. All 
tests  were  successful.  The  six  McDonnell  system  tests  were  conducted  on 
boiler  plate  structure  utilizing  production  pyroswitches,  guillotines  and  wire 
bundles.  The  system  was  sequenced  the  same  as  production  systems. A l l  tests 
were  successful. 
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TABLE 27 PYROTECHNIC QUALIFICATION TEST SUMMARY 
D E V I C E  
_" "" " 
2 1 3  SEP. ASSY. 
269 SEP. ASSY. 
2100 SEP. ASSY. 
DETONATOR 
HORIZON SCANNER 
FAIRING REL.  ASSY. 
HORIZON SCANNER 
REL. ASSY. 
RENDEZVOUS EVAL.  
POD REL.  ASSY 
FRESH AIR DOOR 
NOSE FAIRING REL. ASSY. 
PYROSWITCH (41 PINS) 
PYROSWITCH ( 5 5  PINS) 
PYROSWITCH CARTRIDGE 
INSTANTANEOUS 
80 MS TIME  DELAY 
PYROSWITCH CARTRIDGE 
L A R G E  WIRE BUNDLE (LWB)  
G U I L L O T I N E  
(LWB) CARTRIDGE (INST.) 
(LWB)   CARTRIDGE 
(120 MS TIME  DELAY)  
SMALL WIRE B U N D L E  (SWB) 
G U I L L O T I N E  
(SWB) CARTRIDGE (INST.) 
(SWB) CARTRIDGE 
(120 MS TIME  DELAY)  
1/8 D I A .   C A B L E   C U T T E R  
(WITH INST. CART.) 
GUILL.   (EXPERIMENTS) 
1/16 D I A .   C A B L E   C U T T E R  
GUILL.  (LATCH COVERS)  
(2.0 SEC. T IME  DELAY  CART. )  
EMER. DOCK. REL. (1/8 OIA. 
C A B L E   C U T T E R   G U I L L .   C A R T . '  
DOCKING BAR 
EXTEND  CART.  
JETTISON CART. 
T U B I N G   C U T T E R A E A L E R  
VENDOR 
E T  
E T  
3 A / C T I  
CTI 
DEA/  
HOLEX 
T A L L E Y  
T A L L E Y  
D E A /  
HOLEX 
CTI  
OA/ 
WCDONNELI 
O A /  
MCDONNELI 
C T I  
OA/  
MCDONNEL 
OA/  
MCDONNEL 
C T I  
C T I  
OA/  
MCDONNEL 
C T I  
C T I  
OA/CTI  
ICDONNELL 
:TI 
MCDONNEL 
MCDONNEL 
C T I  
C T I  
MCDONNEL 
/CTI 
- 
< 
J < 
\ 
n 
I 
W c 
X 
- 
~~ - 
20 I S  
3 
3 
20 
20 
6 
3 
- 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
6 
3 
- 
- 
J < 
\ 
I 
W 
0 
J 
c' 
n 
c 
- 
10 
5 
3 
3 
10 
10 
6 
3 
- 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
6 
3 
- 
IO 5 
5 3  
3 3  
3 3  
10 5 
~ -~ 
10 5 
- -  
3 3  
3 -  
3 3  
3 3  
3 3  
3 3  
3 3  
3 3  
3 3  
3 3  
3 3  
3 3  
3 3  
3 3  
3 3  
3 3  
3 3  
6 6  
3 3  
- 
- 
i 
c - 
X 
U 
0 
5 
- 
10 
3 
3 
3 
20 
20 
- 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
6 
3 
- 
> 
I- - 
P 
3 
I 
~ 
15 
10 
3 
3 
ZO 
20 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
6 
3 
z 
E 
< 
Y 
J 
Y 
U 
U 
4 
5 
2 
3 
3 
5 
- 
- 
5 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
6 
3 
6 
U 
L 
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I 
' +  0 
: s z  
- 6 25 
- - 25 
" - 
" -  
2 6 25 
2 6 25 
- -  6 
2 6  6 
2 "  
2 "  
2 "  
- 6 -  
- 6 -  
2 "  
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2 -  - 
- 6 -  
- 6 -  
2 6 -  
2 6 -  
2 "  
2 "  
- 6 -  
- 6 -  
R E L I A B I L I T Y  
ASSURANCE 
T E S T  
SE 
20 
- 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
- 
- 
12 
12 
- 
19 
19 
- 
19 
19 
23 
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3 
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*UNITS WERE FIRST HUMIDITY - TESTED,  THEN VIBRATION - TESTED. 
The following reliabil i ty assurance tests w e r e  conducted t o  demonstrate 
(1) a detonator output of 1.3 times that required, and (2) that detonators 
w i l l  i n i t i a t e  the boosters which i n   t u r n   i n i t i a t e  the FLEE with a gap of 
1.5 times maximum blueprint gap. 
A. Fifty detonators were divided into five groups of ten each. Each 
group was loaded wi th  a reduced output charge and fired into production FLEE 
at  a maximum blueprint gap of 0.015 in .  
GROUP PERCENT NORMAL OUTRTT FLSC INITIATED 
10 out of 10 
10 out of 10 
7 out of 10 
6 out of 10 
None 
B. Thirty production detonators were divided into six groups of f ive 
each. Each group was f i r ed  in to  a detonator block and FLSC assembly wi th  
ident ical  gap adjustments between the detonator to crossover and crossover 
booster t o  FLEX as shown. 
TEST GAP MAX. BWEPRINT GAP FLSC 
GROUP (INCHES) FACTOR INITIATED 
1 0.023 0.015 1.5 5 out  f 5 
2 0.030 0.015 2.0 5 out of 5 
3 0.038 0.015 2.5 5 out  f 5 
4 0.045 0.015 3.0 5 out of 5 
5 0.053 0.015 3 -  5 5 out  of 5 
6 0.060 0.015 4.0 5 out of 5 
Thir ty-f ive f i r ings were made with shaped booster caps and FLSC. A l l  
the f i r ings  w e r e  successful. The tests were divided into two groups as 
follows: Fifteen were made with booster against FLEE wi th  a lead sheath of 
0.025 in.  thick and ambient conditions. Twenty were made with an 0.050 in .  
s t ra ight- l ine gap between the booster and FLSC with a production lead sheath 
of 0.010 in.  thick and fired while a t  -54OF. 
Z 69 Separation Assembly Tests. - The Z 69 separation assembly was 
environmentally tested using test sections as was the Z 13 separation 
assembly. The Z 69 test unit also included the tube cutter, detonator, and 
interconnect. Simulated tubes f i l l e d  with l iquid a t  production pressures 
were in s t a l l ed  in  the tube cutter. 
Nine vendor performance tests were similar to   t he  Z 13 except wi th  60 
linear inches a t  270°F and 60 l inear  in .  on the opposite side a t  -9OOF. A l l  
tests were successful. 
Six successfulMcDonnel1 system t e s t s  were conducted similar to   t he  Z 13 
separation assembly tests. In addition, one assembly was placed i n  an 
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altitude  chamber  for 14 days  at a pressure  level  of 800,000 ft  before  firing 
(static 3). 
2 100 Separation  Assembly  Tests. - The 2 100 separation  assembly  was 
environmentally  tested  at  McDonnell,  to  accelerate  the  test  program.  Each 
test  assembly  consisted  of  three  cutters,  six  mild  detonating  fuse (MDF)
interconnects,  three  unions  and  three  detonators.  The  detonators  were 
manufactured by Central  Technology  Inc.  and  the  remainder of the  assembly  was 
manufactured  by  Ordnance  Associates,  Inc.  The  assemblies  were  mounted  on 
simulated  back-up  structure  for  firing  and  contained  the  tubes,  straps,  and 
wire  bundles  to  be  used  as  production  assemblies.  The  tubes  were  filled  with 
representative  liquid  and  capped.  All  tubes,  titanium  strap,  and  wire  bundles 
in  each  cutter  were  cut  in  two  planes.  The  detonators,  which  are  the  same 
type  as  those  used  for  the R & R separation  assembly,  also  were  environ- 
mentally  tested  at  CTI.  All  tests  were  successful.  The  following  reliability 
assurance  tests  were  conducted  to  demonstrate a de onator  output of 1.3 times 
that  required  by  reducing  the  output  load.  Tests  also  were  conducted  to 
demonstrate  propagation  with  gaps  of 1.5 times  maximum  blueprint  gaps  for  the 
components  of  the  cutter.  The  gaps  are  as  follows: 
GAp LOCATION 2 2% 
A Detonator/Interconnect 0.040 0.060 
B Interconnect  Booster/ 0.032 0.051 
C Interconnect  Booster/ 0.014 0.021 
D Interconnect  Booster/ 0.020 0.030 
E Parallel  Main Column/ 0.078 0.113 
F Crossover/Output  Can 0.027 0.041 
G Output  Can/FLSC 0.088 0.132 
Booster 
Interconnect 
Parallel  Booster 
nsc 
Crossover 
A.  Detonator  Output  Tests  (Five  Groups) 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
fired). 
fired). 
fired). 
fired). 
Ten  detonators  with 10% output  charge  and l5O#, gaps  A-B-C (all 
Ten  detonators  with 10% output  charge  and  lo@$  gaps  A-B-C  (all 
Three  detonators  with 80$ output  charge  and 10% gaps  A-B-C  (all 
Three  detonators  with 60$ output  charge  and 10% gaps  A-B-C (all 
5. Three  detonators  with 4 6  output  charge  and 106 gaps A-B-C (all 
fired). 
B. Gap  Tests  (Three  Groups) 
1. Five  detonators  with 106 output  and 156 gaps  E-F-G (all fired). 
2. Five interconnect/interconnect booster (B) l5C$ gap (all fired). 
3. Five  interconnect  booster/FLSC (D) 156 gap (all fired). 
C. Six  McDonnell  system  tests  were  conducted  on  boiler  plate  structures 
as 2 69 assemblies  and  sequentially  fired as a system. A l l  tests  were 
successful. 
Emergency  Docking  Release  Tests. - The  emergency  docking  release (EDR) 
unit  was  manufactured by McDonnell  and  environmentally  qualification-tested 
with  its  cartridges  at  CTI.  The  cartridges  were  manufactured  by  CTI  and  are 
the'  same  as  those  utilized  with  the 1/8 in.  diameter.  cable  cutter  guillotine. 
After  subjecting  the EDR assembly  to  various  environments,  the  devices  were 
installed  on a load  test  fixture  and  fired  to  verify  proper  operation.  Ten 
assemblies  were  fired  after a limit  load  of 4250 lb was  applied  to  the  latch 
and  then  released,  and  five  were  fired  as  this  limit  load  was  being  applied. 
Two units  without  cartridges  were  static-tested by applying a load  in  excess 
of  the 5770 lb  ultimate  load  until  the  shear  pins  failed.  The  latch  recepta- 
cles  from  five  assemblies  without  cartridges  were  torqued  to 100 in.  lb  and 
held  for 200 hr.  The  torque  was  verified  once  daily  to  insure  that  the 
receptacles  had  not  loosened. Tiro of  these  assemblies  then  were  mounted  on 
the  load  test  fixture  and  subjected  to  more  than 1500 cycles  of  loads  from 
zero  to 4250 lb  to  zero  on  the  latch. A l l  tests  were  successful. 
The  normal  reliability  assurance  tests  were  conducted  utilizing a single 
cartridge  with  reduced  output  charge  to  actuate  the  device.  All  the  cart- 
ridges  with 67$ or  more  output  charge  actuated  the  device.  The 40$ output 
charge  cartridges  did  not,  as  expected,  actuate  the  device. 
Nine  reaction  load  tests  were  conducted  on  assemblies  utilizing  two 
cartridges  with  the  output  charge  uploaded  as  follows: 
A .  Three  firings  with lo@ output  charge. 
B. Three  firings  with ll5$ output  charge. 
C.  Three  firings  with 1 3 6  output  charge. 
The  assembly  was  proof-tested by utilizing  two  cartridges  with  an  output 
of 12oqd. The  assembly  was  also  burst-tested by utilizing  two 156 normal 
output  cartridges  to  insure  that  no  yielding  or  deformation  of  the  pressure 
chamber  occurred. A l l  tests  were  successful. 
In addition  to  the  qualification  firings,  McDonnell  conducted  six  full- 
scale  firings  on  an R & R section  as a system  test  with  three EDR's and  three 
latch  cover  systems  on  each  firing. All tests  were  successful. 
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Docking Bar Assembly Tests. - The docking bar manufactured by McDonnell 
was environmentally tested by CTI with i t s  CTI-designed and manufactured 
cartridges. Four &its w e r e -  fired simultaneously so that the extension and 
je t t ison  car t r idges were pulsed simultaneously to insure proper sequence 
operat  ion. 
Twenty un i t s  were sequentially f ired so that the extension cartridge 
was fired first t o  extend the indexing bar, then the jett ison cartridges were 
fired.  Twelve of the sequentially-fired units had a 1100 l b  limit load 
applied a t  the extreme end of the extended indexing bar, normal t o   t he  
center l ine ;   th i s  was then released and the je t t ison car t r idge fired. 
Two units without cartridges w e r e  s ta t ic- tes ted by extending the bar, 
one unit was tested by applying a load TOO l b  i n  excess of the 1500 l b  
ultimate load normal t o  the ba r  un t i l  f a i lu re  occurred. The other unit was 
tested by applying a load 1070 l b  i n  excess of the 1500 l b  ultimate load a t  
15 degrees above normal un t i l  f a i lu re  occurred. Two units without cartridges 
were s ta t ic - tes ted  to  insure  that the indexing bar would be retained during 
t h e  ascent forces. A calculated force of 31.2 l b  was applied without any 
fai lure .  The load force then was increased until failure occurred verifying 
the 1.5 margin of safety. 
Three system tests for  the  assembly included a dynamic force  tes t  
conducted by the vendor. The docking bar  assembly was mounted on a produc- 
tion support structure of the R & R section and test-fired as follows: 
A .  One assembly s tabi l ized a t  200°F and held  for  a period of four h r  
B. One assembly a t  room ambient conditions. 
C.  One assembly s tabi l ized a t  - 6 5 0 ~  and held for a period of nine h r  
before firing. 
before firing. 
Nineteen rel iabi l i ty   assurance tests were conducted on the  assembly with 
both the extension and jettison cartridge containing reduced output charges 
and sequentially fired. 
A. Five assemblies with 106 output and lo@ shear pin - a l l  fired. 
B. Three assemblies with 80$ output and lo# shear pin - al l  fired.  
C.  Three assemblies with 6O$ output and 100$ shear pin - a l l  fired. 
D. Three assemblies with 4 6  output and loo$ shear pin - did not func- 
E. Five assemblies with 10% output and 8 6  je t t ison shear  pins  - a l l  tion. 
fired (shear pin held un t i l   j e t t i son   cyc le ) .  
One assembly with the indexing b a r  in  the  retracted  posit ion was 
hydrostatically proof (126) and burst ( 1 5 6 )  tested. 
McDonnell conducted ful l -scale  shock tests per TR 052-044.09 i n  which 
the docking bar and emergency release assemblies (all without cartridges) were 
ins ta l led  on a production R & R section. The indexing bar was manually 
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extended,  and  the R & R section  assembly  then  was  impacted  approximately 20 
times  with  the  docking  cone  simulating  various  docking  conditions. 
McDonnell  conducted a docking bar, Spacecraft 11 configuration  demon- 
stration  test  per TR 052-069.56 in  which  the  indexing bar was  manually 
extended  and a docking bar mirror,  tether  clamp  and  tether  weighted  to  three 
lb  were  attached. Two jettison  cartridges  were  installed  and  initiated 
electrically.  The  indexing bar was  jettisoned  and  the  weighted  tether 
separated  from  the  indexing bar. 
McDonnell  conducted  development  and  demonstration  tests  per TR's 
052-069.57, 052-069.57.01, 052-069.57.02 and.052-069.57.03  to  determine  under 
what  applied  side  load  the  indexing bar could  be  jettisoned  with  single 
cartridge  firing. A side  load  of 100 lb  was  determined  to  be  acceptable  for 
mission  plans  which  was  successmlly  demonstrated  with  single  and  dual 
cartridge  firings. 
Mission  Anomalies 
The  anomalies  associated  with  the  pyrotechnic  system  were  electrical 
circuitry  problems,  whereby  electrical  energy  was  not  delivered  to  the 
redundant  cartridge. 
A.  Spacecraft 3 - Fresh  Air  Door - The  device  functioned  but  one  cart- 
B. Spacecraft 6 - Docking  System - The  system  functioned  but  one  jettison ridge  did  not  fire. 
cartridge  (docking bar) and  one  cartridge  in  each  of  the  emergency  docking 
release  assemblies  and  cover  release  guillotines  did  not  fire. 
Pyrotechnic  Qualification  Test  Summary - (See  Table 27) 
Pytotechnic  Failure Summary - (See  Table 28) 
Mission  Evaluation 
The  pyrotechnic  systems  have  f'unctioned  successfully  on  all  missions. 
MISSION PLANNING 
INTRODUCTION 
The  major  objective of the  Gemini  mission  planning  was  to  maximize,  within 
reasonable  limits,  the  probability  of  mission  success. To accomplish  this 
objective,  two  basic  phases of planning  were  undertaken. 
Early  in  the  program,  mission  and  design  objectives  were  developed so
that  the  systems  configuration  requirements  could  be  determined  for  both  the 
Gemini  Spacecraft  and  the  modifications  to  the  target  and  launch  vehicles. 
Following  this,  design  reference  missions  were  established  which  permitted  the 
detailed  specification  of  the  hardware  requirements. 
The  second  phase  was  the  development  of  mission  plans  for  each  flight 
including  both  onboard  operations  and  the  ground  tracking  and  computation 
operations.  This  phase  established a logical  progression  of  missions  and 
maximized  the  probability  of  success  of  each  mission. 
In addition  to  preflight  planning,  some  mission  planning  was  conducted 
during  flights  in  response  to  nonnominal  situations. 
During  the  Gemini  program,  nine  different  configurations  of  the  onboard 
computer  program  were  defined  and,  with  only  three  exceptions,  were  carried 
through  acceptance  test  selloff.  The  large  number  of  configurations  was a 
result  of  additional  mission  requirements  that  were  defined  as  the  Gemini 
program  progressed.  Subsequent  paragraphs  will  describe  the  evolution  of  the 
different  versions  of  the  operational  programs,  the  major  differences  between 
them,  the  analysis  effort  involved  in  defining  the  various  computer  modes,  and 
the  various  levels  of  testing  which  were  used  to  verify  the  computer  programs. 
Description  Of  Math  Flow 
The  Gemini  Spacecraft  digital  computer (SDC) program  originally  was 
designed  to  accomplish  the  mission  objectives  defined  early  in  the  program. 
On later  flights,  the SDC program  was  revised  to  accommodate  new  mission 
objectives  within  the  limited  computer  memory  capacity  of 12,288 13-bit 
instructions.  The  computer  program  also  was  changed  to  improve  guidance 
technique.and  accuracy.  Consequently,  the SDC program  evolved  from  the 
relatively  simple  first  program,  titled  "Gemini  Math  Flow"  which  consisted  of 
four  operational  modes,  to  the  complex  Math  Flow  Seven,  which  utilized  the 
auxiliary  tape  memory (ATM) and  consisted  of  six  program  modules  containing 
nine  operational  modes. 
The  first  math  flow  contained  the  ascent,  catchup,  rendezvous, and 
re-entry  modes  and  was  used  in  acceptance  testing  of  engineering  model 
computers.  The  second  math  flow  evolved  from  the  desire  to  provide  orbital 
navigation  and  re-entry  mode  initialization  capabilities.  The  computer 
memory  capacity  was  insufficient  for  this  math  flow  and,  consequently,  Math 
Flow Two was  short-lived. 
Math Flow Three,  which  was  used  in  Spacecraft 2, was  similar  to  the 
second  math  flow  except  for  the  deletion  of  orbital  navigation  and  re-entry, 
mode  initialization  capabilities.  Math  Flow Four contained  the  touchdown 
TABLE 28 PYROTECHNIC FAILURE SUMMARY 
TEST 
(1 )   GENERAL 
( 2 )  QUAL  (213 )  
I 
VERIFICATION 
(8) M C D O N N E L L  
TEST (VIB)  
RENDEZVOUS 
E V A L  POD REL 
ASSY 
P R O B L E M  
PRIME VENDOR HAD DIFFICULTIES 
WITH THE MANUFACTURING AND 
Q U A L   T E S T I N G  OF DETONATORS, 
CARTRIDGES, GUILLOTINES, 
PYROSWITCHES, AND TUBING 
CUTTER/SEALER.  
D E T O N A T O R  I N S T A L L A T I O N  
PUSHED FLSC AWAY FROM 
INIT IATING BOOSTER.  VARIATION 
OF STAND-OFF BETWEEN BOOST- 
ER/FLSC  TOO  GREAT.  
DlPAM SHAPED CHARGE BLIS-  
TERED.  
T U B E   C U T T E R   F A I L E D   T O   I N I T I -  
ATE.  
T U B E C U T T E R  I N T E R C O N N E C T  
F A I L E D  T O  P R O P A G A T E .  
O N E  D E T O N A T O R  B L O C K B L E W  
F L S C  F R O M U N D E R O T H E R D E T  
B L O C K  A T  D O U B L E  D E T  B L O C K  
AREA. 
THESINGLE BRIDGEWIRE DETO- 
N A T O R  F A I L E D  TO I N I T I A T E  F L S C  
BOOSTER OF TEST STRIP. 
~ ~ 
THE  ASSEMBLY  FAILED  TO  WITH-  
S T A N D  A N  A X I A L  L O A D  OF 1500 
LB FOR FIVE MINUTES DURING 
RANDOM  SPECTRUM. 
. ~" - 
CORRECTIVE ACTION 
_. 
SPACECRAFT 2 UTIL IZED THE PRIME VENDOR' !  
(OA) CARTRIDGES AND DETONATORS WITH 
DUAL BRIDGEWIRES CIRCUITS IN ALL UNITS.  
ABBREVIATED  QUAL  TESTS  WERE  CONDUCTED 
ON THESE UNITS WHICH CONSISTED OF HI-  
TEMP/ALT,  HUMIDITY,  V IBRATION,  AUTO-  
IGNITION, PROOF AND BURST PRESSURE 40-FT 
DROP, ONE AMP NO-FIRE, ONE WATT NO-FIRE. 
THE UNITS WERE A C C E P T A N C E  T E S T E D  AS 
FOLLOWS: BRIDGEWIRE RESISTANCE, LEAKAGE 
VIBRATION, 2OO0F T E M P  SOAK ?4 HOUR, RE- 
S ISTANCE AND DIELECTRIC.  
SPACECRAFT 3 AND  UP - M C D O N N E L L  ASSUME1 
THE DESIGN AND MANUFACTURING OF T H E  
G U I L L O T I N E S ,   T U B I N G   C U T T E R A E A L E R   A N D  
PYROSWITCHES WHICH WERE NOT AVAILABLE. 
MCDONNELL ENGAGED SECOND VENDOR (DTI)  
FOR DETONATORS AND CARTRIDGES WITH 
THEIR ASSOCIATED DEVICED WERE QUALIF IED.  
MADE DETONATOR BLOCK A PART OF THE 
SHAPED  CHARGE ASSY AND  SHAPED  BOOSTER 
T O  F I T  F L S C  SO THAT BOOSTERS WERE IN 
CONTACT WITH FLSC. 
CHANGED FLSC FROM DIPAM TO RDX. SPACE- 
"i 
C R A F T  2 U T I L I Z E D   D l P A M   F L S C .  
REDESIGNED TUBE CUTTER,  ADDED A DETO-  
___ 
NATOR AND REMOVED ONE EXPLOSIVE INTER- 
CONNECT. SPACECRAFT 2 U T I L I Z E D  ASSY 
WITH TWO INTERCONNECTS. 
INCREASED ACCEPTER CHARGE IN EXPLOSIVE 
INTERCONNECT (40 TO  55  mg). 
ADDED SOLID BLAST SHIELD BETWEEN DETO-  
NATOR  BLOCKS  AND  ADDED TWO STIFFENERS 
AT END OF SHAPED CHARGE. 
A NEW LOT OF DETONATORS WERE FABRI- 
CATED INCORPORATING "TARE" WEIGHED 
CHARGE BUILD-UP.  
." ~- 
THE TANG LOCK RETAINER WAS REPOSITIONED 
TO COVER MORE OF THE TANGS, PREVENTING 
THEM FROM CAMMING OUT FROM UNDER THE 
RETAINER PREMATURELY.  
T A B L E  28 PYROTECHNIC FAILURE SUMMARY (Continued) 
TEST 
" . 
( 9 )  C A R T - Q U A L ' H ~  
SCANNER  REL  
ASSY 
. - 
( io )  QUAL - (VIB) 
HORIZON 
SCANNER 
RELEASE ASSY 
r (11)  MCDONNELL TEST HORIZON SCANNER -~ -" 
(12) S P A C E C R A F T  4 
VERIF ICATION 
(HSFR) 
GENCY DOCKIN( 
RELEASE 
(17) Q U A L   ( V l B )  
DOCKING 
(18) SPACECRAFT 11 
VERIF ICATION 
213 DETONATOF 
P R O B L E M  
T H E  O R I G I N A L  C A R T R I D G E  F A I L E t  
~~ 
TO MEET THE ONE AMP/WATT NO-  
F IRE REQUIREMENT.  
ASSY WITH  ALUMINUM  PISTON 
FAILED  S INUSOIDAL  V IBRATION.  
- ~~~ - ~ ~~ 
" " 
THE CHAMBER P L U G B L E W O U T  
DURING AMBIENT TEST.  
AHSFR  FA ILED  TO  FUNCTION.  
ANALYSIS  INDICATED THAT THE 
LOCKING PINS H A D  I N T E R F E R E D  
WITH THE ID OF CYLINDER 
ENERGY. 
T H E   C A R T  WAS SUSPECTED OF 
Y I E L D I N G  LOW ENERGY. 
~ ~ _ _ _ _ _  
.. "" .- 
____-.__ ~- "_ 
PISTON FRACTURED ALLOWING IT 
TO  DEFORM  THE  CLOSURE  CAP.  
HOWEVER, AT A L L  T IMES  THE  DE-  
V ICE FUNCTIONED.  
ONE CARTRIDGE HAD TO EXTEND 
THE BAR WHILE IN A TEMP RANGE 
OF -65OF TO +250°F. WHEN TWO 
CARTRIDGES WERE USED IN THE 
DEVICE FOR REDUNDANCY, THE 
PRESSURE GENERATED WOULD 
SHEAR THE PIN AND JETTISON 
THE BAR. 
"" _____ . . ". ~~~ 
~" ~~ ~ 
THE ELECTRICAL P O R T ~ ~ N - O F  
~ _ _ _ _ _ _  
THE JETTISON CARTRIDGE WAS 
E X P E L L E D  F R O M  T H E  C A R T R I D G E  
C A R T R I D G E   W A L L   R U P T U R E D   A T  
T H R E A D   R E L I E F .  
BREECH CRACKED ON SINUSOIDAL 
V IBRATION 
- ~~ - 
. -~ ~ ~~~ ~~ 
ONE DETONATOR FAILED TO IN-  
IT IATE THE FLSC BOOSTER OR 
T H E  2 1 3  TEST STRIP. 
~- . ~ 
CORRECTIVE  ACTION 
VENDOR  FABRICATED NEW CARTRIDGES (RE- 
MOVED  EPOXY  SEAL)  AND  REDESIGNED  TIME 
DELAY COLUMN TO PREVENT OUTAGE.  
REDESIGN.ED  ASSEMBLY  WHICH  INCORPORATED 
A STAINLESS STEEL PISTON. THIS ASSEMBLY 
PASSED  RANDOM  VIBRATION  TEST.  STEEL 
PISTON ASSY INCORPORATED SPACECRAFT 4 
AND UP. 
CHAMBER PLUG AND ADJOINING AREA WAS RE- 
DESIGNED TO INCREASE THREAD STRENGTH. 
T O  INSURE ZERO INTERFERENCE IN THIS AREA 
A 100% PIN TO PIN PRE-ASSEMBLY ACCEPT- 
ANCE INSPECTION WAS ADDED. 
A NEW LOT OF CARTRIDGES WAS F A B R I C A T E D  
INCORPORATING "TARE" WEIGHED OUTPUT 
CHARGE. 
THE PISTON WAS REDESIGNED TO INCORPO- 
R A T E  A LARGER FILLET RADIUS.  THE NEW 
PISTON WAS TESTED 18 TIMES WITHOUT FAIL-  
URE. 
A SINGLE CARTRIDGE WITH DUAL BRIDGE- 
WIRES AND A SLOW BURNING  PROPELLANT , 
WAS DEVELOPED  AND  QUAL  TESTED  WITH  THE 
DEVICE FOR THE EXTENSION CYCLE. 
A NEW LOT OF CARTRIDGES WAS F A B R I C A T E D  
WITH HEAVIER/STRONGER BODIES. ( INTERNAL 
D I A   A T   T H R E A D   R E L I E F  WAS REDUCED FOR 
FOR THICKER WALL).  
BREECH REDESIGNED WITH LARGER RADIUS 
AND  MATERIAL  CHANGED  TO  STAINLESS 
STEEL.  THIS ASSY PASSED RANDOM VIBRATION 
TEST PER THE SCD. 
A NEW LOT OF DETONATORS WAS FABRICATED,  
INCORPORATING "TARE" WEIGHED OUTPUT 
CHARGE. 
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predict  mode  which  provided  re-entry  mode  initialization  nearly  independent 
of  the  ground.  This  program  utilized 12,150 of  the 12,288 available  instruc- 
tions  and  was  at  that  time  planned  to  be  flown on Spacecraft 3 and  up. A 
February 1964 NASA directive  changed  the  guidance  logic  of  the  re-entry  mode 
to a constant  bank  angle  logic  rather  than  the  proportional  bank  angle  and 
constant  roll  rate  logic  common  to all previous  math  flows.  This,  and  other 
changes,  became  Math  Flow  Five,  and”ath  Flow  Four  was  terminated.  Math  Flow 
Five  saturated  the  computer  memory  and  was  cancelled  at a McDonnell/NASA 
management meeting  approximately  three  days  after  being  defined. 
At  the same meeting,  it  was  decided  to  fly  slightly  modified  versions  of 
Math  Flow  Three on Spacecraft 3 and 4 and  to  define a new  program,  Math  Flow 
Six,  effective  Spacecraft 5 and  up.  The  modified  versions  of  Math  Flow  Three 
which  were  flown  on  Spacecraft 3 and 4, were  titled  Math  Flow  Three  Mod I and 
Mod 11, respectively. 
The  addition  of  the ATM to  the  IGS,  effective  Spacecraft 8 and  up, 
provided  the  means  for  increasing  the SDC program’s  capabilities.  The 
resulting  modularized  program  was  called  Math  Flow  Seven. 
Table 29 provides a brief  general  description  of  the  Gemini SDC math 
flows.  The  descriptions are given  in  the  form  of  major  changes  and/or  addi- 
tions to the  previous  edition. 
Analysis 
Simulations  were  utilized  extensively  in  defining  and  evaluating  the 
different  computer  modes  of  the  Gemini  operational  programs.  These  simula- 
tions  generally  fall  into  the  following  categories: 
A. Early  Simulations - used  to  evaluate  equations  and  served as a basis 
B. Man-in-the-loop  Simulation - to  define  input/output  requirements, 
C. Refined  Digital  Simulations - to  determine  performance  characteristics 
for  configuring a given  computer  mode. 
procedures,  and  display  format. 
and  to  perform  error  analysis. 
Fig. 46 portrays  the  recommended  procedure  for  establishing a specifi- 
cation  control  document (ED), which  was  the  basis  for  the  development  of  an 
operational  computer  mode. Of the  ten  computer  modes  ultimately  developed, 
only  four  (ascent,  catchup,  rendezvous,  and  re-entry)  went  through  this  ty-pe 
of  development.  The  analysis  of  the  remainder  of  the  computer  modes  was 
accomplished  concurrently  with  their  programming  by I B M  for  the  onboard 
computer. A sUnrmary of McDonnell  simulation  programs  used  in  the  development, 
definition,  and  evaluation  of  the  various  computer  modes  is  presented  in 
Table 30. 
Testing 
Verification  of  the  equations  and  determination  that  accuracy  require- 
meats  could be met  was  initiated  at IBM Space  Guidance  Center,  Owego,  New  York 
immediately  upon  receipt  of  the  McDonnell SCb. The  results  of FORTFUN 
simulation  of  the  operational  mode  were  compared  to a simula ion  of  the  exact 
equations to verify  the  validity  and  accuracy of the  equations.  The  basic 
testing  of  the  coded  program  was  conducted  at I B M  in  the  configuration  control 
test  system  (CCTS)  laboratory.  Flight  hardware  used  in  CCTS  checkout  con- 
sisted of the  computer,  manual  data  insertion  unit (MDN), and  incremental 
velocity  indicators (IVI). Inputs  from  other  systems,  e.g.,  radar  and 
accelerometer,  were  provided  by  simulators. 
The  formal  acceptance  testing  was  performed  when  the  operational  program 
was  considered  to  be  ready  for  flight.  This  testing  was  conducted  using  hard- 
ware  and  simulators  similar  to  those  in  the  CCTS  lab.  Post-acceptance  testing 
of the  operational  program  was  conducted  at I B M ,  McDonnell,  St.  Louis  and 
Cape  Kennedy. 
The  purpose of the  mission  verification  simulation (MVS) was  to  verify 
that  the IGS, loaded  with  the  operational  program  and  operating  with  dynamic 
inputs,  performed  in  an  acceptable  and  predictable  manner.  Actual  flight-type 
hardware  used  in MVS testing  consisted  of  the  computer,  IVI, MDN time 
reference  system,  and  attitude  display  group.  Other  inputs  were  supplied  by 
a 7090 computer  through  hardware  simulators. 
The  post-acceptance  testing  included  spacecraft  systems  tests (SST) at 
St.  Louis  and  launch  pad  tests  at  Cape  Kennedy,  and  were  essentially  the  same 
except  that  testing  for  booster  guidance  compatibility  with  that  of  the  space- 
craft  was  only  conducted  at  the  launch pad. The  tests  established  the  proper 
operation  of  the  computer  and  the  operational  program  in  the  total  system 
configuration.  These  tests  were  similar  to  the  acceptance  tests  at I B M during 
computer  and  operational  program  selloff. 
The  operational  program  errors  which  were  detected  during  post-acceptance 
testing  are  summarized  in  Table 31. 
DEVEWPMENT OF  MISSION AND DESIGN  OBJECTIVES 
The  rendezvous  and  re-entry  requirements  had a major  effect  on  mission 
and  design  objectives.  Early  analyses  established  the  need  for  the adar,
inertial  guidance  system,  orbital  attitude  and  maneuvering  system  and  digital 
command  system.  The  inertial  guidance  system  was  required  primarily  for 
navigating  through  re-entry,  and  the  radar  and  maneuvering  system  were  needed 
for  rendezvous.  Additional  studies  evaluated  the  orbital  requirements, 
particularly  the  desired  target  orbit  altitude  and  inclination  to  provide 
satisfactory  launch  windows. A description  of  the  launch  window  problem  is 
given  in  the  following  paragraphs. 
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TABLE 31 PROGRAM ERRORS DETECTED DURING POST ACCEPTANCE TESTING 
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If the  target  orbit  inclination  is  chosen  to  be  slightly  greater  than  the 
launch  site  latitude,  the  displacement of he  launch  site  from  the  orbit 
plane  will  be small for a fairly  long  period  of  time  as  shown  in  Fig. 47. By 
using a variable  launch  azimuth,  the  spacecraft  can  be  inserted  parallel  to 
the  target  orbit  plane  thus  minimizing  the  out-of-plane  displacement.  In 
addition,  yaw  steering  can  be  used  during  the  second  stage  of  powered  flight 
to  eliminate  the  out-of-plane  displacement  entirely  if  the  displacement  does 
not  exceed a certain  limit.  This  limit  is  dependent  upon  the  payload  penalty 
the  planner  is  willing  to  pay  and  was  chosen  to  be 0.53 degrees  for  Gemini. 
By  selecting a target  orbit  inclination 0.53 degrees  greater  than  the  launch 
site  latitude, a continuous  launch  capability  is  available  for 135 min  as 
shown  in  Fig. 48. This  time  is known as the  launch  plane  window.  Higher 
inclinations  break  this  window  into  two p a r t s  and  lower  inclinations  decrease 
the  length of the  window. 
The  target  orbit  altitude  also  affects  the  launch  window.  Since  the 
altitude  specifies  the  period  of  the  orbit,  it  determines  the  points  in  the 
plane  window  where  the  in-plane  phasing  is  equal  to  the  desired  value. The 
range  of  acceptable  phasing  values  determines  the  phasing  windows  or  "panes" 
within  the  launch  window  as  shown  in  Fig. 48. A desirable  situation  would 
be  to  achieve a zero  phasing  error  at  the  same  time  that  the  out-of-plane 
displacement  is  zero  on  several  consecutive  days.  While  this  can  be  achieved, 
the  required  altitudes  are  either so low that  lifetime  constraints  are  vio- 
lated  or so high  that  the  launch  vehicle  capabilities  are  exceeded. An 
altitude of 161 nautical  miles  was  finally  chosen  since  it  provides a phasing
I 
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window  within  the  plane  window  for  several  consecutive  days and furnishes a 
near  optimum  launch  condition  on  the  second  day  after  target  insertion. 
Another  orbital  selection f importance is the  spacecraft  insertion 
altitude.  An  evaluation  was  made of the  launch  vehicle  radio  guidance  system 
accuracies  (which  are a function  of  the  elevation  angle  at  insertion) , the 
exit  heating  requirements,  and  the  launch  vehicle  performance  capability. As 
a result,  an  insertion  altitude of 87 nautical  miles  was  chosen  for  the 
design  requirement. 
After  having  developed  the  basic  systems'  configuration  and  orbital 
obJectives,  three  basic  design  reference missions were  established  to  permit 
detailed  hardware  specifications  to  be  written.  The  first of these  was an 
unmanned  ballistic  mission  for  systems  and  heat  protection  qualification.  The 
second  was a manned  orbital 14-day mission  with a closed-loop  guidance 
re-entry,  and  the  third  was a manned  orbital  rendezvous  and  docking  with 
closed-loop  guidance  re-entry.  These  missions  were  flexible  enough  to  allow 
performance of many other  exercises  such  as  extravehicular  activity.:, 
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DEVELOPMENT OF OPERATIONAL MISSION PLANS 
A logical  progression of missions  was  developed  in  each of several  areas 
of the  missions. As examples,  the  rendezvous  and  closed-loop  re-entry 
guidance  progressions  will  be  described. 
The  rendezvous  planning  began  with  the  Spacecraft 3 mission  in  which  the 
propulsion  and  guidance  and  control  systems  were  evaluated.  It  continued  with 
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the  Spacecraft 4 mission  where a plan  was  developed  for  rendezvous  maneuvers 
and  station  keeping  with  the  spent  second  stage  of  the  launch  vehicle.  The 
plan  for  Spacecraft 5 was a rendezvous  with a rendezvous  evaluation  pod (REP) 
which  carried  aloft  with  the  spacecraft  and  eJected  in  orbit.  This  pod 
included a radar transponder  and  flashing  lights  to  allow a complete  checkout 
of the  onboard.  rendezvous  system.  While a l these  exercises  were  not  com- 
pleted,  they  were  valuable  in  that  they  provided  flight  experience  and  pointed 
out  problem  areas. I n  the  case  of  Spacecraft 5 ,  the  rendezvous  evaluation  pod 
exercise  was  cancelled  because of an electricsl  power  problem,  but  another 
exercise,  referred  to  as  the  phantom  rendezvous,  was  planned  and  executed  in 
real  time.  This  exercise  duplicated  the  maneuvers  planned  for  the  midcourse 
phase of the  first  Agena  rendezvous  mission  and  thus  verified  the  accuracy 
which  could  be  expected  during  this  phase. 
The  Spacecraft 6 crew  completed  the  first  rendezvous  on 15 December 19-65, 
with  Spacecraft 7. While  this  exercise  did  not  include a docking,  it  was 
successful  and  proceeded  almost  precisely  as  planned.  On  the  following 
mission,  the  Spacecraft 8 crew  was  able  to  successfully  rendezvous  and  dock 
with  an  Agena  Target  Vehicle.  Rendezvous  also  was  performed  successfully  on 
Spacecraft 9 through 12 missions. I n  addition,  several  of  these  missions 
included  more  than  one  rendezvous s  that  ten  rendezvous  exercises  in  all 
were  completed. 
The  closed-loop  re-entry  guidance  planning  began  with  guidance  system 
qualification  on  the  unmanned  Spacecraft 2 mission.  On  the  Spacecraft 3 
flight,  the  closed-loop  re-entry  procedures  were  evaluated  and a plan  was 
devised  for  utilizing  the  procedures  on  Spacecraft 4. When a computer  failure 
on  Spacecraft 4 prevented  this,  the  plan  was  rescheduled  for  the  Spacecraft 5 
mission.  However,  the  ground  complex  transmitted an incorrect  initialization 
of  the  re-entry  mode  on  Spacecraft 5, once  again  delaying  the  demonstration. 
Finally,  the  Spacecraft 6 crew  achieved a closed-loop  re-entry.  Following 
this,  closed-loop  re-entries  were  performed  on  Spacecraft 7 through 12 for a 
total  of  seven  successful  exercises. 
In  addition  to  developing a logical  progression  of  missions,  planning  for 
each  mission  involves  consideration  of  such  constraining  factors  as  launch 
windows,  systems  requirements,  crew  procedural  requirements,  necessary  con- 
ditions  for  in-flight  experiments  and  extravehicular  activity,  and  re-entry 
location.  Because  of  their  great  importance,  the  crew  procedural  requirements 
will  be  discussed  in  detail. 
The  four  main  procedural  requirements  are  as  follows: 
A.  Sufficient  time  for  the  crew  to  complete  the  necessary  crew  procedures. 
B. Approach  trajectories  which  are  reasonably  insensitive  to  insertion 
C. Lighting  conditions  which  are  compatible  with  back-up  procedures. 
D. Low terminal  approach  velocities  and  line-of-sight  angular  rates. 
dispersions  and  errors  in  catchup  maneuvers. 
Allowing  time  for  crew  procedures  affected  several  Gemini  missions.  For 
example,  the  Spacecraft 11 first  orbit  rendezvous  was  planned so that  terminal 
phase  initiation  occurred  near  first  spacecraft  apogee.  One of the  primary 
factors  in  delaying  terminal  phase  initiation  until  this  point  was  the  time 
required  for  crew  procedures. 
The  second  procedural  requirement  played n important  part  in  the  early 
rendezvous  planning.  It  was  desired  to  develop a plan  which  could  effect a 
near  nominal  terminal  approach  trajectory  in  spite  of  insertion  dispersions, 
spacecraft  equipment  degradation  or  ground  tracking  and  computation  errors. 
This  desire  stemmed  naturally  from  the  need  to  develop  terminal  phase  pro- 
cedures  which  could  be  employed  if a guidance  component  failed.  After  three 
approaches  were  studied,  the  coelliptical  approach  trajectory  was  selected. 
This  approach  has  been  utilized  on  all  of  the  Gemini  primary  rendezvous 
exercises  except  that  of  Spacecraft 11. 
The  need  for  lighting  conditions  which  are  compatible  with  back-up  pro- 
cedures  has  affected  all  of  the  rendezvous  missions.  The  desired  lighting 
situation  for  primary  rendezvous,  shown  in  Fig. 49, is  that  the  crew  be  able 
to  see  the  following: 
A. The  target  by  reflected  sunlight  prior  to  terminal  phase  initiation. 
B. The  target  acquisition  lights  against a ar  background  during  the 
C. The  target  by  reflected  sunlight  for  docking  in  daylight. 
terminal  transfer. 
This  lighting  situation  allows  the  crew  to  see  the  target  throughout  the 
rendezvous  operations  and  makes  possible  inertial  line-of-sight  angle  measure- 
ments  in  the  event of a platform  failure.  Lighting  conditions  are a factor 
in  selecting  the  terminal  phase  initiation  point,  the  central  angle  of  the 
transfer,  and  the  terminal  approach  angle.  The  desirable  lighting  condition 
for  rendezvous  with a passive  target  is  very  different  from  that  for  rendez- 
vous  with an active  target.  Since  the  passive  target  is  not  visible  in 
darkness,  the  rendezvous  is  conducted  in  daylight. In addition,  terminal 
phase  initiation  does  not  occur  until  near  the  midpoint  of  daylight.  Earlier 
initiations  place  the  sunline  too  near  the  line-of-sight  to  the  target  (as 
shown  in  Fig. 50) obscuring  the  target,  while  later  initiations  do  not  allow 
adequate  daylight  to  complete  the  rendezvous. 
The  final  requirement  imposed  by  the  need  for  workable  onboard  procedures 
is  that  the  trajectory  selected  have a low  terminal  approach  vel’ocity  and 
line-of-sight  angular  rate.  This  requirement  was  important  in  the  selection 
of  the  trajectory  parameters  in  both  the  coelliptical  and  first  orbit  rendez- 
vous  plans.  The 130 degree  transfer  utilized on several  missions  was  chosen 
primarily  because  of  the  low  line-of-sight  angular  rate  near  intercept.  For 
Spacecraft 11, a major  reason  for  the  selection  of  the  biased  apogee  plan  over 
a more  direct  approach  was  that  the  direct  approach  resulted  in a high  closing 
velocity. 
The manner in  which  these  constraints  were  involved  in  the  trajectory 
planning  was  illustrated  by  the  evolution  of  the  first  Gemini  rendezvous  plan. 
The  first  step  in  this  evolution  was  the  selection  of a few c ncepts  for 
achieving  the  desired  objectives.  As  shown  in  Fig. 51, three  different 
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concepts  were  selected.  The  first of these  was  the  tangential  plan  which 
employed  tangential  approach  of  the  spacecraft  to  the  target  vehicle  following 
four orbits  of  ground  commanded  catchup  maneuvers.  The  closed-loop  guidance 
system  was  used  in  this  plan  only  to  remove  trajectory  dispersions  since  the 
midcourse  maneuvers  nominally  placed  the  spacecraft  on  an  intercept  tra- 
jectory.  The  second  plan  has  similar  catchup  sequence  except  that  the 
final  midcourse  maneuver  established a coellip%ical  approach  trajectory.  The 
closed-loop  guidance  system  is  then  used  to  establish a collision  course. A 
third plan featured  rendezvous  at  first  spacecraft  apogee.  With  this  plan, 
the  Spacecraft  would  nominally  be  inserted on a collision  course  with  the 
target  and  the  closed-loop  system  would  be  used  to  correct  insertion 
dispersion. 
Careful  analysis  of a number of suitable  concepts  led  to  the  selection of 
the  plan  best  suited  to  fulfill  the  mission  objectives.  This  involved 
trajectory  error  analysis,  propellant  and  parer  consumption  studies,  an 
evaluation of the  suitability  of  the  plan  for  back-up  guidance  procedures  and 
a general  evaluation  of  the  flexibility of the  plan.  For  the  first  Gemini 
rendezvous,  these  studies  led  to  the  selection of the  coelliptical  rendezvous 
Plan* 
Primary  reasons  for  this  selection  were  as  follows: 
A. The  first  apogee  rendezvous  was  eliminated  froh  consideration  because 
of  the  relatively  high  expected  propellant  consumption. 
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B. The  coellipticd  plan  was  chosen  over  the  tangential plan because  the 
terminal  phase  of  the  coelliptical  plan  was  much  less  sensitive  to  off-nominal 
trajectory  conditions  or  equipment  performance. 
Development  of a single  operational  plan  involved  optimization  of  the 
trajectory  parameters,  development and testing  of  the  ground  support  programs, 
and  the  development,  evaluation  and  crew  training  associated  with  the  onboard 
procedures.  The  onboard  procedures are discussed i n  a follawing  section.  The 
primary  trajectory  parameters  to  be  optimized  for  the  first  rendezvous  mission 
were  the  central  angle  of  the  terminal  phase  transfer  and  the  coelliptical 
differential  altitude.  The  central  angle  to  transfer  was  chosen  to  satisfy 
several  of  the  mission  planning  requirements  described  earlier,  especially  in 
the  area  of  onboard  procedures.  First,  it  was  desired  that  the  transfer 
initiation  maneuver  be  along  the  line-of-sight  to  the  target  in  order  to 
provide a back-up  reference  direction  for  the  maneuver.  The  second  require- 
ment  was a'low terminal  line-of-sight  angular  rate  and  low  closing  rate. 
Finally,  it  was  desired  to  have  the  terminal  phase  initiation  point  below  and 
behind  the  target  vehicle  and  the  final  approach  from  below  and  ahead  of  the 
target  vehicle  to  optimize  the  lighting  conditions.  After an evaluation  of 
all  these  factors, a 130 degree  transfer  was  selected.  The  selection  of  the 
coelliptical  differential  altitude was based  on a trade-off  between (1) the 
desire  to  have  the  range  to  the  target  at  the "PI poin  small enough  that 
visual  acquisition  could be assured,  and (2) the  need  for a large  differential 
altitude  in  order  to  minimize  the  effect  of  insertion  dispersions  and  catchup 
maneuver  errors on the  location of terminal  phase  initiation. This trade-off 
resulted  in  the  choice  of a 15 nautical  mile  differential  altitude. 
This  basic  plan  with  only  minor  modifications  was  employed  on  every 
primary  rendezvous  of  the  Gemini  program  except  that  of  Spacecraft 11. The 
first  orbit  rendezvous  plan  of  Spacecraft 11 underwent  the  same  evolutionary 
phases  as  the  coelliptical  plan,  but  with  results  compatible  with  its 
different  objectives. 
RESULTS OF MISSION PLANNING 
As mentioned  previously,  the  mission  planning  effort  was  oriented  toward 
maximizing  the  probability  of  success  for  each mission. A discussion  of  major 
mission  objectives  and  accomplishments may be  found  in SPACECRAFT FLIGHT 
PERFORMANCE, page 34. 
Development  Of  Hybrid  Simulation 
The  Gemini  hybrid  simulations  were a natural  evolution  of  early  Gemini 
simulations,  which  were  e.ither  analog  or  digital  and  supported a wide  range 
of  studies  as  described  in G & C design  note 141. Since  the  requirement  for 
268 
the eqanded real-time  simulation  capability  of  hybrid  systems  was  already 
recognized  at  that  time,  this  design  note  also  describes  the  planning  to 
achieve a hybrid  capability. 
After  less  than  year  of  development  effort,  the  re-entry  hybrid 
simulation  was  being  used  for  evaluation  of  guidance  concepts.  Major  problem 
areas  encountered  during  this  time  were  digital  program  checkout  and  utiliza- 
tion of advanced  digital-analog  interface  equipment.  Other  hybrid  simulations 
which  became  operational  during 1964 are  summarized  in  Table 32. While  the 
simulations  originally  were  intended  for  guidance  evaluation  studies,  they 
became a useful  tool  for  familiarizing  flight  crews  with  the  required  pro- 
cedures. 
A decision  that  McDonnell  contribute  directly  to  procedures  development 
and  crew  training  initiated  additional  simulation  development.  Simulation 
hardware  and  programs  were  developed  in a parallel  effort.  Major  hardware 
improvements  included: a new  digital  computer  with  expanded  capability,  an 
additional  analog  computer, an improved  star-horizon  display, an improved 
reaction  jet  simulator,  new  Agena  target  models,  and  flight-qualified  crew 
stations  displays.  The  crew  station  is  shown  in  Fig. 52. Simulation 
developments  are  outlined  in  Table 32. 
Re-entry  Simulation. - Although  this  simulation  was  developed  for 
engineering  evaluations  prior  to  the  procedures  d.evelopment  period,  only  minor 
changes  were  required  to  simulate  specific  spacecraft  responses.  The  simula- 
tion  made a significant  contribution  to  the  re-entry  procedure  development  and 
crew  indoctrination  until  after  Spacecraft 8, at  which  time  re-entry  training 
was  transferred  to  the  Gemini  mission  simulator. 
Rendezvous  Simulation. - The  hybrid  simulation  for  evaluating  Spacecraft 6 
rendezvous  procedures  was  initiated  by  developing  an  all-digital  program  on 
the UNIVAC 1218 computer  using a simulated  guidance  computer  programmed  with 
Math  Flow Six. To  achieve  hybrid  operation,  an EA1 231 analog computer  was 
programmed  with  the  spacecraft  dynamics  and  control  systems  and an adage 
conversion  unit  allowed  the  necessary  transfer  of  data. To provide  for 
man-in-the-loop, a fixed  base  crew  station  was  built  and a closed  circuit 
television  window  display  was  incorporated. 
The  simulation  was  completely  reprogrammed  for  Spacecraft 8 utilizing  the 
CDC32OO digital  computer.  The  greater  speed  and  capacity  of  the 3200 allowed 
digital  simulation of the  platform  and  computation of display  drive  equations. 
This  reduced  the analog program  by  one-half  but  required  additional  digital  to 
analog  trunking  capability.  The  trunking  capability  was  accomplished by 
adding  eight  new  conversion  units  and  developing a multiplexing  capability. 
Also, the  math  flow  program  was  updated  to  Math  Flow  Seven  module V to be 
accurate for Spacecraft 8 simulation. An addition  to  the analog program  was a 
simulated  sextant  display  which  was  used  in  the  back-up  procedures.  This 
display  was  continuously  improved  during  the  rest  of  the  program. 
For  Spacecraft 10, the  math flaw was  again  updated  to  Math  Flow  Seven 
module I11 and a new  star  display  was  incorporated  using a spherical  star 
TABLE 32 GEMINI HYBRID SIMULATIONS 
I NAME 
I 1. RE-ENTRY a) 
2. BRAKING  AND 
DOCKING 
I 3. INSERTION  VELO- a )  CITY ADJUST ROUTINE (IVAR) 
I b )  
4. ASCENT 
5.  RE-ENTRY 
6 .  RENDEZVOUS 0 )  
(STATION-KEEPING) b )  
.) 
(IVAR) d)  
(MODULE 3)  e )  
(MODULE 3-2) 1 )  
7. MANEUVER WHILE 
I DOCKED 
8. NAVIGATION 
' PREDICT) 
(TOUCHDOWN 0 )  
(ORBIT  NAV.  AND b)  
PREDICT. 
(MODULE 6 )  C )  
(MODULE 6-3) d)  
TARTED COMPLETE1 
S E E N O T E ( 1 )  
3-25-64 7-12-64 
5- 3-65 5-21-65 
9- 9-64 12-18-64 
2-22-65 8- 7-65 
6-21-65  6-22-65 
12-30--64 2- 6-65 
7- 6-65 
10-11-65 10-21-65 
12- 6-65 
5- 9-66 
7-15-66 9-17-66 
12-27-65 
5-16-66 
5-26-66 
7-15-66 8-19-66 
PURPOSE 
TO STUDY RE-ENTRY FLIGHT 
CONDITIONS WITH MANUAL 
CONTROL. 
TO STUDY RE-ENTRY TO 
DESIRED SITE WITH MANNED 
CONTROL. 
TO EVALUATE PROPELLANT 
AND PROCEDURES FOR 
BRAKING AND DOCKING. 
DEVELOP  RENDEZVOUS 
BACK-UP CHARTS AND VERIFY 
PROPELLANT REQUIREMENTS. 
~~ 
EVALUATE IVAR CAPABIL ITY  
AND FAMILIARIZE 
ASTRONAUTS. 
ASTRONAUT TRAINING 
ASCENT  BACK-UP  CAPABILITY 
TO EVALUATE GEMINI  
ASTRONAUT TRAINING AND 
PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT. 
ASTRONAUT  TRAINING  AND 
PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT. 
SIMULATED ELEMENTS 
ENVIRONMENT (6 D O F ) ,  
MATH FLOW 3: RE-ENTRY 
GUIDANCE, PARTIAL ACME. 
SAME AND MATH FLOW 6 :  
RE-ENTRY GUIDANCE. 
MOTION, 6 DOF). PARTIAL 
ENVIRONMENT  (RELATIVE 
ACME. 
SAME 
ENVIRONMENT (6 DOF). 
MATH FLOW 3 AND 6: 
ASCENT AND CATCH-UP, 
P A R T I A L  ACME. 
SAME 
ENVIRONMENT (6 DOF)   MATH 
FLOW 3r ASCENT, RADIO 
SECONDARY AUTOPILOT, 
MALFUNCTION DETECTOR. 
BOOSTER ENGINES, AND 
GUIDANCE, PRIME AND 
SEE I b  
ENVIRONMENT (6 DOF), MATH 
RENDEZVOUS, PARTIAL ACME. 
FLOW 6: CATCHUP  AND 
SAME 
ENVIRONMENT (6 DOF a PLAT: 
MATH FLOW 7: MOD 5: CATCH- 
U P  AND RENDEZVOUS, ACME. 
SAME AND IVAR 
SAME AS Sa EXCEPT MODULE 
3 AN0 SIMULATED SEXTANT. 
SAME AS 5s WITH ATM AND 
IVAR PORTIONS OF MODULE 2. 
CATCHUP GUIDANCE. COM- 
ENVIRONMENT (6 DOF,  PLAT)  
BINED GEMINI-AGENA 
DYNAMICS, ACME.  AGENA 
CODER COMMAND SYSTEM. 
PRIMARY PROPULSION, EN- 
AGENA ASC ADDED FOR 
SPACECRAFT 11. 
TOUCHDOWN  PREDICT 
GUIDANCE. 
ENVIRONMENT (6 DOF,  PLAT),  
MATH FLOW 7 1  ORBIT PREDICT 
AND NAVIGATION. 
ENVIRONMENT (6 DOF,  PLAT), 
MATH FLOW 7: MODULE 6, 
ACME: 
SAME AS 8c WITH  ATM 
LND TOUCHDOWN PREDICT. 
NOTES: ( I )  DATES DO NOT ALWAYS REPRESENT CONTINUOUS OPERATION; (2) EXPANDED FROM I6 TO 24 D/A CHANNELS 
TABLE 32 GEMINI 'HYBRID SIMULATIONS (Continued) 
EPUIPMENT 
DIGITAL: UNIVAC 1218 
CONVERT;  ADAGE 770 
ANALOG;  EA1 231 
SAME 
ANALOG: EA1 231 
I SAME 
I 
I CONVERT:  ADAGE 770 DIGITAL:  UNIVAC 1218 I ANALOG:  EA1 231 EA1 DOS 
I SAME 
DIGITALI UNIVAC 1218 
CONVERT; ADAGE 770 
ANALOG: EA1 231 
EA1 DDS 
CONVERT;  ADAGE 770 
DIGITAL! UNIVAC 1218 
ANALOGt EA1 231 (2) 
SAME 
EA1 DDS 
CONVERT:  ADAGE 770 (2) 
DIGITAL;  CDC 3200 
EA1 DDS 
ANALOG; EA1 231 
SAME 
SAME AND EA1 131 
SAME A S  Sa. 
DIGITAL:  CDC 3200 
CONVERT:  ADAGE (2) 
ANALOG: EA1 231 
EA1 131 
EA1 DOS 
DIGITAL:  CDC 3200 
CONVERT: EA1 DOS 
DIGITAL;  CDC 3200 
CONVERT:  ADAGE 770 (2) 
EA1 DDS 
ANALOG: EA1 231 
SAME A S  8b. 
SAME AS 8c .  
DISPLAY 
CREW  STATION II 
HORIZON 
SAME 
CREW STATION I 
MODEL. 
MOVING TARGET 
SAME  AND  STAR 
DISPLAY. 
CREW STATION II 
SAME 
CREW STATION II 
SEE 1 
MOVING  AGENA 
CREW STATION II 
MODEL, STAR 
DISPLAY. 
SAME EXCEPT 
BOOSTER  MODEL. 
SAME EXCEPT 
AGENA MODE 1. 
SAME 
SAME AND STAR 
PLANETARIUM. 
SAME AS 5 0  E X C E P T  
STAR PLANE- 
TARIUM. 
CREW STATION II 
AGENA  STATUS 
PANEL. 
CREW STATION II 
CREW STATION II 
CREW STATION II 
STAR  PLANETARIUM 
SAME A S  8 c  
COMMENTS AND REFERENCE! 
SEE GDN 249 
SEE GDN 299 
PROVIDED  ASTRONAUT 
FAMILIARIZATION. 
SEE GDN 264 
FAMILIARIZATION. 
PROVIDED  ASTRONAUT 
SEE GDN 241 
USED ASCENT SIMULATION 
FOR INITIALIZATION. 
FOR SPACECRAFT 6. 
SEE  GDN 289 
SEE SECTION 4.6.1.1 
SEE SECTION 4.6.1.2 
USED  FOR  SPACECRAFT 
S AND 6. 
SEE GDN 388 USED FOR 
SPACECRAFT 7. 
USED FOR SPACECRAFT 
BAND 9 .  
REQUIREMENT DELETED. 
USED FOR SPACECRAFT IO. 
USED FOR SPACECRAFT 
1 1  AND 12. 
SEE SECTION 4.6.1.3 
9. IO AND 11. 
USED ON SPACECRAFT 
SEE SECTION 4.6.1.4 
USED  FOR  SPACECRAFT 8. 
USED FOR PRELIMINARY 
SPACECRAFT 10 WORK. 
USED FOR SPACECRAFT IO. 
DEVELOPED FOR SPACE. 
C R A F T  II AND USED FOR 
SPACECRAFT 12. 
FIGURE 52 HYBRID SIMULATOR CREW STATION 
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field  model.  The  new  star  display  greatly  increased  the  operating  range 
and  accuracy  of  the  star  display. 
Spacecraft 11, the IVAR portion  of  module I1 and an auxiliary  tape 
memory (A") program  were  added  to  the  simulated  math  flow.  This,  along  with 
applicable  changes  in  the  environment  program,  provided a s mulation  beginning 
at SECO and  continuing  through  rendezvous  in  the  first  orbit. 
Wneuver-While-Docked  Simulation, - This  simulation  evolved  from  portions 
of  the-  rendezvous  simulation  and  included  extensive  revisions  to  incorporate 
desired  Agena  systems,  such  as  primary  propulsion  and  remote  command  logic. 
While  minor  changes  were  made  on a flight-to-flight  basis  to  maintain  the 
desired  configuration,  only  one  major  change  was  made.  This  was  the  extension 
of  the  Agena  control  system  to  include  high  order  and  nonlinear  control  system 
effects  for  Spacecraft 11. 
Navigation  Simulation. - The  navigation  simulation  was  composed  of 
several  related  onboard  guidance  modes.  The  first  to  be  developed  was 
touchdown  predict,  which  at  that  time  was a portion  of  Math  Flow  Seven.  This 
first  simulation  was  developed  to  drive  crew  station  displays  only. 
Other  environment  and  navigation  program  sinulations,  orbit  navigation 
and  orbit  predict,  were  developed  concurrent  with  Math  Flow  Seven.  When 
module 6 of Math  Flow  Seven  was  defined,  orbit  determination  and  the  necessary 
realistic  star  display  were  added  to  make a complete  simulation.  Finally, 
touchdown  predict  (module 4)was  integrated  with  module 6 to  support  the 
onboard  re-entry  initialization  procedures  studies, 
Rendezvous  Procedures  Development 
The  primary  means  to  accomplish  rendezvous  with a cooperative  target  was 
closed-loop, i.e., utilizing a radar,  computer,  and  platform. To increase  the 
probability  of  mission  success,  an  alternate  or  back-up  to  the  closed-loop 
system  which  provided a monitoring  capability  and  back-up  guidance  information 
in  case of a closed-loop  equipment  failure.  The  back-up  guidance  commands 
were  based  on  visual  observations  of  the  target  with a retic.1e  or  sextant  in 
conjunction  with  flight  charts.  The  flight  charts,  consisting  of  tables, 
graphs,  and  nomograms,  were  derived from orbital  mechanics  relationships  and 
provide  the  velocity  change  maneuvers  required  to  rendezvous  in  components 
convenient  to  the  crew.  Flight  charts  of  this  form  also  were  required  to 
accomplish  rendezvous  with an uncooperative  or  passive  target  such  as a 
"dead"  Agena  target  which  was  used  on a previous  mission. 
Preparation of flight  charts  and  the  crew  procedures  that  accompany  their 
use  was  followed  by  engineering  evaluation on the  hybrid  simulator.  During 
this  evaluation,  the  flight  charts  were  subjected  to a wi e  variety of tra- 
jectory  dispersions  and  their  performaace  was  compared  with  that of the 
closed-loop  system.  The  procedural  time  line  was  refined  to  simplify  the 
chart usage as much  as  possible  and  thereby  reduce  the  probability  of a 
procedural  error.  The  charts and: hybrid  simulator  then  were  prepared  for 
crew  training.  The  weeks  of  crew  indoctrination  provided  both  the  primary 
and  back-up  flight  crews  with a good  working  knowledge  of  the  procedures and 
flight  charts, and procedures  were  further  tailored  to  suit  crew  preferences. 
I n  addition,  estimates  of  the  orbit  attitude  and  maneuver  system ( O M )  pro- 
pellant  consumption  for  various  rendezvous  situations  were  obtained. 
The  following  paragraphs  describe  briefly  the  rendezvous missions, 
outline  the  development of the  procedures  and  flight  charts for both  primary 
and  rerendezvous  and  present  significant  results of the  engineering  evaluation 
and  crew  training.  However,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  procedures  are 
described  as  they  were  developed  and  that  in  some  cases,  these  were  not 
precisely  followed  in  the  actual  flight. 
Initial  Rendezvous. 
A. Midcourse  Maneuvers - The  Gemini  primary  rendezvous  missions  included 
a number of midcourse  maneuvers  which  corrected  insertion  errors  and  orbit 
perturbations  prior  to  the  terminal  rendezvous  phase.  The  maneuvers  were 
designed  to  position  the  terminal  phase  initiation (PI) point  at  the  correct 
trailing  displacement  and  differential  altitude  from  the.target  with  planned 
lighting  conditions.  The  following  is a discussion  of  the  various  maneuvers 
as  applied  to  each  primary  rendezvous  mission  including  the  source  of  the 
midcourse  velocity  corrections. 
Spacecraft 6 was  launched  into  an  orbit  essentially  coplanar  with  the 
target  vehicle  and  performed  ground-supplied  midcourse  maneuvers  to  rendezvous 
during  the  fourth  spacecraft  revolution. An apogee  height  adjustment  was 
performed  at  the  first  perigee  following  insertion  at  perigee  to  correct  for 
in-plane  insertion  dispersions  and  orbit  decay  due  to  atmospheric drag. A 
phase  adjustment  was  made  at  second  apogee  to  raise  perigee  and  reduce  the 
catchup  rate  to  provide  the  correct  phase  angle  at  third  apogee. An out-of- 
plane  correction  occurred  at  the  nodal  crossing  just  following  second  apogee 
to  place  the  spacecraft  in  the  same  orbital  plane  as  the  target. A vernier 
height  adjustment  was  performed  at  second  perigee  to  compensate for  sm ll
errors  in  the  initial  height  adjustment  and  permit a mo e  nominal  terminal 
phase.  At  third  spacecraft  apogee a forward A V  was  applied  to  raise  perigee 
and  produce an orbit  coelliptical  with  and 15 nautical  miles  below  the  target 
orbit  in  preparation for the "PI maneuver. 
Spacecraft 8 primary  rendezvous  midcourse  maneuvers  were  identical 
to  those  performed  during  the  Spacecraft 6 primary  rendezvous. 
Spacecraft 9 primary  rendezvous  included  ground-supplied  midcourse 
maneuvers  which  resulted  in  rendezvous  with  the  target  during  the  third 
spacecraft  revolution.  These  maneuvers  included a phase  adjustment  at  first 
apogee  to  provide  the  correct  phase  angle  at  second  apogee. A combination 
phasing,  height  adjust,  and  out-of-plane  correction  was  performed  approx- 
imately  one  quarter  orbit  prior  to  the  coelliptical  maneuver  at  second  apogee. 
The  coelliptical  maneuver  and a vernier  out-of-plane  correction  were  performed 
at  second  apogee. 
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Spacecraft 10 primary  rendezvous  included a procedure  for  computer  and 
sextant  usage  to  demonstrate an onboard  navigation  capability.  The  flight 
crew  was  required  to  calculate  the  midcourse  maneuvers  necessary  to  produce 
the  desired  orbit  conditions  at W I  by  using  the  orbit  prediction  and  deter- 
mination  modes of module  VI of the.Gemini  onboard  computer.  These  maneuvers 
were  the  same  as  those  used on the  Spacecraft 6 mission  with  the  exception  of 
the  apogee  height  adjust  at  first  perigee  which  was  replaced  by  an  insertion 
velocity  adjust  routine (IVAR) correction  at  insertion. 
The  procedures  began  by making the  insertion  velocity  adjust  routine 
( IVAR) correction  to  downrange  and  vertical  velocity  after  which  module VI was 
loaded  and  the  orbit  detennination  mode  was  selected  and  started  with  the 
ascent  navigated  insertion  state  vector. In the  first  darkness  period,  the 
altitude  of  the  observed  horizon  was  calibrated  by  taking  sextant  measurements 
to  the  selected  star,  and  plotting  the  resulting  computed  measurement  resi- 
duals on a flight  chart.  After  the  calibration,  the  remaining  darkness  was 
used  to  gather  data  for  the  computer  by  taking two sextant  sightings  and  by 
inputting a dummy  measurement.  Following  the  first  darkness  period  activity, 
the  orbit  predict  mode f module VI was  started  with  the  ascent  vector  and 
used  with  flight  charts  to  obtain  solutions  to  the  midcourse  maneuvers.  The 
second  darkness  period  was  used  to  complete  the  data  table  of  the  orbit 
determination  mode. Two additional  sextant  measurements  were  made,  and a
second  duxny  measurement  was  input,  thus  filling  the  data  table  with  the 
required  six  measurements.  After  processing  the  data  contained  in  the  six 
measurements,  the  computer  produced  an  updated  vector  which  attempted  to 
eliminate  any  IGS  errors  contained  in  the  ascent  vector.  Using  the  orbit 
predict  mode  once  again,  this  updated  vector  was  used  with  the  flight  charts 
to  obtain a second  set  of  onboard  solutions  to  the  midcourse  maneuvers.  With 
the  ground  solutions  to  these  maneuvers  as  the  basis  of  cmparison,  the 
onboard  maneuvers  were  evaluated  to  determine  whether  they  were  within  pre- 
flight  established  bounds.  The  selected  maneuvers  then  were  performed  in  the 
normal  manner. An addition  onboard  capability  similar  to  that  planned  for 
Spacecraft 12 was  provided  for  calculating  the  circularization  maneuver  in 
which  radar  range  data  was  used  with a flight  chart  to  obtain  solution. 
Spacecraft 11 rendezvous  in  the  first  orbit  contained  two  maneuvers 
prior  to  the  tenninal  phase,  radial  insertion  correction  and  an  out-of- 
plane  maneuver.  Both  maneuvers  were  calculated on board.  Because of the 
interrelationship  between  these  midcourse  maneuvers  and  the "PI maneuver a 
discussion  of  the fomer will  be  reserved  for a subsequent  section  on  the 
terminal  phase. 
Spacecraft 12 primary  rendezvous  was  similar  to  that  of  Spacecraft 9 
except  for  the  onboard  computation of the  coelliptic  maneuver  at  second  apogee 
and  out-of-plane  corrections  during  the  terminal  phase.  The  coelliptic 
maneuver  was  calculated  from radar range  measurements  and  onboard  flight 
charts.  The  charts  converted  the  radar  measurements  into a rajectory fix, 
and  supplied  the A V  to  be  applied  at  the  ground  determined  time of second 
apogee  to  provide a coelliptic  orbit  with a nominal  differential  altitude 
of  ten  nautical  miles.  Out-of-plane  corrections  were  calculated  from  platform 
yaw  gimbal  angles  measured  with  the  target  in  the  center  of  the  reticle,  radar 
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range  measurements  and  onboard  flight  charts.  The  actual  change  in  the  yaw 
gimbal  angle  over a specified  interval  was  compared  with  the  required  change 
for  the  appropriate  angular  travel  to  rendezvous.  The  results  of  this  com- 
parison  were  used  in  the  charts  to  obtain  the  out-of-plane A V  to be applied. 
B. Terminal  Phase  Maneuver - The  terminal  phase  of  Spacecraft 6 primary 
rendezvous  contained a 130 degree  transfer  maneuver  occurring  nominally  one 
-minute  after  entering  darkness.  The  closed-loop  guidance  system  was  con- 
sidered  the  primary  method  to  accomplish  rendezvous;  however,  back-up  guidance 
procedures  and  flight  charts  wemidevelopedin  the  event  of  guidance eq~pme t 
failure.  The  terminal  phase  initiation (TPI) lpaneuver  began  with  the  initia- 
tion  cue  which  was  chosen  to  be  the  elevation  angle  of  the  line-of-sight  to 
the  target.  This  cue  provides a convenient  pointing  reference  during  thrust 
application  and  permits  radar  lock-on  during  the  closed-loop  maneuver.  The 
closed-loop "PI solution  was  monitored  with a back-up  solution  computed  using 
the  line-of-sight  elevation  angle  and radar range  and  the  chart  in  Fig. 53. 
This  chart  provided a line-of-sight  maneuver  based on the  nominal  forward A V  
plus a correction  which  was  proportional  to  the  deviation  in  the  range 
measurements  from  the  nominal. A maneuver normal to  the  line-of-sight  which 
was  directly  proportional  to  both  the  angular  variation f am the  nominal  and 
the  radar  range  was  provided. 
Following  the TPI maneuver  the  command  pilot  remained  boresighted  on 
the  target  while  the  computer  collected  radar  data  necessary  for  the  first 
vernier  closed-loop  solution.  After a period  of  optional  platform  alignment, 
the  pilot read radar  range  and  elevation  angle  measurements f'rom the  computer 
and  calculated  the  back-up  solution  for  the  closed-loop  vernier  correction 
using a chart  similar  to  the TPI maneuver  chart.  This  chart  was  similar  to 
the TPI maneuver  chart  and  provided  velocity  corrections  along  and n m 1  to 
the  line-of-sight.  The IVI's displayed  the  closed-loop  vernier  correction  at 
a point  in  the  trajectory  where 8i.8 degrees  central  angle  travel of the 
target  remained  until  intercept.  Upon  completion f. the  thrusting,  the  first 
vernier  was  complete  and  an  identical  cycle  was  repeated  for  the  second 
closed-loop  vernier  correction  which  occurred  at 33.6 degrees  central  angle 
to go to  rendezvous.  Four  back-up  solutions  were  computed  following  the TPI 
maneuver  to  detect a trajectory  error  as  soon as possible.  The  second  and 
fourth  back-up  vernier  corrections  provided a check on the  two  closed-loop 
vernier  corrections.  Following  the  last  vernier  correction  the  command  pilot 
observed any motion  of  the  target  with  respect  to  the  celestial  background 
and  nulled  the  line-of-sight  motion.  The  pilot  monitored  range  and  range  rate 
information  from  the  computer  to  determine  .trajectory  characteristics  and 
give position  reports.  Braking  thrust  was  applied  as a function of range  with 
initiation  at 15,000 ft, braking  to  four f p s  at 3000 ft,  and to one-half f p s  
at 100 ft. Since a radar  failure  precluded  the  use  of  range  information,  
braking  schedule  as  function of time  was  followed  until  visual  growth  of 
the  target  was  detected. 
In the  event  of a radar  failure,  range  and  range  rate  information 
were  not  available  for  terminal  phase  back-up  solutions.  The TPI initiation 
cue  was  elevation  angle  as  in  the  closed-loop  case.  However,  the  spacecraft 
was  controlled  to a specified  attitude  and  when  the  target  drifted  through  the 
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center  of  the  reticle,  thrust  was  initiated.  The  nominal  maneuver  along  the 
line-of-sight  was  applied  and  the  maneuver  normal  to  the  line-of-sight  was 
computed  from  the  deviation  of  observed  elevation  angle  from  the  nominal. 
Only  vernier  corrections  normal  to  the  line-of-sight  were  applied  in  the 
absence  of  range  data. 
A computer  failure  precluded  the  use  of  accurate  radar  and  elevation 
angle  information;  however,  the TPI initiation  cue  could  have  been  obtained 
from  the  attitude  ball  while  holding  boresight.  The TPI maneuver  consisted 
of  the  nominal  velocity  correction  along  the  line-of-sight  and a calcul ted 
correction  normal to the  line-of-sight  based  on  the  deviation  of  inertial 
elevation  angle  from  the  nominal.  The  first two vernier  corrections  consisted 
of  only  the  velocity  correction n o m 1  to  the  line-of-sight  based  on  inertial 
elevation  angle  variations.  The  second  two  vernier  corrections  also  included 
the  component  along  the  line-of-sight  which  was  computed  using  range  rate  data 
from  the  analog  meter. 
In  the  event of a platform  failure,  the TPI initiation  cue  was  radar 
range  obtained  from  the  computer.  The  TPI  maneuver  and  the  four  vernier 
corrections  were  computed  from  the  variations  in  range,  range  rate,  and 
inertial  elevation  angle. 
Although  the  procedures  development  and  flight  chart  derivation  for 
the  terminal  phase  of  most  Gemini  rendezvous  missions  were  very  similar, 
differences  in  format  and  data  measurement  techniques  did  occur  through 
flight  experience.  The  evolution  of  the  procedures  and  flight  charts  is 
outlined  in Table 33 for  Spacecraft 6, 8, 9, 10 and 12 primary  rendezvous 
missions.  This  tabulation  includes a comparison by spacecraft of the TPI 
initiation  cues  and  data  measurement  techniques  used  to  determine  the  back-up 
"PI maneuver  and  back-up  vernier  corrections  for  both  closed-loop  guidance 
and  radar,  computer,  and  platform  failure  cases.  The  major  revision  in  format 
was  the  change  from  tabular  chart  form  for  Spacecraft 6 rendezvous  to  the 
graph  and  nomograph  format  for  Spacecraft 8 and  up  missions  as  shown  for  the 
TPI maneuver  in  Fig. 54. This  change  allowed  direct  interpolation  without 
calculations  and  an  expansion  of  the  data  to  include a w der range of  vari- 
ables.  The  engineering  evaluation  and  crew  training  sessions for-the 
Spacecraft 6, 8, 9 and 10 primary  rendezvous are summarized  in G eC C design 
notes 317, 351, 352, 370, 389 and 409. 
The  development of procedures  and  flight  charts  for  Spacecraft 11 
direct  rendezvous  necessitated a reaction  to  requirements  not  imposed  in 
previous  rendezvous  missions.  These  requirements  included: 
1. Compression  of  the  time  allotted  for  procedures  and  back-up 
guidance  computations  due  to  the  limited  time from insertion  through  inter- 
cept. 
2. The  necessity  for a radial  insertion  correction  to  eliminate  the 
effect  of  downrange  and  flight  path  angle  insertion  errors  on  spacecraft 
position  at  TPI. 
failure  due  to  wide  range  of  possible "PI dispersions. 
3. The  use  of  nonnominal  trajectory  parameters  in  case  of  closed-loop 
In   addi t ion   to   the  ,above requirements, two out-of-plane corrections 
w e r e  planned for  the first time, one at 90 degrees of o rb i t  travel fran 
inser t ion and a second near TPI t o  be applied  in  case of closed-loop  failure. 
To sa t i s fy   the  requirement f o r  a procedural  load which would allow 
rendezvous within one orbit, the following guidance and control function time 
.. l i ne  was established and shown t o  be practical during hybrid simulstion. 
GROUND ELAPSED TIhE 
(Hrs: Min: Sec) 
00: 00 Lift-off 
06: 00 
10: 00 
25: 00 
2g:oo 
49: 00 
1: 01: 00 
1: 13: 00 
EVENT 
Insertion 
Insertion  Velocity  Adjust Routine (IVAR) 
Radial Correction 
Begin Platform Alignment 
Load Module 3 with A9.N 
Compute Out-of-Plane Correction to be 
applied at 90 degrees of O r b i t a l  Travel 
End Platform Alignment 
Acquire R a d a r  Lock-On 
Out-of-Plane Correction 
Select Rendezvous Mode 
Back-up Guidance Computations 
TPI 
Back-up Vernier Computations 
First Vernier Correction 
Back-up Vernier Computations 
Second Vernier  Correction 
Braking and Line-of-Sight Control 
1: 18: 00 Intercept 
A change in   the math flow for Spacecraft 11 allowed the   p i lo t   t o  read 
the navigated downrange angle travelled a t  insertion. From this angle a 
nominal value of radius  rate was determined and compared to   t he   ac tua l  
navigated radius rate read from the comuter. The velocity difference was 
applied  radially  to  achieve a radius  rate which would resul t   in   the  desired 
trailing displacement a t  TPI. This correction was appl ied in  addi t ion to  the 
normal WAR correction. 
The procedures and f l igh t   char t s  provided a back-up t o  the W I  closed- 
loop solution based on the desired 120 degrees of o r b i t a l   t r a v e l   t o  rendezvous 
and the predicted position of the spacecraft at relative apogee (the point 
TABLE 33 PROCEDURE SUMMARY FOR THE TERMINAL PHASE 
OF THE GEMINI PRIMARY RENDEZVOUS 
F A I L U R E  
NONE 
P L A T F O R l  
COMPUTE1 
RADAR 
NONE 
P L A T F O R l  
COMPUTE[ 
RADAR 
_- 
NONE 
PLATFORA 
COMPUTEF 
RADAR 
r(ON  E 
P L A T F O R k  
COMPUTER 
RADAR 
YON E 
PLATFORM 
COMPUTER 
RADAR 
T P I  
C U E  
W G L E ( M D I U )  
RANGE(MDIU) 
A N G L E ( B A L L )  
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(CU MODE) 
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ANGLE 
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CLOSED-LOOP 
RANGE(MDIU) 
N O M I N A L  
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SAME AS 6 
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RANGE(MDlU),ANGLE(STARS) 
RANGE(NOM.),ANGLE(STARS) 
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~~ 
SAME AS 6 
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RANGE(MDIU).ANGLE(STARS) 
?ANGE(NOM.),ANGLE(BALL) 
?ANGE(NOM.),ANGLE(MDIU) 
;AM€ AS 9 
. .~ 
iAME AS 9 
~~~ . . - - .. -. . . . 
VERNIER CORRECTION DATA 
ALONG  LO5  NORMAL  TO  LO5 
CLOSED-LOOP 
RANGE(MDIU) 
M E T E R  
R A N G E   R A T E  
NONE 
~" 
SAME AS 6 
SAME AS 6 
~~ 
SAME AS 6 
CLOSED-LOOP 
RANGE(MDIU)  ANGLE(STARS) 
RANGE(NOM.),ANGLE(STARS) 
RANGE(NOM.),ANGLE(MDIU) 
CLOSED LOOP 
RANGE(MDlU),ANGLE(STARS) 
~~ 
RANGE(METER),ANGLE(STARS) 
RANGE(NOM.),ANGLE(MDIU) 
. .  ~ .~
CLOSED-LOOP 
RANGE(MDIU),ANGLE(STARS) 
RANGE(METER),ANGLE(BALL) 
RANGE(NOM.),ANGLE(MDIU) 
SAME AS 9 
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CORRECT 
NO. 0 
2 
4 
4 
4 
" "  
2 
4 
4 
A 
2 
4 
4 
4 
LOS CONTROL 6 BRAKING 
DATA FOR 
ANGLE(STARS),RANGE(METER) 
ANGLE(STARS),RANGE(METER) 
ANGLE(STARS),RANGE(METER) 
ANGLE(STARS),TIME(GET CLOCK) 
ANGLE(STARS),RANGE(METER) 
ANGLE(STARS),RANGE(METER) 
ANGLE(STARS),RANGE(METER) 
ANGLE(STARS),RANGE(SEXTANT) 
SAME AS 0 
- ~ 
SAME AS 8 
SAME AS 0 
IMPROVEMENTS FROM 
PRIOR  MISSION 
1. MORE ACCURATE CHART 
2. C U R V E S  U S E 0  T O  R E P L A C E  
TABLES. 
3. S E X T A N T  A V A I L A B L E  F O R  
A N G L E   C U E   F O R   P L A T   F O R M  
F A I L U R E   U S E   A N D   R A N G E  
DETERMINATION FOR 
BRAKING(RADAR FAILURE) .  
4. LARGER RANGE OF D ISPER-  
SIONS COVERED. 
1. WIDER RANGE OF VARIABLES 
ON CHARTS. 
2. P I T C H  A N G L E  IS D E T E R M I N E D  
F R O M  B A L L  I N S T E A D  OF 
RETICLE FOR COMPUTER 
F A I L U R E .  
3. C H A R T  F O R  L O S  R A T E  
NULL ING ADDED.  
A. CHART  FOR  RANGE  RATE 
SEXTANT  ADDED.  
DETERMINATION USING 
5. CHART ADDED TO COMPEN-  
SATE  FOR  OFF  NOMINAL 
P I T C H  
~~ . ~ 
1. B E T T E R  P L A T F O R M  A L I G N .  
MENT PROCEDURE 
2. I N E R T I A L  F L I G H T  D I R E C T O R  
I N D I C A T O R   A V A I L A B L E   F O R  
L O S   R A T E   N U L L I N G  
1. MONITORING CAPABIL ITY  ADDED 
F O R   O U T - O F - P L A N E   C O R R E C -  
T ION FOR TPI  AN0  VERNIERS,  
ALSO, BACK UP OUT-OF-PLANE 
CAPABIL IT IES  ADDED  FOR 
RADAR  FA ILURE  CASE.  
2. B E T T E R  P L A T F O R M  A L I G N M E N T  
AS A R E S U L T O F   D E C R E A S E D  
D A T E  C O L L E C T I O N  I N T E R V A L  
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where  the  spacecraft  vertical  velocity  relative  to  the  Agena  Target  Vehicle 
(ATV) is zero).  The  position  of  relative  apogee  was  predicted  in  the  chart 
of  Fig. 55 from a measurement of line-of-sight (IQS) angle  and IDS angular 
rate  taken  at a fixed  time  from  relative  apogee.  The  chart  assumed a nominal 
ATV orbit;  however,  dispersed ATV orbits  were accomohted with  other  charts 
similar  in  format.  In  the  case  of a platform  failure,  the radar range  and 
inertial LOS angle  were  used  in a chart  similar  to  that of Fig. 55 to  predict 
the  relative  apogee  point.  The TPI maneuver  consisted of a forward  component, 
AVx, and an up-dawn  component, AVy, which  were  computed  frun  the X m  and 
YRA at  relative  apogee in the  chart  of  Fig. 56
This  chart  was  derived  from  the  Clohessy-Wiltshire  equations  based  on a 
central  angle  to  rendezvous  of 120 degrees  and a nominal  target  orbit.  To 
account  for ATV orbit  dispersions  the  quantities AVA and b V y  were  added  to 
the AVX and AVy, respectively.  The ATV dispersion  corrections  were  ground 
computations  based  on  one  orbit  of ATV tracking  and  were-relayed  to  the  crew 
prior  to  spacecraft  lift-off.  The TPI maneuver  midpoint  occurs 90 sec  prior 
to  relative  apogee  establishing a 120 degree  central  angle  transfer  trajectory. 
Two vernier  corrections  along  and  normal  to  the LOS were  planned 
following TPI, the  first 12 min  from  the  TPI  midpoint  and  the  second 12 min 
after  the  first.  The  vernier  corrections  in  previous  rendezvous  missions 
relied  on  nominal  values  for  range  and IQS angle  in  case  of a closed-loop 
component  failure,  i.e.,  radar,  platform,  computer.  However,  because  of  the 
possibility  of a large  dispersion  in  the  position  at "TI on  Spacecraft 11, the 
nominal  values of range  and LOS angle  were  supplied  as a function  of  the Xm 
and YRA at  relative  apogee  as  shown  in  Fig. 57. 
An out-of-plane IVAR correction  was  planned  at  insertion  to  reduce  the 
out-of-plane  velocity  error  to  that  of  the  ICs.  In  addition,  the  navigated 
out-of-plane  position  at  insertion w a s  to be read  from  the  computer  at 
insertion  and  used  to  compute a velocity  correction  to be applied 90 degrees 
of  orbit  travel  after  insertion  when  the  position  dispersion  propagated  into 
a velocity  dispersion.  These  two  corrections  reduced  the  out-of-plane  errors 
to  roughly  those  of  the IGS. Another  out-of-plane  correction  was  to be com- 
puted  for  use  at TF'I in  case  of  closed-loop  failure.  "his  correction  was 
based on a measurement  of  out-of-plane  angle  to  the  target  and  the  predicted 
position  at  relative  apogee. A complete  description  of  the  procedures  and 
flight  charts  utilized  during  Spacecraft 11 primary  rendezvous  is  contained  in 
G & C design  notes 339 and 400. A description  of  the  significant  events 
occurring  during  engineering  evaluation  and  crew  training  is  given  in G & C 
design  note 410. 
A measure of procedures  and  flight  chart  effectiveness  for  Space- 
craft 6 through 11 primary  rendezvous  missions  is  presented  in  Tsble 34, 
which  provides a comparison  of  the  closed-loop,  back-up,  and  ground  computed 
solutions  for  the TPI maneuver  during  the  primary  rendezvous.  The  close 
agreement  between  the  closed-loop  solutions  and  those  available  from  the 
flight  charts  indicates'that  rendezvous  could  have  been  accomplished  onboard 
with a high  probability of success  on  any  of  the  missions  with  proper  ground 
control  up  to  the TPI maneuver,  had a closed-loop  failure  occurred.  Due  to a 
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radar  transponder  failure  on  the  Spacecraft 12 mission,  back-up  procedures 
were  employed. 
C. Mission Rendezvous Results - The  following  is  discussion of the 
significant  flight  results  including  problems  which  arose  during  the  primary 
rendezvous  of  Spacecraft 6 through 12 missions: 
Spacecraft 6 - The  closed-loop TPI maneuver  was  performed  slightly 
later  than  nominal  to  insure  that  the  spacecraft  would  be below and  forward  of 
the  target  at  final  rendezvous  and  that  braking  would  be  late,  providing  more 
daylight  during  final  approach. 
The  closed-loop  vernier  corrections  were  displayed  normally,  agreed 
with  available  back-up  solutions,  and  were  applied. No anomalies  occurred 
during  the  nulling  of  the  small  line-of-sight  rates  and  nomin l  braking 
schedule  was  followed  to  station-keeping.  The  crew  commented  that  the  flight 
charts should be simplified  and  should  include a wider  range of trajectory 
variables. 
Spacecraft 8 - The radar referenced  flight  director  indicator (FDI) 
needles  were  sonewhat  erratic on this  mission  prior  to PI. This  problem 
decreased  with  range  but  did  result  in an erroneous  back-up TPI maneuver  which 
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The closed-loop TPI correction agreed 
f a i r l y  w e l l  with-the ground value and was applied. The following procedural 
changes were recommended as a resul t   of   the  flight: 
1. Visual boresighting with the reticle should be used in preference 
2. An antenna select command should be sent   via   the encoder whenever 
3. R a d a r  angle data should be locked out of the computer via   the MDN 
to   nul l ing the FDI's i n  radar reference. 
lock on is  first achieved. 
when the radar referenced FDI needles vary more than one degree from nu l l  when 
on visual boresight. 
A post-flight evaluation of Spacecraft 8 primary rendezvous mission is  
contained i n  G & C design note 372. 
Spacecraft 9 - No major problems w e r e  encountered with the closed-loop 
rendezvous system o r  wi th  the back-up calculation requirements for the TPI 
and vernier corrections. Very small line-of-sight rstes were observed during 
the terminal rendezvous indicating efficient trajectory corrections were 
applied. 
Spacecraft 10 - The terminal phase of the i n i t i a l  rendezvous was 
normal except for the line-of-sight nulling and braking maneuvers. Apparently 
procedural problems i n  switching computer modes and obtaining  iner t ia l ly  
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TABLE 34 COMPARISON OF TPI SOLUTIONS FOR GEMINI INITIAL 
RENDEZVOUS MISSIONS 
t-1 GEMINI  ISSION  CLOSED-LOOP  S LUTION - . - - 
r- v l l l  r 
31 FWD 
4 UP 
26 FWD 
3 DWN 
I X  26 FWD 
I 
" ~ - "-1. 
~~ 
8 U P  
41  FWD 
1 UP 
." " .- ~ 
140 FWD 
27 DWN _ _ ~  
XI1 18 FWD** 
5 DWN 
~ ~ "~ 
BACK-UP  SOLUTION  GROUND  SOLUTION 
~ ~~ 
32 FWD I 2 UP 2 UP 1 32 FWD 
33 FWD 
24 FWD 
2 DWN O* 
32 FWD 
1 UP 0 
27 FWD 
~ 
- ~~~ ~ _ _  
41  FWD 
. 
34 FWD 
4 DWN 6 DWN 
140 FWD I 140 FWD 22 DWN 17 DWN 1 
22 FWD 
3 DWN 3 DWN 
23 FWD 
~ 
*ADJUSTED FOR ERRONEOUS RADAR ANGLE DATA OBSERVED DURING THE GEMINI Vlll FLIGHT. 
**RECONSTRUCTED FROM POST FLIGHT DATA. 
referenced FDI needles  delayed  early  line-of-sight  nulling.  Both  in-plane  and 
out-of-plane  line-of-sight  rates  built-up  such  that  thrust  was  insufficient  to 
stop  the  rates.  Continuous  thrust  application  resulted  in an approach  to  the 
target,  but  with  excessive  propellant  consumption. 
Spacecraft 11 - Was  inserted  as  targeted  and  an  insertion  correction, 
consisting of a 41 f p s  horizontal  in-plane WAR maneuver  and a five fps 
radial  maneuver  computed  onboard,  placed  the  position f relative  apogee 18.9 
nautical  miles  behind  and 8.6 nautical  miles  below  the  target. "his was very 
near  the  desired  point of 15 nautical  miles  behind  the  target  and 10 miles 
below  it.  The "PI computations  were  accurate  as  demonstrated  by  the  onboard 
calculation  of  relative  apogee,  based  on  elevation  angle  measwrements,  which 
was 19.3 and 8.0 nautical  miles  behind  and  below  the  target.  The  required 
TPI thrust  as  calculated  onboard  using  the  flight  chart  was  close  to  the 
closed-loop  solution as shown  in  Table 34. The  first  vernier  correction  was 
displayed  and  applied  normally;  however,  prior  to  display  of  the  second 
closed-loop  vernier,  the radar referenced FDI needles  did  not  agree  with 
v i s u a l  boresighting  and  the  back-up  solution  was  applied. It has been  deter- 
mined  that an intermittent rattar transponder  failure  resulted  in  erroneous 
angle data during  the  last  vernier  correction  and  hence  the  back-up  action 
taken by the  crew  was  justified.  Line-of-sight rate nulling  using a stellar 
inertial  reference  was  employed an range  and  range  rate data were  available 
during  the  braking  maneuver. 
Spacecraft 12 - A radar transponder  failure  on  this  mission  resulted 
in  the  use  of  back-up  rendezvous  procedures.  The  onboard  computed  solution 
for TPI was  very  close  to  the  ground  computed  value  as  shown  in  Table 34.
Four back-up  intermediate  corrections  were  applied  instead  of  the  usual  two 
closed-loop  corrections.  The  velocity  change  requirements  for  these  correc- 
tions  was  low  (total  of  about 10 fps )  and  the  propellant  required  for  braking 
was  moderate.  This  rendezvous  verified  the  accuracy  and  dependability 
expected  from  the  back-up  procedures;  however,  this  occurred  after  almost 
perfect  prerendezvous  maneuvers. 
Rerendezvous. - Several  of  the  Gemini  missions  have  included more than 
one  rendezvous. A passive  rerendezvous fmm an  equiperiod  orbit  was  planned 
for  Spacecraft 8 but  not  completed  because  of a spacecraft  anomaly.  This 
same  rerendezvous  was  achieved  by  Spacecraft 9 and,  in  addition, a rerendez- 
vous  from  above  was  conducted  from a coelliptical  approach.  The  Spacecraft 10 
mission  featured a rendezvous  with  the  Agena 8 Target  Vehicle  following  the 
initial  rendezvous  with  the  Agena 10 Target  Vehicle. As on  the  primary 
rendezvous,  the  approach  was  coelliptical,  but  the  terminal  transfer  was lik  
that  of  the  Spacecraft 9 passive  rendezvous.  The  Spacecraft 11 mission 
included a rerendezvous  from a "stable  orbit"  (i.e.,  zero  differential 
altitude  and a constant  trailing  displacement  before  initiation). A more 
refined  version  of  this  rendezvous  was  planned  for  Spacecraft 12 but  was  not 
included  in  the  final  mission  objectives.  The  following  paragraphs  briefly 
describe  the  flight  charts  used  in  each  of  these  rerendezvous  operations  and 
relate  significant  data  obtained  during  the  engineering  evaluation  and  crew 
training  sessions  held  at  the  McDonnell  hybrid  simulation  facility. 
A. Passive  Rendezvous - As mentioned  previously,  three  varieties of the 
passive  rendezvous  were  performed.  The  first  of  these  was  rendezvous  from  an 
equiperiod  orbit  and  is  described  here.  The  other  two,  referred  to  as  "dual" 
rendezvous  and  "stable  orbit"  rendezvous  are  described  in  subsequent  sections. 
The  separation  for  the  equiperiod  passive  rendezvous  was  initiated  when  the 
spacecraft  made a 20 ms upward  radial  velocity  change.  This  maneuver  was 
executed  ten  min  before  sunset  and  resulted  nominally  in  an  orbit  with 
relative  altitude  variations  of +2.8 nautical  miles  and a maximum  horizontal 
separation  of 11.4 nautical  miles.  About  one-half  orbit  after  the  separation 
maneuver, a nominally  zero  horizontal  adjust  maneuver  was  applied  based on
observation of the  time at which  the  target  vehicle  appeared  to  be  on  the 
spacecraft  local  horizontal.  Sunrise  nominally  occurred  about tw  min  after 
this  correction,  and a short  time  later  the  spacecraft  was  rolled  heads  down 
to  shield  the  spacecraft  windows  from  the sun. The  crew  then  was  prepared  to 
determine  the P I  maneuver. 
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The time and magnitude of the TPI maneuver were determined from the 
time increment between superposition of the  target  and horizon for sextant 
se t t ings  of 43 and 47 degrees as sham  in  Fig. 58. 
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While this  correction  consisted of a component along and normal to   the   l ine-  
of-sight, the correction along the line-of-sight was jus t   the  nominal value. 
This was necessitated by the absence of any range data. The  component normal 
t o  the line-of-sight  consisted of the sum of the ncnninal value and a correc- 
t ion  computed from the actual angle measurements. An alternate deterplination 
of the maneuver was obtained from the MDIU readout of the pitch  angles at the 
sextant superposition times. Both of these detenninations normally were 
employed but in  the event of a platform failure, only the sextant was used 
and with a computer failure, pitch  angle was read from the a t t i t ude  b a l l  t o  
replace the MDIU information. In any case, the result was . a n  &-degree trans- 
fer and two intermediate  corrections were made i n  a nearly  identical  &mer. 
Following the intermediate corrections, the command pi lot  control led 
line-of-sight angular rates in  the  ORB RA!E platform mode.  The p i l o t  used 
, 
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additional  charts  to  determine burn times  for  nulling  the  line-of-sight 
angular rate  and  (with  the  help  of  the  sextant)  for  braking, 
An engineering  evaluation  of  the  proposed  charts  and  procedures  was 
conducted  from 5 to 14 January 1966. Several  procedural  improvements  resulted 
from  the  evaluation,  especially  in  the  technique  for  applying  the  separation 
maneuver.  One  area  which  proved  to  be  difficult  was  that  of  nulling  the 
line-of-sight  angular  rates  for  the  "degree  transfer. 
Crew  training  sessions  were  held  for  the  Spacecraft 8 and 9 crews 
during  the  weeks  of 24 January 1966 and 30 Match 1966, respectively. A 
summary of  Spacecraft 8 and 9 passive  rendezvous  engineering  evaluation  and 
crew  training  is  contained  in G & C design  note 382. 
Several  problems  were  encountered  when  this  rendezvous  was  actually 
conducted  on  the  Spacecraft 9 mission.  The TF'I time  increment  which  was  to 
have  been  measured  by  observing  the  superposition  of  the  target  and  the 
horizon  on  the  sextant  set  sequentially  at 43 and 47 degrees  was  not  made 
since  the  sextant  was  erroneously  set  to 47 degrees  initially.  Instead a 
time  increment  was  measured  by  observing  pitch  elevation  angle  from  the MDIU 
at  modified  times.  The TPI maneuver  was  calculated  to  be  two  sec  of  aft  and 
five  sec  of  down  thrust  which  approximated  the  nominal  values  of 3.6 s c a t 
and 2.8 sec  dawn.  The  first  vernier  correction  also  was  based  on MDIU pitch 
elevation  angles.  However,  the  second  vernier  correction  was  calculated 
following  the  prescribed  procedures  and  the  sextant  measurements.  Both 
vernier  corrections  were  near  the  nominal  value  of  zero.  Braking  thrust 
calculations  were  based  on a ominal  time  schedule  rather  than  on  sextant 
measurements.  The  maJor  problems  in  sextant  usage  involved  tracking  the 
target  in  the  sextant's  small  field  of  view  and  reacquiring  the  target  after 
changing a sextant  setting.  The  crew  recommended  that  platform  angles  be  the 
primary  angle  measurement  source  and  that  the  sextant  be  reserved  for  platform 
failure  cases. 
B. Dual  Rendezvous - The  second  passive  rendezvous  performed  was  the 
Spacecraft 10 - Agena 8 dual  rendezvous.  Following a rendezvous  with  Agena 10,
a series  of  docked  configuration  maneuvers  was  made  to  establish gross pha ing 
and  following  this, a series of undocked  Gemini  maneuvers  was  made  for  fine 
phasing.  The  result  of all these  maneuvers  was a coelliptical  approach  with a 
differential  altitude of seven  nautical  miles  and a phasing  such  that  line- 
of-sight  elevation  angle  of 33 degrees  was  reached  at r( min after  sunrise. 
A 16 min  platform  alignment  began  at  sunrise  and  following  this  alignment, 
the  spacecraft  was  rolled  heads d m  to  shield  the  windows  from  the sun. The 
crew  then  was  prepared  to  determine  the TPI maneuver. 
The  data  used  for  determining  the TPI maneuver  was  nominally  the 
line-of-sight  elevation  angle  change  over  three  min. To obtain  this data, 
visual  acquisition of the  target  was  necessary.  The  spacecraft  pitch  angle 
was  controlled  to  preselect@  angles  as a function  of  time  to  maximize  the 
probability  of  early  visual  acquisition.  Upon  acquisition,  the  spacecraft 
was  controlled  to  visual  boresight  and  pitch  elevation  angles (el d 2) 
were read f r o m  the  computer  three  min  apart. A subtraction  provides  the A 0  
over the  three min interval and this  infonuation  was  used  in Fig. 59 to deter- 
mine components of velocity  change along and  normal to the line-of-sight  for 
an 80 degree  transfer.  Contingency  procedures  were  developed  for  the  case of 
late visual  acquisition (using one  angle  measurement  only or, if very late, 
using  ground  computed  maneuvers) and back-up  procedures  were  developed  in  the 
event of a platform or computer failure. Elevation  angle  was read from  the 
attitude ball in the cmputer failure  case  and  target-to-horizon  sextant 
angle measurements  were  used  in  the  event  of a platform  failure. Two 
intermediate  corrections  were  made  following TPI. These  corrections  were 
computed  in  the same manner as the TPI maneuver  except  that  the  line-of-sight 
component was not  determined. 
Another  procedure  that  proved  useful  for  the  dual  rendezvous w a s  the 
use of the  braking  chart. This  chart  provided an estimate of the mnge rate 
at a range of  two  nautical miles, the  time  from TPI to a range of two  nautical 
miles,  and  the  terminal.  approach  angle.  This nfomation was  based  on  the 
line-of-sight  elevation  angle  at  the  second  pre-!PI  measurement.  The  charts 
used for braking  and  line-of-sight  control for  the  equiperiod  passive  rendez- 
yous were  not  employed  here  since  the  terminal  approach  velocity  was so high 
that  sextant  measurements  were  ineffectual. 
An engineering  evaluation of these  charts  was  conducted  during  the 
first week of June 1966. As anticipated,  line-of-sight  control  during  the 
terminal approach was a  problem  but  eventually  was  mastered.  Several  modifi- 
cations  to  the  charts  resulted  from  the  evaluation. 
From 6 to 10 June 1966, 54 runs were  made  during  the  crew  training 
session. The  training  resulted  in an increase  in  the  TPI-to-sunset  minimum 
time  from 25 to 28 min. This  allowed  more  time  for  braking  and  line-of-sight 
control  before  entering  darkness  and was the  result  of  a  number  of  fly-bys 
caused by early  darkness  entry. A summary of Spacecraft 10 dual  rendezvous 
evaluation  and  crew  training  is  contained  in G & C design  note 390. 
The  only  problem  encountered  during  the  dual  rendezvous was the 
attempt to estimate  ranges  greater  than  one  nautical  mile  using  the  sextant. 
This  apparently  was  caused  by  the  end-on  approach  to  the  target.  At  ranges 
less than one  nautical  mile  stadiametric  ranging  with  the  sextant  was  possible 
and  the  normal  braking  schedule was followed. 
C. Rendezvous  from Above - A second  rendezvous  was  performed  during  the 
Spacecraft 9 mission  which was similar to the  Spacecraft 8 coelleptic  primary 
rendezvous.  The  difference was that  instead of being  displaced 15 nautical 
'miles below  and 142 nautical  miles  behind  the  target  following  circularization, 
the  spacecraft  was 15 nautical  miles  above  and 126 nautical  miles  ahead  of  the 
target.  The  flight  charts  used to compute  the W I  maneuver  and  vernier 
corrections  during  the  rendezvous f r a n  above  were  the  corresponding  Space- 
craft 8 flight  charts  rescaled to fit  the  Spacecraft 9 rendezvous. 
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The  following  modifications  were  required: 
1. Pitch angles  were  modified to include  a 180 degree  change  in  the 
line-of-sight  angle and e m r s  in  the  platform  torquing r&te which was preset 
for a spacecraft  orbit 15 nautical  miles  below  the  target. 
to provide  minimum total A V  for  the  rendezvdus  fram  above. 
direction  for  the  same  set of trajectory  conditions as on the  Spacecraft 8 
rendezvous  since  the  position  of  the  spacecraft  relative to th  target 
vehicle w a 8  reversed on the  Spacecraft 9 rendezvous fran above, 
4. An additional  curve was included  which  provide  up-darn  thrust  in 
case of a platform  failure  during  the  vernier  corrections.  This  was  necessary 
because of the  lack of a stellar  inertial  reference when the  target  vehicle 
was viewed  against the earth  background. 
2. The  computer  constant for target  orbital  radius, RIJI, was modified 
3. The charts  were  modified to indicate  a  thrust in the  opposite 
A summary of  evaluation  and  crew  training  for  the  rendezvous f rom 
above  is  contained  in G & C design  note 376. 
The  flight data from  the  Spacecraft 9 rendezvous  from  above  indicates 
that radar lock-on to the ATDA was  achieved  at 70 nautilcal  miles. The  closed- 
loop TPI solution  was 19 FWD and 4 DWN which  did  not  agree  exactly  with  the 
back-up  and  ground  solutions  which  were 16.5 FWD and 3.0 UP and 16.5 FWD and 
0.3 UP, respectively.  The  back-up  solution  was  applied  since  the  closed-loop 
solution  appeared to be  erroneous. Only the  closed-loop  vernier  corrections 
were  applied  since  the radar angle  data  displayed  on  the FDI needles  contained 
transients  (which  were  anticipated  with  the  rate  stabilized ATDA) making A 0  
measurements  for  back-up  corrections  impractical.  The  target was first  seen 
in  reflected  moonlight  at  a  range  of 20 nautical  miles  but  was  lost  one  min 
later when daylight  occurred  precluding visual tracking  of  the  target  for 
back-up  calculations.  Visual  observation  again  was  obtained  at  three  nautical 
miles,  but the  target  was  intermittently  lost  against  the varying terrain 
features.  Line-of-sight  rate  nulling  was  done  in  the  orbit  rate  platform  mode 
by  noting small angular changes  over small time  intervals.  Although  visi- 
bility  problems  and  unsteady FDI needles  caused  the  indicated  corrections to 
be  inaccurate  and  scattered,  trends  were  established  for  gross  line-of-sight 
nulling.  It was apparent  that  accurate radar data was a  necessity  for an 
efficient  terminal  phase of rendezvous  from  above  both  because  of  the  visi- 
bility  problems  during  back-up  calculations  and  because  of  the  need  for 
accurate  angle  data  in  lieu  of an inertial  reference  for  line-of-sight  rate 
nulling. 
D. Stable  Orbit  Rendezvous - The  Spacecraft 12 passive  rerendezvous  was 
a stable  orbit  rendezvous  chazacterized by a  zero differentia altitude  and 
a  constant  trailing  displacement  prior to TPI of 15 nautical miles. A nominal 
TPI maneuver of 5.5 fps aft  and 2.9 f’ps down  produced  a  transfer  traJectory 
with  intercept  in 330 degrees  of  target  central  angle travel.  Five  nominally 
zero  vernier  corrections  were  planned  at  selected  central  angles  to  go  to 
rendezvous.  The  vernier  correction  components normal to the  line-of-sight 
were  based on the  deviation of measured  elevation  angles  from  nominal  angles 
determined as a function of the  actual  relative  position at PI. The  vernier 
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correction  component  along  the  line-of-sight  for  the  first  vernier  was 
computed  from  the  elevation  angle,  nominal  range,  and an empirical  relation- 
ship.  The  line-of-sight  vernier  component  was  omitted  for  the  second  and 
third  corrections  due  to  the  lack  of  range  data,  but,  this  component  was 
included  in  the  last two corrections  as  sextant  ranging  information  became 
available . 
A stable  orbit  passive  rerendezvous  similar  to  that  planned  for 
Spacecraft 12 was  performed  during  the  Spacecraft 11 mission.  The  difference 
in  the  trajectory  profile f h r n  the  Spacecraft 12 rerendezvous  was a 25 nauti- 
cal mile trailing  displacement  instead  of 15 nautical  miles. A ground 
supplied TPI maneuver  established  the  transfer  trajectory  and  the  fourth 
vernier  correction  chart  of  Spacecraft 8 scaled  by  one-third  was  used  to 
verify a ground  supplied  vernier  correction. 
The  Gemini  XII-Agena  Tethered  Vehicle  Gravity  Gradient  Operation - At 
47 hr  and 23 min  into  the  Gemini  XI1  mission,  the  spacecraft  undocked  from 
the  Agena  Target  Vehicle  and  deployed a 100 ft tether  between  the  vehicles. 
The  objectives  of  this  maneuver  was  to  establish a mode  of  stabilization  of 
the  tethered  system  using  the  gradient of the  earth's  gravitational  field,  as 
described  and  analyzed  in  Structural  Dynamics  Design  Note 31. Attempts  by  the 
command  pilot  to  orient  the  spacecraft  above  the  Agena  with  the  proper  initial 
relative  velocity  were  impeded  by OAMS thruster  problems,  but  at 48:21 into 
the  mission  the  crew  reported  the  tether  was  becoming  "fairly  taut."  At 
49:28, the  crew  felt  that a stabilized  mode  had  been  established and turned 
off the  Agena ACS. A few  minutes  previous  to  this,  the  spacecraft OAMS was 
shut  down  and  also  the  crew  had  reported a "tight  tether."  For  the  following 
2 4 2  hr,  the  tethered  system  drifted  without  control  system  activity  to 
determine  to  what  extent  the  gravity  gradient  had  stabilized  the  system  about 
the  local  vertical. 
Data  Evaluation - The  only data available  for  evaluating  the  gravity 
gradient  operation  are  the  spacecraft  inertial  platform  gimbal  angles 
(e, $ 0 ) . Only  two  of  these  three  Euler  angles  are  of  interest  here - 8. 
(pitchj  and $ (yaw).  These  determine  the  orientation  of  the  spacecraft 
longitudinal  axis  and  should,  therefore,  give  some  indication  of  the  orienta- 
tion  of  the  tether  (or  more  precisely,  the  line  between  the  centers-of-gravity 
of  the  two  vehicles) . The (O,O,O) position  corresponds  to  the  spacecraft 
longitudinal  axis  oriented so as  to  be  in  both  the  local  horizontal  and 
orbital  planes  with  the  spacecraft  small  end  forward  and  the  crew  sitting 
upright. 8. is  measured  first  and  is  positive  when  the  spacecraft  is  pitched 
up. \cI is  then  applied  about  the  spacecraft yaw axis  and  is to the  crew's 
right. The nominal  gravity  gradient  orientation  is  therefore (270 degrees, 
zero  degrees, 9) . 
SDDN 31 details  the  histories  of 8- and $ f r o m  the  time  the  Agena ACS 
was  shut dam till  the  Gemini  docking bar was  purposely  blown  thus  terminating 
the  tether  operation. 
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Following  the  Agena ACS shutdown,  the  spacecraft  is  seen  to  flip  over 
from  the  horizontal  forward-facing  position  to  the  downward  pointing  position 
in a period  of  about  ten  min.  Neither  this  flip  nor  the  one  occurring  at 
50:30 was  obvious  to  the  crew,  apparently  because  of  the  associated  rolling 
motion.  Following  the  first  spacecraft  flip, a period  of  regular  oscillatory 
motion  occurs  at  frequency  readily  identified from mDN 31with the  space- 
craft  moment-of-inertia  and  tether  elasticity  interaction.  The  second 
spacecraft;  flip  is  seen  to  be  coincident  with a fuel  cell  purge  which  may  have 
been a contributing  factor.  Despite  the  occasional  erratic  motion  of  the 
spacecraft,  the  crew  stated  that  at  no  time  after  Agena ACS shutdown  did  the 
tether  make an angle  as  great  as 90 degrees  to  the  local  vertical, i.e., the' 
total  tethered  system  remained  stabilized.  The  dashed  line  faired  through 
the  data  indicates  this  was so. The  librational  motion  of  the  total  system 
about  the  local  vertical  is  approximated  by  this  line.  It  shows  the  system 
to be executing a counterclockwise  coning  motion  when  viewed  from  above.  The 
pitch  and  yaw  periods are on  the  order of one  hour  as  expected  with  yaw 
somewhat  shorter  than  pitch  due  to  centrifugal  force  effects  shortening  the 
yaw  period. 
Conclusion - From  crew  observation  interpretation of spacecraft 
angular motions,  it  is  concluded  that  the  tethered  system  was  stabilized  about 
the  local  vertical  for a period  of  about 2-1/2 hr (l-2/3 orbits).  The  motions 
observed  were  in  general  agreement  with the prediction  of SDDN 31. A com- 
prehensive  evaluation  of  the  Gemini  XII-Agena  tethered  vehicle  operation  is 
given  in  Structural  Dynamics  Design  Note 32. 
Re-entry  Procedures  Development 
Re-entry  Monitoring  Procedures. - The  re-entry  monitoring  procedures  used 
on  Gemini  missions.provided  the  flight  crews  with a means  for  evaluating 
information  on  the  operational  status of the  primary  closed-loop  guidance 
system.  Based  on  this  information, a decision  was  made  onboard  as  to  whether 
primary  or  back-up  guidance  should  be  employed.  Briefly,  the  primary  guidance 
procedure  was  to  maintain  the  modulated  bank  angle  conrmanded  by  the  computer 
by  nulling  the  displayed bank angle  error.  The  back-up  guidance  procedure  was 
error  to  the  target  and  reverse  the bank angle  at a time  specified  by  ground 
to  null  crossrange  error  to  the  target.  The  monitoring  procedures  used  the 
flight  director  indicator (FDI) range  error  and  bank  error  display  information 
generated  by  the  re-entry  mode  of  the  onboard  computer. 
, to  establish a ground  supplied  constant bank angle  which  nulled  downrange 
The  first  event  monitored  was  the  time of arrival  at a navigated  altitude 
of 400,000 ft which  gave  the  first  indication  of  the  status  of  the  computer 
guidance  and  navigation  functions.  This  event  was  signaled  onboard  by  the 
initial  deflection of the FDI bank error  display  in  response  to a ccanputer 
commanded  constant bank angle. An arrival  time  within  the  tolerance of +40 
and -25 sec frm the ground computed  time  of  arrival  indicated  acceptable 
operation.  However, a tbie  outside the tolerance  indicated  that a system 
failure or degradation  in  navigation  accuracy had occurred  which  might  pre- 
clude  the  use  of  primary  guidance. From the  time of arrival  at 400,000 ft to 
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guidance in i t i a t ion ,  which occurred at approximately 300,000 ft, the back-up 
bank angle was maintained.. This was done t o  avoid having t o  switch from the 
computer comrmsnded bank angle   to   the back-up bank angle at guidance i n i t i a t i o n  
when further information on the  operational status of the  cmputer was avail- 
able. 
The second event monitored w a s  the initial downrange error needle 
deflection at guidance in i t ia t ion .  An acceptable deflection was within +5O 
nautical  miles of the ground computed value relayed following retrofire. If 
the  deflection was within tolerance the back-up bank angle was ignored and the 
closed-loop bank angle commands maintained. If the in i t i a l  de f l ec t ion  was 
outside  the  established limits the back-up bank angle was held and reversed at 
the designated time. The needle deflection was monitored continuously during 
re-entry to see that the range e r ro r  was being driven to null .  Detailed 
descriptions of the above procedures f o r  each spacecraft are G & C design 
- 
notes 394, 358,  353, and 334. 
Touchdown Predict Procedures. - The touchdown predict procedures involved 
estimating a trial r e t r o f i r e  time which would r e s u l t   i n  a computer-predicted 
touchdown location  within a desired landing area. 
This trial retrofire time was a time-to-go t o   r e t r o f i r e  and was estimated 
from the  difference  in the longitude of the desired landing area and the 
longitude of the spacecraft a t  the current mission the, assuming the space- 
craft  travelled four degrees of longitude per min. If the predicted touchdown 
location was not desirable, the trial re t ro f i r e  time was adjusted by calcu- 
la t ing  a correction time from longitude difference between the displayed and 
the desired longitude. Prediction was continued until  the predicted landing 
site was acceptable at which time the   re t rof i re   in i t ia l   condi t ions  w e r e  trans- 
ferred to  the re-entry mode by inserting an accept code in to  the  computer. A 
detailed  description of the  touchdown predict procedures is contained in 
G & C design note 348. 
A variety of s c i en t i f i c ,  medical, technological, and engineering experi- 
ments were conducted on Gemini missions t o  extend man's knowledge of space and 
t o  develop fu r the r   t he   ab i l i t y  t o  s u s t a i n   l i f e   i n  space. 
The McDonnell Company was responsible for integrating experiment equipment 
in to   t he  G e m i n i  Spacecraft, while NASA was responsible for the design, con- 
struction, and qualification of experiment equipment before   f l ight  and the  
analysis of the data after f l i gh t .  
This swmnary describes the experiment objectives, experimental equipment, 
and the interface requirements i n  the spacecraft. Table 35 lists the  space- 
c ra f t   e f f ec t iv i ty . fo r  each experiment. 
Since eqeriment equipment was the responsibil i ty of NASA, no a t tanpt  i s  
made to describe equipent design and evaluation, state-of-the-art advances, 
qualification program resu l t s ,   r e l i ab i l i t y  and quality assurance program 
results, r e su l t s  of flight missions; o r  any problems associated with the over- 
a l l  program. The resuits of these experiments are reported in  G e m i n i  Mid- 
Program Conference (NASA SP-121), and Gemini Sumnary Conference (NASA sp-138), 
and i n  hkmed Spaceflight Experiments Interim Reports (MSC-TA-R-67-1, 2, 3, 
dated March, &y, and August 1967 respectively). 
ECPERIMEWC D-1 (BASIC  OBJECT  PHOTOGRAPHY) 
The objective of this experiment was to   i nves t iga t e   t he   ab i l i t y  of man t o  
acquire, track, and photograph space-borne objects, such a s  the  rendezvous 
evaluation pod ( R E P ) ,  the Agena Target Vehicle, and na tura l  ce les t ia l  bodies. 
The following equipment was required: a Zeiss Contarex camera, a 200 mm 
Nikkor f/4 lens, a Questar 1400 mm lens, three f i l m  packs, a telescopic sight,  
a periscope viewer, a window and lens bracket assembly, a f i l m  transport 
adapter, an optical  sight,  a photo event indicator, and a Gemini voice tape 
recorder. 
The experiment equipment interface with the spacecraft was accomplished 
a t  the  RH hatch window by mounting the ACFE window and l e n s  bracket assembly 
a t  three points on t h e  window sil l .  An adapter was provided on the window 
bracket t o  permit the interchange of t he  two lenses. A l l  equipment was stowed 
i n   t h e  cabin. 
Electr ical  power was provided from the main bus for   the  GFAE photo event 
indicator. 
MPERIMENT D-2 (NEARBY OaTECT  PHOTOGRAPHY) 
T h i s  experiment, an extension of Experiment D-1, was intended t o  demon- 
strate the   f l i gh t  crew's proficiency in acquiring high-resolution photographs 
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ITABLE 35 DOD/NASA EXPERIMENTS -. 
.NASA - G E M I N I  MISSIONS 
* 
E X P E R I M E N T   T I T L E  H 
BASIC OBJECT PHOTOGRAPHY 
N E A R B Y   O B J E C T   P H O T O G R A P H Y  
MASS DETERMINATION 
CELESTIAL  RADIOMETRY 
STAR OCCULTATION NAVIGATION 
SURFACE PHOTOGRAPHY 
SPACE  OBJECT  RADIOMETRY 
RADIATION IN  SPACECRAFT 
SIMPLE NAVIGATION 
ION-SENSING ATTITUDE CONTROL 
ASTRONAUT  MANEUVERING  UNIT  
ASTRONAUT  V IS IB IL ITY  
U H F / V H F  P O L A R I Z A T I O N  
NIGHT IMAGE INTENSIF ICATION 
POWER TOOL EVALUATION 
CARDIOVASCULAR CONDITIONING 
INFL IGHT EXERCISER 
IN  FL IGHT  PHONOCARDIOGRAM 
BIOASSAYS - BODY FLUIDS 
BONE DEMINERALIZATION 
CALCIUM BALANCE STUDY 
INFL IGHT SLEEP ANALYSIS  
HUMAN OTOLITH FUNCTION 
MSC-1 E L E C T R O S T A T I C   C H A R G E  
MSC-2 
TRI -AXIS  MAGNETOMETER MSC-3 
PROTON-ELECTRON SPECTROMETER 
MSC-4 
MSC-5 
OPTICAL COMMUNICATION 
BREMSSTRAHLUNG SPECTROMETER MSC-7 
B E T A   S P E C T R O M E T E R  MSC-6 
L U N A R   U V   S P E C T R A L   R E F L E C T A N C E  
MSC-8 COLOR PATCH PHOTOGRAPHY 
MSC-10 TWO-COLOR EARTHS LIMB PHOTOS 
MSC- I2  LANDMARK  CONTRAST  MEASUREMENTS 
S-1 ZODIACAL L IGHT PHOTOGRAPHY 
5-2 
FROG EGG GROWTH 5-3 
SEA URCHIN EGG GROWTH 
5-5 SYNOPTIC TERRAIN PHOTOGRAPHY 
5-15 SYNOPTIC WEATHER PHOTOGRAPHY 
5-7 CLOUD TOP SPECTROMETER 
5-8 VISUAL ACUITY 
5-9 
5-10 
NUCLEAR EMULSION 
LIBRATIONS REGIONS PHOTO 5-29 
GEMINI WAKE MEASUREMENT 5-26 
UV ASTRONOMICAL CAMERA 5-13 
MICROMETEORITE COLLECTION 5-12 
AIRGLOW HORIZON PHOTOGRAPHY S-11 
AGENA  MICROMETEORITE  COLLECTOR 
S-4 RADIATION AND ZERO-G ON BLOOD 
5-30 DIM-LIGHT ASTRONOMICAL OBJECT PHOTO. 
5-51 DAYTIME SODIUM CLOUD PHOTO. 
MISSION NUMBER 
3 5* 1A 6 71 
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*ALSO ON T D A  4 (ATDA)  
of the rendezvous evaluation pod (REP). I n  addition, the spacecraft was t o  
perform station  keeping  within 60 f t  of t he  REP and t o  make an in-plane 
maneuver around the R E P  t o  permit an all-aspect viewing. Subsequently, the 
spacecraft was t o  be maneuvered 500 f t  a f t  fo r  photographs with the 1400 mm 
lens.  
The ,equipment used i n   t h i s  experiment was the  same as that f o r  Experiments 
D-1 and D-6. The experiment equipment interface with the spacecraft, including 
stowage provisions, was a lso   the  same as that fo r  Ekperiments D-1 and D-6. 
EXPERIMENT D-3 (MASS DETERMINATION) 
The objective of t h i s  experiment was to   invest igate   the  feasibi l i ty   of  a 
direct-cantact method of determining the mass of an orbiting vehicle. The 
procedure involved accelerating the G e m i n i  Agena Target Vehicle by pushing it 
with the spacecraft. The mass of the  target vehicle would be determined by 
measuring the incremental velocity change and the thrusting time. 
No special  equipment was required because the  experiment employed the 
existing Gemini data acquisit ion system. No interface with the spacecraft was 
required. 
EXPERIMENT D-4/D-7 (CELESTIAL RADIOMETRr AND SPACE  OBJECT RADIOMETRY) 
The objective of the D 4 D - 7  experiment was t o  obtain spectral irradiance 
information about various celestial and t e r r e s t r i a l  backgrounds, rocket plumes, 
and cold objects in space. 
The equipment flown on Spacecraft 5 f o r  t h i s  experiment was: a m u l t i -  
channel radiometer, an IR interferometer/spectrometer, a cryogenic inter- 
ferometer/spectrometer, an FM/FM transmitter, an electronic unit, a recorder 
electronics unit ,  a tape transport, and a UHF’ antenna. 
On Spacecraft 7, the radiometer was s l igh t ly  modified and different 
filters were employed. With these exceptions, the equipment was t he  same for  
Spacecraft 5 and 7. 
The components, location, and the functions of the  items of equipment 
were : 
The tape recorder, used t o  record spectrometer and canmutated data, was 
located i n   t h e  l e f t  skid-well. 
The IR spectrometer consisted of two separate detectors uti l izing’a 
common opt ica l  system t o  pruvide  spectral  radiance measurements of t a rge t s  
and earth background to   the  tape  recorder  and the  telemetry  transmitter. 
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The radiometer contained filters f o r  measuring target  radiation  over 
selected spectral regions. The JR spectrometer, the cryogenic spectrometer, 
and t h e  radiometer were mounted in   the  re t rograde  sect ion of the  adapter.  
Jettisonable  doors were provided to  protect   the  radiometer and the  spec- 
traneter sensor elements @wing the launch. 
Power ON/OFF switches for the tape recorder, t he  IR spectrcmeter, the 
radiometer, t he  cryogenic spectrometer, and the telemetry transmitter were 
located on the instrument console in the spacecraft cabin. 
The electronic unit ,  the telemetry transmitter,  and the antenna were 
mounted i n  the  equipment section of t h e  adapter. 
Spacecraft power was u t i l i zed   t o   ope ra t e   t h i s  experiment. 
The experiment determined the  threshold of sensi t ivi ty   values   in   absolute  
numbers fo r  ea r th  and sky background radiation. Irradiance measurements of 
the  sun, moon, stars, cloud formations, and active and passive earth objects 
were taken. Measurements on the rendezvous evaluation pod (REP) and on 
rocket engine plumes were made during the Gemini V mission. During the  
Gemini VI1 f l i gh t ,  measurements were made on the second stage of the launch 
vehicle. 
EXPERpiENT D-5 ( STAR OCCULTATION  NAVIGATION) 
The objective of this experiment was t o  determine the usefulness of the 
star occultation technique for space navigation. An astronaut was equipped 
with a photoelectric  occult   telescope  to make time and in tens i ty  measurements 
of stars occulted by the  edge of the ear th ' s  atmosphere. The procedure 
involved  visually  locating  occulting stars and manually recording the appro- 
p r i a t e  times. The photometric attenuation and the  time measurements data 
would be recorded and transmitted via telemetry, or else recovered after 
spacecraft  re-entry  for  post-flight  orbit computation and comparison. with 
ground track data. 
The experiment equipment consisted of a GFAE star occultation photometer 
and one telemetry channel. Interface with the spacecraft involved modifying 
the cushion l i n e r  i n  t h e  aft centerline stowage container   to  accommodate the  
photometer. An e l e c t r i c a l  connection and two u t i l i t y  cords were provided i n  
the spacecraft cabin, one cord supplying photometer power and the  other trans- 
mitting telemetry signals.  
EXPERIMENT D-6 (SURFACE PHOTOGRAPHY) 
The objective of this experiment was to   inves t iga te  the technical prob- 
lems associated wi th  acquiring, tracking, and photographing t e r r e s t r i a l  
objects. 
The equipment and the equipment interface with the spacecraft, including 
stowage provisions, were t h e  same as those  for  Experiments D-1 and D-2. 
The procedure involved acquisition of the object by using the   op t ica l  
sight and the spacecraft  attitude  instruments, and tracking by means of t h e  
te lescope s ight ,  the opt ical  s ight ,  and the periscape viewer. 
For the acquisit ion and v isua l  tracking modes, t he  coarmand-pilot would 
maneuver the  spacecraft;   for  the  telescope and periscope tracking modes, the 
p i l o t  would control the spacecraft. Beginning with the acquisit ion of the  
terrestrial object by the crew, four photographs would be taken. 
EXPERIMENT D-8 (RADIATION I N  SPACECRAFT) 
The objective of the  D-8 experiment was t o  gather reliable data on the  
absorbed and total   radiation  doses  penetrating the cabin of the Gemini Space- 
c raf t .  T h i s  information is  highly relevant to the accuracy of future  manned- 
space-mission  planning. 
The experiment equipment consisted of two act ive current-mode ionization 
chambers, five small passive dosimeter packets, three telemetry channels, 
and an  e lec t r ica l  power cable for each ionization chamber. The portable 
tissue-equivalent ionization chambers were t o  measure the  dose levels during: 
(1) the "nonanomaly" revolutions and (2) during spacecraft passage through 
the  anomdous region of the inner Van Allen  radiation belt. 
The experiment equipment interface with the spacecraft consisted of 
attaching the ionization chambers and the  dosimeter packets inside the  cabin, 
and providing  electrical  parer  connections and the  wiring for  telemetry  output. 
MPERIMENT D-9 (SIIWlLE NAVIGATION) 
The objective of this experiment was t o  prove the f e a s i b i l i t y  of space- 
craft navigation by manual means during f l ight .  Star and horizon sightings 
and measurements were t o  be made using a handheld space sextant. The goal 
would be a simplification of orbital   determination mathematics so that the  
orientation and t h e  s i z e  and shape of t h e  o r b i t  could be obtained  with  the 
sextant and an analog computer. 
The experiment equipment consisted of only the handheld sextant. The 
interface with the spacecraft comprised provisions for staring t h e  sextant 
within  the  cabin. 
ExpERpzENT D-10 (ION-SENSING ATTITUDE CONTROL) 
The objective  of  the D-10 experiment was t o  evaluate the  use of ion 
sensors i n  determining spacecraft attitude. 
The experiment equipment consisted of two ion sensors and two extendible 
booms. The booms were used t o  elevate the ion sensors above the spacecraft 
t o  measure var ia t ions  of   the   ion flow. 
The pitch sensing system consisted of two planar  electrostatic  analyzers 
mounted 90 degrees apart on an extendible boom in the spacecraft  retroadapter.  
Each analyzer was set at an angle of 45 degrees from the plane of zero pitch. 
The yaw sensing system was iden t i ca l   t o  the pitch sensing system, except that 
the  two planar  electrostatic  analyzers were mounted 40 degrees from the  plane 
of zero yaw. The data acquired by the  sensing systems were tape recorded and 
transmitted on ten high level and four lo-level telemetry channels of the  
adapter TM multiplexers. 
Spacecraft power operated the experiment equipment. A power ON/OF'F 
switch and an antenna ExIEND/SAFE switch were provided on the instrument 
console i n  the spacecraft cabin. 
The objectives of t h i s  experiment were t o  perform EVA ut i l iz ing   the  
astronaut maneuvering uni t  (AMU), and t o  determine the capabi l i t ies  of t h e  
uni t .  
The experiment equipment consisted of the following GFAE: an astronaut 
maneuvering unit ,  a battery unit ,  a tether l i ne ,  a thrust  neutralizer pul l -  
off housing, a telemetry receiver, and an ELSS unit  and associated umbilical. 
The following equipment was CF'E: an AMU cover assembly, two UHF antennae and 
a coaxial switch. 
The experiment equipment interface Kith the spacecraft was as follows: 
A .  The AMU was i n s t a l l ed   i n   t he  equipment adapter section against a 
torque box and secured by a hoUm tension bolt .  The hydrogen peroxide and 
nitrogen  service  l ines and the  tension  bolt  were cut by a pyro gui l lot ine 
activated from a cabin switch (AMU DEPLOY) on the  command p i l o t ' s  instrument 
panel. 
same time as the, AMU cover was jettisoned. T h i s  was accomplished by activa- 
t ing  the. EVA BARS EXT switch on the  cabin RH circuit  breaker  panel. 
the annunciator panel and an Hz02 temperature and pressure gauge. The latter 
B. The hand and foot rails and the  two UHF antennas were deployed at the  
C. Other cabin displays consisted of an H& pressure warning l i g h t  on 
was read with the  selector switch in the EXP position. Spacecraft power was 
util ized  only  for  reading the temperature  and  pressure gauge  and fo r  
telemetry. 
The telemetry receiver was located i n  t h e  adapter  electronics module, and 
was connected t o   t h e  UHF antennas by the  coaxial switch. 
The AMU provided the  astronaut  with  automatic  attitude  control  and sta- 
b i l i za t ion  in  three axes, and manual t r ans l a t ion  in  two axes. Side transla- 
t i o n  could be accomplished by a combination of a r o l l  o r  yaw maneuver and 
t rans la t ion  in  one of the  avai lable  modes. The astronaut controlled the AMU 
manually through the knobs located on the  sidearm controllers. Controller 
knob movement was direction oriented. 
The uni t  components were an oxygen subsystem, redundant propulsion and 
e l ec t r i ca l  packages (activated by a single handle on the uni t ) ,  a telemetry 
transmitter, and a communications transceiver. 
EXPER~MENT D-13 (ASTRONAUT VISIBILITY) 
The objective of t h i s  experiment was t o  measure, under controlled condi- 
t ions,  t he  visual   acui ty  of the  astronauts during long space f l igh ts ,  in   order  
t o  determine whether a prolonged spacecraft environment tended t o  degrade the 
crew's eyesight. 
The e-eriment equipment consisted of a GFAE photometer, a GFAE vision 
tester with mouth supports, a CFE l i g h t  t r ap  mounted upon the  forward end of 
the  RH hatch, and one high-level telemetry channel. 
The experiment equipment interface with the spacecraft consisted of 
stowage provisions for the equipment, the connection of the  vis ion tester t o  
the existing power supply, the attachment of the mouth supports t o  the p lo t  
board f i t t i n g s  under the LH and RH main instrument panels, and the connection 
of the photometer t o  the  telemetry channel. 
MPERIMENT 11-14 (w/m POLARIZATION) 
The objectives of the  D-14 experiment were (1) t o  measure the incongrui- 
ties which ex i s t  i n  the electron content along the orbital  path,  and (2) t o  
gain knowledge about the structure of t h e  lower ionosphere and i ts  temporal 
variations.  These goals were achieved by measuring the electron content of 
t h e  ionosphere below the Gemini Spacecraft with a Faraday rotat ion systerq 
u t i l i z ing  dual-frequency transmitters operating at about 130 mc and 400 mc. 
The experiment equipment consisted of a transmitter, a diplexer, a 
colinear dipole antenna, and an antenna boom. The transmitter generated the 
two signals of about 130 mc and 400 mc, which were then fed in to  the diplexer 
303 
t o  be combined i n t o  a single output. The diplexer contained two passive f i l -  
ter  c i r cu i t s   t o   p reven t  feedback between t h e  two transmitter outputs.  Frau 
the   diplexer   the  s ignals  were fed through coaxial cables to   the   d ipole  
antenna, from which they were radiated with a ver t ical   polar izat ion.  
The t ransmit ter  and diplexer were mounted in  the  spacecraft   adapter  equip- 
ment section and the  antenna and antenna boom were mounted in   the   adapter  
retrograde section. The antenna assembly comprised an extendible dipole 
antenna, the antenna boom, and a choke t o   i s o l a t e   t h e  antenna from the boom. 
The upper element of t h e  antenna was hinged i n  two places so that it could be 
confined within the spacecraft during the launch. 
Spacecraft power operated this experiment. A parer  ON/OFF switch and an 
antenna EXJ!EXD/RITL'BACT switch were loca ted   in   the  instrument console i n  the 
spacecraft cabin. 
EXPESl" D-15 ( NIGH!J! IMAGE INTENSIF'ICATION) 
The objective of the D-15 experiment was to obtain information on the 
performance of t he  low l ight- level   te levis ion system, which was designed f o r  
nighttime surveillance of oceans by an orbiting spacecraft .  
The experiment equipment consisted of f ive  uni t s :  a !Y camera, a camera 
control unit, a viewing monitor, a recording monitor and photographic camera, 
and a monitor electronics and equipment control unit .  Operation of the system 
was as follows: the TV camera scanned the earth scene and focused the image 
upon a sensor which converted the  image in to  an e lec t r ica   v ideo   s igna l  that 
was supplied t o   t h e  viewing monitor and t h e  recording monitor. The camera 
control unit  regulated the operation of the  Tv camera. The viewing monitor, 
receiving the video signal from the TV camera unit ,  reproduced and displayed 
t o  the astronauts the scene viewed by the camera. The recording monitor also 
received the video signal from the  TV camera uni t  and reproduced t h e  image 
for recording by the  photographic camera. The monitor electronics and equip- 
ment control  unit   contained  circuits  to  operate  both  the viewing monitor and 
the recording monitor. 
The TV camera was mounted perpendicular to  the  spacecraft   skin on a CFE 
coldplate located i n  the adapter retrograde section. A CFE mirror reflected 
TV camera vision forward and parallel t o  the spacecraft longitudinal center- 
l i n e .  T h i s  mirror was located externally on the spacecraft adapter retrograde 
section and, p r i o r   t o  use, was held in  p lace  by a je t t isonable  fa i r ing.  The 
mirror was extended into  posi t ion upon the application of experiment standby 
power and was then locked in to  th i s  pos i t ion .  The camera control unit  had no 
external  controls and was mounted on a CF'E coldplate on the  electronics module 
in the spacecraft adapter equipnent section. The viewing monitor was stowed 
i n  the spacecraft cabin. The recording monitor and photographic camera were 
mounted on the  coldplate   in   the  r ight  side landing gear well of the  space- 
c ra f t  so that they  projected  into  the equipment bay through the damper cutout. 
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The monitor electronics and equipnent control unit was also mounted on a (3% 
coldplate  in  the  r ight  side  landing  gear well. 
The experiment u t i l i zed  three high-level and three bilevel TM channels of 
t h e  spacecraft adapter section telemetry system. A power ON-OFF-STANDBY 
switch and a fa i r ing  door SAFE-OPEN switch were pruvided on the  instrument 
console in the spacecraft cabin. The experiment used spacecraft power. 
EXPERIMEN!C D-16 (POWER TOOL EVALUATION) 
The object ives   of   this  experiment were to  evaluate man's a b i l i t y   t o   p e r -  
form maintenance tasks i n  free space and to   appra ise   the  performance of a 
minimum reaction power t o o l  designed t o  overcome the effects   of   react ive 
torques and forces under zero gravity conditions. 
The experiment equipment consisted of a GFAE space power too l   (ba t te ry  
operated), a GFAE hand wrench, a GFAE space power too l  r e s t r a i n t  assembly with 
mounting rails and a work-site containing an array of mechanical fasteners, a 
GFAE knee te ther ,  and a CFE s t r a i n  gauge to obtain load-readings through 
telemetry. 
The experiment equipment interface with the  spacecraft was as follows: 
The r e s t r a in t  assembly, on its rails, was i n s t a l l ed   i n  the retroadapter 
section immediately aft of the RH hatch. A spring-loaded access door at the 
adapter  outside  skin was opened on booster  separation by the action  of a 
gui l lot ine upon i ts  restraining cable. The restraint assembly was unlocked by 
the EVA astronaut and rolled outboard radially a t  the  start of the  experiment. 
The power t o o l  and the hand wrench were stowed i n  the power t o o l  restraint 
assembly. 
The knee t e the r  was stowed i n  t he  cabin and taken out at EVA. During 
the experiment, t h e  tether was at tached  to   the  as t ronaut 's  knees and t o   t h e  
adapter handrail.  
EXPERIMENT M-1 (CARDIOVASCULAR CONDITIONING) 
The obJective of the M - 1  experiment was t o  evaluate the effectiveness of 
pneumatic pressure cuffs around t h e  astronaut's  legs  in  preventing  cardio- 
vascular deterioration caused by prolonged weightlessness. The pressure cuffs 
were cycl ical ly  inflated, creating a stress on the  venous system i n   t h e  
p i l o t ' s   l e g s  which would approximate the n o m 1  gradient i n  a low gravi ty  
environment. 
The experiment equipment was as follows: a GFAE cardiovascular reflex 
conditioner, GFAE inf la tab le  cuf fs  ( in  the  p i lo t ' s  space s u i t ) ,  C F E  cardio- 
vascular reflex conditioner mounting devices, a CFE manual control, and CF'E 
hose assemblies. 
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The equipment interface with the spacecraft consisted of mounting provi- 
sions  for  the  cardiovascular reflex conditioner unit between the  e ject ion 
seats at the  large  pressure bulkhead, and a manual ON/OFF control mounted on 
t h e  water management panel. 
E I ( P E R m  M-3 (IN-FLIGIFP EXERCISER) 
The objective of t h e  M-3 experiment was to   devise  a method for  evaluating 
the general physical condition of the crew during a space f l i g h t .  T h i s  
evaluation was based upon the response of the cardiovascular system t o  a 
calibrated work load, which fo r  th i s  experiment was t he  periodic use of an 
in-fl ight exerciser.  Blood pressure was measured at the beginning and end of 
each  exercise  period;  the  pulse rate was continuously monitored by in-flight 
biomedical instrumentation. 
The experiment equipment consisted of a GFAE EC30004 in-fl ight exerciser.  
The contractor's experiment equipment interface consisted of a cabin stowage 
provision  for t h e  exerciser.  
EXPERIMENT M-4 (IN-FLIGHT PHONOCARDIOGRAM) 
The objective of t he  M-4 experiment was t o  measure the  functional  status 
or   the   fa t igue  state of t h e  astronaut 's  heart muscle by determining the time 
interval  between the   e l ec t r i ca l  and the  mechanical systole of the  heart  muscle. 
The experiment equipment consisted of an  onboard biomedical tape recorder, 
an electrocardiographic signal conditioner, and a phonocardiographic t r ans -  
ducer. The astronaut 's  heart  sounds were detected by the phonocardiographic 
transducer and transmitted by a shielded cable to   the  s ignal   condi t ioner ,  
located in  a pocket of the astronaut's undergarment. The signal was relayed 
from the s ignal   condi t ioner   to   the  sui t   b ioplug and then on t o  the  biomedical 
tape recorder. 
The transducer was attached to the astronaut 's  chest  on the  sternum; 
transducer and signal conditioner were considered part of the  as t ronaut 's  
suit. Spacecraft power was u t i l i z e d  f o r  this experiment and spacecraft wiring 
transported data from the signal  conditioner  in the suit t o  the GFAE bio- 
medical tape recorder  in  the spacecraft cabin. 
EXPERIMEN!C M-5 (BIOASSAYS BODY FLUIDS) 
The intent  of the  M-5 experiment was to   gather  data on the   e f fec t  of 
space f l i g h t  upon various systems of the  human body. T h i s  experiment concen- 
trated upon the effects of space f l i g h t  which alter the chemistries of body 
f lu ids .  The  method was to obtain pref l ight ,  in-f l ight ,  and post-fl ight 
samples of body f lu ids ,  which were then analyzed for   e lectrolytes ,  hormones, 
protein, and other organic constituents that indicate the physiological 
s ta tus   of   the  crew. 
The pr incipal  weight loss during f l i g h t  may be related t o  water loss, of 
urinary, sweat or other origin.  Fluid intake and urinary output were mea- 
sured, along with changes in   t he   e l ec t ro ly t e  and hormone concentrations in 
samples. Befare fl ight,  the plasma and ur ine samples were analyzed; during 
f l ight ,  only the urine was sampled. 
To obtain this data, a quantity of ll2 GFAE 75 cc urine sample bags was 
provided. Starage provisions in the cabin constituted the  experiment equip- 
ment interface.  
EXPERIMJ?,NT M-6 (BONE DEMINERALIZATION) 
The objective of this experiment was to   e s t ab l i sh  the  occurrence and 
degree of bone demineralization resulting from inmobilization and prolonged 
weightlessness encountered by astronauts in space f l i gh t .  
The experiment involved the  making, before and a f t e r  the f l igh t ,  of a 
series of radiographs of each astronaut's left foot and l e f t  hand. The 
method used was radiographic bone densitometry. No in- f l igh t  equipment was 
required fo r  this experiment, but a special analog computer and several stan- 
dard clinical  x-ray machines, standard films, and calibrated densitometric 
wedges were employed a t  Cape Kennedy, on the recovery carrier, and at the  
Manned Spacecraft Center. 
There was no experiment equipment interface with the spacecraft. 
EXPERlMENT M-7 (CALCIUM BALANCE STUDY) 
The objective of this experiment was to obtain information about the 
effects of extended space f l i g h t  upon  human bone and muscle t i s sue .  Bedrest 
s tudies  have demonstrated t h a t  a prolonged immobility of t he  human body 
results i n  substant ia l  losses  of calcium, nitrogen, and related elements. A 
sizable decrease i n  the body's normal aggregate of these elements, due t o  
the stresses of a long space flight, could i n  theory lead t o  a serious weak- 
ness of t he  bones and muscles. This experiment was conducted t o  determine 
whether these losses  were large enough to  require  prophylactic  procedures. 
Equipment f o r   t h i s  experiment consisted of urine sample bags and a supply 
of GFAE defecation gloves. As a back-up t o   t h e  sample bags, a f lme te r  was 
added i n  the urine transport  system; this output signal was recorded on the 
voice tape recorder. The equipnent interface with the spacecraft consisted 
of stowage provisions  in  the  cabin  for the gloves and sample bags. 
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EXPERlMEwT M-8 (IN-FLIGHT E X E C J ! R O E N C E P H )  
c 
The goal of this experiment was to   obtain  precise  and objective informa- 
tion  regarding the number, duration, and depth of an  astronaut's  sleep  periods 
during fl ight.  T h i s  informatton i s  v i ta l  in  devis ing  fu ture  work-rest cycles 
and i n  determining t o  w h a t  extent   pi lot  performance would be  affected by 
diminished  alertness. 
. A  
This  experiment employed an electroencephalogram (EEG) t o   cha r t   t he  
bra in ' s   e lec t r ica l   ac t iv i ty ,  which undergoes established  variations with 
d i f fe ren t   l eve ls  of sleep. 
The experiment equipment consisted of a biomedical tap.e recorder, two 
miniature  transistorized amplifiers, and two pa i r s  of nontraumatic scalp elec- 
trodes. The electrodes monitored the  e l ec t r i ca l  ac t iv i ty  of the cerebral 
cortex, sending a signal which was conditioned by the amplifiers for   s tor ing  
i n  two channels of the biomedical tape recorder. 
The electrodes were attached to   the   as t ronaut ' s   sca lp  and both  the  elec- 
trodes and the amplifiers were considered part of the astronaut ts  suit. 
Spacecraft power operated this experiment and spacecraft  wiring  transported 
data from the ampl i f i e r s   i n   t he   su i t   t o  t he  GFAE biomedical tape recorder i n  
the spacecraft cabin. 
The objectives of the  M-9 experiment were twofold: (1) to   a s ses s   t he  
a b i l i t y  of the  as t ronauts   to   determine  horizontal i ty   using  their   spacecraf t  
alone as a reference, and (2) t o  determine the  possible   effect  of prolonged 
weightlessness upon equilibrium. 
In  weightlessness,  primary  gravitational  cues  are  lost and the o t o l i t h  
apparatus (the organs of equilibrium) is  deprived of i t s  normal stimulus. 
This permits  investigation of the  importance of secondary gravi ta t ional  cues 
i n  enabling the body t o   o r i e n t   i t s e l f .  In o rb i t a l  f l ight,  the astronaut i s  
responsive t o  his spacecraft because of t a c t i l e  messages, even though his eyes 
are closed. 
Persons having a b i l a t e ra l  loss of otolith  function  are  incapable of 
es t imat ing the ver t ical  and horizontal i n  the  absence of visual  cues. Pro- 
longed weightlessness may also change the   s ens i t i v i ty  of the  equilibrium 
organs. For t h i s  reason, the astronauts were required t o   o r i e n t  a luminous 
l ine  dai ly   during the f l i g h t   t o  permit monitoring of t h e i r   o t o l i t h   a c t i v i t y .  
The experiment 'equipment was incorporated  into  the GFAE v i s ion   t e s t e r  
used i n  Experiment S-8/D-13, but i n  all other   respects   the two experiments 
were separate. The experiment equipment interface with the spacecraft was the  
same as t h a t  of t he  S-8/D-13 experiment. 
m m m  m-1 (EE!L%OSIIATIC CHARGE) 
The objective  of  the MSC-1 experiment was t o   de t ec t  and measur\. any 
accumulated e l ec t ros t a t i c  charge that might have been created on the  surface 
of the Gemini Spacecraft by ionization from a t t i t u d e  motor exhausts. Investi- 
gation  of these theoretical  charges was required before attempting rendezvous 
f l i g h t s  because of the poss ib i l i t y  of explosion and other  detrimental effects 
due to   the   d i scharge  of e l ec t ros t a t i c   po ten t i a l  between spacecraft during 
rendezvous. The experiment equipnent was also t o  be operated during retrofire 
and during the  spacecraf t ' s  passage through the  South Atlantic magnetic 
anomaly. 
The experiment equipment consisted of a sensor unit and an  electronics 
unit .  The sensor unit contained a sensor disk v ibra t ing  in  a direct ion nonnal 
t o  its surface, and a preamplifier to detect  the electrostatic charge. The 
electronics  unit  contained an osc i l l a to r  which generated the cur ren t   to   d r ive  
the sensing disk, an automatic ranging device extending over four decades, a 
demodulator t o  condition the amplifier output for telemetry input, and a power 
conditioner. 
The two experiment un i t s  were mounted between s t r ingers  i n  the  retro-  
grade adapter section of the spacecraft, af t  of the r ing at s ta t ion  Z 94.40, 
with the element of t h e  sensing unit exposed t a  space after spacecraft inser- 
t ion.  The sensing element was protected during launch by a Jett isonable door, 
which was jet t isoned a t  the  first application of power t o  t he  sensor  unit ,  
Telemetry data were transmitted by t h e  electronics unit on two '1M channels of 
the high-level multiplexer in the re-entry module. Spacecraft power operated 
the experiment; a power ON/OF" control switch was located on the instrument 
console i n  the spacecraft cabin. 
EXPERIMENT MSC-2 (PROTON-ELECTRON SPECTROMETER) 
The objective of Experiment M S C - 2  was t o  measure the proton and electron 
intensi t ies   outs ide the  spacecraft and to   inves t iga te  the radiation dose 
received by the crew during the mission. A long-range goal of this experi- 
ment was t o  discover how closely  the measured dose agreed with a predetermined 
calculation,  to  permit more accurate  predictions of the r ad ia t ion   t o  which 
astronauts may be exposed on space missions. 
The experiment equipment was a proton-electron spectrometer. On the  
Gemini N mission, the  unit employed a pulse height analyzer with a p l a s t i c  
s c i n t i l l a t o r  i n  an anticoincidence arrangement. On the Gemini V I 1  mission, 
t h e   s c i n t i l l a t o r  was replaced  by a t h i n  dE/dx p l a s t i c  wafer mounted over  the 
instrument entrance aperture. This modification permitted the  measurelaent of 
protons of energy 5 < E < 18 MeV instead of protons of energy 25 < E < 80 MeV. 
The spectrometer, which monitored the  external  environment, was mounted 
i n  the Gemini equipment adapter  section and fastened t o  the center   pal le t  
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area, with the spectrometer face looking aft and covered by the adapter  ther- 
ma3 curtain. The internal  radiat ion dose was monitored with operational film- 
badge packages i n  the crew's underclothing. The electronics unit  data were 
transmitted on eight   bi level  and six high-level TM channels of the spacecraft 
PCM telemetry system i n  the adapter section. A power ON/OFF control switch 
(labeled SFT-MAG) was located on the instrument console (Agena Control 
section) in the spacecraft cabin. The pilot  recorded the experiment ON/OFF 
times on the  Gemini voice recorder. Spacecraft power operated t h i s  experiment. 
EXPERlMENT MSC-3 (TRI-AXIS MAGNETOMETER) 
The objective of the  MSC-3 experiment was t o  determine the direct ion and 
amplitude of the ear th 's  magnetic f ie ld  during selected periods of several 
orbital missions. This information was v i t a l   t o  the support of the MSC-2 
experiment, s ince  par t ic le  in tens i t ies  are strongly directional with respect 
t o   t h e  magnetic f ield.  A tri-axis flux-gate magnetometer was u t i l i z e d  t o  
gather this information over the range of 0 t o  60,000 gammas in   three  axes .  
The experiment equipment consisted of a sensor unit, an electronics unit ,  
and an interconnecting cable. The sensor unit contained three orthogonally 
mounted sensing devices for measuring vector components of the magnetic f ie ld  
i n  the  three axes. The electronics unit contained a converter which supplied 
the necessary sensor drive currents, detected and transformed the magnetic 
f ie ld  sensor signals and converted these signals t o  a 0-5 analog DC voltage. 
The experiment un i t s  were mounted i n  t h e  spacecraft- adapter section. The 
sensor unit was mounted upon a contractor furnished telescopic boom which was 
capable of extending the unit  40 in.  from the  spacecraft adapter skin. The 
e lectronics   uni t  was hard-mounted on the retrobeam in the spacecraft  adapter 
retrograde section. From t h i s  unit ,  data were transmitted on three high-level 
TM channels of the adapter section telemetry mult5plexer. A power ON/OFF 
control switch (labeled SPT-MAG/OF'F/MAG ONLY) was located on the instrument 
console i n  t h e  spacecraft cabin. Spacecraft power operated the experiment. 
EXPERlMENT MSC-4 (OPTICAL COMMUNICATION - LASER) 
The objective of t h i s  experiment was t o  determine the feasibil i ty of 
using coherent optical beams (laser beams) for spacecraft-to-earth comunica- 
t ion.  
The spacecraft experiment equipment was a self-contained compact t r ans -  
mitter employing a gallium arsenide semiconductor laser as the active coherent 
l i g h t  source. Three instrumented ground sites were established, each equipped 
with a flashing beacon and having the  capabi l i ty  t o  col lect  and demodulate 
coded opt ical  s ignals ,  
The transmitter, which was designed t o  be handheld by the astronaut, had 
special  infrared safety (spectral)  glasses and a microphone attached. A 
6-power telescope, in conjunction with a 400-angstrom f i l ter  for   f ine   t rack ing  
of the ground beacon, was i n t e g r a l   t o  the  unit .  
The spacecraft experiment equipment was mounted on the center stowage 
container door before and after the  experiment. 
ExpERlMENT MSC- 5 (LUNAR W SPECTRAL REFLECTANCE) 
The objective of the MSC-5 experiment was t o  determine u l t rav io le t  spec- 
tral reflectance of the lunar surface between 2000 and 32,000 angstroms. Data 
from t h i s  experiment were t o  be used t o  estimate the   to ta l   inc ident  W energy 
on a n  as t ronaut 's  face while he is  on the lunar surface. These data will 
influence the design of lunar space su i t s .  
The experiment equipment consisted of a 70 mm general purpose Maurer 
camera, a Maurer f i l m  magazine, an aiming telescope, an objective grating, an 
objective prism, and an extended timer. 
The experiment equipment was stowed i n  t h e  spacecraft cabin. A mounting 
bracket  for  the Maurer camera was supplied by Mchnnell t o  posit ion the camera 
i n   t h e  opened right-hand hatch, so that the  camera could be aimed by t h e  
i l luminated reticle in the left-hand window. The camera could be removed from 
the  bracket for use in other photography, such as general purpose and 
Weriment  S-11 . 
EXPERI[MENT MSC-6 (BETA SPECTR0"ER) 
The objective of the MSC-6 experiment was t o  check the calculational tech- 
niques used t o  compute the spacecraft external radiation. The data obtained 
were also used t o  update and f i l l  voids   in  the knowledge of t h i s  environment 
as it af fec ts  manned earth orbital  missions.  The beta spectrometer was used 
i n  conjunction with the  Bremsstrahlung spectrometer (Experiment MSC-7) and the 
tri-axis f l u - g a t e  magnetometer (Experiment MSC-3). This equipment provided the  
added a b i l i t i e s   t o  determine the direction and amplitude of electrons imping- 
ing upon the spacecraft and t o  discover the extent of x-ray radiation. 
The experiment equipment consisted of two units,  a sensing unit and an 
electronics unit .  The sensing unit contained a stack of four lithium- 
dr i f ted  s i l i con  semiconductors to  de tec t  be ta  par t ic les .  The electronics 
unit conditioned the sensing unit data for transmission by the spacecraft 
telemetry system. 
The experiment un i t s  were mounted in the spacecraft adapter retrograde 
section. The sensor unit was mounted flush with the adapter skin and was 
protected during launch by a spring-loaded door operated by a cable  guil lotine.  
The electronic  unit was mounted on the retro-rocket beam. Ikta from the  unit 
were transmitted on eight   bi level  and two high-level !M channels of t h e  adap- 
ter section telemetry multiplexer. A power ON/OFF control switch (labeled 
SFT-MAG/OF'F/MAG/ONLY) was on t h e  instrument console in the spacecraft  cabin.  
T h i s  switch served both the MSC-3 and the  MSC-6 experiments. Spacecraf't 
power operated  this  experiment. 
The objective of the MSC-7 experiment was t o  measure the secondary gamma 
rays produced i n  the materials of t he  G e m i n i  Spacecraft by trapped electrons 
while the  spacecraft was passing through the South Atlantic magnetic anomaly 
regions. While such rays do not now appear t o  be biologically significant,  a 
problem may develop in future long-duration missions, when astronauts might 
be required to subsist for considerable periods in high trapped-electron flux 
environments. For this reason, a time-differentiated measurement of these 
rays over a large section of the spacecraft was deemed desirable. 
The Bremsstrahlung spectrometer employs a s c i n t i l l a t o r  of cesium iodide 
and p l a s t i c .  Coupled with the sensor i s  an electronics section composed of a 
photomultiplier tube and an analog-to-digital converter. Transmission is 
accomplished by the spacecraft telemetry system. 
The experiment uni t  was mounted on the  large  pressure bulkhead, inboard 
of the left-hand seat rail i n  the spacecraft cabin. The electronics data 
were transmitted on eight bilevel and two high-level TM channels of the 
re-entry module telemetry system. A power ON/OFF switch was located on the  
instrument console in the spacecraft cabin. Spacecraft power operated this 
experiment. A synchronous pulse was provided from the spacecraft PCM system 
t o   t h e  experiment package. 
EXPERlMENT MSC-8 ( COLOR PATCH PHOTOGRAPHY) 
The objective of this experiment was t o   a sce r t a in  whether exis t ing photo- 
graphic materials accurately reproduce the colors of objects photographed i n  
space. These materials were evaluated by photographing a target containing 
known colors outside the spacecraft and comparing t h e  photographs with the 
target colors.  
The experiment equipment consisted of a 70 mm Maurer camera, a film 
magazine, a color patch slate, and a three f t  extension rod. The color patch 
s l a t e  was a ti tanium  plate  with Bureau of Standards primary colors - red, 
blue and yellow - and a neutral gray. The extension rod held the color patch 
three f t  from the camera. To reducs the effect  of ultraviolet  energy on the 
f i l m ,  a filter cutt ing off at 3500 A was placed over the camera lens.  
The experiment equipment interface with the spacecraft consisted of 
stowage provisions in the cabin for the  camera, color slate, extension rod, 
adapter, and mounting c l ip .  
EXPERIMENT MSC-10 (TWO-COLOR EAEiTH' S LlMB PHCXL?OGRAPHY) 
The purpose of the MSC-10 experiment was t o  provide a precise  definit ion 
of the earth 's  limb so that future astronauts would be able t o  use it t o  make 
a navigational fix. Black and white photographs of the limb were taken with 
a two-color f i l ter  mosaic placed i n  the magazine d i r ec t ly   i n   f ron t  of the 
film. The central  ver t ical  port ions were red-transmitting Wratten No. 
and the side portions blue-transmitting Wratten No. 47B. These filters per- 
mitted microdensitometry measurement of t he  terrestrial elevation of the blue 
over the red  portion of each photographed limb. 
The experiment equipment consisted of a 70 mm Hasselblad camera, a 
modified 70 mm f i l m  magazine, and a voice tape recorder. The experiment 
equipment interface w i t h  the spacecraft consisted of stowage provisions in 
the cabin  for   the camera and the tape recorder. 
EXPERPIIGMI MSC-12 (LANDMARK CONTRAST MEASUREMENT) 
The objective of t h i s  experiment was t o  determine the r e l a t i v e   v i s i b i l i t y  
of terrestrial landmarks from outside the  earth's atmosphere. The eventual 
objective was t o  provide a reliable source of data f o r  ApoUo onboard guidance 
and navigational systems. 
The perception, alignment and ident i f icat ion of landmarks are t o  a 
marked degree based upon t h e i r  luminance and contrast with surrounding areas. 
T h i s  contrast i s  reduced by increasing the amount of atmosphere between the  
feature  and the observer. Although the  visual contrast  of ground targets 
viewed from outside  the atmosphere w i l l  be considerably reduced, visual con- 
trast i s  a useful c r i t e r ion  fo r  target v i s i b i l i t y .  Because contrast i s  a 
rat io ,  the measurement i s  independent of long-term photometric equipment gain 
s tab i l i ty ,  and the  e f fec ts  of scattered l i g h t  reception are also negligible. 
This  experiment u t i l i zed   t he  same photometer provided f o r  the D-5 experi- 
ment, with the addition of two optical  filters over the photometer lens.  The 
experiment equipment interface with the spacecraft was the same as t h a t  of the 
D- 5 experiment. 
EXPERI" S-1 (ZODIACAL LIGHT PHOTOGRAPHY) 
The objectives of the S-1 experiment were t o  photograph the  zodiacal 
l i gh t ,  the airglow, and other d i m  l i g h t  phenomena such as t h e  gegenschein. 
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Previous experience on t h e  Mercury program had shown conclusively that these 
experiments could be performed at altitudes above 90 kilometers without air- 
glow contamination. 
Some of  the  questions which this experiment was intended t o  resolve were: 
A .  What is the minimum angle from the  sun at which the zodiacal l ight 
B. Is t he  gegenschein t o  be found i n  t h e  anti-sun posit ion,  or w i l l  it 
C.  Does the airglow layer extend beyond the "normal" 90 kilometer range? 
D. What i s  the   in tens i ty   d i s t r ibu t ion  of the  zodiacal   l ight  and of the 
could be studied without twilight interference? 
rather  be found t o  have a westerly displacement? 
Milky Way i n  various  orientations - such as the region of the sky near Cygnus? 
The experiment equipment consisted of a modified 35 mm Widelux Camera 
(GFAE) with a ro ta t ing   l ens  which provided very wide angle  pictures  ( larger 
than 50 degrees by 130 degrees). The camera included an  electronic device 
which programed the exposures according t o  a predetermined sequence. A 
special  mounting bracket (CFE) was at tached  to   the  r ight  hand hatch window 
f o r  camera positioning on all affected spacecraft except Gemini IX. During 
the Spacecraft 9 mission, the pi lot  held t h e  camera. The camera and mounting 
bracket are stowed i n  the spacecraft cabin during launch and re-entry. 
FXPERl"T S-2 ( S E A  URCHIN EGG GROWTH) 
The objective of t h i s  experiment was t o  evaluate the effects of low 
gravity upon a simple biological system during sensitive stages of i ts  develop- 
ment, such as f e r t i l i z a t i o n  and cel l  divis ion.  
The experiment equipment was a cylindrical container composed of eight 
specimen chambers, each divided into separate compartments f o r  sperm, ova, and 
fixative solution. Florida sea urchin eggs were t o  be f e r t i l i z e d  i n  f o u r  of 
the  chambers shortly before launch and i n   t h e  remaining chambers smn after 
orbital  insertion. Rotation of a handle on the container allowed both the 
f e r t i l i z a t i o n  of the  eggs and the  release  of   the   f ixat ive  solut ion  to   inhibi t  
their  growth at various stages of development. 
The experiment package was located in the spacecraft cabin on t h e   l e f t  
hand hatch and had no system interfaces  other  than mounting. 
MPER~MENT s-3 (FROG EGG GROWTH) 
The objective of this experiment was t o  determined the  effects  of weight- 
lessness upon normal. cell  divis ion,  cel l  dif ferent ia t ion,  and normal embryo 
formation i n  f e r t i l i z e d  f r o g  eggs. Since the frog egg is known t o  o r i e n t  
itself with respect to gravity during i t s  ear ly  development, it was an ideal 
subject for this experiment. 
The experiment was contained in two packages, each package having four 
chambers which were par t i t ioned  into a frog egg section and a f ixa t ive  sec- 
t ion.  Each package was insulated and had temperature control systems t o  
maintain an experiment temperature of close t o  TOOF. A t  specified times i n  
the f l igh t ,   f ixa t ive  was injected  into  the egg chambers by means of an 
actuating handle on the outside of each package. This action would k i l l   t h e  
eggs i n  two chambers of each package, thereby preserving them fo r  micro- 
scopic study at the  end of the  f l igh t .  Ident ica l  hardware was ut i l ized  for  
control experiments on the  ground. 
The experiment packages were mounted one on each hatch of the re-entry 
module. Power fo r  temperature control and telemetry was provided by the  
spacecraf t  e lectr ical  system. 
EXPER7MENT S-4 (RADIATION AND ZERO G ON RLOOD) 
The objective of the S-4 experiment was t o  determine whether chranosome 
aberrations  in human white blood c e l l s  were being produced by a syner- 
g i s t ic   in te rac t ion  between radiation and weightlessness during orbital 
f l i gh t .  
The experiment plan was t o  irradiate a thoroughly studied biological 
material with a known qual i ty  (phosphorous 32 beta rays) and quantity 
(approximately 2 rads) of radiation during the weightless phase of f l i g h t .  
A duplicate control sample a t  Cape Kennedy was actuated concurrently and sub- 
jected to an equivalent irradiation for comparison. 
Each experiment package contained ten blood samples. Incorporated into 
the volume of each sample were two fluoroglass dosimeters to insure that the  
exposure was of the required duration. Two block dosimeters were also 
included i n  each instrument package t o  measure the nonelectron background 
radiation. Irradiation of the blood samples w a s  i n i t i a t ed  manually during 
f l i gh t  by means of a handle on the experiment package. The in-flight experi- 
ment package was loca ted  in  the spacecraft cabin on the right hatch. Elec- 
t r i c a l  power was provided from the  spacecraft and one telemetry channel was 
supplied t o  monitor package temperature. 
EXPERIMENT s-5 (SYNOPTIC TERRAIN PHOTOGRAPHY) 
The objective of the S-5 experiment was t o  secure high quality, small  
scale photographs of selected land and near-shore areas fo r  geologic, geo- 
graphic, and oceanographic study. The experiment plan called for photographic 
coverage of essent ia l ly  two types, (1) pictures of wel known areas whach 
would serve as standards for the interpretation of lesser known areas, and 
(2) clear  pictures  of more' remote regions t o  extend the scope of the existing 
photography. 
Within the  limits of fuel and power reserves, t h e   f l i g h t  crew was t o ' t a k e  
vertically oriented, systematic overlapping photographs of the target areas, 
and good .single pictures  of any  other areas which were cloud-free and had 
t e r r a i n  .features of possible   interest .  
The experiment equipment consisted of a 70 m general purpose Hasselblad 
camera, 70 mm f i l m  magazines, a haze filter, an exposure meter, and a voice 
tape recorder. The experiment interface with the spacecraft consisted of 
cabin stowage provis ions  for   the equipment. 
EXPERIMENT S-6 (SYNOPTIC WEATHER PHCYrOGRAPW) 
The objectives of t he  S-6 experiment were t o  secure high resolution color 
photographs of meteorological  interest and to   acqui re .de ta i led  photographs of 
the  earth's cloud cover i n  order t o   v a l i d a t e  the information obtained from 
weather satell i te pictures .  
The experiment equipment consisted of the 70 urm Hasselblad general pur- 
pose camera, a film magazine, a haze f i l ter ,  and the  voice tape recorder. 
Stowage provis ions  for   this  experiment equipment were made i n  the space- 
craft  cabin.  
EXPERIMENT s-7 ( CLOUD-TOP SPECTRO-Y) 
The objective of the  S-7 experiment was t o  test the   poss ib i l i t y  of mea- 
suring cloud altitudes from orbi t ing satellites by means of a handheld spec- 
trograph. This  experiment was of interest  to meteorologists because cloud 
altitude indicates atmospheric states upon which weather forecasts are based. 
The experiment equipment consisted of a GFAE spectrograph f i t t ed  with a 
35 mm camera body. A voice tape recorder was a l s o  used. The experiment 
interface with t h e  spacecraft provided cabin stowage for the spectrometer and 
tape  recorder. 
EXPER= S-8 (VISUAL ACVI!CY) 
The objective of the S-8 experiment was t o  determine t h e  astronaut 's  
naked eye capabi l i ty  to  dis t inguish smal objects upon the  earth's surface 
during daylight. A photoelectric photometer was mounted near the lower corner 
of the right batch window. This instrument measured the  amount of ambient 
l ight dispersed into the p i l o t ' s   l i n e  of sight  at t h e  moment of observation 
of the ground test patterns.  Data from the  photometer were sent  t o  the ground 
by real-time telemetry. 
Ground targets ,  set up a t  several locations, consisted of a number of 
2000-ft squares of plowed and graded s o i l  which were covered with white 
rectangles of Styrofoam-coated wallboard. Each of these Styrofoam rectangles 
was oriented in  one of several  posit ions (i .e. ,  east-west, north-south, o r  
diagonal) within its square, and the placement was varied from square t o  
square. 
Advance knowledge of the  placement of the rectangles was withheld f r an  
the astronauts, since it was their  task to  repor t  the  or ien ta t ions .  The plan 
ca l led   for  a change i n  the placement of the  rectangles between orbi ta l   passes  
and an adjustment i n  their  s i ze  i n  accordance with the  variables of s lan t  
range, elevation of the sun, and the visual perforrmnce of the astronauts on 
preceding passes. 
The experiment equipment, in   addi t ion   to  the photometer and the  ground 
site preparation, included ground instrumentation t o  determine atmospheric 
and lighting conditions. The experiment equipment interface with the  space- 
craft  consisted  of  cabin stowage provisions  for the photoelectric photometer, 
and the  connection of the photometer t o  a spacecraft telemetry channel. 
EXPERIMENT S-9 (NUCLEAR EMULSION) 
The primary objective of the S-9 experiment was t o  broaden our knowledge 
of high-energy-particle physics, especially of such phenomena as cosmic rays 
and V a n  Allen radiation. To accomplish t h i s  investigation, the experiment 
plan called f o r  a stack containing nuclear emulsion t o  be exposed on several 
long-duration  orbital flights. 
Nuclear emulsion has two principal advantages t o  recommend it i n  this 
type of experiment: (1) the amount of data that can be obtained for a given 
weight of the emulsion is  high compared t o  t h e  r e su l t s  achieved by other 
detectors, and (2)  special  properties of nuclear emulsion permit a more 
detailed study  of  energetic  particles than is  possible w i t h  other mediums. 
The emulsion (made of gelatin and i n e r t  s i l v e r  bromide) was arranged i n  
a stack composed of two sections held together by clamping plates .  When the 
spacecraft encountered the desired experiment environment, the upper section 
of the  s tack was designed t o  separate f r o m  the  lower section, allowing the 
s tack to  commence its planned operation. During EVA, the experiment package, 
which was mounted i n  the  retrograde  section of the adapter immediately behind 
the   r igh t  hand hatch, was t o  be retrieved by t h e  astronaut; it would then be 
stored i n  a heat-insulated  location inside the re-entry  vehicle. 
To protect the  experiment from excessive radiation in a high apogee orb i t ,  
an insulated door containing 0.50 in .   th ick aluminum radiation shield was 
ins ta l led  i n  the  adapter skin, over  the  sensit ive surface of the  package. 
T h i s  door was held closed during the launch phase and opened when the  horizon 
scanner f a i r ing  
main instrument 
was jett isoned. A toggle switch was added t o  the r igh t  hand 
panel  for actuation of the  pyrotechnic door. The temperature- 
maintaining container in the re-entry module was a cold box made of welded 
aluminum, cooled by the spacecraft bypass coolant lines. One high-level 
analog channel was provided t o   t h e  experiment package for telemetry. 
EXPERIMENT S-10 (AGENA MICROMETEORm COLLECTOR) 
The primary objectives of the S-10 experiment were t o  study the micro- 
meteorite content of the upper ionosphere and of the near-earth space environ- 
ment, and t o  determine w h a t  e f fec t  t h i s  environment has upon biological micro- 
organisms. These objectives were t o  be accomplished by exposing various 
samples of polished metal, glass, plast ic ,  and meteorite material to the  
par t ic le  f lux of  t h e  upper atmosphere. It was hoped that t h i s  procedure would 
yield d,ata about impact craters,  meteor erosion rates, and the deterioration 
of  optically ground and polished  surfaces. 
In addition, t h i n  f i l m  samples and biological specimens were exposed t o  
discover  penetration  characteristics and the  number of  l iving microorganisms 
remaining upon the  b io logica l  p la tes  a f te r  exposure. Hyperclean surfaces 
were also provided to   col lect   par t iculate   mater ia l .  
The experiment equipment was composed of (1) an aluminum frame which 
provided a mounting platform  for  the  polished  plates  and  collection  surfaces, 
(2)  a mounting bracket of rails t o  contain the  collector frame, and (3  ) an a f t  
fa i r ing  and a removable forward fa i r ing   to   p ro tec t  t h e  sensit ive experiment 
plates  from the  direct  impact of airborne particles during launch and o rb i t a l  
insertion. A fabr ic  pouch was also provided in  the spacecraf t  cabin to  stow 
the micrometeorite collector after i ts  re t r ieva l  from the  TDA. The mounting 
bracket and the aft  fa i r ing  were attached to the outer skin of the TDA 
cylindrical section; both bracket and fa i r ing  were permanently instal led.  
The experiment method was t o  mount the  col lector  on the  TDA i n  the  closed 
position, within the mounting rails. During EVA, the  p i l o t  was t o  remove the 
fa i r ing  cover and expose the collection surfaces to the outside environment. 
On the following mission, the astronaut was to  c lose the old col lector  and 
retr ieve it f o r  stowage in the spacecraft  cabin.  He would then replace it 
with a new collection package whose cover he would open t o  expose the sensi- 
t ive   p la tes .  
EXPERlMENT S-11 (AIRGLOW HORIZON PHOI'OGRAPHY) 
The objective of the S-11 experiment was to   ob ta in  more complete informa- 
t i o n  about the airglow layer, a band of l igh t   ly ing  some s i x   t o   t e n  degrees 
above the  visible horizon of the  earth. T h i s  objective was t o  be achieved 
by means of a thorough photographic coverage, comprising both nighttime and 
twilight  pictures  of  the  layer.  
The experimgnt required that an  opt ical  f i l ter ,  which passed only the 
5577 8 and 5893 A l i nes  of the neutral oxygen and sodium atoms, be f i t t e d   t o  
the camera. Through t h i s  f i l ter ,  the airglow band would continue t o  be 
visible, although all other details of the horizon would disappear; t h i s  
phenomenon i s  due to   the   fac t   tha t   the   a i rg low i s  an emission of l i g h t  by t h e  
gases of the high atmosphere. Additional exposures with the  lens  filter 
removed from the  camera were t o  be made f o r  comparison. 
The equipment w a s  a 70 mm general purpose camera with an f/0.95 lens, a 
f i l m  magazine containing the optical f i l ter ,  an exposure timer and an 
illuminated sight, a window camera mounting bracket, and a mounting bracket 
a d p t e r  . 
The experiment equipment interface with the spacecraft consisted of 
stowage provisions in the cabin for the camera, f i l m  magazine, mounting 
bracket and adapter. The contractor's interface requirements also included 
the attachment of the mounting bracket to   the  r ight   hatch window. 
EIBERSMENT s-12 (MICRCMFTEORITE COLLECTION) 
The objectives of the S-12 experiment were (1) to  co l lec t  and recover 
uncontaminated micrometeorite material in the near-earth space environment, 
and (2)  t o  determine the   e f f ec t s  of t h i s  environment upon biological micro- 
organisms. 
The experiment method involved exposing highly polished plastic and 
metal  plates outside the spacecraft  during orbital  f l ight.  The par t iculate  
material collected, t h e  number of l iv ing  organisms remaining upon the exposure 
plates,  and the holes and cra te rs  made in the specially polished plates con- 
s t i tu ted  the  data requirements of the experiment. In addition, sterile sur- 
faces were provided for  gathering microorganisms which might be emitted from 
the spacecraft or from expelled materials. 
The collection equipment included an  aluminum assembly providing 24 sur- 
faces  for  t he  collection of data and the exposure of specimens. Two motor- 
operated cover doors permitted the controUed exposure of the p la tes  and 
specimens by the f l i g h t  crew. In  addi t ion to  the col lector  assembly, the 
experiment required a mounting bracket and aft  fairing, a removable forward 
fairing, and a cabin control switch. 
The experiment equipment was mounted on the contractor-furnished mounting 
bra.cket attached t o  the outside moldline of the retrograde section of the 
adapter. Upon the experiment's completion, the collector assembly was 
retrieved and stowed i n   t h e  Spacecraft cabin on the centerline structure door. 
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EXPEEUMENT S-13 (W ASTRONOMICAL CAMERA) 
The principal  goal of the  S-13 experiment was t o   a sce r t a in   t he  ultra-, 
violet   radiat ion  spectra  of s t a r s   i n  .the'wa;velength between 2000 and 4000 A. 
Photographs were t o  be made with  the 70 m general purpose camera, used i n  
conjunction with an objective  grating (Gemini X) o r  an objective prism and an 
objective grating (Gemini XI and Gemini XII) . The high resolution photographs 
obtained with t h i s  equipment were expected to  reveal  absorption and emission 
l ines in the spectra,  thereby enabling us to analyze atomic excitation and 
ionization phenomena in  these  wavelength regions. Knowledge about the  surface 
temperatures of the selected stars and the  absorpt ion  effects   taking  place  in  
t h e i r  atmospheres wil be gained as a result. 
The experiment equipment consisted of the 70 mm Maurer camera, film 
magazines, an objective grating attachment, an objective prism, a W lens, a 
cable release, and a camera mounting bracket. 
The experiment equipment interface with the spacecraft consisted of the 
same contractor-furnished mounting bracket used in   t he  MSC-5 experiment 
(Lunar W Spectral Reflectance). 
EXPERIMENT s-26 (GEMINI ION WAKE MEASURE") 
The goals of the s-26 experiment were (1) t o  determine the extent of the 
atmospheric disturbance produced by an orbit ing Gemini Spacecraft, and (2)  t o  
achieve a more ccmplete understanding of the  structure  of  the  ion  f lux 
result ing from the spacecraft's passage. To ar r ive  at these objectives, the 
accomplishment of the following steps was necessary: 
A.  A mapping of the spacecraft ion density wake within specific coor- 
B. A contour mapping of the spacecraft electron density wake made con- 
C. A determination of electron temperature within the same posit ion 
D. A recording of the fluctuation of ambient ion and electron  densi t ies  
dinates. 
currently wi th  A. 
coordinates. 
and temperatures caused by the   var ia t ions   in   a l t i tude  and posit ion of the  
docked GATV configuration. 
f i r ing .  
E. A measurement of ionization oscil lations due to  spacecraf t  thruster  
The experiment equipment consisted of two ion detectors, an electron 
detector, and a programmer uni t .  
The four experiment un i t s  were mounted i n  the  ta rge t  docking adapter 
(TDA)..  One of t h e  ion detectors and the electron detector were mounted upon 
the  forwgrd ring (adapter station 23.795) and projected toward the cone. The 
other ion detector and the programmer unit were mounted within the TDA. The 
I 
experiment packages u t i l i zed  power from the  Agena Target Vehicle. The experi- 
ment was turned on at the  time of Agena act ivat ion,   pr ior   to   launch and 
remained on f o r  the duration of the mission. ESrperiment data were t rans-  
mitted on the Agena pulse-code-modulation system u t i l i z ing  11 Agena PCM 
channels . 
E X P E R ~ N T  T-1 (RE-EXCRY C-CATIONS) 
The objective of t h i s  experiment was to   i nves t iga t e   t he   f eas ib i l i t y  of 
overcoming re-entry radio blackout by injecting water vapor in to  the  ionized 
sheath which surrounds the spacecraft during re-entry. 
The experiment equipment consisted of a GFAE water expulsion system and 
a W E  experiment activation switch. 
The experiment interface with the spacecraft comprised the  in s t a l l a t ion  
of t he  water expulsion system on a modified RH skid well door and provisions 
for  wiring  the system to  the  activation  switch  located on t h e  RH switch/ 
circuit breaker panel. 
EXPERIMENT T-2 (MANUAL NAVIGATIONAL  SIGHTINGS) 
The objective of t h i s  experiment was t o   eva lua te   t he   ab i l i t y  of a navi- 
ga to r   t o  measure the angles between various  celestial   bodies from the Gemini 
Spacecraft using a handheld sextant. 
The experiment equipment consisted of a space sextant, two sextant eye- 
pieces, a battery, and the general-purpose photo event indicator. The experi- 
ment equipment interface with the spacecraft consisted of stowage provisions 
in   the   cab in   for  the sextant, photo event indicator, and the related equip- 
ment. 
m m m  s-29 
(PHOI'OGFUPHIC SmTDY OF EARTH - MOON L4 AND L5 LIBRATION REGIONS) 
The objective of this experiment was a photographic investigation of the 
regions of the L4 and L l ibrat ion points  of  the earth-moon system. T h i s  
investigation was inten 2 ed t o  settle the question  of the existence  of  clouds 
of particulate matter which may be orbi t ing the earth i n  these regions. The 
l ibrat ion  points ,  which l i e  in   t he   o rb i t a l   pa th  of t he  moon, 60° ahead of and 
600 behind t h e  moon, define an area of stable equilibrium in which centrifugal 
forces balance gravitational forces. These points have therefore been pro- 
posed as sites f o r  earth o rb i t a l   s t a t ions  which, once in orbit ,  .could be 
maintained i n  that condition indefinitely. The existence of particula;te 
clouds i n  these  regions, whether derived from interplanetary matter or! from 
material sloughed off by the moon, would go far t o  demonstrate the re la t ive  
quiescence of t h e  area and hence the   f eas ib i l i t y   o f   t he  proposed space s ta t ion  
location. 
The experiment equipment consisted of one GFAE f i l m  back with special  
high speed black-and-white film, the  Experiment S-ll mounting bracket (GFAE), 
the  Maurer 70 m camera with f/O.95 lens,  and the  extended exposure timer. 
Since a l l  the equipment l isted above, except the special f i l m  back, had 
previously been provided for   o ther  purposes, only special cabin stowage pro- 
v i s ions   for   the  f i l m  back were required i n  order t o  incorporate t h i s  experi- 
ment into the mission. 
EXPERIME!NT S-30 (DIM LIGHT  ASTRONOMICAL OBJECT PHOTOGRAPHY) 
The goal of t he  S-30 experiment was t o  obtain photographs of selected 
faint astronomical phenomena by using the  low l i g h t  te levis ion camera and 
other equipment of the  D-15 experiment. The primary targets were (1) the 
Lagrangian l ibrat ion points ,  (2) the gegenschein, (3) the zodiacal l ight at 
600 elongation, ( 4 )  the airglow layer viewed i n  prof i le ,  and ( 5) the  
brightest  portion  of t he  Milky Way. 
The ,experiment was t o  start upon the next orbital  pass a f t e r   t h e  D-15 
experiment, thereby eliminating equipment warm-up time and conserving space- 
c ra f t  power. The command p i l o t  was t o  orient the spacecraft  so tha t  t he  
ta rge t  was centered in the f ie ld  of view from the cabin window. Before and 
during camera actuation, the astronauts were t o  describe the scene on the  
voice tape recorder, noting the star f i e l d  and any dim l i g h t  phenomena v i s i -  
ble. After each exposure sequence, t he  command p i l o t  was to  reor ien t  the 
spacecraft t o   t h e  next target. 
The experiment equipment and the  stowage provisions were the  same as 
those provided for Experiment D-15 (night image intensif icat ion) .  
EXPERI"I S-51 (DAYTIME SODIUM CLOUD PHOTOGRAPHY) 
The aims of this experiment were (1) t o  determine the possibility of 
photographing a sodium vapor cloud during the  daytime, and (2)  t o  analyze the 
behavior of upper atmosphere winds at a l t i tudes  between 100 and 150 kilometers. 
The experiment was t o  be i n i t i a t e d  by launching a French Centaur rocket from 
a si te i n  Hmmaguir, Algeria, on a ba l l i s t i c   t r a j ec to ry .  
A t  approximately 60 miles al t i tude,  sodium vapor was t o  be ejected from 
the rocket along the flight path. Directional commands from the ground were 
t o  be given t o  the astronauts as they approached the cloud. When the  
astronauts saw t h e  cloud, they were t o  photograph it as it dissipated, 
recording  the  effects  of the high a l t i t ude  winds upon the vapor. 
L 
The experiment required a Maurer 70 mm camera, an  interference  f i l ter ,  
one f i l m  pack containing high speed black-and-white f i l m ,  and two pairs   of  
goggles fo r  t he  f l i gh t  crew.  Stowage provisions for the experiment equipment 
were made in the spacecraft cabin. 
TARGET DOCKING ADAPTER AND AU-ED TARGET DOCKING ADAPTER 
- ~ .  "" .. . . ~. 
TARGET DOCKING ADAPTER 
General 
The ta rge t  docking adapter (TDA) is combined with the Agena t o  form the 
Gemini-Agena Target (GAT) Vehicle, u t i l i zed   i n  rendezvous and docking missions 
with the Gemini Spacecraft. The TDA receives the spacecraft, attenuates 
impact shock, and provides a r ig id  connection between the  Gemini and the  
Agena.  The TDA consists of two major s t ructural  components - a cylindrical  
shell  section (adapter) and a truncated docking cone section (docking cone). 
The assembly is shown i n  Fig. 60 and the docking system is shown in Fig.  61. 
Adapter. - The adapter shell  i s  bolted t o   t h e  Agena forward auxi l iary 
rack. During the  launch, a clamshell-type aerodynamic ascent shroud is  
mounted on a r ing at the  forward face of the adapter shell .  T h i s  shroud i s  
jett isoned before orbit  insertion. The shell section of the adapter contains 
the following components: 
A .  Three hardpoints for rigidizing of the docking cone. 
B. Attachment poin ts   for   the  shock attenuation system. 
C.  Mooring drive system. 
D. Radar transponder and associated electronics. 
E. Acquisition and docking cone l igh ts .  
F. Left and r ight  status display panel ( the center status display panel 
G. Power and sequent ia l  e lectr ical  systems. 
H. Various experiments housed within or mounted upon the adapter shell .  
i s  mounted on a l a t e r a l  damper). 
Docking Cone. - The docking structure, a double-skinned, r ing and r ib  
stiffened truncated cone, serves as a structural bridge between the  Gemini 
nose hardpoints and the hardpoints in the adapter shell .  The docking cone 
contains the following components: 
A. Mooring latch.  
B. Umbilical plug. 
C. Three f i t t i n g s  which a t tach   the  shock attenuation system. 
D. Electrostatic discharge device. 
The docking cone is connected t o  and held  in  a f ixed   re la t ionship   to   the  
adapter by the  shock attenuation system. During ini t ia l  contact  with the 
Gemini spacecraft, the docking cone i s  i n  i ts  extended or "unrigidized" 
323 
E X 1  
324 
" . .  
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FIGURE 6 1  DOCKING SYSTEM 
position. During the r igidizing sequence, the docking cone and the spacecraft 
are pulled toward t h e  docking adapter main structure,  and the base of t he  cone 
is seated firmly against hardpoints i n  the adapter shell. 
Structural Design Criteria 
The TIM i s  designed f o r   t h e  limit loads and heating effects of the Atlas/ 
Agena design launch trajectories. For these conditions, ultimate loads are 
limit loads times a safety  factor  of 1.25. 
The design launch vibration spectrum i s  11.2 g ' s  RMS with the following 
distribution: 0.08 g2/cps, 20 t o  200 cps; 0.12 8 / c p s  from 200 t o  500 cps; 
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and 0.05 8 / c p s  from 500 t o  2000 cps. This was based on data from the Mercury 
program and trajectory  information  for  the Atlas/Agena (Ref McDonnell Report 
8616, Appendix A), with a conservative assumption that the Agena configuration 
would be comparable t o  Mercury i n  developing buffeting pressures. By compari- 
son, the Gemini launch spectrum is  8.8 g' s RMS. 
Latching And Rigidizing 
Docking i s  accomplished by s l iding the  f ixed  la tch  receptacles  on the 
G e m i n i  R & R section past three spring loaded latch hooks inside the TDA cone. 
When a l l  three la tches  are engaged the automatic rigidizing sequence i s  
in i t i a t ed  by the closure of three limit switches, one at each latch point.  
Rigidizing i s  achieved by applying tension to  three  over-center  l inkages 
driven by the mooring drive system. (The l a t t e r  i s  an electromechanical 
device, consisting of an electric motor driving through a series of gearboxes 
and flexible shafts) .  Rotation of the over-center links compresses t h e  
dampers and preloads the spacecraft-docking cone combination against the hard- 
points in the cylindrical section, thus achieving structural continuity between 
the spacecraft and the target vehicle.  
Rigidizing is  completed when the  docking cone, with the spacecraft 
attached, bottoms against  structural  stops within the cylindrical  portion of 
the  TDA. After the r igidizing sequence, the over-center linkage has completed 
i t s  t r ave l  and has shut off the motor by means of the  three limit switches. 
Rigidizing can be accomplished automatically (normal. mode) o r   i n i t i a t ed   v i a  
the UHF ground command l ink.  
In addi t ion   to  the automatic rigidizing sequence employed on the 
Gemini VI-TDA 2 mission, subsequent missions provided, through t h e  umbilical 
plug and the single point umbilicals, a pilot  hardline control of the  opera- 
t ion.  A RIGID-OW-STOP switch on the spacecraft instrument panel i s  fo r  t he  
use of the crew during a docking anomaly, In  the R I G I D  position the switch 
applies power i f  the automatic rigidize circuit  fails. The STOP posit ion cuts 
off power i f  t h e  r ig id ize  limit switch fails. 
During a normal docking procedure, a Gemini/TDA umbilical mating forms a 
hardline electrical. connection. The umbilical connector i s  a nine conductor 
receptacle-plug assembly. The receptacle mates with t h e  docking adapter plug 
as the spacecraft and the TDA a re  being rigidized. The connector is mated by 
using a spring-operated insulator block. The mating of t h i s  assembly i s  
i l lus t ra ted  in  F ig .  62. 
The TDA has f lash ing   acquis i t ion   l igh ts   in   addi t ion   to  l i g h t s  t o  illumi- 
nate the  cone. The two acquis i t ion l ights  (65 f lashes  per  min, nominal), 
which can be seen for about 20 nautical  miles, aid t h e   p i l o t s   i n   v i s u a l l y  
tracking the Agena Target Vehicle. These l i g h t s  are mounted a t  the outer 
edges of the adapter  structure and are v i s ib l e  around the outer edge of  the 
cone. They are extended at first docking cone unrigidizing and remain 
extended. 
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FIGURE 62 GEMINIITDA UMBILICAL MATING 
Two approach l i g h t s  a r e  mounted on the lower inside of t h e  adapter and 
shine through the  rear  of the cone and on the  upper inside surface near the 
V-notch. These l i g h t s  may be turned off and on either by p i lo t   o r  ground 
command. 
In addition, the spacecraft is f i t t e d  with a 4000 candlepower rendezvous- 
docking l i g h t  which i s  mounted externally on the retrograde section (centered 
above and ju s t  af t  of the heads of t he  f l i gh t  crew). T h i s  l i g h t  aids i n  
observing the  Agena ta rge t  during rendezvous. 
Unrigidizing And Unlatching Sequence 
On TDA 2, unrigidizing could be in i t i a t ed  by hardline  or UHF command t o  
sequentially unrigidize the mooring drive system, r e t r ac t  t h e  la tches   to   a l low 
t h e  spacecraft t o  separate from the  target vehicle, and, after 30 sec, reset 
the la tches  to  permit  addi t ional  docking operations. On TDA 3 and up, 
(Spacecraft 8) the  unrigidizing and unlatching were considered as separate 
sequences. 
Unrigidize Sequence. - To back up the unrigidizing sequence by hardline 
o r  UHF command, an OFF-UNDOCK switch i s  mounted on the  spacecraft center 
instrument panel. The UNDOCK posit ion applies power  through the Gemini/TM 
umbilical and one of the rendezvous umbilicals to   in te r rupt   r ig id ize  power 
and supply power t o  the unrigidize side of the  mooring drive motor. Power t o  
the mooring drive motor i s  cut off when two of   the  three limit switches sense 
that the unrigidizing has been accomplished. 
Unlatching Sequence. - The unlatching sequence begins with the unrigi- 
dize sequence. Power is simultaneously applied t o  the unrigidize winding of 
t h e  mooring drive motor and t o   t h e   r e t r a c t  winding of the   l a tch   ac tua tor .  
The actuator mechanism r e t r a c t s   t h e  three latches  by means of a system of 
spring cartridges, bellcranks, and a run-around cable. The s l ip  c lu t ch  in  
the  la t>h   ac tua tor   s l ips  until the  load i n   t h e   l a t c h e s  i s  relieved by suffi- 
cient  movement of the unrigidizing system. After full re t ract ion of the 
la tches ,  the clutch w i l l  continue t o   s l i p   u n t i l  one of t he  two spacecraft free 
limit switches i s  returned t o  the unactuated position. A t  this time, power 
is removed from the   l a tch   ac tua tor   re t rac t  winding and appl ied   to  the extend 
winding. In addition, all sequential relays are reset for  addi t ional  docking 
maneuvers. Parer is removed from the  extend winding of t he  la tch  ac tua tor  
when an external limit switch senses that the actuator i s  extended and the  
la tches  are reset .  Fig.  63 i l l u s t r a t e s  the l a t c h  hook re t racted and extended 
configurations. 
RETRACTED (DISENGAGED)  POSITION EXTENDED  (SET)  POSITION 
STRUCTURE 
FIGURE 63 LATCH HOOK 
The crew can separate the spacecraft from the  Agena i n  an emergency by 
pressing an emergency switch which fires pyrotechnic igniters, breaking the 
la tch receptacles  loose from the spacecraft. Emergency separation permanently 
removes the  docking capabi l i t i es  of the spacecraft and target vehicle.  
Development And Qualification  Tests 
Primary development .&d qual i f ica t ion  tes t s  are l i s t e d   i n  Table 36. The 
1/4 scale impact tests and the   s t i f fnes s  and response t e s t s   o f   t he  combined 
vehicles were also appl ied  to  the  TDA. Additional TDA tests included the 
dynamic response of equipment to   v ibra t ion ,  and element impact tests t o  develop 
the design of the docking cone shock absorber tests. A s  a result of tests the  
proposed pyrotechnically  actuated  transponder door was deleted  pr ior   to   the 
first TDA f l i g h t  (TDA 2 )  and was replaced with a fixed door f o r   a l l  missions. 
Failure Summary And Analysis 
No s t ructural  failures occurred during development or  qual i f icat ion 
tes t ing.  The following is a summary of the  failures, f ixes ,  and retests. 
Evaluation of Mooring Drive System. - TRO52-044.07.01 - The mooring drive 
system,-.Tested- i n  the Zaleski Chamber at -650~,  would not consistently drive 
t o  a rigidized posit ion with minimum interface voltage. In addition, the 
la tch release actuator  fa i led to  operate .  (When the  l a t ch  release actuator 
was replaced and the  specimen was moved t o  the  18 f t  a l t i t ude  chamber fo r  
continued t e s t s ,  f a i l u r e  analysis of the actuator did not confirm the  - 6 5 O ~  
fai lure .  Further  tes t ing of t he  mooring drive system underpower condition i s  
discussed  in Mooring . ...  . . Drive Power Unit Comparison Test, below.) 
. . .~ . 
Mooring Drive Power Unit Comparison Test. - TRO52-044.07.05 - This test- 
ing wasaimed at developing- suff ic ient  power i n   t h e  mooring drive motor t o  
consistently achieve a fu l l  rigidizing cycle at the  minimum voltage. Power 
was increased 50% by a minor redesign of the brake coil, which allowed more 
current to flow through the armature. The greater outputs were evaluated and 
found satisfactory.  As a result, the Agena interface maximum voltage was 
decreased from 29.5 v o l t s   t o  26 volts. This motor was r e t e s t ed   i n  
~~052-044.07.06, described below. 
Mooring Drive Motor Evaluation. - TRO52-O&.O7.O2 - T h i s  t es t ing  was 
ins t i tu ted  because of the impracticability of seal ing  the mooring drive power 
unit  to zero leakage at an appreciable altitude. A power uni t  known t o  leak 
was put  in to  a five-day altitude soak, then operated for 130 cycles. This 
tes t   ind ica ted  that the motor had degraded but not fa i led;   s ta t ic   torque 
output was down by approximately 30$. Failure analysis showed that the  
brushes were p i t t ed  by arcing and that a portion of the   gear   t ra in  has been 
badly eroded and had f i l l e d  t h e  gearbox with "shavings." This incident was ; 
.due t o  improper assembly; t he   p i t t ed  brushes were deemed otherwise no- f o r  
the  la rge  amount of cycling i n  a hard vacuum. Therefore, no f ixes  o r  r e t e s t s  
were made. 
Functional Test TDA. - TRO52-044.07 - This testing followed 
TRO52-OW.07.01 and was done i n   t h e  18 f% a l t i t ude  chamber. Testing con- 
s is ted.of   the  appl icat ion of 150 cycles at room ambient conditions, 100 cycles 
at 450,000 f't and 200OF, and 30 cycles at 450,000 ft and -650~ .  Again t h e  
system indicated inadequate parer t o   r i g i d i z e  at minimum interface  voltage. 
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TABLE 36 STRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT 8, QUALIFICATION TESTS 
T.R. NUMBER 
(TDA 8 SIC) 
052-044.05 
(TDA 8 S/C) 
052-044.06 
(TDA) 
052-044.07 
(TDA) 
052-052.16 
(TDA) 
052-044.08 
052-05240 
(TDA) 
052-052.47 
(TDA 8 SIC) 
052-058.34 
(TDA) 
(TDA) 
(TDA) 
052-058.44 
052-058.45 
052-044.09 
(TDA 8 S/C) 
052-044.1 1 
(TDA) 
(TDA 8, S/C) 
052-055.10 
LMSC SW/30.83 
(TDA) 
(TDA 8 S/C) 
052-044.19 
052-044.18 
(TDA) 
(TDA 8, S/C) 
052-044.20 
WORK REQUEST 
7677.01 
WORK..REQUEST 
7677.02 
052-052.27 
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TEST 
1/4 SCALE GEMINI DYNAMIC MOORING 
DEVELOPMENTMODELTEST 
DYNAMIC RESPONSE OF GEMINI 
FIGURATION 
-~ 
SPACECRAFT  IN  THE MOORED CON- 
LATCHING, MOORING AND LATCH 
RELEASE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL AND 
L I F E  TEST, TDA 
DEVELOPMENTOFTDADAMPERS 
DOCKING CONE IMPACT TEST 
DEFLECTION TEST OF TARGET 
DOCKING  ADAPTER  DOCKING CONE 
STIFFNESS TEST  OF  TDA STRUC- 
TURAL ASSEMBLY 
DYNAMIC RESPONSE OF  TDA DAMP- 
ERS 
VIBRATION TEST - TARGET DOCK- 
ING  ADAPTER  (TDA NO. 2) 
DEMONSTRATION OF TRANSPONDER 
NIC DOOR FIRING 
PERFORMANCE AFTER PYROTECH- 
FULL SCALE MOORING SHOCK a 
FUNCTIONAL TEST OF GEMINI 
SPACECRAFT AND AGENA TDA 
TDA APPROACH LIGHT ASSEMBLY - 
QUALIFICATION TEST 
- 
FUNCTIONAL CHECK OF GEMINI 
TDA  UMBILICAL 
STRUCTURAL TEST REQUIREMENTS, 
GEMINI-AGENA TDA 
- 
QUALIFICATION  TEST  OF  TDA - 
R 8 R "S/C GONE" SWITCH/ 
UMBILICAL 
- 
QUALIFICATION TEST OF RE-DE- 
SIGNED TDA  LATCH  RELEASE AC- 
TUATOR 
FUNCTIONAL EVALUATION TESTS 
OF MODIFIED TDA - R 8 R 
QUALIFICATION  TEST  OF  TALLEY 
CORP. MODEL 938T100 MOORING 
DRIVE SYSTEM (52-34700) 
QUALIFICATION  TEST  OF  TALLEY 
LEASE ACTUATOR (52-34702) 
ULTIMATE STRENGTH STATIC TEST 
CORP. MODEL 934T100  LATCH RE- 
OF GEMINI-AGENA MANEUVERING 
~ . _ _ _  ~~ "" - ~. 
PURPOSE 
~ . . - . 
TO  VERIFY DOCKING IMPACT DYNAMICS 
- ..~ .- ____  .~ . " 
VERIFY  THE MODAL RESPONSES OF  THE GEMINVAGENA 
SPACECRAFT, GATHER EQUIPMENT RESPONSE DATA, 
AND  VERIFY  THE  STABILITY  OF  THE  RlGlDlZlNG  LINK- 
AGE  AGAINST  INADVERTENT  RELEASE 
VERIFY THE OPERATIONAL FATIGUE LIFE OF THE TDA 
MECHANISM SYSTEM 
_ _ _  
" ~~ - .  
" 
DEVELOP THE METERING ORIFICE TO DESIGN REQUIRE- 
MENTS 
VERIFY TYPE OF STRUCTURAL DESIGN OF CONE SUR- 
FACE AND SUBSTRUCTURE TO SATISFACTORILY RESIST 
LOCAL  IMPACT LOADS 
DETERMINE DEFLECTION CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
52-34004 DOCKING CONE 
VERIFY STIFFNESS OF COMPOSITE TDA WITH AND WITH" 
OUT  PRELOAD 
OBTAIN LOADS DATA  IN DAMPERS AND DAMPING CON- 
ST,ANTS CORRESPONDING TO  VIBRATION  FREQUENCIES 
~~ .~ 
. ~ .  - ~ 
- . . -  .~ 
" 
"_ " . ~ ~. 
- . - - - . - 
CHECK ACTUAL EQUIPMENT VIBRATION RESPONSE AND 
APPLY ACCEPTANCE LEVEL RANDOM VIBRATION 
TO OBTAIN DYNAMIC IMPULSE INFORMATION ON FIRING 
OF TRANSPONDER DOOR PYROTECHNIC 
"~ 
- . ~. 
QUALIFY TDA, INDEX BAR AND GEMINI R 8 R FOR DOCK- 
ING  IMPACT LOADS. DEMONSTRATE A L L  FUNCTIONING, 
INCLUDING EMERGENCY RELEASE AFTER BEING SUB- 
JECT TO IMPACT - . .~ 
QUALIFY TDA APPROACH LIGHT INSTALLATION. DEMON. 
STRATE PERFORMANCE, L I F E  REQUIREMENT AND STRUC 
TURAL ADEQUACY FOR LAUNCH VIBRATION ENVIRON- 
HEN T 
T o  DETERMINE THE FUNCTIONAL ADEQUACY OF THE 
~~ 
UMBILICAL ASSEMBLY AND SUBJECT THE MECHANISM TO 
THE LAUNCH VIBRATION SPECTRUM 
STRUCTURALLY QUALIFY TDA FOR LAUNCH CONDITION! 
:ENCOMPASS ATDA CONDITIONS) 
- 
ro QUALIFY FOR SPACE USAGE THE TDA - R (L R * w c  .~ ~ 
SONE" SWITCH/UMBILICAL 
~- ~" . 
ro QUALIFY THE RE-DESIGNED LATCH RELEASE ACTU- 
.- " 
\TOR FOR SPACE USAGE 
___-___ ~ 
ro EVALUATE THE DOCKING FUNCTION< OF THE TDA - 
. -  
i 8 R FOR REVISED RlGlDlZE AND UNRlGlDlZED SEQUEN. 
r l A L  MODIFICATIONS 
ro QUALIFY THEMOORING DRIVE SYSTEM OF THE TDA 
'OR SPACE USAGE 
ro QUALIFY THE LATCH RELEASE ACTUATOR OF THE- 
" 
TDA FOR SPACE USAGE 
ro QUALIFY CRITICAL STRUCTURE OF GEMINI AND 
-____. ... 
4GENA (TDA)  UNDER  ULTIMATE LOADS FOR ORBITAL 
AANEUVERING . 
Also t he   l a t ch  release actuator would not operate at 659 unless 28 vo l t s  
were applied. Failure analysis on the actuator indicated satisfactory opera- 
t i o n   t o  -70 but not below. The motor brake was found t o  be at fault by 
successful operation of the actuator a t  -8oO~ with the brake removed. A b e e  
development program, conducted by failure analysis on the actuator, evolved 
the present flight configuration. The first f i x  was t o  remove Drilube from 
the  brake spline and give the brake a metal-to-metal f r i c t ion   su r f ace   i n  
place of the cork-to-meta friction surface. The final corrective action was 
t o  remove the  brake and reset the  clutch  load  to  permit  sl ippage each normal 
cycle 
Qualification of Talley Latch Release Actuator. - ~~7677.02 - The first 
actuator (P/N 52-34702-3, S/N 105) fa i led  humidity tests. Much internal  
corrosion was discovered by failure analysis, indicating that moisture seals 
were inadequate. Therefore, specific sealing methods were specified, but the 
remrked actuator again failed salt fog testing due.to inadequate sealing of 
the actuator shaft. This was corrected by ins ta l l ing  a boot over t he  shaft 
after rigging the shaft t o  a TDA. The humidity retest was then accomplished 
sa t i s fac tor i ly  . 
Mooring Drive and Latch Release Actuator Flight Evaluation Q u a l  Test. 
TRO52-044.07.06 - T h i s  t es t ing  superseded TRO52-044.07, and consisted of 
exposing the t a l l e y  components t o  salt fog, and then install ing them i n  TDA 
s t a t i c  a r t i c l e  No. 1 for vibration, temperature, and a l t i t ude  response. The 
components subjected t o  salt fog failed. The output gearboxes and the  H drive 
had great internal corrosion. The condition of the power unit  and the  f l ex  
shafts was acceptable, however. It was concluded that the corroded components 
needed grease protection rather than Drilube. A salt fog r e t e s t  using 
reworked gearboxes and H drive was successful. 
TDA Approach Light Qual Test. - TRO52-044.U - The TDA approach l i gh t  
i s  a commercial a i r c ra f t  product, General Electr ic  PIN 4502. Vibration tests 
resulted i n  t he   f a i lu re  of t he   l i gh t  element, caused. by a l i g h t  support hinge 
pin which had slipped half’way out of i t s  bracket. A re tes t  was conducted with 
the  hinge pin staked i n ,  but the element again failed. Sine sweeps were made 
to   e s t ab l i sh  resonant frequencies, and shock mounts for  these rarges were then 
provided. With this reworked ins ta l la t ion  the  th i rd  v ibra t ion  tes t  was passed. 
Functional. Check Gemini/Agena Umbilical. - TRO52-055.10 - Testing of the 
Gemini/Agena umbilical disclosed that three of the nine contacts exhibited 
discontinuity when subjected to  s ide load.  Although failure analysis con- 
cluded that a poor quali ty component was responsible, design tolerances were 
nevertheless revised. 
In  a second anomaly, the dielectric sleeve material dis tor ted at high 
temperature and therefore required higher than normal forces .for proper opera- 
t ion.  It was established that Fiberglas would be a be t te r  material for  the  
fabrication of the sleeve, since it possessed the same nonconductive proper- 
t i e s  but was immune t o  warping at high temperatures. These redesigned fea- 
tures were retested  for  high and low temperatures under side load and humidity 
environments. The umbilical performed sa t i s fac tor i ly  i n  i t s  retest. 
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TDA Communication System 
The TIU communication system responds t o  Gemini Spacecraft radar 
interrogation signals and furnishes an L-band canmand l ink.  .The system con- 
sists of a radar transponder, two sp i r a l  antennas, a multielement dipole 
antenna, a boost regulator, and a dipole antenna boom ( see Fig. 64). In 
addi t ion  to   serving as a radar beacon, the transponder can detect L-band 
comands v i a  RF p r i o r   t o  docking, and via hardline (through the umbilical) 
after docking. 
TDA Status Display Panel 
The TDA status display panel shows Gemini p i lo t s   the   c r i t i ca l   func t ions  
of t he  TIM and the Agena vehic les   in  the near-docked and docked configura- 
t ions.  The panel may be set on dim, bright,  or off posit ions.  Containing 
nine l ights  and three quantity indicators, the  panel provides the following 
information: 
A .  DOCK Light (green) indicates that the docking cone i s  i n  the unrigi-  
dized  position and the latches are rese t .  
B. RIGID Light (green) indicates that the docking cone i s  r ig id ized  to  
the  adapter . 
C. PWR Light (green) indicates that t h e  Agena e l ec t r i ca l  power i s  suffi- 
c ien t   to   per fom all operations. 
D. MAIN Light, showing red with the  main engine f i r ing,  indicates  that  
the turbine has exceeded the  overspeed limits, the  hydraulic pressure too 
low, or   the   d i f fe ren t ia l   p ressure  between the  fuel  and oxidizer tanks (f’uel 
above oxidizer) is low. When the  main engine i s  not f ir ing,  it indicates 
that the different ia l   pressure between the f u e l  and oxidizer tanks ( fue l  
above oxidizer) i s  improper. 
and oxidizer tank pressures are satisfactory. 
closed and either the  main o r  secondary engines may be fired by command. 
enough pressure  for a specified U n i t  I1 (200 l b )  f i r i n g  and that both propel- 
lant tank gas manifolds have a specified pressure. 
H. SEC LO Light indicates that sufficient pressure remains i n  both Agena 
nitrogen spheres for a specified Unit I (16 l b )   f i r i n g  and that pressure also 
ex i s t s   i n  both propellant tank gas manifolds. 
I. A T T  Light indicates that the  Agena a t t i t ude  control system is active. 
J. Main Time Indicator shows by min and sec the (F’PS) engine burn time 
K. Secondary Time Indicator shows by min and sec the burn time remaining 
E. MAIN Light, showing green, indicates that the hydraulic, main fue l ,  
F. ARMED Light (amber) indicates that the engine command c i rcu i t s  are 
G. SEC H I  Light (green) indicates that both Agena nitrogen spheres have 
remaining i n  the Agena primary propulsion system. 
i n  t h e  secondary propulsion system (SPS). The clock runs at two speeds, 
depending upon whether the Unit I (16 lb,  SPS LO) engines or the Unit I1 
(200 lb ,  SPS H I )  engines are burning. 
centage of pressure remaining i n   t h e  Agena at t i tude  control  system gas 
sphere. 
L. At t i tude  Gas Indicator is a synchro clock which reg is te rs  the per- 
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Electrostat ic  Discharge Device 
A discharge device i s  mounted on the leading edge of the  TDA docking cone 
to   neut ra l ize  the e lec t ros ta t ic   po ten t ia l  between the  spacecraft and the 
target vehicle before final docking. On the  Gemini IX and X missions (TDA 5 
and TDA IA), a monitor was used t o  measure t h i s  potent ia l  between the  vehi- 
cles during docking; this data was transmitted t o  ground s ta t ions by the 
Agena telemetry system. Flight data revealed t h e  e l ec t ros t a t i c  po ten t i a l  t o  
be minimal; therefore t h e  discharge device was deleted f o r   t h e  Gemini X I  and 
Gemini XI1 missions. 
Velcro Patches 
On Gemini V I 1 1  and l a t e r  missions, three Velcro patches were mounted on 
the   adapter   s t ruc ture   in   l ine  w i t h  t he  top  acquis i t ion  l ight  t o  provide EVA 
handholds . 
Fxperiments 
During the Gemini program, two experiments were mounted on the TDA, the  
Agena micrometeorite collector (S-10) and the G e m i n i  ion wake measurement 
(s-26) . 
S-10 Experiment. - The S-10 experiment i s  mounted on the TW for the 
G e m i n i  VI11 through the Gemini X missions and fo r  Gemini X I 1  (TDA IA, 3, 5 and 
7A, and on 'IDA 4 fo r  the A m ) .  This experiment i s  described i n  EXPERIMENT 
S-10 (AGENA MICROMETEORITE COr;r;EcTOR>, page 318. 
s-26 Experiment. - The s-26 experiment is mounted on the inside of the 
adapter structure on the G e m i n i  X and the G e m i n i  X I  missions (TIN IA, and 6). 
This experiment i s  described in MPERIMENT s-26 (GEMINI I O N  WAKE MEASUREMEXC), 
page 320. 
Special Instrumentation 
Temperature Sensors. - A l l  TDA missions had four temperature sensor skin- 
mounted around the circumference of the  TDA. The Gemini V I  (TDA 2)  and the  
Gemini V I I I  (TDA 3) missions had three additional sensors mounted on the TDA. 
On these lat ter missions, the three additional sensors were mounted i n   l i n e  
with one of t h e  other  four  sensors  to measure launch temperature. 
Accelerometers. - To measure acceleration during docking t h e  Gemini V I  
(TDA 2)  and t h e  Gemini V I 1 1  (TDA 3)  missions had three accelerometer/amplifier 
units,  one t o  measure longitudinal acceleration and two t o  measure lateral 
acceleration. 
Configuration Changes To TDA 7A For EVA Activity 
A .  A work s ta t ion  was added t o  t h e  back surface of the docking cone. 
This work station contained a torque wrench, a t e s t   b o l t ,   e l e c t r i c a l  discon- 
nects, and f l u i d  disconnects. 
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B. Four t e the r  attachment rings were added t o   t h e  l i p  of t he  docking 
C . Two handrails were added t o   t h e  TDA/shroud f a i r ing  mating ring. 
D. Sixteen chamfered holes were d r i l l ed   i n   t he  TDA skin and a pip-pin 
E. A receptacle was added t o  TDA cone f o r  an extendible handrail from 
F. Five pip-pins were stowed on the TDA cone. 
G. Two portable handholds were stowed on the  TIM cone. 
cone . 
attachment f i t t i n g  was i n s t a l l e d   i n  each hole. 
the spacecraft. 
Gemini/Agena Tether. - The TDA was modified f o r   t h e  Gemini X I  and X I 1  
missions by the addition bf a Dacron s t rap which served as a te ther .  One end 
of  the  white Dacron t e t h e r   l i n e  hooks t o  a redesigned TY damper a t t a c h e n t  
f i t t i n g  on the Agena docking cone. The other end loops over the Gemini docking 
bar. The te ther  is  stored on the  Agena target  docking adapter t o  permit i ts  
connection t o  successive spacecraft while docked. Deployment of the  te ther  
i s  accomplished automatically when the  Gemini i s  separated from the  Agena. 
The purpose of t he   t e the r  was t o  allow  the performance of extended 
station-keeping operations between the  Gemini and Agena vehicles. Such 
operations were performed by inducing an angular  velocity  about the common 
center-of-gravity of t he  system or  by uti l izing  gravity  gradient wi th  t h e  
Agena toward the earth.  Either method eliminated the possibil i ty of contact 
between the  two vehic les   o r   the i r   d r i f t ing   apar t .  
TDA Mission Performance Summary 
Gemini V I  Mission. - TDA 2, used for  t he  Gemini V I  mission, performed as 
specif ied  unt i l   the  anomaly occurred on t h e  Agena vehicle. 
Gemini V I 1 1  Mission. - TDA 3, used fo r  the Gemini V I 1 1  mission, per- 
formed as specified throughout the  l i f e  of t he  Agena Target Vehicle. One 
problem was encountered wi th  the  unrigidizing and la tch  reset   indicat ions on 
Agena telemetry. After the spacecraft had unrigidized and separated from the  
target vehicle during the spacecraft thruster anomaly, Agena telemetry indi- 
cated that the TDA was neither rigidized nor unrigidized. T/M also indicated 
tha t  the status display panel was on the BRIGIET sett ing,  which meant t ha t  
proper data regarding rigidizing should have been received. However, subse- 
quent debriefing proved that the panel was i n   t h e  DIM condition because the  
astronauts had not sent the BRIGHT comnd .  After the crew cycled the mooring- 
drive system with the status panel on the BRIGHT set t ing,  the  proper indica- 
t i o n  of l a t c h  reset was received. The Agena T/M indication was therefore 
anomalous and no changes were made t o   t h e  TDA as a result of this discrepant 
reading. 
The astronauts reported a blurring condition which at times made reading 
of the s ta tus  display panel  diff icul t .  Mission evaluation demonstrated, 
however, that t h i s  was an opt ical  problem caused by the  window configuration 
and was not   ascr ibable   to   e lectr ical  anomaly. 
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Gemini M Mission. - TDA 5,  
specified up through  the anomaly 
Gemini X Mission. - TIlA IA, 
specified. 
used on the  Gemini IX mission, performed as 
on the  Atlas vehicle. 
used on the Gemini X mission, performed as 
Gemini XI Mission. - TDA 6, used on the  Gemini X I  mission, performed 
normally except f o r  two anomalies. The transponder transmitter ourput began 
t o  degrade i n  the la t ter  stages of first rendezvous and later failed. This 
anomaly is  described in Spacecraft U, page 92. A t  t he  time of t h e  second 
undocking, an apparent mooring drive anomaly occurred. Post-separation 
telemetry data indicated that the  TDA la tches  had not reset. T h i s  was con- 
finned by crew observation of the DOCK l i gh t  on the GATV status panel. The 
crew transmitted the RF command to   unrigidize the  TIN, and t h e  proper reset 
indication was obtained on the status panel through telemetry data. An 
investigation  of data and an analysis of t he  system indicate that the   l a t ch  
actuator limit switch probably stopped after power interruption  but  before 
the actuation of the DOCK l i g h t  and the telemetry limit switch. The possi- 
b i l i t y  of the plunger's stopping consistently i n  t h i s  deadband region (approxi- 
mately 0.005 inch) was considered highly unlikely; there i s  therefore no 
danger of actuator damage and the proper status indications can be recovered. 
No corrective  action was consequently taken. 
Gemini X I 1  Mission. - TDA 7A, used on the  Gemini X I 1  mission, performed 
nomaji- transponder  transmitter anomaly on TIZA 6 reoccurred 
on TDA 7A. T h i s  a n o d y  is described i n  Spacecraft 12, page 92,. 
AU-ED TARGET DOCKING ADAPTm 
General 
The augmented t a rge t  docking adapter (ATDA) provides a target vehicle 
f o r  rendezvous and docking with the  Gemini Spacecraft when an Agena ta rge t  i s  
not available. The ATDA i s  launched in to  i ts  o rb i t  by the  Atlas standard 
launch  vehicle (SLV) . 
The ATDA consists of f ive major s t ructural  sect ions:  a launch shroud, 
a TIZA, an equipment section, a modified G e m i n i  Spacecraft re-entry control 
system (RCS), and a ba t te ry  module ( See Fig. 65 and 66). 
Launch Shroud. - The launch shroud f o r   t h e  ATDA i s  the  same as that used 
on the  Gemini Agena Target (GAT) Vehicle, except f o r  minor modifications t o  
accommodate the sl ightly different launch trajectory.  The shroud is jetti- 
soned two sec  prior t o  separation from the booster. 
TDA. - The TIlA used on the  augmented ta rge t  docking adapter i s  the same 
configuration as that used f o r   t h e  Gemini VI11 mission (TDA 3) ,  except that 
it has only four mutually independent temperature sensors mounted rad ia l ly  
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FIGURE 65 ATDA GENERAL ARRANGEMENT 
on t h e  adapter skin. Also the accelerometer and the amplifier sets were 
deleted and an ascent antenna i s  mounted on the docking cone. The docking 
cone approach l i gh t   c i r cu i t  i s  wired i n   s e r i e s   t o  reduce the voltage level. 
Equipment Section, - The equipment section is a ring-stiffened cylindrical 
shell which i s  semimonocoque at the  forward end (TDA)  and monocoque aft.  Two 
internal  I-beams, extending across the diameter of the cylinder and in te r -  
secting at right angles near the vehicle centerline, support the ATDA elec- 
t r i c a l  equipment. This equipment consists of f l i g h t  qualified components 
which are mounted and wired by approved methods. Space for various experi- 
m.nts is provided i n  t h e  forward end. (ATDA equipment locations are sham i n  
Fig. 67.) 
RCS Section. - The RCS section is  similar t o  that used i n  the Gemini 
Spacecraft re-entry control system, except that its operation is modified by 
the different functions of the  ATIIA sequence. The section i s  qualified by 
Gemini Spacecraft standards. 
Battery Section. - The battery section is of cross-beam construction and 
has individual compartments f o r  each of the  three primary ba t te r ies  and the  
two squib batteries. The section is  covered by a cylindrical  can which pro- 
t ec t s   t he  batteries and supports the separation system and t h e  separation 
guide rails. 
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FIGURE 67 AUGMENTED TARGET DOCKING ADAPTER EQUIPMENT 
Separation System 
The ATDA separation system consists of two par t s ,  (1) a f l ex ib l e   l i nea r  
shaped charge (FLSC) at the   i n t e r f ace  of t he  ATDA shell and the booster  
adapter shell, and (2) an eight preloaded bungee system which i s  f i x e d   t o  
the booster adapter portion of the FLSC ring structure. (See Fig. 68. ) 
ATDA Display System 
The display system provides f o r  visual acquisit ion,  indication, and 
monitoring of various ATDA functions. 
Acquisition and Docking Cone Lights. - The l i g h t s  are iden t i ca l   t o   t hose  
used on t h e  TDA f o r  the Gemini Agena Target Vehicle missions. The acquis i t ion 
l i gh t s   ob ta in   e l ec t r i ca l  power from the  ATDA common bus; t he  docking cone 
l i gh t s   ob ta in  power from t h e  ATDA main bus. 
Running Lights. - Six running l ight assemblies, two red, two green, and 
two amber, are mounted on t h e  ATM equipment s e c t i o n   t o  approximate the 
configuration used on t h e  GAT vehicle. 
Status Display Panel. - The ATDA s ta tus  display panel  i s  physically 
i d e n t i c a l   t o  t h e  panel used on t h e  TDA f o r   t h e  GAT missions and indicates  
only  the following functions: 
A. Dock s ta tus  l ight  (green)  indicates  that the  docking cone is  i n  t he  
B. Rigid status l ight  (green)  indicates  that t h e  docking cone is i n  the  
C. Amed status l i g h t  (amber) indicates that r ing  A of the re-entry 
D. ATT s ta tus  l igh t  (green)  ind ica tes  that 0 degree per sec rate control 
unrigidized  posit ion and that the  la tches  are rese t .  
r igidized  posi t ion.  
control system has been activated. 
has been se l ec t ed   i n  all three axes. 
Target Stabil ization System 
The t a rge t   s t ab i l i za t ion  system (TSS), i n  conjunction with the RCS, 
provides three axis rate s tabi l izat ion of  the ATDA. The TSS controls the ATDA 
t o  fixed turning rates about the pitch and roU. axes and to rate damping about 
the  yaw axis i n  the  biased rate damping mode. The TSS rate damps t he  ATDA 
about all three axes i n   t h e  normal rate damping mode. The rate damping charac- 
t e r i s t i c s   i n  the  biased rate  damping mode f o r   r o l l  are 2.2' + 0.5O/sec; f o r  
pitch,  1.8O + 0.25O/sec; and f o r  yaw, Oo + 0.25O/sec. I n  thz normal rate 
w i n g  mode-the character is t ics  for  rol l -are  0' + 0.50°/sec; f o r   p i t c h  and 
yaw they are Oo + .25'/sec. 
- - 
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Comunication System 
The comunication system consists of a tracking system, a telemetry 
system, a d i g i t a l  command system, and a rendezvous radar transponder system. 
The comunication system provides information, acquisition, and command l inks  
between the  spacecraft  and t h e  ATM, and between the ground and the ATDA. 
Tracking System. - The tracking system consists 0f.redundan-b C-band 
radar transponders and antennas. The transponder responds t o  the ground 
tracking radar s ta t ions  and either transponder can be energized by ground 
command v i a   t h e   d i g i t a l  command system. 
Telemetry System. - The ATDA telemetry system consists of two T/M t rans-  
mitters operating with two diplexers, three coaxial switches and three 
antennas t o  accomplish real-time T/M transmission t o  ground s ta t ions.  The 
components i n  the T/M system are energized by commands from the  digital .  
cammand system (DCS). 
Digital  Cormnand System. - The digital. command system provides a real- 
time command l ink  for   the  spacecraf t  and permits ground control of the ATDA. 
The command system consis ts  of a receiver-decoder unit and three  re lay  uni ts .  
Rendezvous Radar Transponder System. - The rendezvous radar transponder 
system is  i d e n t i c a l   t o  that used on the  GAT vehicle except that there i s  only 
a single comand capabili ty  in  both  hardline  l ink and RF link. 
Development And Qualification  Tests 
The development and qualification tests l isted i n  Table 36 apply a l so  t o  
the  TDA used on the  ATDA. In addition, the following tests were performed 
on t h i s  TDA. (TDA 4) Results were satisfactory.  
Structural  Development Test. - TR052-005.21 (determination of load 
relaxation of bungee cord) was i n s t i t u t ed   t o  determine the  work output capa- 
b i l i t y  of bungee cord after exposure t o  various temperatures and durations 
of sustained loading. 
Structural   Qual i f icat ion Tests. - TRO52-080.09 (SST vibration test  of 
the   s implif ied  target   vehicle  (ATDA) ) was run t o  demonstrate the  capabili ty 
of  the ATDA to  function  properly  during and after a normal launch  vibration 
test. 
Antenna Patterns.  - Antenna patterns were run at St.  Louis on the ATDA 
VHF antennas using a one-third scale mock-up. Patterns were a l s o  run at 
Cape  Kennedy  on the C-band antenna, using a full scale mock-up. Testing 
showed all antenna patterns t o  be  satisfactory  for  the  mission. 
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ATDA Mission Performance Sunrmary 
The ATDA was launched as the   t a rge t   vehic le   for  the.Gemini IXA mission 
after the  Agena Target Vehicle f o r  the Gemini IX mission failed t o  achieve 
orb i t .  
The ATDA w a s  placed  in a nearly  c i rcular  (161 nautical   mile)  orbit ,   but 
a shroud separation indication was not received. Examination by the  Gemini MA 
crew determined that the shroud had not  properly  eJected, and had failed t o  
expose the  docking cone of the  TDA. The shroud was pa r t ly  open but the for-  
ward band was held by the pyrotechnic wire bundle t o  each ign i te r .  The two 
halves of the  shroud were st i l l  at tached  to  the TRA by the  wire bundles between 
the shroud and the  docking adapter section of the TIM. The docking maneuver 
of t h e  Gemini IXA spacecraft with the ATDA w&s therefore  not  possible. 
I 
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